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My graduate education at the University of Michigan has been a journey from 
traditional history to quantitative history to social history.  Six and a half years ago, in 
January 2003, I arrived at the University of Michigan with a background in political and 
institutional history.  Interested in learning social and quantitative history, I entered the 
field of historical demography and enrolled in classes in social scientific and demographic 
methods.  I soon discovered, however, that in the post-modern era after the linguistic turn, 
most historians were no longer satisfied with numerical descriptions of social behavior.  
Instead, they sought the stories behind their quantitative results to elucidate the mentality 
and agency of historical actors.  Accordingly my graduate education also became a 
journey to develop solutions to integrate quantitative and qualitative methods and produce 
a more holistic understanding and history of human experience. 
Fortunately, the well-preserved archival sources in Shuangcheng enabled me to 
integrate quantitative and qualitative analyses and produce a textured history of land 
distribution.  Shuangcheng was established through the relocation of a state bannermen 
population in the early nineteenth century.  Upon their arrival, the state allocated land to 
official immigrants and tried to preserve its equal distribution within and unequal 
distribution between state-designated population categories.  At the same time, in the 
century from 1815 to 1913, local practices also interacted with state policies to bring forth 
changes in both policy and local society.  Although the distribution of landed wealth is 
 iv
considered an important topic in Chinese history and history in general, due to the lack of 
individual plot data, especially longitudinal and intergenerational wealth data, few studies 
anywhere have explored individual and household-level land distribution for entire 
communities or higher levels of administrative aggregation, especially over time.  In my 
dissertation, I can do so and describe not only the pattern of distribution per se, but also the 
state policies and local practices that produced and maintained this pattern. 
I commenced my project by analyzing the socio-demographic data generated from the 
Qing banner population registers for Shuangcheng.  The Qing banner population registers 
in Shuangcheng were compiled annually between 1866 and 1912 as part of the local 
government archives.  My professors, James Lee and Cameron Campbell, had already 
located and acquired the microfilm version of these voluminous registers from the 
Genealogy Society of Utah and recruited me to this project.  In the summer of 2003, under 
their direction, I went through these microfilms and compiled, in longitudinal order, the 
lists of registers which need be entered first.  In the winter of 2004, they began to code 
these data with the data coders in the Lee-Campbell research group: Sun Huicheng and 
Jiyang.  In a fall 2004 research seminar with Professor Myron Gutmann, relying on their 
initial data transcriptions of 231,392 observations of 19,240 individuals, I wrote my first 
research paper on mortality in the Shuangcheng banner population.  In 2005, I further 
developed these research results into my first conference presentation to the IUSSP 
Conference on Vulnerable Populations where I identified distinctive mortality patterns 
between the two categories of immigrant populations: metropolitan and rural bannermen.  
And this presentation in turn became my first English language publication, albeit in a 
French journal (Chen, Campbell, and Lee 2006).   
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At the same time, beginning in the summer of 2004 with support from the 
Department of History, the International Institute, and the Rackham Graduate School at 
the University of Michigan, I started to collect qualitative sources on Shuangcheng and 
encountered a sea of alternate materials.  I first visited the First Historical Archives in 
Beijing, where I found court memorials archived in the collection of the Grand Council or 
Junjichu lufu zouzhe, which thoroughly documented the early history of the Shuangcheng 
state farm from the initial policy discussion to relocation and settlement from the central 
government’s perspective.  Then, in the Liaoning Provincial Archives in Shenyang, the 
large collection of Shuangchengpu Zongguan Yamen Dang'an, or Shuangcheng banner 
government archives, provided me with rich information of the later development of 
Shuangcheng society.  With 1,555 volumes of documents dating from 1850 to 1924, this 
archival collection not only included communications between local and provincial 
government on policy implementation, fiscal reports, taxation files, and routine 
administrative paperwork, but also contained voluminous legal cases with rich information 
on local practices of land transaction, land rental, marriage, commercial activities, and etc.   
In the summer of 2005, this time with support from the Center for Chinese Studies, I 
visited in addition to the First Historical Archives and Liaoning Provincial Archives, the 
Shuangcheng City Archives with my advisor, James Lee, and located not only the 
Shuangchengpu Xieling Yamen Dang’an (30,064 items), which is from the same 
government archive as the Shuangchengpu Zongguan Yamen Dang’an, but also the 
archives of the civilian local government (9,623 documents between 1882 and 1912).  
Since then, I worked intensively on these archival sources to explore the history of 
Shuangcheng.   
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These central and local government archival documents, with their rich information 
on historical context, provided important alternate insight into the population and land data.  
Beginning in May 2006, I initiated the data transcription, cleaning, and processing of the 
land data from four registers—compiled in 1870, 1876, 1887, and 1889—of the Bordered 
Yellow banner and linked them to the banner population registers most by machine and 
the remainder by hand.  In the summer of 2006, I was therefore able to make a 
preliminary analysis of land distribution among the metropolitan bannermen in the 
Bordered Yellow banner.  The results revealed a surprisingly equal land distribution 
which I described in 2007 and 2008 panel presentations at the annual meetings of the 
Social Science History Association.  To investigate why the pattern of land distribution 
was so equal, I began to examine the institution that organized the land and population 
registers.  I especially paid attention to official communications on policy implementation 
and legal cases regarding land disputes.  Through close reading of the legal cases, I 
identified local practices that were not documented by the official paperwork and 
discovered that in Shuangcheng the unit of state land allocation was the household.  
Although the actual residential arrangements of household members varied, the 
government allocated land to all registered household units equally.  Excited by these 
discoveries, I continued to explore social and economic organization in Shuangcheng.  
While the quantitative data generated the large picture, the qualitative materials fleshed out 
the mentality of the policy makers and local actors that directed their behaviors.  
Quantitative and qualitative methods and data, in other words, complemented each other to 
provide me with a holistic view of state land allocation and local practices of land 
accumulation and transfer.   
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Archival researches, moreover, also facilitated data transcription and linking.  Until 
2007, I had thought that the population data available for longitudinal analysis began in 
1870, since an 1870 reform in Shuangcheng administration had renamed all banner 
villages, making it difficult to link populations before 1870.  In the spring of 2007, based 
on archival studies and with the help of Sun Huicheng, I was able to link the Shuangcheng 
banner villages before and after 1870.  This advancement enabled the extension of the 
longitudinal population dataset back to 1866.  
During this mutual process of archival study and data analysis, the collective efforts of 
data acquisition and entry by James Lee, Cameron Campbell, Sun Huicheng, and Jiyang in 
the Lee-Campbell research group and the Asia Library of the University of Michigan made 
much of my research possible.  In 2006, Michael Meng at the Asia Library generously 
purchased the microfilms of Shuangchengpu Zongguan Yamen Dang’an, which James and 
I hand carried back to the United States in separate trips.  Beginning in September 2006, 
Sun Huicheng entered the remaining land registers.  In August 2007, the major work of 
data entry was completed, generating a total population dataset of 1,346,829 observations 
of 108,100 individuals and a total land dataset of 19,609 records of 13,155 land owners, 
most of which I linked to the banner population registers by machine and the remainder, 
with Sun Huicheng’s help, by hand.   
In the summer of 2007, with support from professors James Lee and Cameron 
Campbell’s research grants, I visited Shuangcheng City Archives for the second time.  
This time, in addition to the Qing dynasty archives, I also explored the Republican 
government archive, or Shuangcheng xian gongshu dang’an (10,033 items between 
1912-1932), and the registration of land acreage and population class classification 
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compiled at the time of the 1947 land reform.  The documents in these two collections 
revealed the persistence of the social structures and tensions created by the Qing 
government to the eve of the land reform.  
In addition to the distribution of landed wealth, I also explored other aspects of social 
life in Shuangcheng.  In January 2007, I analyzed institutional, household, and individual 
influences on the timing of first marriage for metropolitan and rural bannermen and 
presented my findings at “the International Conference on Marriage and Family” in Seoul, 
South Korea.  The results for first marriage timing revealed distinct patterns for the two 
population categories, as had my analysis of mortality; men of metropolitan bannermen 
were more likely to marry than were those of rural bannermen, while women of 
metropolitan bannermen married later than their rural banner counterparts.  This finding 
supported previous understandings of marriage behavior in China: male hypogamy and 
female hypergamy resulted in greater chances of marriage for men with higher social status, 
and late marriage for women with higher social status.  This study was also the first 
quantitative analysis of the determinants of female first marriage for a late imperial 
Chinese population.  In the summer of 2007, working with Professors Cameron Campbell 
and James Lee, I extended the analysis to include both banner population in Shuangcheng 
and the banner peasants of the Imperial Household Agency in Liaoning, the latter dataset 
consisting of 1.4 million observations of one-quarter million people.  This paper will be 
the China country chapter of the Eurasia Project’s comparative volume on marriage and 
remarriage in Europe and Asia in the past, and was presented at the Population Association 
of America’s session “Family Change in Historical Perspective,” in New Orleans in 2008 
(Chen, Campbell, and Lee 2008). 
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As my understanding of the history of Shuangcheng deepened, I also confronted the 
question of framing: what was the meaning of the history of Shuangcheng and the patterns 
of land distribution in this society to the large picture of Chinese history and society.  
Compared to the rural Chinese societies studied by other scholars in North China, the 
Yangzi delta, and Guanzhong (Huang 1985, 1990; Qin and Su 1996), the institutional 
setting and frontier environment of Shuangcheng was unusual.  First, established by the 
state under the Eight Banners, Shuangcheng was highly institutionalized, and metropolitan 
and rural bannermen were well supported by the state land.  Moreover, the abundant 
Northeast frontier land in Shuangcheng created a low labor-land ratio which was 
uncommon compared to other parts of China.  Professor James Lee provided me with a 
comparative perspective and pointed out that state institutions in Shuangcheng had 
numerous precedents in Chinese history and, moreover, an enduring legacy in the present 
day.  Using resource allocation to classify populations and structure the society was a 
typical practice of the Chinese state.  In our numerous conversations, we placed the case 
of Shuangcheng in its historical context and compared it with similar institutions in 
Chinese history.  Shuangcheng society, in other words, despite its unusual geographical 
and institutional context, represented one historical continuity in China’s long history of 
state practice.  As I show in my dissertation, although the meaning of population 
categories and the institutions that classified populations changed with political regimes 
and their contexts, such practices persisted through Chinese history. 
----- 
 
This study could not have been accomplished without the constant support of my 
teachers, colleagues, friends, and families, to whom I am grateful.  I first would like to 
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express my gratitude to my advisor and mentor James Lee, a passionate, dedicated, and 
caring advisor.  He provided me with my topic and much of my serial data as well as 
unfailing encouragement and intellectual support throughout the process of data analysis, 
dissertation framing, narrative construction, writing, and rewriting.  When I was 
overwhelmed by the fascinating stories and details in the archives, James constantly 
reminded me to focus not on the trees but on the forest.  I benefitted from his teaching not 
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methodologies and Chinese history.  In my transformation from a traditional historian to a 
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I am also indebted to the other advisors in my committee: Professors Cameron 
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Weights and Measures 
 
The following are the conversions of weights and measures used in Shuangcheng: 
 
1 li = 576 meters = 0.58 kilometers 
 
1 shang = 1.84 hectares 
 
1 market shi = 4 imperial shi = 320.75 kilograms 
 




People’s age is measured by sui. An infant is counted as one sui at birth and two sui at 
age one.   
According to the Qing government standard, the age range for adult male in Shuangcheng 




I use Liaoning to refer to the Qing dynasty Fengtian, the present day Liaoning Province.   
 
 




baimu zhi tian  百亩之田 
bajia junfen  八家均分 
bangding  帮丁 
baojia  保甲 
baqianshang  八千晌 
bendi qiren  本地旗人 
bitieshi  笔帖式 
booi  包衣 
bu  步 
bu zai ce fuding  不在册浮丁 
bubing  步兵 
buzhengshi  布政使 
buzhi quxiang  不知去向 
cangguan  仓官 
cangwu bitieshi  仓务笔帖式 
chengding  成丁 
chengzhong jingqi di fuding  承种京旗
地浮丁 
chi  尺 
chipin  赤贫 
Daxue yanyi bu  大学衍义补 
dian  典 
dilin  地邻 
ding  丁 
dingque  丁缺 
enque  恩缺 
fangyu  防御 
fengdui  封堆 
fu dutong  副都统 
fubing  府兵 
fuding  浮丁 
fuding buzhun lingdi  浮丁不准领地 
fuduo  浮多 
gongcang  公仓 
gongque  公缺 
gongtian  公田 
gongzu  公租 
guodan  过单 
hanjun  汉军 
hanren  汉人 
hengchan  恒产 
Hengchan fuduo  恒产浮多 
ji pin  极贫 
ji ru  寄入 
jia wu chanye nian yi cheng ding zhi 
xiansan  家无产业年已成丁之闲散 
jiala  甲喇 
jiangjun  将军 
jiao guan ling ding buchong 交官另丁
补充 
jichan  己产 
jie ming bao guan, yi bei shu zu  借名
报官，以备输租 
jikou shoutian  计口授田 
jiming  记名 
jingqi  京旗 
jingqi yi  京旗翼 
jingshi (statecraft)  经世 
jingtian  井田 
jingyan  经筵   
jingzhi ce  经制册 
jinshi  进士 
jun  郡 
juntian  均田 
juntun  军屯 
li  里 
liangzhang  粮长 




liji  礼记 
lingcui  领催 
linghu  另户 
liumin  流民 
maohuang  毛荒 
menfa  门阀 
mingtian  名田 
minren  民人 
mu  亩 
muzhang  牧长 
nanren  南人 
nazu  纳租 
neiwufu  内务府 
nianli jingzhuang kanneng wunong  年
力精壮，勘能务农 
niru  牛录 
paoma zhanshan  跑马占山 
pijia  披甲 
pin  贫 
qianfeng  前锋 
qidian  旗佃 
qiduwei  骑都尉 
qingfu fanghuang zongju  清赋放荒总
局 
qiwu chengban chu  旗务承办处 
quechu  缺出 
ruding chenming  入丁陈民 
Sanxing  三姓 
sanwangshang  三万晌 
semu  色目 
shang  晌 
shao you yang shan  稍有养赡 
shengyuan  生员 
shi  石 
shijia zhang  十家长 
shipu  世仆 
shoutian  授田 
Shuangcheng  双城 
sitian  私田 
suique  随缺 
suique di  随缺地 
taiqi  抬旗 
tongtun tongju  同屯同犋 
tun  屯 
tunda  屯达 
tunding  屯丁 
tuntian  屯田 
wei xiaoqi xiao  委骁骑校 
wei xieling  委协领 
wei zuoling  委佐领 
wopeng  窝棚 
wumu zhi zhai  五亩之宅 
xian  县 
xiansan  闲散 
xiaoqixiao  骁骑校 
xieling  协领 
yamen  衙门 
yangshan  养赡 
yangyubing  养育兵 
yicang  义仓 
yihu  一户 
yinhu   隐户 
yinjian  引见 
yiren buzhun chengling liangfen dingque  
一人不准承领两份丁缺 
youding  幼丁 
yusui  逾岁 
zhantian  占田 
zhaofei qian 照费钱 
zhaozhang jian de  照章拣得 
zhengding  正丁 
zhengshen qiren  正身旗人 
zhishen buzhun suan hu  只身不准算
户 
zhushi  主事 
ziken  滋垦 
zong tunda  总屯达 
zongguan  总管 
zongzu  宗族 
zu  族  






In this dissertation, I study the implications for patterns of equality and inequality of a 
common state practice in Chinese history, the creation of population categories with 
differentiated entitlement rights, using a well-documented example.  In 1815, in response 
to the fiscal challenge of supporting bannermen, an elite population who depended on state 
stipends for their livelihoods, the court established a state farm in Shuangcheng in 
Northeast China, planning to relocate metropolitan bannermen from Beijing there to 
become farmers.  The court also relocated rural bannermen from other parts of Northeast 
China to Shuangcheng to help the metropolitan bannermen adapt to the rural environment.  
Eventually, 3,000 rural and 698 metropolitan banner households resettled in the 120 
banner villages in Shuangcheng, living off the land allocated by the state.  The state 
divided these official immigrants and other unofficial immigrants to this area into four 
population categories with differentiated entitlements to land: metropolitan and rural 
bannermen as the haves and floating bannermen and civilian commoners as the have-nots. 
I demonstrate the implications for inequality of the interplay of state land allocation 
policies based on population category and local land acquisition practices by analyzing 
longitudinal individual-level population data, household-level landholding data, and 
qualitative documents from central and local archives.  The state’s land allocation policies 
maintained inequality between categories and promoted equality within them: 
metropolitan bannermen had twice as much land as rural bannermen, while floating 




Despite the persistence of various local practices of land accumulation, transaction, and 
inheritance, the data demonstrate enduring between-category inequalities and 
within-category equalities among the majority of the population in Shuangcheng from 
1870 to 1912.  Moreover, tensions built into the unequal distribution of land transformed 
administrative categories into distinct social groups that transcended individual and polity.  
By documenting this instance of the state’s creation of population categories through the 
allocation of land and contextualizing it in Chinese history more broadly, this study shows 
the salience of within-category equalities and between-category inequalities created by 







Part One  Categorical Equality and Durable Inequality 
Chapter I    
State Categories and Durable Inequality 
  
Five days after the Chinese New Year in 1824, a procession of 53 wagons started their 
journey from Beijing, the Qing capital city, to Shuangcheng, a state farm established in 
1815 in the northeastern frontier.  In these wagons rode a total of 187 people from 53 
households: 60 men, 54 women, and 72 children.1  Descended from the conquest elite 
called bannermen who had conquered and settled in Beijing in the middle of the 
seventeenth century (Han 1987), these families were returning to the rural northeast many 
generations later, lured by the promise of economic rewards.  Abandoning the relative 
ease of city life, they had little knowledge about either their itinerary or destination, for the 
government had arranged everything.  All they knew was that they were returning to the 
remote homeland of their ancestors, where fertile land, clean and spacious houses, and 
assistance to farm the land awaited them. 
These 53 metropolitan banner households were the first Beijing pioneers to settle in 
Shuangcheng, but others soon followed. In the next three decades, another 643 
metropolitan banner households arrived in Shuangcheng.  There they joined 3,000 
households of rural bannermen from Liaoning and Jilin who had settled between 1815 and 
1820 to assist the metropolitan bannermen, a large population of floating bannermen, who 
                                                        




had begun to arrive in the early nineteenth century, and an increasing number of civilian 
commoners.   
By the 1860s a total of 5,300 households had settled in Shuangcheng, establishing a 
rural society divided into two segments: the haves – metropolitan (jingqi) and rural 
bannermen (tunding), who were supported by the state with land grants – and the have-nots, 
floating bannermen (fuding) and commoners (minren), who were excluded from state land 
allocations.2  Among the haves, the metropolitan bannermen were the top elite, with land 
grants twice the size of those allocated to rural bannermen.  These asymmetrical 
entitlements continued until 1906, by which time Shuangcheng had become a county with 
more than 60,000 households and 440,000 people.3  Moreover, the legacy of this social 
segmentation persisted far beyond the fall of the Qing in 1912. 
In this dissertation, I reconstruct the settlement history and the subsequent land 
distribution in Shuangcheng to explore how inequality and equality were structured in 
historical China.  Social stratification in contemporary China has been a hotly-studied 
topic in recent years.  However, scholars seldom recognize the institutional connection 
between contemporary and historical social stratification.  Scholars of contemporary 
China often identify two contradictory characteristics of the socialist system between 1950 
and 1980: on one hand, the egalitarian distribution of material wealth within categories and, 
on the other, inequality between state-created categories.  In his work on social 
                                                        
2 The number of household is summarized from banner population registers and archival documents on the 
baojia system.  Among the 5,300 households residing in Shuangcheng, 473 of them were headed by 
metropolitan bannermen, 3,000 were headed by rural bannermen, and 1,876 of them were headed by either 
bannermen or civilian commoners organized under the baojia system. 
3 See SCXZ (1990) p. 829.  The data on the number of households and population are based on 1910 
population information.  Compared to that of 1860, the number of household and population in 1910 
significantly increased because the administrative area of Shuangcheng had expanded in 1882, which 
included both the previous Shuangcheng and Lalin.  The population increase is also partly due to 




stratification in post-socialist China, Wang Feng commented on these two characteristics: 
    “During no other period in its history did China pursue equality more 
rigorously than in the three decades between 1950 and 1980.  With a socialist 
experiment, China transformed itself into one of the most egalitarian societies in 
the world in no more than a decade’s time.  The internal logic of the very same 
social system, however, also dictated the creation of new social categories as the 
basis of economic and social organization.” (Wang 2008) 
 
While this is a salient point, the egalitarian but segmented distribution of wealth, 
characterized by Wang as a socialist innovation, is actually a variation on a practice that 
existed in Chinese history for more than two millennia: the state’s classification of its 
population into distinct categories, corresponding to differential entitlements to material 
wealth.  The Shuangcheng state farm is an example of such an institution.  By creating 
four different categories of population – metropolitan, rural, floating, and civilian –the 
Qing state established differential entitlements to landed wealth and simultaneously 
distributed land equally within each population category.  Through these arrangements, 
the Qing state built, maintained, and sustained a social hierarchy and an institutional 
context that persisted until the twentieth century, not just in Shuangcheng, but in many 
areas and populations in China.  Despite a century of continuous social revolution and 
economic reform, the legacy of this institution continues today. 
 
Political systems and wealth stratification 
In human history, inequality has existed in different forms and at different levels, and 
scholars have long established that patterns of social stratification are closely associated 
with political systems and culture (Lane 1987; Kerbo 2000; Ebert and Zavarzadeh 2008). 
Regarding the dynamics of inequality in different cultures, Western societies and China 




systems and traditions. Western societies are characterized by material inequality within a 
democratic political tradition, while China is characterized by the equal distribution of 
material wealth under autocracy.  This contrast in political system and wealth distribution 
between the West and China is still evident in the present day, even though the distribution 
of wealth in the West is more egalitarian now than in the feudal age and inequality in China 
has grown since 1979.4   
In the early history of the West, the monarch and nobility owned the majority of 
landed wealth, and, during the transition from feudalism to capitalism, more and more land 
became the private property of the nobility (North 1973).  At the same time, the 
institutionalization of democracy emphasized the impartibility of private property and 
enlisted state power to protect it (Moore 1966; North 1973).  This transition, therefore, 
resulted in the concentration of landed wealth in the hands of merchant groups and the 
former noble class.  Only in the nineteenth century, when the development of capitalism 
significantly increased total wealth, did wealth distribution become less concentrated.  
In contrast to the triumph of private land ownership in western societies, state land 
ownership prevailed in China as a major land system along with an early version of 
privatization (Hou 1954; Li 1957).  Both an early emergence of private land ownership 
and the intervention of political power into economic rights characterized the land system 
in historical China.  As early as the fifth century B.C., the state allowed private land 
transactions, which indicated that landowners had acquired economic rights on their landed 
                                                        
4 In the West, the redistributive force generated by the development of capitalism and the welfare state has 
equalized the wealth distribution in the last one and a half centuries, while China is experiencing increasing 
inequality since the onset of economic reform in the late 1970s.  However, at the turn of the twenty-first 
century, in such Western countries as United Kingdom, Sweden, and United States, the top 10 percent of 
households possessed more than half of the total wealth,4 while in China the top 10 percent of individuals 
only owned around 30 percent of total wealth (Li and Zhao 2007).  This contrast between Western 





property.  At the same time, however, political power dominated economic rights (Yang 
1990).  Emperors, in the name of the state, possessed the power to take land away from 
owners and redistribute it.  Land owners thus only had incomplete rights to their property.  
This dualism in Chinese land system created difficulty for scholars in distinguishing 
private from state land ownership.5  Before the eighth century, the state did not collect tax 
on land, but levied a poll tax and labor service from commoners.  This tax system was 
built on the basis of state land ownership; the state owned land and allocated it to 
commoners, and, in return, commoners paid their levies to the state.  Therefore, despite 
the existence of private land transactions, state ownership was the major land system.  In 
780, the tax reform of the Tang state introduced the principle of tax collection based on 
household land and property and therefore marked the onset of the transition of land 
ownership from state to private (Woodside 2006).  This transition continued in the 
following dynasties and was finally completed in the mid-eighteenth century, when the 
Qing state began to collect taxes exclusively on land.  However, despite the growing 
importance of private ownership, the state still owned a larger proportion of land in the 
form of imperial and state farms (Chen 2007b).  After 1949, state land ownership, again, 
became the major land system in post-revolutionary China. 
The persistence of state land ownership went hand in hand with the autocratic political 
system that developed over China’s long history, from the emergence of the first Chinese 
                                                        
5 Due to their different interpretation of the early emergence of private land transaction and political 
domination in economic rights, scholars have an especially hot debate on the nature of land ownership 
systems during the Qin and Han period (approximately 221 B.C.-220 A.D.).  Three competing opinions 
exist: 1) state land ownership was the dominant form (Hou 1954; Li 1957; He 1956; Yang 1995; Fu 1982; 
Zhang 2004); 2) private land ownership was the major form (Hu 1957; Hou 1957; Tian 1960; Zhang 1995; 
Lin 1981; Zhao and Chen 1982; Zhang 1983); 3) state and private land ownership coexisted in this period, 
but private land ownership was the major type (Jiang 1957).  Despite these diverging opinions, scholars 
generally agree on the existence of the dualism of the Chinese land system.  Here I follow the point of 




emperor in 221 B.C. to the present day.  Since the third century B.C., China’s autocratic 
political system has been marked by a well-developed centralized bureaucracy, which 
managed to govern a vast territory for more than two millennia.  This long history of unity 
not only generated a refined bureaucratic system, but also established centralization as the 
norm.  The autocratic nature of the Chinese state legitimized the emperor’s absolute 
power and his ultimate control of land.  Therefore, although during periods when the 
central government was weak, land became increasingly concentrated in the hands of large 
landlords and political elites, the ultimate nature of the state’s relationship to land 
ownership was never in question, and eventually, the Chinese state was always able to 
reinstate its ownership rights (He 1956, 1958). 
The case of Shuangcheng exemplifies the state’s ability to maintain control over land 
even in a period when the power of the central government was on the wane.  The 
Shuangcheng state farm was established in the twilight years of the Qing Empire in the late 
eighteenth century.  From 1815 to 1906, despite internal rebellions and foreign invasions 
that seriously weakened the power of the central government, the Qing state succeeded in 
maintaining banner land ownership in Shuangcheng.  Even after 1906, when land 
ownership in the state farm changed from the state to private, the legacy of state control 
still produced a stable land ownership regime for bannermen. 
This study of Shuangcheng also highlights the Chinese state’s tradition of maintaining 
an equal distribution of land across the population in general and especially within 
population categories.  In Shuangcheng, the state not only allocated land equally among 
metropolitan and rural bannermen, but also developed systems to prevent future land 




equal wealth distribution which had been practiced in China for two millennia (Woodside 
2006).  While the egalitarian distribution of wealth had emerged as an influential ideal in 
political thought as early as the fifth century B.C., institutions that implemented an equal 
distribution actually dated back to the eleventh century B.C.  Following this traditional 
practice, Chinese emperors constantly restricted the concentration of wealth in rich 
families through taxation and, when necessary, the coercive deprivation of property.  At 
the same time, as early as the third century, the Chinese state developed a granary system to 
balance harvest fluctuations and relieve famines and disasters (Will and Wong with Lee 
1991).6  Moreover, such local social organizations as lineages and households also 
followed the same model to collectively allocate resources to their members (Campbell 
and Lee 2006, 2008; Faure 2007; Lee and Wang 1999).   
Hitherto, despite the officially-proclaimed state and local procedures to prevent 
wealth concentration in China, the lack of empirical data on landholding largely restricted 
our understanding of their operation under the autocratic system.  In previous national 
level studies of the distribution of landed wealth in China, scholars have generally agreed 
that land distribution underwent a ‘dynastic cycle;’ at the beginning of each dynasty, the 
state was able to maintain relative equality, while, by the end of each dynasty, land became 
increasingly concentrated, marking the decline of state power (He 1956, 1958).  Chinese 
scholars, preoccupied with the egalitarian distribution of wealth, often focus on the 
historical periods and regions with concentrated land distributions, and therefore dispute 
the significance of earlier egalitarian wealth distribution, instead describing historical 
                                                        
6 According to Pierre-Etienne Will and R. Bin Wong, the earliest granary that bore the function of 




China as a country with a high level of inequality.7  Moreover, although some scholars 
have managed to construct a picture of relatively equal land distribution in local 
communities (Huang 1985; Qin and Su 1996), the lack of longitudinal and household-level 
data often yields fragmented views (Esherick 1981).  
In this dissertation, I use empirical data on land distribution in Shuangcheng to 
demonstrate that the state effectively maintained a relatively equal land distribution 
through the institution of population categories.  I study Shuangcheng because the unusual 
completeness of historical sources allows me to explore the state institution of population 
categories from the perspective of both state regulations and local practices.  To do so, I 
integrate quantitative and qualitative approaches to analyze two types of data drawn from 
central, provincial, and county archives: one a longitudinal individual-level household and 
land dataset for 108,100 individuals in 120 villages, mainly suitable for quantitative 
analysis; the other being the edicts, court memorials, local government administrative 
documents, lawsuits, and petitions which survive in various archives, all of which are 
mainly suitable for qualitative analysis.  The two types of sources complement one 
another to provide a long-term view of state policy and local practice from 1815 to 1913, 
consisting of the state’s official language of egalitarianism in wealth distribution, its 
operation in local society, and the actual distribution of land under the interaction of state 
policy and local practice.   
Throughout the period under study, land distribution in Shuangcheng exhibited a 
                                                        
7 There are many such studies and they represent the main trend of studies on land distribution in historical 
China.  For example, scholars generally consider the Song dynasty as a period with high level of land 
concentration (Wang 1996; Jian 1983), with large landlords and political elites accounting for two thirds of 
registered land ownership (Yang 1957) or even more (Li 1957).  Another period with a high level of land 
concentration, which many scholars have studied, is the Ming dynasty.  In fact, in almost every currently 
available general history of China, scholars described land amalgamation as a salient problem for almost all 




pattern of categorical equality and inequality.  Metropolitan and rural bannermen owned 
the majority of registered farmland in Shuangcheng.  Civilian commoners and a limited 
number of floating bannermen could only officially own land by working as state tenants.  
While, in general, metropolitan bannermen owned more land than rural bannermen, land 
distribution within each category was relatively equal.  Moreover, among the haves, state 
policy was especially effective in keeping the proportions of both the landless and the 
wealthy landed low. 
 
Categorical equality and inequality 
Categorical distinctions – those that classify populations into separate groups along 
various axes of difference – are an important source of inequality.  In his seminal work on 
categorical inequality, Charles Tilly pointed out that inequalities arising from categorical 
differences are usually the largest and most significant social inequalities (1998).  In 
contemporary societies, there are two types of inequality, continuous and categorical.  
Continuous inequality is usually caused by acquired individual attributes that range along a 
scale from low to high – for example, education or income.  This type of inequality is open, 
fluid, and easy to change.  Categorical inequality, however, corresponds to ascriptive 
categories—such as black/white, male/female, and citizen/non-citizen—and is structured 
by boundaries that are hard, if not impossible, to cross.  In many societies, categorical 
inequalities interact with continuous inequalities to become ‘durable’ inequalities. 
Tilly’s theoretical framework, however, fails to account for an important set of 
categorical inequalities: those created by the state.  Drawing from western experience, 




In Tilly’s framework, society is the principal actor that differentiates these categories and 
creates inequalities.  However, in historical China, despite the existence of the above 
social categories, the population categories created by the state have comprised the most 
important source of inequality.  The Chinese state was famous for its ability to divide the 
population into categories marked by differential obligations and privileges.  In practice, 
the state could choose any ascriptive characteristics (e.g. ethnicity and work unit affiliation) 
as criteria to classify population.  For example, in the Yuan dynasty (1271-1368), the state 
classified the population into four ethnic categories –Mongol, Central Asian (semu), Han 
people (hanren), and Southerners (nanren) –and implemented policies to distinguish their 
political rights (Meng 1980).  Under the socialist regime, the Chinese state elaborated the 
institution of population categories and expanded it to the national level.  Not only did the 
urban/rural division mark fundamental differences in resource allocation, but income was 
also unevenly distributed between the various work units in urban areas (Wu 2002; Wang 
2008).  By differentiating privileges and obligations, the state created different political, 
social, and economic meanings to different ascriptive groups. 
The Shuangcheng state farm was founded on the state institution of population 
categories.  The state distinguished members of the Shuangcheng population by their 
eligibility to immigrate, banner affiliation, and place of origin, thereby differentiating 
immigrants’ entitlement to land grants.  Metropolitan and rural bannermen were the haves 
because they moved into the area at the behest of the state and with its support, while 
floating bannermen and civilian commoners were the have-nots because they were 
unofficial immigrants who came on their own.  Among the have-nots, floating bannermen 




Moreover, among the haves, more land was allocated to metropolitan bannermen because 
they were jingqi from Beijing, and rural bannermen were given less because they were 
tunding from the Northeast. 
 While the western concept of categories often essentializes the boundaries between 
categories and the population in each category,8 in China, the definition and membership 
of the state-created categories often change with political regimes and policy.  In Chinese 
history, although some sorts of categories persisted that differentiate the privileged group 
from the rest of the population, the boundaries of these categories and the content of the 
privileged population were redefined in each dynasty, as the composition of elite changed.  
For example, in his study on the emergence of local militarization in the nineteenth century, 
Philip Kuhn reveals the continuity of the militia system in historical China and implied that 
the Chinese state persistently organized a special population category under the militia 
system to ensure the supply of military force (Kuhn 1980).  However, the population 
organized by these militia systems varied from dynasty to dynasty.  Therefore, in China, 
the boundaries and contents of population categories are in fact mutable. 
Due to this mutability of state-created categories in China, inequalities generated by 
these categories were not durable.  The elite groups in one dynasty could be commoners in 
the other.  Therefore, the entitlement the state assigned to population groups is often more 
important than the membership of any category per se.  Moreover, since the entitlement 
assigned to population categories were so important, virtually all boundaries between 
categories in China, including both state-created ones and socially formed ones, eventually 
                                                        
8 Dorothy Solinger’s study on the rural migrant workers in China is one example of such essentialization of 
boundaries between population categories (1999).  In her work, Solinger powerfully analyzed the social 
consequences of urban-rural division in China and the disadvantaged situation of rural migrant workers.  
However, in this study, she paralleled this urban-rural division with the division of citizen and non-citizen 




became porous.  For example, the incorporation of the Khitan and Jurchen ethnic groups 
into Han-Chinese during the thirteenth century well illustrates how changes in the contents 
of state categories lead to changes in ethnic composition.  Khitan and Jurchen were 
respectively the ruling ethnic groups of the two conquest dynasties, the Liao (916-1125) 
and the Jin (1115-1234).  Under their regimes, Khitan and Jurchen respectively enjoyed 
political and economic privileges as conquest elites, which distinguished them from the 
Han-Chinese.9  However, after the Mongols conquered North China in 1234, the glories 
of Khitan and Jurchen faded away.  The Mongol ruler classified all ethnic groups in North 
China, including Han-Chinese, Khitan, and Jurchen, into the category of “Han people 
(hanren),” equalizing their political rights.  The Mongols’ creation of “Han people” 
politically eliminated the boundaries between the categories of Khitan, Jurchen, and Han 
created by former dynasties.  This policy change, together with the frequent interactions 
and acculturation between the three ethnicities, eventually led to the assimilation of Khitan 
and Jurchen ethnic groups.   
Yet, in historical China, some state-created categories did generate durable 
consequences.  For example, in his study on the Qing Eight Banner system, Mark Elliott 
explores the formation of banner identity and Manchu ethnicity as a result of the state 
institution of Eight Banners, which maintained the bannermen as the conquest elites 
(Elliott 2001).  In my study on land distribution in Shuangcheng, I similarly argue that 
patterns of inequality and equality created by state categories are much more durable than 
previously understood, demonstrated by the fact that categorical inequality and equality in 
                                                        
9 The Liao dynasty governed the Khitan and Han-Chinese separately.  As the ruling ethnicity, the Khitan 
enjoyed greater access to official positions than the Han-Chinese.  In the Jin dynasty, the ruling ethnicity 
Jurchen also enjoyed political and economic privileges (Liu 1996a).  The rulers moved the Jurchen 
population into North China and organized then into a special military organization called tuntian jun.  
Moreover, to support the Jurchen population, the Jin rulers occupied a large amount of land in North China 




Shuangcheng persisted after the fall of the Qing. 
These state categories became durable because the corresponding institutions 
continuously enforced both between-category inequality and within-category equality and 
thereby turned the loosely bound population categories into political, social, and economic 
groups.  To create such population categories, the state imposed political and 
socio-economic inequalities to mark group boundaries according to the desired ascriptive 
characteristics.  At the same time, the state had to enforce equality to eliminate or 
minimize existing boundaries within each population category.  Since populations in a 
society could be grouped in different ways by various characteristics, subgroups still 
existed in each state created category.  For example, in Shuangcheng, members of 
metropolitan, rural, and floating bannermen had different ethnicities, and members of 
civilian commoners had different places of origin.  In order to integrate these subgroups, 
the state assigned equal entitlement to them to undermine differences associated with their 
ascriptive characteristics.  Therefore, a dual process of differentiation and 
homogenization characterized the formation of state population categories: differentiation 
through between-category inequality, and homogenization through within-category 
equality. 
These conflicting characteristics – between-category inequality and within-category 
equality – define distinctive and persistent features of Chinese social stratification with a 
long history.  With the power to control and allocate material wealth, the Chinese state 
was able to differentiate the entitlement of different population categories.  At the same 
time, with a long ideological and institutional tradition of equal distribution, the Chinese 




while the state created and maintained inequality between population categories, it 
simultaneously stipulated and enforced egalitarian principles within each population 
category.  The state not only allocated equal amounts of land within the respective 
categories of metropolitan bannermen and rural bannermen, but also established 
regulations on land inheritance and land transfer to prevent wealth concentration.  With 
empirical data, I also show that this enforced within-category equality played a crucial role 
in forging distinct group identities for metropolitan and rural bannermen, and that these 
group identities resulted in different performances in land acquisition.  Because of this 
within-category equality, metropolitan and rural bannermen remained distinctive and 
separate groups even after the fall of the Qing (Komekura 1941). 
This dissertation is therefore an examination of the process through which the state 
created and enforced between-category inequality and within-category equality in 
Shuangcheng.  This process involved the participation of both the state and local society; 
although the state played a dominant role in creating population categories, it was their 
social acceptance that made these categories durable.  In this study, I not only examine 
state policies from an institutional perspective, but also analyze local practices of land 
acquisition and transaction to investigate the process through which the local society 
accepted these policies, perpetuating the between-category inequality and within-category 
equality created by the state. 
 
Actors and agency 
In my study of local land-acquisition practices in Shuangcheng, I also confront the 




processes: on the one hand, the state controlled settlement and land allocation; on the other, 
local practices that deviated from these regulated behaviors also existed and persisted.  
Both processes influenced the distribution of landed wealth: between-category inequality 
and within-category equality were well maintained in the population as a result of state 
policy; at the same time, stratification did increase as a result of bannermen’s land 
acquisition.  The coexistence of these conflicting phenomena is in fact a typical pattern of 
state-society interaction in historical China.   
In contrast to the binary model of state and society in the West, in which society was 
independent to and constantly struggled with royal power, civil society in historical China, 
as a product of such autocratic rule, never developed into a rival of state power (Kuhn and 
Jones 1978).  The Chinese state had a long tradition of institutional intervention in social 
affairs.  From as early as 221 B.C., the Qin Empire had established a hierarchical system 
of central, prefecture (jun), and county (xian) governments to control local society.  
Although the state did not establish formal government institutions below the county level, 
it still appointed local elites to government-controlled posts, such as a village head to 
supervise local society (Ch'u 1962; Hsiao 1960).  Moreover, in late imperial China, the 
development of the civil service examination intensified state control of local society.  
Through the exam system, the state not only drew local elites into the bureaucratic system, 
but also disseminated Confucian doctrines through the process of exam preparation (Elman 
1991, 2000).   
However, despite the enduring autocracy of imperial rule, local agents representing 
what we often call ‘local society’ were still able to operate with tremendous leeway even in 




agency of such local society originated in the intentionally imperfect nature of state 
institutions.  On the basis of enforced imperial control, the Chinese state intentionally kept 
government lean, and separated the government from local society.  The Chinese state did 
so to both ensure centralized control of the government system and avoid excessive state 
intervention in local society.  From as early as the Western Han dynasty (202 B.C.-25 
A.D.), the appointment of local officials had followed strict rules of avoidance, which 
prevented a candidate from serving in his place of origin or in the adjacent regions.10  At 
the same time, for the convenience of governance, the state intentionally used local elites, 
informal government personnel, and such social organizations as lineage to carry out 
administrative tasks at the local level (Ch'u 1962; Guo 1994; Hsiao 1960; Reed 2000).  
This design allowed the above-described local agents tremendous independence in 
coordinating property transactions, mediating litigation, and maintaining local order 
(Huang 1996, 2001; Kuhn 1980; Scogin 1994, 2001).  This design also enabled a 
centralized control by the Chinese state for two millennia over its vast territory. 
The design of the Shuangcheng state farm also exemplified this paradoxical nature of 
state-society interaction in China.  On one hand, when designing the settlement, the state 
dispersed immigrants from the same descent group or banner administrations into different 
villages to undercut the power of preexisting social organizations.  Compared to the usual 
human settlement experience, in which such organic groups as lineage played important 
role in migration and settlement, this measure especially demonstrated the state’s intention 
                                                        
10 The rule of avoidance originated in the Western Han.  In the Han, members of the imperial lineage 
could not serve as official in regions surrounding the capital.  In the Eastern Han, the state stipulated that 
an official candidate could not serve in regions where his affinal families originated, nor in the neighboring 
region to his hometown.  The rule of avoidance continued to be elaborated in later dynasties.  In the Qing, 
the regions a candidate had to avoid included the region where his lineage resided, the region where his 
own family had spent a considerable amount of time, and, if he was from a merchant family, the region 




to exert strong control over banner immigrants in Shuangcheng.  This move made the 
state the only authority in organizing settlement and land allocation.  On the other hand, 
when designing local government, the state still followed traditional practice to maintain a 
lean government and left tremendous space for local agents and customary practices in 
land acquisition and inheritance. Since the state undercut lineage organization – an 
important local agent, during the settlement process – individuals and households also 
became independent and active agents. 
Moreover, the fact that both the state and local society had a multitude of 
representatives at various levels increased the dynamism of local governance (Li 2005; 
Kuhn and Jones 1978).  On the state side, the central, provincial, and local governments 
all represented the state.  These three levels of government, however, did not necessarily 
share the same interests; while the central government focused on maintaining order at the 
national level, the provincial and local governments also sought to strengthen their own 
power.  In Chinese history, these varied interests of the different levels of government 
comprised a chronic tension between centralization and localization.  At the same time, 
the interests of local society were also diverse.  Although local elites played a major role 
as intermediary between the state and local society, many more groups pursued their 
interests through various means.  For example, in his research on clerks and runners in the 
Qing county yamen, Bradly Reed demonstrates that the non-elite group of yamen clerks 
and runners played an important social role, mediating the relationship between state and 
society (2000).  These diversified groups in local society further increased the complexity 
of local governance.  




of its unusual importance as a national project.  While the life of a specific county level 
government and society seldom attracted much attention from the central government, 
Shuangcheng was a major focus of central policy since its settlement in 1815.  The state 
established the Shuangcheng farm both to relieve its fiscal burden of supporting the banner 
population and to sustain the Eight Banners.  As I will show, the three levels of 
government institution sometimes had different foci on policy implementation, and thus 
conflicted with one another.  Thus, the different interests of state representatives provided 
bannermen with opportunities to choose institutional support for their specific interests.  
At the same time, in the history of land acquisition in Shuangcheng, representatives of 
local society existed at all levels—individual, household, and village. 
The drastic political and social changes in the nineteenth century further stimulated 
the diverging interests of the multitude of representatives of state and society.  Beginning 
in the late eighteenth century, the Chinese state saw signs of decline in many aspects of its 
control, e.g. corruption of bureaucrats, serious fiscal problems due to an increasing 
dependent banner population, and the declining banner tradition.  In the nineteenth 
century, internal rebellions and foreign invasions catalyzed these crises and thereby 
brought significant changes to the political system; the power of central government 
weakened and fiscal crises continued to grow.  The changes at the national level affected 
every corner of China Proper, including Shuangcheng.  The central, provincial, and local 
governments used various strategies to adapt themselves to the changing national and 
regional contexts.  In Shuangcheng, differences between the interests of the three levels of 
government were especially pronounced, and the resulting power dynamic provided 




the specific behaviors of the representatives of state and society in Shuangcheng, I 
introduce here the actors in the national and regional contexts. 
 
The central government 
The central government was the most steadfast proponent of state land ownership and 
the egalitarian principle in wealth distribution.  In Shuangcheng, the central government 
established strict regulations to protect banner land ownership and the equal distribution of 
land among metropolitan and rural bannermen.  These policies included residential 
segregation between bannermen and civilian commoners and rules of land allocation and 
reallocation that prevented wealth concentration.  Moreover, even in an age of increasing 
fiscal crisis, declining central power, and pressing threats from internal rebellions and 
foreign invasions, the central government insisted on maintaining equality and state 
control.  It was this central government insistence that made Shuangcheng an unusual case 
of durable state land ownership and equal land distribution in a period of increasing 
privatization.   
By the time the Jiaqing emperor (r.1796-1820) established the state farm in 
Shuangcheng, the power of the central government had begun to decline.  The White 
Lotus rebellion (1796-1804) broke out in the first year of the Jiaqing reign.  It lasted for 
nine years and swept through Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Hubei provinces.11  Quelling this 
rebellion cost the Qing state huge military expenditure, creating a fiscal crisis for the 
government.  At the same time, in the process of suppressing the rebellion, local military 
forces consolidated under the organization of local elites (Kuhn 1980).  Both the fiscal 
                                                        





crisis and local militarization threatened the central government’s control. 
In the wake of the White Lotus rebellion, the central government established the state 
farm in Shuangcheng to ameliorate its fiscal crisis.  Ever since the establishment of the 
Qing, the government had continuously supported the bannermen with state stipends and 
land grants.  As early as the 1730s, the state budget had fallen short of supporting an 
increasing banner population, and, under the deteriorating fiscal situation following the 
White Lotus rebellion, the government’s difficulties in raising the banner population in 
Beijing became especially prominent.  Moving the bannermen to the frontier and having 
them earn their living on state land became an ideal solution, both to relieve the fiscal crisis 
and to maintain the elite status of the banner population. 
Despite the state’s active responses, the political and fiscal crises continued to grow 
through the remainder of the Qing period.  In 1840, the Opium War between Great Britain 
and China started a century-long history of foreign invasion that turned China into a 
semi-colonial society.  Moreover, the Taiping rebellion (1851-1864) swept half of China 
and seriously damaged the Yangzi delta, the most economically prosperous region and an 
important source for state revenue.  Consequently, the power of the central government 
was further weakened; inside China Proper, provincial governors became more and more 
autonomous in their control of revenue and military forces.  In addition to the increasing 
local autonomy, the Manchu rulers also felt pressing threats from the growing power of 
Han-Chinese officials.  For 200 years, since the establishment of the Qing dynasty in 1644, 
Qing emperors had maintained the dominance of the Manchu ethnicity in the government 
system.  However, in the course of suppressing the Taiping rebellion, some Han-Chinese 




central government and in some provincial governments. 
Under the pressing challenges to centralization and state power, the central 
government especially paid attention to maintaining state land ownership and population 
categories in Shuangcheng.  While central control deteriorated in China Proper, the 
frontier setting in Shuangcheng provided the state an opportunity to intensify its control 
and to preserve the banner tradition, the symbol of Qing rule.  Therefore, although the 
central government had to constantly adjust its policies to accommodate the deteriorating 
fiscal and political situation, it was reluctant to give up banner land ownership in 
Shuangcheng and Northeast China.  In 1852, the state allowed private land ownership on 
banner land in other regions of China Proper.12  However, it did not permit free land 
transactions in Northeast China until 1906.   
 
The Jilin provincial government 
The central government succeeded in maintaining the state institution of population 
categories in Shuangcheng because of its tight control of Jilin Province, to which 
Shuangcheng belonged in the Qing.  The Qing rulers considered Jilin, together with the 
other two northeastern provinces, Liaoning and Heilongjiang, the cradle of the Qing and 
the property of the Manchu.  Therefore, throughout the Qing, the Manchu rulers 
maintained northeast China as the base for their rule over the majority Han-Chinese 
population.  Qing rulers forbade free immigration to the three northeastern provinces from 
1668 to the 1850s as to ensure Manchu military and economic control and privilege in this 
area.  The state also designated all land in Jilin, including plains, mountains, and ponds, as 
                                                        




state land.  All products from the land were specially designated to supply the imperial 
lineage’s consumption. 
The military nature and the Manchu dominance of the Jilin provincial government 
also allowed for tighter state control.  For the majority of Qing history, the Jilin Provincial 
government belonged to the Eight Banner garrison system.  First established in the banner 
garrison of Ningguta in 1653, it supervised the garrisons scattered over the entire province 
and coordinated their military activities (Ding 2003).  The chief official/officer held the 
title of general (jiangjun), and all personnel in the government were Manchu or Mongol 
bannermen.  Before the mid-nineteenth century, the population of Jilin mainly consisted 
of soldiers, banner immigrants, criminal convicts, political exiles, and a few civilian 
commoners who had surreptitiously entered the region (Lee 1970).  In addition to its 
military function, the provincial government handled civil affairs, collecting taxes on the 
few registered residents and the products from the land.13  This military government lasted 
until 1907, when a civilian government replaced it.14   
Despite the state’s tight control, the drastic political and social changes in the 
nineteenth century also challenged the Jilin provincial government.  The first challenge 
came from the growing immigrant population.  With the settlement of Shuangcheng in 
1815, more and more unregistered Han-Chinese and banner immigrants entered this area to 
make a living.  For example, in 1845 and 1847, the Shuangcheng government registered 
more than 3,000 households of floating bannermen from Liaoning, who had moved to 
Shuangcheng without a government order.  The growth of this unregistered population 
                                                        
13 In the 1720s, the Qing also established several civilian administrations at the local level to supervise the 
civilian population who surreptitiously migrated to this area (Fan 2007).  However, the provincial 
government was still under the Eight Banners. 
14 At the provincial level, the state kept the banner government until 1907.  At the local level, the state 
had established civil government in the 1730s to govern a handful of settlements of Han-Chinese 




posed a problem of control.  At the same time, beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, 
the shortage of government revenue became a serious problem.  Due to continuous 
foreign invasions and interior rebellions, the state’s demand for military power 
significantly increased.  Jilin was one of the major sites to supply the Eight Banner troops.  
Consequently, military expenditure became a heavy burden on provincial revenue.  In the 
second half of the nineteenth century, the shortage of financial resources to cover the huge 
military expenditure persisted as a major theme in government policy discussions. 
To cope with these challenges, successive generals of Jilin pushed the central 
government to adjust its policies to accommodate social and political changes.  Proposals 
from the generals of Jilin often deviated from the central government’s ideal of 
maintaining Manchu control.  For example, in 1861, Jingchun, the general of Jilin 
(1853-1864), petitioned to allow free immigration to Jilin and to rent out uncultivated land 
to these new immigrants in order to increase government revenue.  Despite its deviation 
from the state ideal, the central government eventually approved Jingchun’s proposal, 
which would both relieve the state’s fiscal burden and extend its control.  This move 
marked the state’s approval of free immigration to Jilin, initiating mass immigration to this 
province.  Subsequently, the Jilin population increased by a factor of thirteen, from 
327,000 in 1850 to 4,416,300 in 1907 (Fan 2007; Ho 1959; Liang 1980).15  This example 
demonstrates that, compared to the central government, the provincial government usually 
took a more practical stance toward solving administrative problems to sustain the state 
governance.  As I show in this dissertation, in the history of Shuangcheng state farm, four 
generals of Jilin—Fujun (1814-1817, 1818-1822, and 1824-1827), Boqitu (1827-1828), 
                                                        
15 The 1850 population data is from Ho 1959, p.283.  The 1907 population data is from Fan 2007, p. 70.  




Jing’ebu (1840-1848), and Ming’an (1877-1883)—repeatedly pushed the state to adjust 
policies according to the context of Shuangcheng. 
 
The local banner government and local society 
The Shuangcheng local banner government developed together with the local society.  
Up until the early nineteenth century, Shuangcheng was still largely empty land.  In the 
first 35 years from 1815 to 1851, while the first generation immigrants settled down and 
were still adapting to the new environment, the banner administration in Shuangcheng only 
existed in its prototype, without independent rights of taxation and adjudication.  In 1852, 
the local banner administration finally consolidated its power and acquired complete rights 
as a government, collecting rent and taxes, adjudicating legal cases, and maintaining local 
order.  By then, the banner immigrants were in their second or third generation.  
Subsequently, lineages, which had been dispersed by the state during the settlement stage, 
re-emerged as an element of local society.  Families, descent groups, and village 
communities were actively involved in activities of land acquisition and land transfer, and 
therefore, institutional and social development went hand in hand to mark Shuangcheng’s 
development. 
At the same time, the national political and economic changes that occurred in the 
mid-nineteenth century also provided Shuangcheng residents with opportunities for wealth 
accumulation.  Beginning in the 1840s, in the wake of fiscal crises caused by foreign 
invasion and inner rebellions, the state sought to open more land in Northeast China to 
supplement state revenue with rent income.  In Shuangcheng, the state thus allowed the 




legitimize the private land cultivation some families had practiced after their initial 
settlement.  Such individual behaviors of land cultivation, together with land transfer, 
gave rise to stratification in landed wealth, and thereby further complicated local 
governance. 
In the course of land allocation and land acquisition in Shuangcheng, the coexistence 
of competing institutions characterized local rule, both at the regulatory level and in the 
overall system of governance.  In terms of regulation, state policies of land allocation and 
customary laws of land transaction complemented each other to provide convenience for 
the local government and residents.  Although state regulations dominated land allocation 
and reallocation in the state farm, they also left space for customs to guide the myriad local 
behaviors of land inheritance and transaction.  Therefore, customary norms became an 
important supplement to state regulations in directing the actual procedures of local 
practices.  For example, in land inheritance in Shuangcheng, although the state mandated 
the primogeniture principle, some bannermen practiced partible inheritance under 
customary norms while simulating the façade of primogeniture in the official registers. 
Discrepancies also existed between state regulations and customary norms.  While 
the state emphasized equal land allocation within each population category, customary 
norms highlighted kinship and geographic ties.  In local practices of land acquisition, this 
discrepancy enabled bannermen to choose between competing institutions according to 
their specific interests.  In addition, the discrepancy between state regulation and 
customary norms provided local officials with greater autonomy in adjudicating 
land-related litigations; officials could refer to either state regulations or customary norms 




officials and bannermen both exhibited greater agency. 
The changing social and political context in Northeast China further complicated local 
dynamics by bringing competing government systems to Shuangcheng.  Before 1882, the 
Shuangcheng banner government was the sole government authority in the local society.  
However, the opening of Jilin to free immigration in 1861 resulted in a growing 
Han-Chinese population in Shuangcheng and its adjacent areas.  Subsequently, in 1882, 
the state established a civil government in Shuangcheng.  The civil government 
administered not only the area of the state farm, but also the adjacent areas that had 
previously belonged to a banner garrison named Lalin.  At the same time, the 
Shuangcheng banner government remained the authority in the state farm, which included 
120 banner villages and more than 100 natural settlements called wopeng.  Therefore, for 
the thirty years from 1882 to the end of the Qing in 1911, a dual government system existed 
in Shuangcheng.  Moreover, even after the fall of the Qing, the republican government 
still kept the banner administration, renaming it the Office of Banner Affairs (qiwu 
chengban chu), which continued to administer the 120 banner villages.16   
The establishment of the civil government offered Shuangcheng bannermen an 
alternative institution and thereby weakened the power of the banner government.  In 
theory, the banner government still had authority over all state farm-related affairs.  In 
reality, however, due to the overlap of administrative areas, the duties of the two 
governments were not completely distinct.  Not only did the two governments often work 
together to adjudicate disputes that involved both bannermen and civilian commoners, 
some bannermen also brought their disputes directly to the civil government.  Unfamiliar 
                                                        





with the state population categories and the corresponding land allocation policies, the 
judgments of the civil government sometimes deviated from state regulations and thereby 
benefited those bannermen who preferred solutions other than those offered by the land 
allocation policy.  
 
Traditions, policies, practices, and consequences 
With rich historical sources on both state and local society, the history of the 
Shuangcheng state farm perfectly connects the Chinese state’s tradition of equal 
distribution of material wealth with the creation of population categories in local society.  
The political ideal of equal distribution of wealth has a long history dating back to the 
classics of various philosophical schools of ancient China, including Confucianism, 
Daoism, Mohism, and Eclectics.17  However, due to the lack of data, no study has 
explored the application of this egalitarianism in local society.  The history of land 
distribution in Shuangcheng reveals the entire process by which the state enforced such 
egalitarian ideals in local society, including institutional design, social responses to state 
policies, and the consequences of the state-society interaction on wealth distribution.  To 
describe this process, I organize my dissertation into four parts, following the story line of 
ideals, state policies, local practices, and consequences.   
In chapter two, I explore the tradition of egalitarianism in Chinese history and its 
application in the Qing Eight Banners.  I demonstrate that in historical China, the political 
ideal of an egalitarian distribution of wealth persisted under both Han and non-Han 
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Qiyan explored philosophical teachings that contained the ideal of equal distribution of material wealth 
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regimes.  Moreover, in application, this egalitarian ideal was often realized through the 
state institution of population categories; while promoting equality within each category, 
the state also maintained inequality between populations, differentiating their entitlement 
rights to material wealth.  Therefore, the model of Shuangcheng state farm originated 
from a rich theoretical and institutional background in Chinese history. 
I organize chapters three to nine into three parts –state policy, local practice, and 
wealth stratification and social formation—to reconstruct the settlement history, the 
subsequent distribution of landed wealth, and the formation of social groups in 
Shuangcheng.  With this organization, I adopt the model framework in the field of 
resettlement study to narrate the settlement and development of the Shuangcheng society, 
inspired by case studies of the resettlement of involuntary migrants in Africa and Southeast 
Asia by anthropologists Elizabeth Colson and Thayer Scudder.  The settlement of banner 
immigrants in Shuangcheng resembles in many ways the organized resettlement of 
“involuntary” migrants, which has been an increasingly common phenomenon in the last 
half-century in both developing and industrialized countries (Scudder and Colson 1982; 
Guggenheim and Cernea 1993).18  Like the metropolitan bannermen relocated to 
Shuangcheng, these displaced populations are moved under government supervision 
because of projects and persecutions that are often initiated by the state without any local 
participation.  Based on numerous case studies, Scudder and Colson theorize that 
relocation and resettlement took place in four stages: “recruitment,” “transition,” “potential 
development,” and “handling over or incorporation” (Colson 1971; Scudder 1985; Scudder 
                                                        
18 While there are numerous case studies on the phenomenon of involuntary migrants, two major volumes, 
one edited by Scudder and Colson in 1982 and the other edited by Scott Guggenheim and Michael Cernea 




and Colson 1982).19  This framework not only describes the resettlement process in a 
temporal phase, but also captures the key characteristics of the society of each stage. 
In part two, which includes chapters three, four, and five, I focus on the official 
institutions and the state policy of land allocation which were established in the early stage 
of the settlement (1815-1830).  This period resembles the “recruitment” and “transition” 
stages of the resettlement framework, during which the immigrants largely depended on 
the existing authorities for material and security.  As I will show, the state was the only 
authority in planning and organizing the settlement of Shuangcheng immigrants.  
Moreover, through the planning of this settlement, the Qing designed a local society 
significantly dependent on state power.  The land allocation policy and the corresponding 
registration system successfully created and maintained population categories with 
differential entitlements to land.  Subsequently, the state institutions established in the 
early stage of settlement largely determined the nature of Shuangcheng society, as well as 
the social boundaries in the remainder of its history.   
In part three, which consists of chapters six and seven, I study local practices of land 
acquisition, transaction, and inheritance, which became active in the mid-nineteenth 
century.  These behaviors arose in the period resembling the “potential development” 
stage.  After the initial transition period, individuals gradually adapted to the new 
environment and began to seek opportunities to maximize their own interests.  Beginning 
                                                        
19 In the “recruitment” stage, the government makes decisions on where to move the migrants and how the 
move shall take place.  In the “transition” stage, which refers to the first several years after the initial 
settlement, the dislocated individuals are still adjusting themselves to the new environment and show 
tremendous dependence to existing authorities.  In the “potential development” stage, the individuals 
begin to adapt to the new environment, seeking new options, and new social organizations gradually 
develop.  Consequently, the authority of old institutions declines, and inequality in the community widens.  
The “handling over or incorporation” stage deals with the long-term success of resettlement, demonstrated 
by the incorporation of the community into a larger territorial framework, and how the community plays a 




in the 1840s, private land opening became more and more prevalent.  At the same time, 
local methods of land transfer that deviated from official processes persisted.  In dealing 
with the affairs of the state farm, the state also adjusted policies to accommodate the local 
practices.  These behaviors made possible wealth accumulation and stratification that 
were contrary to the state’s egalitarian ideal.  Moreover, as immigrant families moved into 
their second and third generations, family and descent groups, which were undercut by the 
state during the initial settlement stage, reemerged as important local agents in 
coordinating wealth transmission and inheritance. 
Finally, in part four, which consists of chapters eight, nine, and ten, I analyze land 
distribution among metropolitan and rural bannermen from 1870 to 1906 to examine the 
levels and sources of inequality.  Land distribution is particularly salient during this 
period because, by 1870, Shuangcheng society had reached the stage of “handling over,” 
becoming an important site of grain production in Northeast China.  The level of 
inequality in land distribution in Shuangcheng, therefore, reflects social stratification 
resulting from the interaction between state policies and local practices over time.  I reveal 
that, a half century after the initial settlement, patterns of land distribution in Shuangcheng 
exhibited both change and continuity.  Through continuous private land cultivation and 
accumulation, an upper class had emerged in Shuangcheng, of which rural 
bannermen—who were relegated by state policies to a wealth status lower than that of 
metropolitan bannermen—accounted for a significant proportion.  At the same time, some 
households, including those of both metropolitan and rural bannermen, had become 
landless.  Yet, despite the emergence of stratification in landed wealth that transcended 




were well maintained among the majority of the metropolitan and rural banner population, 
and the distribution of land in Shuangcheng exhibited a pattern of stratification without 
concentration.  Eventually, the tensions between population categories created by the 
state’s land allocation policy in Shuangcheng turned these administrative categories into 




Chapter II    
Egalitarian Principles and Institutional Traditions 
 
Over the course of human history, numerous societies that span the range of culture 
and geography have practiced equal distribution of wealth.  Scholars have agreed that 
these characteristics are particularly common in early small-scale communal societies 
(Lenski 1966; Radcliffe-Brown 1948; Sahlins 1972; Turnbull 1961).  The Andaman 
Islanders studied by Alfred Radcliffe-Brown is an example: in Andaman society, land is 
commonly owned, and everyone has equal access to the necessities of life.  Food and 
wealth are equally distributed, despite the fact that the “produce of the land and all portable 
property are privately owned” (Lenski 1966).  Although this type of society has become 
increasingly rare, examples can be found in many parts of the world.1  Moreover, 
communal ownership and the equal distribution of wealth have also been practiced in 
larger and more complex societies.  For example, under the serfdom economy in Russia, 
village communes equally distributed and redistributed land and obligations among 
villagers according to their labor availability (Watters 1968).  Even in the western 
societies in present day, public ownership has continued on community properties as well 
as some scarce resources.  
While most societies became more unequal as they grew in size and complexity, 
China has distinguished itself by preserving the egalitarian tradition into its state 
                                                        
1 Some well-studied examples of primitive communal societies include the Andaman islanders in South 
Asia (Radcliffe-Brown 1948), Bambuti Pygmies of Zaire in Africa (Turnbull 1961), and the Dai 




institutions and using state power to create and maintain such egalitarianism.  The 
institution of state population categories in Shuangcheng was built on this egalitarian 
tradition.  In this chapter, I situate the state farm institution in Shuangcheng and the 
corresponding Eight Banner system in historical and institutional context to understand the 
importance of the egalitarian tradition.  I first examine the origins of the egalitarian ideal 
in Chinese history and how political philosophies and institutions converged in China to 
fashion the equal distribution of wealth, and to perpetuate such distribution as an important 
platform of political legitimacy.  In this process, not only did the Han-Chinese dynasties 
pass down the essential theories and institutions that would enable an equal distribution of 
wealth, but the non-Han regimes, with their nomadic traditions, also contributed to the 
development of egalitarianism.  I then summarize the key features of the Eight Banners in 
the Qing.  The Eight Banners, which is the larger institutional background of the 
Shuangcheng state farm, represents an elaborated form of the state institution of population 
categories, a major component of which was the equal distribution of material wealth. 
 
Roots of the egalitarian traditions 
Institutions and philosophy 
The practice of equal distribution and the ideal of egalitarianism in China originated in 
the ancient village communes, where local institutions ensured the equal distribution of 
resources.  One well-known example of such an institution in ancient China was the 
jingtian system, the land system practiced by village communes in the period before 
written records.2  Under the jingtian system, the village government controlled two types 
                                                        




of land, corporate land (gongtian) and private land (sitian).  Villagers worked the 
corporate land collectively and the village government divided the private land into plots of 
equal size to be farmed by households.3  Each household, usually consisting of a married 
couple and their young children, received one plot.  Moreover, after the initial distribution, 
the village redistributed the plots among the villagers every one to three years to maintain 
equality (Yang 2006b).  When the king of Western Zhou (11th century- 771 B.C.) 
established a feudal state in China in the eleventh century B.C., he inherited this principle 
of equal land distribution and organized administrative and residential units accordingly; in 
the rural area around the capital, the basic residential units, known as li, each consisted of 
ten households (Yang 2006a).  This early practice of equal distribution established an 
institutional model for later Chinese dynasties (Yang and Li 1990). 
In the sixth and fifth centuries B.C., in response to rising inequality and social disorder, 
egalitarianism gradually developed into a philosophy of governance.  In the sixth century 
B.C., economic growth produced social and economic inequality, resulting in the collapse 
of the old social order.  The power of the king of Zhou declined, and the lords under him 
waged wars against one another to expand their territory and power.  In order to reinstate 
the old social order, philosophers generalized the life of ancient village communes to the 
entire society and created the ideal world of “Great Commonality,” described in detail in 
the Book of Rites (liji): 
    “When the Grand course was pursued, a public and common spirit ruled all 
under the sky; they chose men of talents, virtue, and ability; their words were 
sincere, and what they cultivated was harmony. Thus men did not love their 
                                                                                                                                                                     
history.  Although the academy has not reached consensus about the practice and its nature, scholars in 
general agree that the jingtian system did exist in China and was the major land system practiced by village 
communes (Yang 2003; Li 1999; Zhou 2002). 
3 According to Mencius, each plot had a size of 100 mu.  The actual practice of jingtian and the plot size, 




parents only, nor treat as children only their own sons. A competent provision 
was secured for the aged till their death, employment for the able-bodied, and 
the means of growing up to the young. They showed kindness and compassion 
to widows, orphans, childless men, and those who were disabled by disease, so 
that they were all sufficiently maintained. Males had their proper work, and 
females had their homes. (They accumulated) articles (of value), disliking that 
they should be thrown away upon the ground, but not wishing to keep them for 
their own gratification. (They labored) with their strength, disliking that it 
should not be exerted, but not exerting it (only) with a view to their own 
advantage. In this way (selfish) schemings were repressed and found no 
development. Robbers, filchers, and rebellious traitors did not show themselves, 
and hence the outer doors remained open, and were not shut. This was (the 
period of) what we call the Great Commonality.”4 
 
As the above text indicates, the society of “great commonality” was an extremely altruistic 
society.  In the society of “great commonality,” material wealth was a public resource that 
should be equally distributed among the population, regardless of gender, age, and 
biological conditions.  The equal distribution of resources thus comprised an integral part 
of the greater ideal of “great commonality.”   
While various philosophical schools shared this egalitarian ideal,5 Confucian scholars 
continued to develop it, emphasizing that material wealth in particular should be equally 
distributed.  In the Analects, Confucius stressed the importance of equal distribution in 
maintaining stability: 
“The head of a state or a noble family worries not about underpopulation 
but about uneven distribution, not about poverty but about instability.  For 
where there is even distribution there is no such thing as poverty, where there is 
harmony there is no such thing as under-population and where there is stability 
there is no such thing as overturning.”6 
 
Although Confucius expressed a strong preference for equal distribution as the key to good 
governance, he did not specify what should be equally distributed to maintain stability.  It 
                                                        
4 Sacred Books of the East, volume 28, part 4: The Li Ki, James Legge, 1885. 
5 Other than Confucianism, philosophers of Mohism, Daoism, and Eclectics (zajia) all expressed this 
egalitarian ideal (Chen and Lin 1986). 




was Mencius (372-289 B.C.) who indicated that it was the material wealth necessary to 
maintain people’s subsistence that should be equally distributed.  In his teachings, 
Mencius paid special attention to people’s livelihood and provided more concrete 
descriptions of good governance to the rulers.  Mencius summarized these basic materials 
with the term “constant means (hengchan),” which included land, food, clothing, and 
shelter.  As for their distribution, Mencius followed the standard of the jingtian system; 
each household owned a “homestead of five mu of land (wumu zhi zhai)” and “a land lot of 
a hundred mu (baimu zhi tian).”  Only when people met their subsistence with equally 
distributed wealth, did their prince become a “true King.”7 
Along with the development of philosophical teachings, equal distribution remained a 
traditional practice in China and played an important role in the trend of centralization 
from the fourth to first century B.C..  Not only was this political ideal morally appealing, it 
also helped rulers consolidate political power.  Carrying out and maintaining an equal 
distribution of wealth requires that a state centralize control of materials and population, 
and this centralization of power complemented changes already underway in China.  
From the fourth to the second century B.C., the Chinese political system transformed from 
feudal to imperial.  This change required that the state undercut the power of the nobility, 
who controlled a considerable amount of land and population.  The equal distribution of 
land therefore aided the consolidation of state power.  Even before Confucianism became 
                                                        
7 In his conversation with King Hui of Liang on good governance, Mencius said: “If you wish to put this 
into practice, why not go back to fundamentals? If the mulberry is planted in every homestead of five mu of 
land, then those who are fifty can wear silk; if chickens, pigs and dogs do not miss their breeding season, 
then those who are seventy can eat meat; if each lot of a hundred mu is not deprived of labour during the 
busy seasons, then families with several mouths to feed will not go hungry. Exercise due care over the 
education provided by village schools, and discipline the people by teaching them duties proper to sons and 
younger brothers, and those whose heads have turned grey will not be carrying loads on the roads. When 
the aged wear silk and eat meat and the masses are neither cold nor hungry, it is impossible for their prince 




the orthodox philosophy, the Qin state of the Warring States period (476-221 B.C.) had 
already equally allocated state land to eligible commoners through the shoutian and 
mingtian policies.8  The Qin state went on to unify China in 221 B.C., establishing the Qin 
Empire under a central government.  In the second century B.C., Emperor Wu (156-87 
B.C.) of the Western Han (202 B.C.-25 A.D.) further strengthened the centralized 
government system and adopted Confucianism as the orthodox state ideology.  Thereafter, 
equal distribution of wealth, together with other Confucian teachings, became the principle 
of good governance for Chinese emperors. 
Philosophical teachings and institutional development thus went hand in hand to 
establish the equal distribution of wealth as a normative practice.  The Qin (221-206 B.C.) 
and Han Empires (202 B.C.-200 A.D.) both inherited the practice of equal land allocation; 
the state consistently allocated land to commoners according to household size (jikou 
shoutian) (He 1958, 1956).9  Even when China broke apart at the end of the Han period, 
state intervention in land distribution persisted.  For example, in the Wei Kingdom, the 
government established the institution of tuntian to organize the peasants who farmed the 
state land allocated to them.  This institution later developed into the zhantian system and 
was applied to all the land in the Western Jin (265-316), a dynasty which briefly unified 
China.  Under the zhantian system, the state stipulated the amount of land an individual 
                                                        
8 In the fourth century, Qin had established a policy that allocated state land according to military rank.  
Officers who earned a high rank through achievement in the battlefield could have a considerable amount 
of land.  At the same time, soldiers could attain a plot of 100 mu for killing one enemy officer (Han 1984).   
9 In the Qin and Han, under the system of equal land allocation, commoners also had certain property 
rights on their land.  After the initial allocation, commoners could sell their land or buy more.  However, 
when wealth became increasingly concentrated, the state would confiscate the property of merchants and 
big landlords and redistribute it.  One famous example was the gaomin policy of Emperor Wu in the Han.  
In the beginning of the Western Han, the state did not control much land.  In the second century B.C., the 
emperor confiscated rich merchants’ properties, including slaves, vast amount of land, and houses.  The 
confiscated land became state land and Emperor Wu allocated a considerable amount of state land to 




could have: each adult male had 70 mu, and each adult female had 30 mu.10  This state 
practice of equal distribution of wealth has persisted for so long because it was an effective 
means for the state to maintain power and control, thereby providing later Chinese 
dynasties rich institutional precedents. 
 
Equal distribution and conquest dynasties 
While the Han-Chinese dynasties built a solid theoretical and institutional background 
for equal land distribution, when land became seriously concentrated it was the non-Han 
regimes that reinstated equal land distribution as a national institution in medieval China.  
Beginning in the Eastern Han dynasty (25-220 A.D.), land gradually concentrated in the 
hands of officials and large landlords (Wang 1992).  This land concentration destroyed the 
equal distribution of land practiced in the Qin and Han periods.  At the same time, the 
growth of the economic and political power of the large landlords seriously weakened the 
central government and led to the decline of the Eastern Han.  In 316, the invasion of 
nomadic tribes divided China into two parts, north and south; this divided status was 
maintained for 265 years.  The Han-Chinese regimes, though they only occupied the 
regions south of the Yangzi River, had to constantly fight the invaders to protect their 
territory.  Ruling with a weakened central government, emperors relied heavily on the 
powerful noble lineages (menfa) to organize military power (Tian 1989).11  These noble 
                                                        
10 See Jinshu, juan. 27, p.790.  Since there are no detailed records about the zhantian system, scholars are 
still debating its application in the society.  Yet this regulation indicated the state’s intervention in land 
distribution.  
11 The noble lineages in the Southern dynasties were not the same as those in the feudal period.  These 
nobles rose as a result of the weakened central power beginning in the third century.  The noble lineages 
came into being during the Eastern Jin dynasty (316-420).  These families controlled military power, 
along with a large amount of land and labor.  Their existence seriously weakened the power of the 




lineages occupied the high-ranking posts in the government and owned a large amount of 
land and labor.  At the same time, in 485, the rulers of the Northern Wei dynasty (386-534) 
in North China enforced state landownership and established the equal land (juntian) 
system as a national institution.      
The equal land (juntian) system incorporated both the land institutions of the earlier 
Han-Chinese dynasties and elements of communal practices derived from the nomadic 
tribal tradition (Tang 1956; Han 1984).  Under the equal land system, the state controlled 
all farmland and allocated it equitably to commoners according to household size.  As in 
the zhantian system in Western Jin, the household, headed by a married couple, was the 
unit of land allocation.  Each adult man and woman received a plot, with the plots 
allocated to women being smaller than those given to men.12  By farming their plots, 
households paid taxes and labor services to the state.  Ultimately, however, these plots 
belonged to the state; couples were required to return their plots when they reached the age 
of 70.13  This practice of land return derived from tribal tradition and thus differed from 
the practice under Han-Chinese dynasties, which allowed the peasants to pass down the 
allocated plots to their descendants.  Land return intensified state control, and the 
implementation of this equal land system helped the nomadic rulers to consolidate their 
power in a central government.  At the same time, the input from the nomadic tribal 
tradition also refreshed the ideal of equal wealth distribution.  This institution not only 
became the land system of the Northern dynasties from 485 to 581, but also remained the 
national land system after the unification of China (in 581) and persisted until 780, a period 
                                                        
12 In Northern Wei, each male above the age of fifteen received 40 mu of uncultivated land and 20 mu of 
land with mulberry trees.  Each married female received 20 mu of uncultivated farmland. 
13 On top of the basic land allocation policies, the juntian system also had supplemental regulations to 
define land allocation among landlords and officials.  Some scholars argue that in fact the state could only 
allocate land without owners according to the juntian regulations (Jian 1983).  Moreover, some scholars 




of 300 years. 
The equal land system also served as the basis for the fubing institution, a military 
system created by a Xianbei ruler named Yuwen Tai that drew soldiers from the 
state-created category of military households (Gu 1962).  The Northern Wei dynasty, 
which had maintained unity in North China, collapsed in 535 A.D., leaving behind two 
competing regimes (the Western and Eastern Wei) and rising local military forces.  In 542 
A.D., Yuwen Tai, a general of Western Wei, recruited the private armies controlled by 
powerful warlords in North China and enrolled them into a centralized military system 
called fubing.  All households under the fubing system were separately registered as 
hereditary military households and supplied the soldiers of the imperial guards and the 
central army.  The fubing system was a historical precedent of the Eight Banners in the 
Qing. 
Through Yuwen Tai’s policies of homogenization, the fubing system finally turned 
the military households into a special population category.  Yuwen Tai replicated the 
Xianbei tribal model to organize the army by three hierarchies: all armies were divided into 
twenty-four divisions, belonging to twelve generals, and these twelve generals were 
supervised by six noble chiefs, of which Yuwen Tai was one (Gu 1962, Tang 2006).  
Despite their diverse ethnic backgrounds, every general and soldier acquired a Xianbei 
surname; military divisions were thus organized as tribal clans.  Through this constructed 
blood tie, Yuwen Tai consolidated his power and centralized military forces by enforcing 
soldiers’ and generals’ personal loyalty to the chief/ruler. 
Alongside the tribal tradition, the practice of equal land distribution also contributed 




system, each military household also received landed property like commoner households.  
In return for their military service, Yuwen Tai exempted the military households from the 
tax and labor service associated with their allocated land.  The combination of state 
control and equal allocation of material resources weakened military households’ 
dependence on their former lords and maintained uniformity in access to material wealth, 
thus eliminating alternative power structures.   
The equal land (juntian) and fubing systems illustrate how the absolute power of 
nomadic rulers fostered centralization.  A nomadic tribe usually consisted of three classes, 
nobles (including the tribal head and his families), commoners, and slaves.  In contrast to 
Confucian teachings, which based a ruler’s legitimacy on his ability to provide people with 
the necessities of life, tribal heads gained their absolute authority by organizing production 
and military battles.  While Confucian teachings still emphasized a contractual 
relationship between rulers and the people, obedience to the tribal heads was absolute 
because it was the only way to survive in cruel military fightings.  Ironically, in medieval 
China, the autocratic nature of the tribal tradition helped to reinstate the equal distribution 
of material wealth.  In the remainder of Chinese history, the conquest dynasties, Liao 
(916-1125 A.D.) and Jin (1127-1234 A.D.) both governed the conquest elite separately 
from the rest of the population and awarded them equal access to material wealth.14 
 
The evolution of egalitarian ideal in the Ming 
In the Ming (1368-1644 A.D.), the dynasty preceding Qing, neo-Confucian 
scholar-officials drew on all the Han and non-Han institutions of equal land distribution to 
                                                        




advocate for equal distribution of material wealth.  These scholar-officials celebrated 
equal distribution as an antidote to the high level of land concentration in the Ming.  Qiu 
Jun, a neo-Confucian scholar-official, in his work Daxue yanyi bu (The Supplement to the 
Elaboration of the Great Learning), recounted all the historical institutions of equal land 
distribution, the jingtian in the pre-Qin period, the zhantian system in the Eastern Han and 
in the Wei state of the Three Kingdoms period, and the equal land (juntian) system in the 
Northern Wei.  In contrast to these systems, he criticized land concentration for its harm to 
people’s livelihood and state control: 
“Ever since the Qin state adopted Shang Yang’s proposal of abolishing the 
jingtian system and destroyed the boundaries between each plots, the state could 
no longer allocate land to people.  Commoners could occupy land as they 
wanted.  Wealthy people could buy land; powerful people could acquire land 
(by power); capable people could farm the land.  Those who owned the land 
did not necessarily farm it, while the people who farmed it did not own it.  The 
state could only extract ten percent of the output, while private owners received 
the majority of the output.  Contemporary Confucian scholars always lamented 
that the rulers could not recover the principles of the three dynasties to 
administer the people … If the wealth was not equally distributed, there was no 
way to educate and support the people.”15  
 
According to Qiu Jun, land concentration jeopardized state income, thereby weakening 
state power.  To prevent land concentration, He argued that, although it was not realistic to 
reinstate the jingtian and juntian systems, the state still should maintain an equal land 
distribution among the people.  The equal distribution of material wealth was not only a 
way to support the population, but also a way to educate it.   
Qiu Jun’s vision of the state role in maintaining an equal land distribution represented 
the orthodox interpretation of Chinese history and official ideology of political economy in 
the Ming and Qing.  In 1487, when Qiu Jun submitted his work to Emperor Xianzong, the 
emperor ordered the inclusion of this work in the textbook for the emperor’s jingyan study, 
                                                        




the instruction system for the emperor to study Confucian classics and history.16  From 
then on, this work remained a major textbook for the emperor’s jingyan study not only in 
the Ming but also throughout the Qing dynasty.  Moreover, this work was also soon 
published and widely studied by generations of scholars who prepared for the civil service 
exam.   
The call for equal distribution not only persisted in theoretical teachings but also 
influenced policy discussions and practice in the Ming dyansty.  Throughout the dynasty, 
some scholar-officials constantly advocated policies to reinstate the jingtian system on 
military state farms (Wang 1998).  Although the state never succeeded in implementing 
the jingtian system, the military state farm still inherited some elements of the jingtian and 
juntian systems, equally allocating land and obligations to households (Wang 1965).  
Thus, by the Qing period, the rulers had created and sustained an elite institution, the Eight 
Banners, drawing reference not only from philosophical and institutional precedents but 
also from their own tribal traditions. 
 
The Eight Banners 
The Eight Banners is an institution to organize a military elite population that 
characterized the rule of the Qing, dividing the people into bannermen and civilian 
commoners.  Developed in the early seventeenth century in Northeast China, the Eight 
Banners was originally the institution the Manchu rulers used to organize and control the 
subject population of the early Manchu state in the Liaodong area.  By 1644, when the 
Manchu conquered China, all the population in Liaodong – Manchu, Mongol, and Han as 
                                                        
16 In China, the tradition of emperors studying classics to learn the way of governance originated very early.  
By the Northern Song dynasty (960-1127 A.D.), the jingyan instruction system became institutionalized 




well as some other ethnicities – had been enrolled into the Eight Banners.  After the 
Manchu entered China Proper and established the Qing dynasty, the emperors preserved 
Eight Banners to organize the conquest elites.  The Eight Banners thus served as the 
institution to distinguish the bannermen from civilian commoners; bannermen served the 
state as soldiers and officials (officers) and enjoyed state stipend and political privileges, 
while civilian commoners had nothing from the state.  Therefore, the division between 
bannermen and civilian comprised the most important categorical inequality in Qing 
China.   
Throughout the Qing period, the Manchu emperors invested huge efforts to maintain 
the Eight Banners.  The emperors first did so to backup the minority Manchu ruling over 
the majority Han-Chinese.  With the Eight Banners, the Manchu emperors managed to 
stay at the top of the ethnic hierarchy and thereby sustained their status as the ruling elite 
(Elliott 2001).  Even after the Manchu emperors successfully strengthened their rule and 
mastered the Han-Chinese model of bureaucracy, the Eight Banners still remained an 
important tradition.  In this section, I therefore analyze three key characteristics of the 
Eight Banners: the equal division of administrative units and material wealth, the 
bannermen as hereditarily bonded labor of the emperor, and the banner land as well as 
other types of material support that enforced the bond between bannermen and the emperor.  
These very characteristics of the Eight Banners were also the principles of the banner 
institution in Shuangcheng. 
 
Equal division 




from a tribal society to a bureaucratic state (Meng 1960; Liu 2001).  Nurhachi, the 
founder of the Qing, first created the Eight Banners to support an aristocratic monarchy.  
In 1600, Nurhachi started to transform Jurchen tribe’s basic hunting unit,17 niru, into the 
basic military unit of the Eight Banners.  He formally created a system consisting of 
eight banners in 1615 to organize the military niru, proclaiming himself the “bright khan” 
in the next year.  The Eight Banners therefore replaced previous tribal organizations, 
weakening the blood tie between the Jurchen tribes and helping to consolidate the khan’s 
authority.  In this sense, the Eight Banners combined social, economic, and military 
functions into one system.  In this new system, those who had been commoners under 
the tribal system worked as peasants in peaceful periods and served the khan as soldiers 
during times of war.  Each banner was headed by a commander who owned a number of 
niru and claimed loyalty to the khan.  In addition to serving as the commander of two 
banners, Nurhachi tactically co-opted other banner commanders by bringing them into 
the state power structure, appointing them state counselors or awarding them noble titles.   
After Nurhachi’s death, his son Hong Taiji further consolidated the khan’s authority.  
Hong Taiji undercut the powers of banner commanders by creating official positions 
within the Eight Banners that reported directly to the khan (Liu 2001).  He also adopted 
the Han-Chinese model to establish Six Boards in the khan’s government (Liu 2001; 
Elliott 2001).  At the same time, Hong Taiji created Mongol (in 1635) and Han-Chinese 
Banners (in 1642) to organize the increasing Mongol and Han population in the Liaodong 
area, ultimately transforming the Manchu tribes into a bureaucratic state and turning the 
Eight Banners into an administrative system.  Therefore, before the Manchu conquest of 
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China proper, the Eight Banners served as the fundamental government institution of the 
Manchu state in Northeast China (Meng 1960).   
The equal distribution of material wealth had been a founding principle of 
Nurhachi’s Eight Banners.  He ensured that plunder was always allocated equally 
among the eight banners (bajia junfen); regardless of the size of a banner’s population, 
each banner had an equal share of material wealth.18  To protect this egalitarian 
principle, Nurhachi established corresponding archival and judicial institutions to monitor 
distribution (Jiang 2007).  The implementation and enforcement of equal distribution 
also strengthened Nurhachi’s power.  Before his death, Nurhachi reemphasized the 
importance of equal distribution in his last words to the nobles and ministers:  
“In the past, my six grandfathers, together with Dongguo, Wangjia, Hada, 
Yehei, Wula, Huifa, and Mongol, all had an insatiable desire to wealth and 
goods.  They pursued selfishness and neglected equity and justice.  
(Therefore) they fought with and killed one another, resulting in their failure. … 
I took them as a warning and required that the eight families (banners), once 
acquired some material wealth, must share it for public use and equally 
distribute it.  Each banner should not take more than its deserved share.”19  
 
Nurhachi’s descendents inherited this rule and complied with it so strictly that any material 
goods that could not be equally distributed whole were divided into pieces (Zhang and Guo 
1988).   
Equal distribution was also the guiding principle in organizing the banners themselves.  
Nurhachi not only trimmed the size of the military niru to three hundred soldiers each, but 
also equalized the number of niru in each banner and redistributed niru among the eight 
banners to balance their powers.  He further established a population registration system 
to monitor and control the size of niru.  Initially, the size of the eight banners varied 
                                                        
18 The distribution of material wealth within each banner, however, followed equitable principles, such that 
members with a higher political status gained more. 




dramatically.  For example, in 1632, the Bordered Blue banner had sixty-one niru, while 
the Bordered White banner had fifteen.  By 1634, as a result of Nurhachi’s and Hong 
Taiji’s efforts in redistributing niru, the number in each banner ranged from twenty-five to 
thirty-two (Jiang 2007).  In that year, Hong Taiji determined that the number of niru in 
each banner should be thirty.  Equal distribution of both wealth and population was 
therefore a fundamental principle of the Manchu state. 
The equal distribution of population and material wealth created uniformity in 
administration and helped to consolidate the khan’s power, intensifying central authority at 
the expense of noble power.  To enforce the rule of equal division among the eight 
banners, Nurhachi published a set of laws and established institutions to regulate and 
monitor the distribution of material wealth.20  These institutions became part of a 
preliminary central bureaucracy independent of the banner commanders, whose individual 
power was held in check by the equal distribution of population under their control.  
Moreover, the equalized niru and banner size also produced uniformity in the social, 
administrative, and military units, which, as China’s millennial history had shown, are 
essential to a centralized bureaucratic state. 
After the Qing conquest of China proper, the nomadic tradition of equal distribution 
converged with Confucian ideologies and remained the philosophy of good governance.  
In order to adapt themselves to the task of ruling the Han-Chinese population, the Qing 
emperors inherited the government institution and ideology from the Ming; 
neo-Confucianism remained the orthodox philosophy, and the Manchu emperors also 
                                                        
20 For example, in order to ensure that all material wealth, including goods seized in the war, would be 
public property, Nurhachi required every general to immediately report the quantities and contents of their 
capture.  Nurhachi and Hong Taiji developed this rule into a full set of institutions.  By the time of Hong 




started to study Confucian classics.  Confucian teachings that emphasized people’s 
livelihood, provided the emperors with an alternative venue to interpret the principle of 
equal distribution.  For example, the Kangxi emperor had paid close attention to the 
agricultural development and the livelihood of peasants (Wang 1993c). 
At the same time, the Eight Banners became an institution of the elite population.  As 
a minority group ruling over a massive geographic territory and the majority Han-Chinese 
people, the Manchu emperors largely used the Eight Banner forces to secure their control.  
The emperors not only brought the Eight Banner population into the inner capital city, but 
also established a national garrison system to police the Han-Chinese and other 
populations (Ding 2003; Elliott 2001).  The banner population thus became an elite 
population, serving the state and enjoying economic and political privileges.  Throughout 
the 268-year Manchu rule, the Eight Banners maintained sharp boundaries between 
bannermen and Han civilian commoners.  The bannermen therefore acquired a distinct 
ethnic identity, the legacy of which led to the formation of the Man ethnicity in the 1950s. 
 
Hereditarily-bonded labor (shipu) 
Qing contemporaries described the bannermen as “hereditarily-bonded labor 
(shipu),”21 acknowledging that while the bannermen were elite, they were also personally 
                                                        
21 “Shipu” is a term that appeared in documents written in Chinese.  The term “shipu” here is a general 
reference to the banner population, which is different from its usage to refer to booi, a specific category in 
the eight banners who were bonded labor to Manchu nobles.  In 1780, the Qianlong emperor, in his order 
to move some Shengjing (Liaoning) bannermen to the Jilin banner garrison, used this term. He said: “Since 
you all are Manchu shipu, what would be the difference between [being in] Shengjing and 
Jilin?”(SCPTTJL, p. 228)  In 1868, in his policy discussion on relocating bannermen from Beijing to state 
farms, the Governor of Shanxi Province Shen Guifen wrote: “Our emperor considered people vulnerable. 
Within the country, even when a single person was displaced, (our emperor) would help him with sympathy. 
Not to speak of the eight banner shipu and the descendents of those who made great contributions. They are 
close to our emperor.  Can you tolerate their suffering in hunger and cold without finding a solution for 




bonded in labor to the emperors and hereditarily bonded to boot.22  The term of 
“hereditarily bonded labor” reflects a feudal bond between the bannermen and the 
emperors.  The state supported bannermen with material wealth and, at the same time, 
forbade them from taking occupations other than serving the state.  This feudal bond had 
been in place since Nurhachi’s initial creation of the Eight Banners; Nurhachi himself had 
first enforced former tribal members’ personal bonds to the ruler.  The bannermen were 
thus a subject population of the Manchu nobles; bannermen served their commanders and, 
in return, the commanders were responsible for their peoples’ livelihoods.  In this sense, 
the banner commanders resembled feudal lords.  After Hong Taiji succeeded in 
undercutting the banner commanders’ power, the emperor replaced banner commanders as 
the only authority.  Consequently, the emperor became the lord of all the bannermen and 
was responsible for providing their living.  The term “bonded labor” therefore justified the 
state’s support to and control over bannermen. 
The Manchu emperors maintained the elite status of the bannermen by providing them 
both material support and opportunities for occupational mobility in the bureaucracy.  
According to their rank, the state provided banner officials and soldiers with two forms of 
material support: stipends consisting of silver and grain, and property grants consisting of 
land and housing.  For example, in the first half of the Qing dynasty, a soldier of the 
lowest rank in Beijing received four taels of silver monthly, while a soldier of this rank in 
the provincial garrisons received three taels of silver.  All banner households enjoyed land 
and housing grants exempted from tax and rent, which provided them with a permanent 
source of income (Elliott 2001).  Moreover, in terms of occupational mobility, state 
                                                        
22 A direct translation of the Chinese term shipu is bonded servants.  Many scholars used this direct 
translation.  However, this translation does not reflect the precise meaning of the bannermen.  Therefore, 




regulations that restricted certain positions to Manchu and Mongol bannermen increased 
their opportunities to enter state bureaucracy relative to those of civilian commoners.23 
Although all bannermen belonged to the elite, the state created categories within the 
banner population to define hierarchical entitlements to state support.  The state classified 
population by multiple criteria: ethnicity, service location, and population status.  In terms 
of ethnicity, there were three categories, Manchu, Mongol, and Han-Chinese, 
corresponding to three sets of eight banners that organized these ethnic groups.24  Manchu 
bannermen, who shared the ruler’s ethnicity, and Mongol bannermen, who had an affinal 
relationship with the Manchu, enjoyed better material support and occupational mobility 
than did Han-Chinese bannermen.  Moreover, Han-Chinese bannermen were also 
vulnerable to being expelled from the Eight Banners when necessary to relieve the fiscal 
burden of supporting bannermen.25 
In terms of service location, bannermen in the capital differed from those in garrisons, 
and those in Northeast China differed from those in other regions of China proper.  
Bannermen in the capital were called metropolitan bannermen (jingqi).  They occupied 
the top layer in the hierarchy of state stipends and land grants.  A metropolitan bannerman 
                                                        
23 In the Qing bureaucracy, in almost every level of government, the court stipulated that some posts could 
only be filled by Manchu and Mongol bannermen.  Moreover, the state also arranged special examinations 
for Manchu and Mongol bannermen.  For example, the court created a translation exam just for Manchu 
and Mongol bannermen, which only required candidates to translate Confucian classics from Chinese to 
Manchu or vice versa, a test much easier than a standard civil service exam (Elliott 2001).  Despite the 
opportunities the court provided, bannermen’s occupational mobility was also largely restricted to serving 
the emperor and state, either as soldiers/officers, or as government officials.  As Mark Elliott has 
commented, the occupational privileges were in fact a double-edged sword to bannermen. 
24 The ethnic composition of bannermen was actually more complicated than this.  In addition to the 
Manchu, Mongol, and Han-Chinese, there were also Xibe, Korea, and some other small ethnic groups in 
Northeast China.  In terms of institutionalized population categories, however, there were mainly three. 
25 Beginning in the mid-eighteenth century, in order to relieve the fiscal burden of supporting the banner 
population, the Qianlong emperor started to expel Han-Chinese bannermen from the banner system and 
turn them into civilian commoners (Sun 2005; Wang 1993b).  This expulsion was accomplished both by 
asking regular Han-Chinese bannermen to decline their banner affiliations and by expelling Han-Chinese 





with the lowest soldier’s rank received two taels of silver as monthly salary, while a 
garrison bannermen of the same rank only received one tael of silver.26  Bannermen in 
garrisons in Northeast China received the least material support.  While bannermen in 
other garrisons received both silver and grain salaries, those in Liaoning had no grain 
stipend.  Instead, they worked on state-allocated land to supplement their living (Ding 
2003).  Occupational mobility was also much more restricted for garrison bannermen than 
for metropolitan bannermen.27 
In terms of population status, there existed regular bannermen (zhengshen qiren) and 
bondservants (booi).  Regular bannermen served the Qing as soldiers, while bondservants 
served the imperial lineage as artisans and peasants or as servants of the regular bannermen.  
The regular bannermen and bondservants had completely different entitlements to political 
participation and economic support.  In general, bondservants had very limited access to 
education and thus to official positions compared to regular bannermen.  For a long time, 
royal peasants of the imperial lineage were not even allowed to take exams (Ding et al. 
2004).  Nevertheless, bondservants could occupy powerful positions and influence 
politics through their intimate relationships with the emperor.  Bondservants also tended 
to have heavier economic burdens than regular bannermen because of their obligation to 
produce materials for the imperial lineage. 
The state maintained separate registration to distinguish these different population 
categories and define their hereditary status.  This practice had been in place since 
Nurhachi founded the Eight Banners.  Once a banner household was classified into a 
                                                        
26 See Ding 2003, p.220. 
27 In the Qing, metropolitan bannermen had two occupational tracks: they could serve as soldiers or take 
exams to become officials.  Opportunities for garrison bannermen, however, were largely restricted by 
state policy.  Before the nineteenth century, they were not allowed to take exams in the provinces where 
the garrisons were located.  To take exams, garrison bannermen had travel to Beijing, and this 




certain category, its descendants would remain in the same category unless they acquired 
official permission to change categories.  Officials updated the population registers every 
three years, noting the vital events that had occurred during the interval -- birth, marriage, 
death, and escape.  Population registration therefore provided an official and reliable 
reference for a banner household’s category and thus its entitlement.      
Nevertheless, despite the sharp distinctions between these different population 
categories within Eight Banners and that between bannermen and civilian commoners, the 
boundaries of these categories were porous.  Within the Eight Banners, the court’s most 
loyal servants and the families of imperial concubines could change their status from a 
lower to a higher category through “banner elevation (taiqi)” (Elliott 2001; Wang 
1993b).28  Between bannermen and civilians, the membership of bannermen also changed 
along with the court policies.  Before the eighteenth century, a large number of 
Han-Chinese households were included into the Eight Banners as a result of institutional 
expansion taking place in both the Northeast and Beijing.  In the Liaodong area, not only 
were the previous Han residents enrolled into the Eight Banners in the early seventeenth 
century, but also the Han immigrants who moved into this area in the late seventeenth 
century became the bond servants of the imperial lineage and were organized by the Eight 
Banners (Ding et al. 2004).  In North China, since the Manchu entered China Proper until 
the early eighteenth century, many Han-Chinese were admitted to the Eight Banners 
through their submission of land and material wealth (Wang 1993b).  Beginning in the 
mid-eighteenth century, however, when the court found it difficult to support the 
                                                        
28 In general, banner elevation took place in three forms, moving from the category of the bond servant to 
regular bannermen, from the lower five banners (Bordered White, Plain Red, Bordered Red, Plain Blue, 
and Bordered Blue) to the upper three banners (Plain Yellow, Bordered Yellow, and Plain White), or from a 




increasing banner population, it started to expel Han-Chinese bannermen from the Eight 
Banners and turn them into civilian commoners (Sun 2005; Wang 1993b).  This expulsion 
was carried out both by asking regular Han-Chinese bannermen to decline their banner 
affiliations and by expelling Han-Chinese who had been adopted by Manchu bannermen.  
Therefore, throughout the Qing, the content of banner membership constantly changed as 
the rulers manipulated population categories. 
 
Banner land: crises and responses 
Banner land – the state land allocated to banner soldiers as their material support – was 
a critical element in the Eight Banners.29  The practice of allocating land to the conquest 
elite had existed in the Jin dynasty (1115-1234),30 with whom the Manchu rulers shared 
the same ethnic origin.  When building the Manchu state, Nurhachi reinstated this practice 
and institutionalized it.  In the founding period of the Manchu state, when land was the 
only form of state support to banner soldiers, state ownership and allocation of banner land 
rendered the ruler power over the Eight Banners.  In this sense, banner land came into 
being in 1621, when Nurhachi led his troops into the Liaodong Plain and enclosed 30,000 
shang of land to allocate to banner soldiers (Zhao 1997).  Each soldier received six 
shang;31 by parceling out the land in this way, Nurhachi established the tradition of 
                                                        
29 Scholars have two points of view regarding the definition of banner land.  One perspective defines 
banner land in a narrow sense, including only state land that was equally allocated to banner soldiers.  The 
other perspective defines banner land more broadly, including not only land allocated to banner soldiers, 
but also farms owned by nobles and officials and pasture land designated especially for bannermen.  Both 
opinions view land allocated to soldiers as the core of banner land. 
30 See chapter I, the note about tuntianjun in the Jin dynasty (Liu 1996b). 
31 Due to their different interpretations of Nurhachi’s edict on the land allocation in 1621, scholars have not 
reached consensus on the recipients of the banner land.  Most scholars maintain that the recipients 
included not only banner soldiers, but also the residents of the Liaodong area (Yi, Chen, and Li 1992; Zhao 
2000).  Some scholars, however, only considered residents in Liaodong the recipients of land (Guo 1982), 




allocating state land equally among bannermen.   
The function of banner land and the Eight Banners, therefore, resembled that of the 
equal land (juntian) system and the fubing institution; the state provided material support, 
and, in return, the banner households provided specialized services to the state.  The 
banner land system applied the principle of equal allocation.  As early as 1621, in his edict 
to the residents of Liaoning on equal land allocation, Nurhachi criticized the Ming for 
allowing land concentration and expressed as an ideal the egalitarian distribution of 
wealth: 
“In the past, you rich people of the Ming dynasty occupied a large amount 
of land and hired labor to farm it. (You) sold grains from the field which (you) 
could not consume. The poor people had neither land nor grain.  They had to 
purchase the grain. Once they used up their money, they had to fall to 
beggars. … The rich, rather than stocking up grains until they decay and thus 
wasting the effort to preserve them, would gain a great reputation if they [use 
the grains] to support poor people. … Now, I allocate to each adult male five 
shang of land to grow grains and one shang of land to grow cotton.  You 
people should not underreport the number of adult males.  Otherwise the 
unreported [adult male] could not obtain his land.  From now on, I also 
allocate land to all beggars and monks, so that beggars need not beg.  Every 
three adult males work collectively on one shang of public land.  Every twenty 
adult males should send one as soldier and one as laborer.”32 
 
 
In this edict, Nurhachi designed a model resembling the equal land (juntian) system; every 
adult male received the same amount of land; in exchange for the allocated land, they either 
provided tax and labor service to the state or served the state as soldiers.  Under this 
scheme, Nurhachi and Hongtaiji gradually enrolled all residents in the Liaodong area into 
the Eight Banners and allocated land and housing to the entire population (Zhao 1995).   
                                                                                                                                                                     
this question, Zhao Lingzhi used other historical sources to demonstrate that in 1621, Nurhachi only 
allocated land to banner soldiers (1997).  Despite their different opinions, most scholars agree that the 
30,000 shang of land specified in Nurhachi’s edict was designated for allocation to banner soldiers only. 
32 See Manwen lao dang, 1621.7. (Chinese translation, trans. by the First Historical Archives and the 




After entering China Proper, the Manchu rulers maintained the banner land system as 
an important component of the Eight Banners.  In both the surrounding areas of Beijing 
and the banner garrisons in the provinces, the Qing occupied a large amount of land to 
allocate to banner soldiers, officials, and nobles.  The court acquired banner land from two 
sources; one source was land enclosed from waste land and land previously owned by 
Han-Chinese peasants; the other was land submitted by landlords who achieved admission 
to the Eight Banners upon the submission of their land.  From 1644 to 1669, the Manchu 
emperors occupied a total of 15,346,716 mu of enclosed land and 3,276,463 mu of 
submitted land in the surrounding areas of Beijing (Peng 1992; Zhao 2002a).33  The court 
then allocated this land to soldiers and officials according to their ranks; bannermen of the 
same rank received the same amount of land.34  In 1647, the court granted bannermen 
permanent usufruct on their allocated land but prevented them from selling their land to 
civilian commoners (Zhao 2002b).  The banner land system therefore became an 
important method to marking the boundaries of the elite institution of Eight Banners, as 
only bannermen were entitled to banner land. 
Inside China Proper, however, the banner land system was soon threatened by 
changes in bannermen’s lifestyle and the arising private land transactions.  While in the 
past bannermen had been farmers during peaceful times, after the Manchu conquest of 
China, the majority of the banner population settled in Beijing and became city dwellers 
therefore becoming detached to their allocated land.  At the same time, the state stipends 
to bannermen in the form of cash and rice salaries weakened the importance of banner land, 
                                                        
33 Of the 15,346,716 mu of enclosed land, 14,012,871 mu were for banner soldiers and officials, and 
1,333,845 mu were for imperial lineages. 
34 The criteria for land allocation changed over time.  For example, in 1645, each banner soldier had six 
shang of land, and each official with the rank of assistant commander-in-chief or higher had thirty shang of 





which used to be the only material support.  Therefore, the majority of bannermen in 
Beijing enjoyed city life, renting their banner land out to civilian commoners.  By working 
on banner land as tenants, civilian commoners gradually came to occupy the land.  Land 
transactions were frequent, both among bannermen and between bannermen and civilian 
commoners.35 
Private land transactions threatened both banner landownership and equal land 
distribution.  As early as the 1680s, some bannermen had sold their allocated land to 
civilian commoners (Zhao 2002b).  By the 1730s, a considerable proportion of banner 
land belonged to civilian commoners.36  This situation not only impoverished some 
bannermen, but also jeopardized the state control of banner land and thus the Eight Banners 
as an elite institution.  To maintain banner landownership and the privileges of bannermen, 
in 1729, the Yongzheng Emperor (1723-1735) ordered the government to investigate 
banner landownership and redeem land sold to civilian commoners (Wei, Liu, and al. 
1989).  However, despite government efforts to protect banner landownership, bannermen 
continued to sell land to civilian commoners.  From 1729 to 1762, the court repeatedly 
redeemed banner land from civilian commoners.  For example, in the five-year period 
from 1757 to 1762, the court redeemed more than 1,800,000 mu of land from civilian 
commoners, at the cost of 2,380,000 taels of silver (Wei, Liu, and al. 1989).  After 1762, 
due to fiscal difficulties, the court stopped redeeming banner land. 
                                                        
35 Land transactions included land rental, conditional sale, and land sale.  The edited book by the Wei, 
Qingyuan and Liu, Shouyi et. al., Qingdai de qidi, collected rich materials on behaviors of land transaction 
(1989).  Not only did bannermen sell their land to civilian commoners, but some capable bannermen also 
bought land from civilian commoners. 
36 About the proportion of banner land sold to civilian commoners, scholars often cite the memorials of 
two Qing officials, Hetai and Shuhede, who stated that about half of the banner land in the surrounding area 
of Beijing had been occupied by civilian commoners (Zhao 2002b). This stated proportion, however, did 
not draw from statistics but from general impression of the contemporaries.  Therefore, the proportion of 
50 percent is not reliable.  Yet, from this stated proportion, we can tell that a considerable amount of 




In addition to renting and selling land to commoners, bannermen also engaged in land 
transactions with one another, resulting in increasing stratification.  In the Qing empire, 
the court did not approve free land transactions between bannermen until 1758 (Zhao 
2002b).37  Nonetheless, land transactions between bannermen had been common since the 
late seventeenth century (Zhao 2002b).  Through these transactions, some powerful 
bannermen became large landholders, while others became landless (Liu 1998a; Wei 1995).  
The rising inequality in the banner community seriously weakened the principle of equal 
distribution, threatening the Eight Banners as an elite institution.   
Alongside the crisis in banner land, the court also identified challenges to the Eight 
Banners in terms of declining banner tradition and growing fiscal difficulty in supporting 
bannermen.  After entering Beijing, bannermen were detached from the land and became 
a population that did not contribute to production.  This urban lifestyle was the opposite of 
the traditional lifestyle of bannermen, who had lived as both farmers and soldiers back in 
Northeast China.  Having become used to the leisurely city life, some bannermen gave up 
their warrior skills of archery and horse riding.  Moreover, as the banner population 
increased, the state could no longer provide every banner adult male a post with a state 
stipend.  The category of xiansan bannermen—bannermen without a banner post and 
thereby unemployed—emerged and grew in size (Wei 1995); in 1771, the court identified 
more than 6,000 widowers, widows, and orphans in the metropolitan banner population 
who could hardly make a living, of which some even became paupers (Liu 2008).  
Beginning in the 1730s, by which time this non-productive banner population had almost 
doubled in size since their arrival in Beijing (Elliott 2001), the court officials had a heated 
                                                        





discussion on policies to solve the livelihood problem of bannermen and save the Eight 
Banners.38 
Among the suggested solutions to save the Eight Banners, sending banner population 
to state farms and reinstate their attachment to land was an especially appealing one, 
because it shifted bannermen’s dependence on state stipend to state land.39  In this way, 
the state was not only relieved from the fiscal burden of supporting bannermen, but also 
ensured the banner population stable income from their land.  While land in the areas 
surrounding Beijing was occupied by rich bannermen and civilian commoners, many 
officials proposed to relocate bannermen to frontier regions and build up state farms there.  
Following this long-term policy discussion, in 1742, the Qianlong emperor ordered the 
relocation of metropolitan bannermen from Beijing to Lalin, a site southeast to 
Shuangcheng, to live on the state land there (Ding 1985).  Between 1742 and 1758, the 
government used coercion to organize 3,000 households to Lalin and equally allocated 
land to them.  However, many households failed to settle down, and soon abandoned the 
state farm to return to Beijing.40     
Thus, by the time the court initiated the relocation of metropolitan bannermen to 
Shuangcheng, the Jiaqing emperor and court officials had faced both opportunities and 
                                                        
38 The court officials’ discussions are collected in Huangchao jingshi wenbian (the Imperial Collection of 
State-craft Writings) juan. 35.   
39 Under the initiative of relocating metropolitan bannermen to state farms in Northeast China, the court 
had carried out several relocation projects since the mid-eighteenth century.  Other than the relocation 
projects to Lalin (1742-1758) and to Shuangcheng in (1815-1830), in 1885, the court carried out another 
relocation project to move metropolitan bannermen to Hulan, a place in Heilongjiang Province (See the 
communications between the general of Heilongjiang, the local banner government of Hulan, and the 
central government on 1885.6.25, 1885.8.28, 1886.8.5, 1887.2.28, and 1888.4.10, QDHLJLSDAXB pp. 
180-182, 257, 289-290, and 354-356).  This relocation project, however, was a failure.  Only nine 
households of 26 people moved to Hulan, and these nine houseods failed to settle there.  One year after 
their arrival, only 17 of the 26 people survived, while the rest died of disease.  In 1888, the court finally 
permitted the remaining metropolitan bannermen to return to Beijing.  
40 Ding Yizhuang studied in detail the 1742 relocation of metropolitan bannermen to Lalin (1985).  Due to 
the lack of material source on this relocation project, it was not clear how many households returned to 




challenges.  In terms of opportunity, the long Chinese history had accumulated rich 
historical references in support of an institution of population categories.  Moreover, the 
abundant uncultivated land in Shuangcheng provided the court an ideal ground to restore 
the genuine banner tradition.  At the same time, however, the Qianlong emperor’s failure 
in settling metropolitan bannermen indicated the difficulty in the organizational work.  
Furthermore, after the initial settlement, all the challenges the Eight Banners had 
encountered in China Proper could potentially challenge the Shuangcheng state farm.  
Therefore, the creation and maintenance of the Shuangcheng state farm was an experiment 
in many ways, settling an urban population in rural frontier, creating new population 




Part Two  State Policy 
Chapter III    
Shuangcheng Settlement, 1815-1830 
 
Many nations have experiences of frontier settlement, but the Chinese state has 
distinguished itself from other nations by its ability to transform and eventually integrate 
frontier societies with the center.  While frontier settlement carries the risk that these 
societies will eventually break away from the mother country (e.g. the German migration 
to Poland and Russia), China succeeded in maintaining ties with its various colonial 
cultures in such frontier regions as the Southwest (Lee Forthcoming), Northwest (Millward 
1998; Perdue 2005), and even Taiwan (Shepherd 1993).  China’s ability to expand in this 
way can, in large part, be attributed to the active role played by the state, which not only 
organized migration to the frontier, but also invested huge amounts of effort and revenue to 
settle and develop frontier societies (Lee 1978, 1982).  Moreover, these frontier 
developments were further supported by state revenue that regularly flowed from the 
center to the periphery, a uniquely Chinese model of governance (Lee Forthcoming). 
The traditional view of the northeast frontier, however, identifies the late imperial and 
early modern state as weak.  Scholarship on migration to this region began during the 
1930s, a period when the Chinese state was indeed week and fragmented, and such 
pioneers as Franklin Lian Ho (1931) and Owen Lattimore (1932), for example, may have 




Following the story line established by these influential studies, later scholars of the 
migration to Northeast China in the Qing dynasty described this movement as a largely 
voluntary migration of desperate Han-Chinese who encroached upon institutions 
established by a declining state.  These narratives, however, neglect the role of that state in 
building and adjusting those institutions (Isett 2004, 2006; Lee 1970; Reardon-Anderson 
2005).1  Neither is there room for state institutions in the crystallized memory of the early 
immigrants.  Rather, their descendants celebrate their ancestors’ legendary lives as an 
example of the rule of the mighty in a setting free of state intervention.  The common 
founding story repeated by every immigrant family was “running a horse to occupy a 
mountain (paoma zhanshan).”2   
By the same token, the two major studies of the establishment of the Shuangcheng 
state farm also consider this settlement a failure (Ding 1985; Wei 2008).3  On the topic of 
Shuangcheng relocation and settlement, Ding Yizhuang conducts a pioneer study in her 
master thesis on the relocation and settlement history of Shuangcheng state farm (Ding 
1985).  In a recent article, Wei Ying examines the process of the establishment of the state 
                                                        
1 In his synthetic history of Northeast China, Robert Lee attributed the development of the Northeast 
frontier to the Han-Chinese immigrants and described this process as the sinicization of the Northeast 
frontier (1970, 78).  In this story, although the state created new institutions to maintain the frontier order, 
it only played passive roles.  Although this narrative is correct in describing the general trend, it 
overlooked the role of the Qing government in strengthening the banner system and regulating the frontier 
orders.  Later scholarship followed this general narrative, focusing on the practices of Han-Chinese 
immigrants and neglecting the state. 
2 Our research group led by Professor James Lee and Cameron Campbell has done extensive fieldwork 
among the descendants of immigrants who settled in Liaoning during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.  In our interviews of these descendants, almost every immigrant family stated that their family 
history started with the story of “running a horse to occupy a mountain.”  Coincidently, during my visits to 
Shuangcheng in 2005 and 2007, even though the Qing documents provide abundant evidence of state 
intervention, the descendants of the banner immigrants told me the same story. 
3 On the topic of Shuangcheng relocation and settlement, Ding Yizhuang conducted a pioneer study in her 
master thesis on the relocation and settlement history of Shuangcheng state farm.  In a recent article, Wei 
Ying examined the process of the establishment of the state farm, including the origins of the relocation 
policy and the recruitment of immigrants.  Both studies considered the relocation a failure, judging by 
whether this settlement provided an effective solution for the livelihood problem of the Eight Banner 




farm, including the origins of the relocation policy and the recruitment of immigrants (Wei 
2008).  Both studies consider the relocation a failure, drawing on the fact that this 
settlement did not provide an effective solution for the livelihood problem of the banner 
population in general.4  Moreover, they characterize the entire project as failed because 
the state had originally intended to move 3,000 metropolitan banner households, but was 
only able to recruit 698 households.  
In this chapter, I explore the early history of the Shuangcheng settlement to 
demonstrate that the Qing state was in fact capable of building and maintaining institutions 
in Northeast China.  Shuangcheng was not only a successful state-organized migration, 
but also a successful instance of the creation of population categories.  Compared to other 
frontiers where the state confronted indigenous populations outside of its control, the 
indigenous population in Northeast China had already been organized as a state population 
of bannermen.  The state therefore had greater control in this area and was able to better 
manifest its will.  Shuangcheng exemplifies the capacity of the Chinese state to settle a 
frontier and maintain control over the society.  In Shuangcheng, the state organized and 
implemented the entire process of settlement - from site selection, residence planning, and 
immigrant recruitment to final settlement.  In carrying out these steps, the state established 
an institution based on the hierarchy of metropolitan bannermen, rural bannermen, and 
civilians.  The state not only created these distinctive categories, but also eliminated other 
existing social organizations among and boundaries between the immigrants.  The 
Shuangcheng settlement process in this regard provides an excellent opportunity to 
                                                        
4 Both studies also noted the positive role of the Shuangcheng relocation project.  Ding maintains that 
through this project, the rural bannermen who settled in Shuangcheng contributed to the development of 
this area.  Wei acknowledged that this project at least solved the livelihood problem of those metropolitan 




observe the details of the design and creation of the institution of population categories.   
By examining the process through which the state designed and created population 
categories in Shuangcheng, I also shed light on the state’s role in immigrant settlement and 
the social consequences of state policies.  As case studies on the social consequence of 
resettlement of involuntary migrants in Africa and Southeast Asia reveal, the improper 
settlement of these migrants can lead to poverty or the further displacement of population 
(Colson 1971; Scudder and Colson 1982).  Therefore, the government’s organizational 
work plays an especially important role in the successful resettlement of involuntary 
migrants.  Yet despite its importance, current understandings of the state role in 
resettlement processes are largely restricted by limited access to adequate data.  Many 
such relocation projects in the last half century were not successful, as immigrants failed to 
develop new communities and instead dissipated (Scudder and Colson 1982).   
The Shuangcheng settlement was one of the numerous projects in China’s long history 
of government-organized migration dating back to the eleventh century B.C.  According 
to James Lee, from 225 B.C. to 725 A.D., the state directly or indirectly moved at least 16 
million people for such purposes as political and social integration, economic development, 
and control of the rich and powerful (1978).  Through these migration projects, the 
government developed a wealth of techniques for planning and financing migration and for 
settling migrants.  The government often provided housing, transportation, and food to the 
migrants to assist the settlement.  Despite the Chinese state’s renowned reputation in 
organizing migration, however, it rarely kept detailed records on the planning and 
settlement process, preventing a better understanding of the state’s role in the development 




The successful settlement of bannermen in Shuangcheng, accompanied by 
exceptionally complete records, thus serves as a good case for the analysis of state 
performance in the resettlement of involuntary migrants and institution building in local 
societies.  In this chapter, I therefore reconstruct the early history of the relocation to 
analyze the key characteristics that contributed to the successful settlement of the 
bannermen.  I begin my narrative with the planning of the relocation in 1812.  Even at 
this early stage, the state had manifested its will to create population categories and 
differentiate their entitlements, as evidenced by site selection and residence design.  The 
state relocation plan, however, met its biggest obstacle in the recruitment stage 
(1815-1828), as few metropolitan bannermen were willing to move.  In the second section, 
I analyze the recruitment of immigrants to illustrate the efforts of the emperor and court 
officials to carry out the relocation project despite the resistance of metropolitan 
bannermen.  Finally, I examine the settlement of the banner immigrants in Shuangcheng 
from 1815 to 1830.  Drawing on historical records both from this period and from the 
1870s, I reveal the huge state investment in the settlement and the creation of new 
population categories on the one hand, and in the elimination of old categories on the other.   
 
Initiating the relocation 
In 1812, the Qing court initiated the relocation of bannermen to Shuangcheng, 
subsequently engaging the emperor, central government officials, the provincial 
government, and local officials.  In that year, the Jiaqing emperor (1796-1819) issued an 




to support metropolitan bannermen.5  This move was the result of long-term policy 
discussions and experiments that started in the mid-eighteenth century,6 and was intended 
to shift the banner population from state-dependency to self-support.  This edict motivated 
several enthusiastic provincial governors experienced in establishing state farms in frontier 
regions, including notably: Fujun, the vice president of the Board of Works of Shengjing 
(today’s Liaoning) and later general of Jilin; Saichong’a, the general of Jilin (1809-1813);7 
and Songyun, the minister of the Department of Personnel (1811-1812).8  From 1812 to 
1814, these officials investigated all the proposed sites (from western Liaoning to northern 
Jilin) to look for an ideal place to settle the metropolitan bannermen.9  After each 
investigation, they sent back memorials discussing the conditions of the site and the 
plausibility of relocation.  The emperor and ministers in the Grand Council discussed 
these official recommendations and, in 1815, finally settled on Shuangcheng as the 
relocation destination. 
Fujun, the general of Jilin (1814-1817, 1818-1822, and 1824-1827), was the major 
                                                        
5 In 1817, the Jiaqing Emperor issued an edict, stating that “due to the increasing banner population in 
Beijing, it is harder and harder for bannermen to make ends meet. Now, it is impossible to increase the 
quota of banner posts thus to provide those unemployed bannermen stipend. Those bannermen are still 
young but have nothing to do. Some of them even wander around and incur troubles. It is such a pity. … 
Now if we follow the old way to send the unemployed bannermen in Beijing to Jilin and allocate the vast 
land to them, they can either farm the land by themselves or have tenants and live on the rent.  By all 
means, they can make a sufficient living.” (SCPTTJL, p.1) 
6 Most policy discussions were collected in Huangchao jingshi wenbian (the Imperial Collection of 
State-craft Writings) juan. 35, and Huangchao dao xian tong guang zouyi (The Imperial Memorials of the 
Reigns of Daoguang, Xianfeng, Tongzhi, and Guangxu), juan. 31.   
7 QSG, book 37, juan.342, p.11212. 
8 Before working as the Minister of the Board of Civil Office, Songyun had worked at the post of general 
of Yili (1802-1808, 1813-15), in present Xinjiang Province (QSG, book 37, juan. 342, pp11115-11117).  
Songyun’s major achievement at the post of general of Yili was the successful settlement of several state 
farms in Xinjiang.  After a short period in the Central government, Songyun returned to his post of general 
of Yili again.  Therefore, Songyun was experienced in planning state farms. 
9 In these three years, the officials investigated the pasture land in western Liaoning, Shengjing, and 
Shuangcheng and Lalin in northern Jilin. See the court memorials by Saichong’a, Cheng’an, Songyun, and 
Fujun et al on 1812.5.6, 1812.7.6, 1812.7.12, 1812.8.12, 1812.8.25 (JJCLFZZ, microfilm reel 138, 1875-10; 




figure who pushed through the entire relocation and organized the state settlement.10  
Fujun was born under the Mongol Plain Yellow banner in Beijing, gained his jinshi degree 
in 1779 through the translation exam for bannermen, and started his official career as the 
Assistant Secretary (zhushi) of the Board of Rites.11  Like many of his contemporaries, 
Fujun was trained in a tradition of statecraft (jingshi) that emphasized pragmatic 
manipulation of institutions and organizations in the pursuit of wealth and good 
governance.12  Before becoming the general of Jilin, he had worked at a variety of other 
posts in such frontier provinces as Xinjiang and Liaoning, and had gained a good 
reputation for maintaining order in local societies.   
When the Jiaqing emperor initiated the relocation project in 1812, Fujun was the Vice 
President of the Board of Works in Shengjing, and devoted himself immediately to this 
project.  Together with Songyun and Hening, the commander-in-chief of Rehe, he 
proposed the banner pasture land in western Liaoning as the site of relocation and even 
managed to acquire the emperor’s approval to start test farming in this area.  Their foray 
into western Liaoning, however, affected the interests of the old authorities, including the 
Pasturage Director (muzhang), Lamas, and the Mongol banner officials in charge of this 
region.  As a result, the emperor and the Grand Council decided to stop the test farming 
                                                        
10 See Fujun’s biography in QSG, book 37, juan.342, p. 11119. 
11 For the date when Fujun gained his jinshi degree, see the biographical materials of Fujun collected in 
Zhu Pengshou’s manuscript on biographic materials of Qing people, book 6, p.593 (2002). 
12 In his study of Chen Hongmou, an exemplar of the statecraft tradition, William Rowe examined the 
content of statecraft in the Qing dynasty (2001).  The term and tradition of statecraft originated from the 
Neo-Confucian school in the Southern Song dynasty (1127-1276).  Compared to the traditional Confucian 
teachings that emphasized moral exhortation, the thoughts of statecraft emphasized a more practical 
adaptation of institutions for the purpose of improving people’s livelihood.  From the eighteenth century 
on, quite a few high officials were influenced by the thoughts of statecraft and exhibited a pragmatic 
attitude in solving problems in governance.  The trend of statecraft was especially celebrated from the 
1820s to the mid and late nineteenth century.  While previous studies of statecraft mainly focus on the 
Han-Chinese officials of the Qing, Fujun’s performance also exhibited the pragmatic characteristics of 
statecraft.  Having studied the Confucian classics, Fujun was of course influenced by the thoughts of 
statecraft.  At the same time, however, as he was of Mongol ethnic background, Fujun’s pragmatic way of 




two years later, and punished the three officials.  Fujun, who by that time had advanced to 
the post of the general of Jilin, still insisted on continuing this project because he 
considered it a waste to discard the previous preparations.  His insistence irritated the 
emperor and the Grand Council and he thus received a punishment that downgraded his 
salary rank by three grades.13   
Under Fujun’s close supervision, the final planning and initial settlement of the 
Shuangcheng state farm occurred over the next fourteen years, from 1814 to 1827.  After 
accepting the post of the general of Jilin in 1814, Fujun continued the site investigation left 
by the preceding General Saichong’a.  In 1815, Fujun finally decided to recommend 
Shuangcheng as the site of relocation and acquired the approval of the Jiaqing emperor and 
the Grand Council.  In that year, the first 1,000 bannermen from four garrisons in Jilin 
Province were moved to Shuangcheng to prepare the land and housing.  In order to ensure 
that the relocation proceeded smoothly, Fujun even moved his office to Shuangcheng.  
From then until 1827, he followed every important step of the relocation. 
 
Planning the landscape 
Fujun and the Jiaqing emperor selected Shuangcheng because of its natural conditions 
and political advantages.  First, Shuangcheng beat other proposed destinations by virtue 
of its flat topology and vast quantity of fertile and uncultivated land.  Shuangcheng is in 
                                                        
13 About the opening of pasture land in western Liaoning, see the court memorials by Songyun, Hening, 
and Fujun on 1812.8.12, 1812.8.25, 1813.9.26, 1814.9.8 (JJCLFZZ, microfilm reel 138, 1875-52, 1875-56, 
1875-86, 1876-74, 1878-20), and the court memorial by the Grand Council on 1814.11.22 (JJCLFZZ, 
microfilm reel 138, 1878-51). This event is related to the relocation project initiated by the Jiaqing emperor 
in 1812.  By 1813, the three officials had started to recruit labor to farm the land and established 
preliminary regulations.  In the end, the emperor and Grand Council decided to stop this project and 
punished the three officials.  Songyun and Hening received the punishment of having their salary ranks 





the alluvial plain of two rivers, the Songhua River and the Lalin River.  The area Fujun 
located extended 43 kilometers from north to south and 75 kilometers from east to west.14  
The Lalin and Songhua Rivers surrounded its south, west, and north borders (map 3.1).  
During the site investigation, officials found that the proposed locations in Liaoning had 
been either largely occupied by civilian commoners or controlled by other banner 
authorities,15 while Shuangcheng still remained unpopulated; only about one hundred 
civilian settlements, each consisting of a handful of registered households, were scattered 
over the Shuangcheng area.16  Establishing the state farm in a relatively unpopulated area 
allowed the government to avoid both the cost of driving settled residents off the land and 
all the resulting uneasiness.  
 
Map 3. 1 The borders of Shuangcheng and distribution of villages, 1820-1822. 
Source: Map made by Ren, Yuxue (Ren, Lee, and Campbell 2009). 
 
                                                        
14 The memorial submitted by Fujun and Songning on 1815.4.29 (SCPTTJL, pp.17, 20).  In this 
document, Fujun stated that the area extended 75 li between the north and south ends and 130 li between 
the east and west ends.  In the Qing, one li equals 576 meters (Wu 1984). 
15 See JJCLFZZ, reel 138, 1878-51 and reel 232, 3386-15. 





Second, in order to facilitate political control, the emperor also emphasized the site’s 
proximity to administrative centers.  The most ideal site, as Emperor Jiaqing stated, would 
be five to six kilometers from Jilin, the seat of the general of Jilin, and from Ningguta, a 
major banner garrison in Jilin, because “the site that accommodates the relocated 
bannermen has to be supervised by the general or vice commander-in-chief (fu dutong), so 
that bannermen would settle down and make their livings.”17  Combining all the above 
considerations, Shuangcheng was an optimal site, located only 46 kilometers from 
Alchuka and Lalin, two major banner garrisons in Jilin.18   
In 1815, Fujun carefully laid out the boundaries of the state farm and the banner 
villages.  Fujun first built several hundred big tamped mounds (fengdui) to mark the 
borders of the state farm (map 3.1).19  With this move, Shuangcheng became a formal 
administrative area.  The Shuangcheng seat was centered in the south, 11 kilometers from 
the south border and 34 kilometers from the north border.  Surrounding the Shuangcheng 
seat, Fujun established the first forty banner villages.  As map 3.1 shows, these forty 
villages, known as the central tun, were grouped into eight banners, with five villages in 
each banner.  The eight banners of the central tun were lined up in two columns.  To the 
west of the county seat, from north to south, were the Plain Yellow, Plain Red, Bordered 
Red, and Bordered Blue banners, which comprised the left wing of the banner 
                                                        
17 See the edict of Jiaqing Emperor in 1917.7.19 (SCPTTJL, p. 2). Under this consideration, the officials 
rejected some other locations in Jilin, which, although remaining unpopulated, were too far away from the 
banner garrisons (SCPTTJL, p.2).  Even Shuangcheng at first glance did not meet the emperor’s 
expectations.  Voicing this concern in 1813, the court waited another two years before approving 
Shuangcheng as the site of relocation (JJCLFZZ, Saichong’a, 1813.5.8, microfilm reel 138, 1896-14). 
18 Alchuka and Lalin are two banner garrisons that were established in response the 1742 relocation of 
metropolitan bannermen to Lalin (Ding 2003).  
19 SCPTTJL, p. 57.  In the Qing dynasty, the state widely used tamped mounds (fengdui) as border 
markers on the unpopulated Northeast frontier.  Every so often, the government would send a group of 




administration.  Symmetrically opposite to the east of the county seat were the Bordered 
Yellow, Plain White, Bordered White, and Plain Blue banners, which comprised the right 
wing of the banner administration.  This distribution of the eight banners was standard in 
every banner city in China proper.20 
In 1819, Fujun expanded the state farm and designed two further sets of banner 
villages, known as the right and left tun respectively.21  As map 3.1 shows, the right and 
left tun were respectively located to the west and east of the central tun, distinguished by 
some small tamped mounds.22  Like the central tun, the right and left tun each had 40 
villages, organized by the eight banners.  In the centers of the right and left tun, Fujun 
established corresponding banner administrations.  Probably because of geographic 
constraints, Fujun did not align the wings of the right and left tun vertically but instead 
aligned them horizontally; If facing out from the Shuangcheng seat, one would find the 
right and left wings of either tun correspondingly lined up to the right and left of the seat of 
either tun.  Upon the planning of these banner villages, Fujun drove the civilian 
commoners out of the designated areas.  This early planning laid out the basic landscape 
of Shuangcheng. 
Interestingly, when designing the state farm villages, Fujun deliberately left the areas 
surrounding the seat of each tun to accommodate civilian commoners (Ren, Lee, and 
Campbell 2009).23  As map 3.1 shows, while the 120 banner villages were distributed in 
                                                        
20 The alignment of the eight banners followed the standard set up at the beginning of the Qing dynasty: 
the Bordered Yellow, Plain White, Bordered White, and Plain Blue banners comprise the Left Wing, and the 
Plain Yellow, Plain Red, Bordered Red, and Bordered Blue banners comprise the Right Wing.  Their 
alignment followed the order from the north to south.  The Qing emperors arranged the banner locations 
according to the Chinese philosophy of the Five Elements, wuxing. See BQTZ, book 1, p. 17. 
21 See Fujun’s memorial on 1818.8.27, SCPTTJL, p. 21. 
22 See Fujun’s report to the Jiaqing emperor on 1822.7.4, SCPTTJL, pp.56-57. 
23 In their paper on the development of the civilian division in Shuangcheng, Ren Yuxue has a detailed 




an orderly way over the entire Shuangcheng area, the natural settlements of civilian 
commoners were scattered in the empty land around the Shuangcheng seat and the seats of 
the right and left tun, and along the northern border of Shuangcheng.24  The empty areas 
around the seats of the right and left tun were especially large.  The government later 
developed these areas as salary land for soldiers and officials (suique di), on which civilian 
commoners worked as tenants.25  Apparently, Fujun intended this arrangement from the 
beginning. 
With this design, Fujun residentially segregated the haves, metropolitan and rural 
bannermen, and the have-nots, civilian commoners.  Fujun separated the banner 
immigrants from civilian commoners to prevent commoners from encroaching on banner 
land, a major concern of the state in maintaining the Eight Banners.  In Shuangcheng, the 
state stipulated that civilian commoners should not reside in the areas of banner villages.  
Even those civilian commoners hired by bannermen as laborers could not bring their 
families into banner villages.26  With this residential segregation, Fujun established a 
remarkable boundary between banner immigrants, who were entitled to state land, and 
civilian commoners, who were not. 
At the same time, however, Fujun also kept civilian commoners as laborers and 
therefore an indispensable population category in the state farm.  While the state was 
cautious about the potential threats civilian commoners posed to banner landownership, 
the state needed laborers in Shuangcheng to farm not only the land allocated to banner 
immigrants but also land set aside to generate revenue for office expenditures and official 
                                                        
24 The civilian division in the northern border of Shuangcheng developed in 1820 (SCPTTJL, p. 56).  
25 See the six articles of the Regulation of Shuangcheng Relocation (Shuangcheng tunwu zhangcheng) 
compiled by Songlin 1823.6.5 (SCPTTJL, pp.70-74).  




salaries.  Therefore, Fujun and his colleague Songlin pointed out that “(we) should not 
allow civilian commoners to reside inside the small tamped mounds [note: boundaries of 
the banner villages].  (However, we) cannot do well without allowing civilian commoners 
to reside within the big tamped mounds [note: boundaries of the state farm] and farm the 
suique land as tenants.”27  By keeping civilian commoners on the salary land, the 
government secured both labor supplies and rent, which comprised a major source of local 
government revenue prior to the mid nineteenth century (Ren, Lee, and Campbell 2009).  
Fujun’s early planning of the state farm thus laid the ground for the institution of 
population categories in Shuangcheng: the banner immigrants were designated as the 
haves and allowed to reside in banner villages, while civilian commoners were designated 
as the have-nots and permitted only to work as state tenants. 
 
Recruiting banner immigrants 
The recruitment 
Compared to planning the Shuangcheng state farm, recruiting banner immigrants was 
a much harder and lengthier task.  In order to prepare Shuangcheng for the settlement of 
metropolitan bannermen, Fujun recruited banner immigrants from the rural Northeast 
provinces of Jilin and Liaoning to pave the way.28  In 1815 he arranged to move the first 
1,000 bannermen from four banner garrisons in Jilin to the central tun of Shuangcheng.29 
The recruitment soon seemed to reach a deadlock, however, as many bannermen 
abandoned the state farm shortly after their arrival. Fujun attributed their departure to the 
                                                        
27 Ibid. 
28 Fujun’s purpose was to prevent a repeat of the failure of the earlier relocation of 3,000 metropolitan 
bannermen from Beijing to Lalin, an area southeast to Shuangcheng in 1748.  The bannermen relocated 
there ended up escaping from the state farm because of their lack of knowledge and ability to farm the land. 




fact that their families were not allowed to follow them to Shuangcheng, and further 
blamed  the inadequate material compensation provided by the government.30 
Learning from these setbacks in recruiting Jilin bannermen, Fujun soon turned to 
Liaoning for solutions.  In 1817, Fujun accepted the post of the general of Shengjing.  
Although the official history does not explain his rationale, it appears that he went to 
Liaoning to recruit more banner immigrants for Shuangcheng.  In 1818, as the general of 
Shengjing, Fujun proposed to recruit 2,000 more banner immigrants from Liaoning and 
Jilin Provinces to fill the empty land in Shuangcheng.  In this memorial, Fujun claimed 
that 1,739 bannermen from Liaoning were already willing to move to Shuangcheng.31  
After the emperor approved this proposed relocation, Fujun returned to his post as general 
of Jilin in the same year to supervise their settlement in 1819 and 1820. 
At the same time, Fujun also revised the policy that only allowed the northeast 
bannermen move to Shuangcheng as individuals and instead required the bannermen to 
move with their families.  The Liaoning bannermen responded enthusiastically to this 
recruitment.  As Fujun described in his memorial: “I checked the bannermen who were 
relocated to (Shuangcheng) one by one.  A lot of them moved with their entire family.  
Some of them even moved their entire kin group, and, some even retired from active 
banner service in order to move.”32  Ultimately, a total of twelve banner garrisons in 
Liaoning and five banner garrisons in Jilin sent 3,000 households of bannermen to 
Shuangcheng (map 3.2).33  These northeast banner households were classified as “rural 
                                                        
30 See the memorial by Fujun on 1816.9.6 (SCPTTJL, p.19). 
31 See Fujun’s memorial on 1818.8.27 (SCPTTJL, p.23).  In this memorial, Fujun said: “Of the 2,000 
banner adult males designated to the two newly established tun, 1,739 are banner adult males from the 
various locations in Shengjing, who had obtained written guarantees from [their lineage members and 
village authority] of their intention to move.”  
32 See Fujun’s memorial on 1821.1.6 (SCPTTJL, p.44).  




bannermen” (tunding).  The success of the later settlement of metropolitan bannermen 
depended significantly on the contributions of this “rural” advance team. 
 
Map 3. 2 Sending communities of banner immigrants to Shuangcheng. 
Sources: the Shuangcheng banner population registers. See SCPGBTDHKDM. 
 
 
Overall, rural bannermen from Liaoning performed better than those from Jilin 
because they had prior farming experience.  While both groups served the state as soldiers, 
when soldiers were not needed, the Jilin bannermen mainly served as hunters and 
lumberjacks,34 while the Liaoning bannermen worked mainly as farmers (Ding 2003).  
Notably, bannermen from Jinzhou, Fuzhou, and Gaizhou (map 3.2) accounted for a large 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Fujun planed to relocate 1,000 households from Liaoning and a total of 2,000 households from Jilin.  The 
Jilin bannermen, however, were passive and escaped from the state farm.  Finally, Fujun had to fill the 
quota left by Jilin bannermen with Liaoning bannermen.  Therefore, in the end, the Liaoning bannermen 
outnumbered Jilin bannermen.  See Songlin’s memorial on 1822.5.15, SCPTTJL, p.55.  
34 See Songlin’s memorial, Ibid.: “All of the one thousand adult males in the central tun were from the 
various garrisons in Jilin.  They have been working as soldiers to serve the state and hunting and 
lumbering for a living.  (Thus), they are not familiar with agriculture and often escaped after arriving at 




proportion of those from Liaoning and were especially active.  These bannermen 
responded favorably to the move because their garrisons were mainly located in coastal 
areas with hilly land, important for military purposes but not ideal for farming.35  
Shuangcheng, in comparison, provided these Liaoning bannermen much better conditions 
for farming.  Songlin, who served as general of Jilin when Fujun was in Liaoning, 
described the enthusiasm of the Liaoning bannermen to emigrate to Shuangcheng: 
  “(These bannermen) were originally farmers who could not find land to farm 
because there were many people but little land.  Once they arrived in 
Shuangcheng where there is abundant land but few people, and where the land 
is fertile, they were all happy to work on the land.”36 
 
By the fifth month of 1820, all the 3,000 rural banner households had settled in 
Shuangcheng.37 
With the successful settlement of rural bannermen concluded, Fujun started to recruit 
metropolitan bannermen in 1821.38  Six days after the New Year, Fujun submitted a 
memorial to the Daoguang emperor, along with a well-planned task list and timetable for 
relocating metropolitan bannermen to Shuangcheng.39  According to Fujun’s plan, the 
court would move two hundred households every year from 1824 on, so that after fifteen 
years, 3,000 metropolitan banner households would have moved to Shuangcheng.  The 
                                                        
35 The Qing state settled the banner population in different parts of Liaoning according to their different 
functions.  The bond servants of the Imperial Household Agency, who worked as farmers and provided the 
imperial lineage members with produce from land, were located on the alluvial plains of the Liao River.  
The banner soldiers of the outer Eight Banners were located in banner garrisons which were important for 
military control.  The bannermen who were relocated from Liaoning to Shuangcheng mainly consisted of 
bannermen from the outer Eight Banners. 
36 See the memorial by Songlin on 1822.5.15.  In this memorial, Songlin included a description of the 
bannermen from Fuzhou and Gaiping, two banner garrisons close to the coastal area (SCPTTJL, p.55). 
37 See Fujun’s memorial on 1820.5.17 (JJCLFZZ, reel 138, 1883-15.) 
38 Because of the active response from the Liaoning bannermen, the 3,000 quota of rural banner 
households was soon reached in 1820.  Interestingly, this active response was not the result of a bad 
harvest.  According to James Lee and Cameron Campbell’s research, hard years for farmers in Liaoning 
began in the period 1820-1822, right after the recruitment in Liaoning was completed (Lee and Campbell 
1997). 




three-year interim between 1821 and 1824 would allow banner officials in Beijing time to 
recruit metropolitan bannermen, and provide rural bannermen time to prepare their land 
and housing.  Fujun expected that, by 1824, rural bannermen would have developed 
enough land to produce surplus crops, which could help subsidize the costs of relocating 
metropolitan bannermen.  The relocation project would then be self-sufficient and 
self-sustaining, a major achievement both for the state and for the bannermen because 
“their relocation, can relieve the burden of supporting the banner population in our interior; 
while it strengthens the frontier on our borders.”40 
The actual results of recruitment, however, threw a damp cloth over plans made by the 
emperor and Fujun.  In early 1822, the emperor found that after one year of recruiting 
efforts, only 28 metropolitan banner households had volunteered to move to Shuangcheng.  
By the end of 1823, two years later, the number of metropolitan banner volunteer 
households had only increased to 53.  As table 3.1 shows, after these first 53 households 
moved to Shuangcheng in 1824, another 77 households volunteered to move in 1825.  
Disappointed at this result, the imperial court put more effort into recruiting unemployed 
bannermen.  In a court discussion, Yinghe, the Assistant Grand Secretary, proposed that 
banner captains in Beijing circulate an order among the unemployed bannermen who had 
no property (jia wu chanye nian yi cheng ding zhi xiansan), listing all the benefits of 
moving to Shuangcheng, and threatening them with cancellations of their banner 
registration if they refused to move.41  Perhaps as a result of such efforts, 189 households 
                                                        
40 See Fujun’s memorial on 1821.1.6 (SCPTTJL, p.43). 
41 See Huangchao jingshi wenbian (the Imperial Collection of State-craft Writings), book 18, juan. 35, pp. 
33-36.  In this memorial, Yinghe proposed to explicate to metropolitan bannermen the benefits of moving 
to Shuangcheng as follows: first, these bannermen could have free state land and change their property 
status from have-nots to haves; second, the move was easy because the government would provide 
immigrants with stipends and accommodations; finally, by farming the land in Shuangcheng, these 




volunteered to move to Shuangcheng in 1826, followed by another 49 households in 1827.  
However, in the years after 1827, the number of households moving to Shuangcheng again 
significantly dropped, with only 27 households moving in 1828.42  By the end of that year, 
a total of 378 metropolitan banner households had settled in Shuangcheng.43 
 
Table 3. 1 Number of metropolitan banner households migrating to Shuangcheng and 
their household income at the time of move, 1824-1826. 
  Monthly stipend* 
Date of 
relocation  
Total # of 
households  Three taels or more   
Two or one and a 
half taels  No stipend 
   N.  Percent  N. Percent N. Percent  N. Percent 
1824  53 100  31 58.5  11 20.8   11 20.8  
1825  77 100  37 48.1  31 40.3   9 11.7  
1826  189 100  111 58.7  54 28.6   24 12.7  
            
Total  319 100  179 56.1  96 30.1   44 13.8  
Sources: The memorial and attached name lists of the metropolitan banner immigrants to Shuangcheng.  
NGTFDTYMDA, 1824.1.3, microfilm reel 52, volume 289; 1824.12, microfilm reel 52, pp. 559.  
JJCLFZZ, on 1825.10.27, microfilm reel 232, 3388-25.   
* Information of monthly stipend is from BQTZ, juan 29, 549-553. The monthly stipend in the year 1824 is 
calculated by adding up all the stipends the household members received because the name list for 1824 
contains detailed information on every household member, including banner posts.  The name lists for 
1825 and 1826, however, only include the banner post of the household head.  Therefore, monthly 
stipends in 1825 and 1826 are calculated based on the household head’s monthly stipend. 
 
Government recruitment of metropolitan bannermen for Shuangcheng ended after 
1828.  In 1827, Fujun advanced to the post of the Assistant Grand Secretary and left 
Jilin.44  Although he still tried to continue the relocation project and to recruit more 
metropolitan banner households, the emperor and court officials shifted the bulk of their 
interests from this campaign.  In 1828, Fujun proposed allowing the banner captains to use 
                                                                                                                                                                     
that if they refused to move to Shuangcheng and violated the law later because of their poverty, then their 
banner registers would be cancelled.  
42 XZSL, juan. 131, QSL, book 34, p. 1178b.   
43 XZSL, juan. 146, QSL, book 35, p. 244a.  The number of households volunteering to move to 
Shuangcheng, according to the annual reports, sums to 389.  However, some bannermen died on their way 
to Shuangcheng, and some changed their minds and escaped (for an example, see JJCLFZZ, reel 232, 
3388-8).  Therefore, only 376 households ultimately settled in Shuangcheng. 




coercion to secure enough banner migrants to fill the annual quota of two-hundred 
households.45  It seems that the emperor and other officials did not follow up on Fujun’s 
coercive recruitment plan.  Instead, the emperor started to recruit bannermen in Rehe, a 
garrison north of Beijing, to fill the relocation quota.46  In 1829, Boqitu, the general of 
Jilin and Fujun’s successor, memorialized to reduce the quota of metropolitan banner 
households from 3,000 to 1,000.  The emperor approved Boqitu’s proposal and moved his 
attention away from the relocation project.  In 1830, more than one hundred banner 
households moved from Rehe to Shuangcheng.  After 1830, banner households still 
sporadically arrived in Shuangcheng from both Beijing and Rehe, with a total of 598 
metropolitan banner households settling there by 1843.47  By 1852, the local government 
reported that the number of metropolitan bannermen households in Shuangcheng had 
reached 698.48 
                                                        
45 See Fujun’s memorial on 1828.10.19 (JJCLFZZ, microfilm reel 232, 3388-47).  Fujun’s plan was as 
follows: every year, twenty banner captains under each of the Manchu banners and five banner captains 
under each of the Mongol banners should send one household from their subordinates to Shuangcheng.  
Thereby, the eight Manchu banners would have 160 households and the eight Mongol banners would have 
40 households, which, together, would fill the quota of 200. 
46 In 1829, Chengge, the Minister of the Grand Council, mentioned the situation of the bannermen in Rehe, 
saying that a banner soldier had to use his stipend to raise eight to nine household members (XZSL, book 
35, p. 508a.).  Then in 1830, the vice commander-in-chief, dutong, of Rehe Yu’en memorialized to 
relocate some of the Rehe bannermen to Shuangcheng.  The Daoguang emperor approved this request and 
the planning for relocation started in the fifth month of 1830.  See XZSL, juan.167, 1830.4, book 35, 
pp587b. and juan.169, 1830.5, book35, pp629b. 
47 See Jing’ebu’s proposal on 1844.5.7.  “Last year, we checked the five hundred and ninety-eight 
households of Metropolitan bannermen in this state farm.” (SCPTTJL, p.240) 
48 For the number of metropolitan banner households, see SCPZGYMDA, reel 163, vol. 653, pp. 191-195.  
While most of these metropolitan banner households were recruited in their place of origin and relocated to 
Shuangcheng, some households settled through different ways.  For example, in 1823, the Board of 
Revenue memorialized to keep a metropolitan bannerman named Qingde and his families, who settled in 
Shuangcheng in 1821, to fill the quota of metropolitan banner households (JJCLFZZ, reel 232, 3387-32; 
also see SCPTTJL, pp. 119-120).   According to this memorial, Qingde was imprisoned as a criminal and 
was sent to Jilin to serve the sentence in 1818, accompanied by his families.  In 1821, Qingde volunteered 
to go to Shuangcheng and therefore settled in the Central tun, where Qingde learned farming skills.  In 
1822, Qingde was released and should come back to Beijing.  However, Qingde claimed that he had 
become used to farming and would not like to quit his land in Shuangcheng.  The Board of Revenue 
therefore requested the emperor’s permission to keep Qingde’s household in Shuangcheng, treating it as a 
metropolitan household.  The 1866 population register shows that Qingde’s descendants resided in the 




State efforts to recruit more metropolitan bannermen failed in face of their 
unwillingness to move.  By the 1820s, these descendants of the banner warriors had lived 
in Beijing for more than 150 years.  Moreover, with the state stipend, they had already 
become used to luxurious city life.  Without any knowledge of farming, Shuangcheng to 
them meant a cold and remote land with a boring life on the wild frontier.  As Fujun 
vividly depicted: 
“[The metropolitan bannermen] are not willing to move because of the 
following reasons.  They think there is no opera house nor tea house or bar in 
Shuangcheng.  (They) therefore have no place for entertainment.  Moreover, 
there is also no place for them to ask for loans.  They have gotten used to a life 
of leisure and do not care about the sense of honor and livelihood, considering 
farming drudgery.”49 
 
From the above quotation, we can see that, although the Qing officials described the 
unemployed bannermen as extremely poor people without property and occupation, their 
life style was actually leisured and relatively well off. 
 
Immigrant socioeconomic profiles 
Previous studies on the social status of the Shuangcheng immigrants describe them as 
poor bannermen who had neither land nor the means to make a living.  For example, Ding 
Yizhuang describes the metropolitan bannermen who volunteered to move to Shuangcheng, 
even those who had banner posts and government stipend, as “penniless (chipin)” (Ding 
1985).  This view mainly derives from an intuitive understanding of the purpose of this 
relocation: to relieve the problem of supporting bannermen.  In fact, not only 
contemporary scholars but also the organizers of the relocation project, the emperor and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
headed by Qingde’s grandson Yingwu (the 1866 population register: SCPGBTDHKDM, reel 1834686, vol. 
218; and the 1897 three generation register of metropolitan bannermen, SCPGBTDHKDM, reel 1834666, 
vol. 68).      




the officials, identified the target population as “penniless” bannermen.  Previously, the 
government had in fact tended to assign bannermen with lower socioeconomic status to 
provincial garrisons.  As the Jiaqing emperor stated: “At times of sending bannermen in 
Beijing to banner garrisons in provinces, by all means there is no reason to first select those 
who are law-abiding and ambitious.”50   
The status of the rural bannermen recruited to Shuangcheng, however, reveals a 
different pattern.  Initially, the banner officials followed the traditional practice, selecting 
lower-status bannermen for relocation to Shuangcheng.51  In the first years of settlement, 
however, Fujun noticed that these immigrants were more likely to abandon the state farm 
and return to their places of origin because they were incapable of farming.  Therefore, 
when recruiting the Liaoning and Jilin bannermen in 1819, Fujun adjusted the recruitment 
policy to instead focus on relatively higher-status households. 
Fujun required banner officials to screen immigrants on their age and family 
background, ordering them to “select those from a large and affluent descent group with 
many adult males, so that they will not escape.”52  Fujun also required that the recruited 
bannermen in Jilin and Liaoning obtain a signed guarantee from their descent group, 
ensuring that they would not flee.  Consequently, quite a few bannermen from Liaoning 
                                                        
50 RZSL, juan. 260, QSL, book 31, p. 519a. 
51 Sending bannermen with lower economic status out is a convention in the history of the relocation of 
bannermen, and was followed in the 1819 recruitment of banner immigrants in Liaoning.  Fujun found 
that some of the immigrants sent to Shuangcheng were indeed too young or too old to farm.  Moreover, 
some immigrants were not serious farmers but people without a stable occupation and likely to seek trouble.  
For example, in 1820, the banner government in Shuangcheng sent Yichong’e, a bannerman from Fuzhou, 
and his families back and asked the general of Shengjing to punish Yichong’e (SCPTTJL, p. 113).  The 
Shuangcheng government did this because Yichong’e would not follow the official assignment to move to a 
separate village and attempted to sue the banner captain.  When the officials checked Yichong’e’s history, 
they found that Yichong’e had a bad reputation as a trouble-maker in his place of origin and was sent to 
Shuangcheng because of this.  In 1818, Yichong’e committed a minor crime and received the punishment 
of wearing a cangue for one month.  However, Yichong’e escaped and went to the office of the general of 
Shengjing to sue his banner officials.  The banner officials then decided to send Yichong’e and his 
families to Shuangcheng.  




and Jilin were from at least the middle of the social spectrum.  The settlement experience 
later verified the wisdom of these screening policies.  In 1822, when Songlin, the new 
general of Jilin, investigated the state farms, he found that the most successful settlers and 
farmers were immigrants from the coastal areas of Liaoning.  These households were 
generally large and affluent, with estates and land in their places of origin: “Every principal 
adult male [household head] had one to three assistant adult males to help with the farming.  
Some of them even cashed in their estates [in their place of origins] and bought cows and 
horses themselves, so that (they) could cultivate more land.”53 
Moreover, in the recruitment of metropolitan bannermen, Fujun also found out that, 
contrary to his original plan to recruit poor bannermen without occupation or property, 
bannermen with banner posts and state stipends were actually more likely to move.  
Originally, Fujun and the court planned to move unemployed xiansan bannermen – those 
without state stipends – to Shuangcheng.  After one year of recruitment, however, Fujun 
found that the majority of the twenty-eight banner households who first volunteered to 
move to Shuangcheng were in fact headed by bannermen with such posts as tax preceptor 
(lingcui), foot soldier (bubing), and yangyubing,54 earning monthly stipends of one and a 
half to four taels of silver plus annual grain salaries.55  Fujun concluded that the relatively 
high status of these families was due to a regulation that unmarried bannermen did not 
qualify as households and thus could not move to Shuangcheng (zhishen buzhun suan hu).  
                                                        
53 See Songlin’s memorial on 1822.5.15 (SCPTTJL, p.55).   
54 The post of yangyubing was created in the mid-eighteenth century to accommodate the increasing 
unemployed banner population, See BQTZ, book 1, pp 550-551. 
55 Bannermen with a banner post usually had two forms of salary, silver and grain.  The silver was 
distributed monthly, and the grain salary was distributed twice every year.  A vanguard (qianfeng), tax 
preceptor, military protector (hujun), and horse-soldier (mabing) had a monthly stipend of four taels of 
silver and an annual grain salary of forty-six hu (about 2,461 liters) of rice.  A foot-soldier had a monthly 
stipend of three taels of silver and an annual grain salary of twenty-two hu (about 1,177 liters) of rice.  
Only the post of yangyubing had a monthly stipend of two taels of silver without a grain salary (See BQTZ, 




This regulation excluded those who were too poor to get married from the recruitment 
pool.56  In order to accommodate unmarried bannermen, Fujun moved to loosen the 
criteria of recruitment to allow any combination of three relatives to move as a household.  
In 1825, Yinghe supported Fujun’s proposal, as it would help fill the annual quota of two 
hundred households.57  For Yinghe, the ideal recruits were Manchu and Mongol 
bannermen with monthly stipends of less than three taels.58   
Despite government efforts to recruit poor bannermen, relatively higher-status still 
accounted for the majority of metropolitan immigrants.  As table 3.1 shows, in 1824, 31 of 
the 53 initial banner households (59 percent) from Beijing had banner posts with monthly 
stipends of three taels or more plus grain salaries.  11 households had the post of 
yangyubing, which had a monthly stipend of one and a half tael of silver.  Only another 11 
households were xiansan, without any kind of state support.  Among the 31 households 
with monthly stipends of three or more taels of silver plus grain salaries, the grain salary of 
the lowest rank alone could feed a family of two adults and two children, and that of the 
highest rank could feed a family of six adults and one child.59  None of the metropolitan 
banner households moving to Shuangcheng had more than seven members, so those with 
grain salaries could have even saved some grain and used their monthly stipends for other 
purposes.  In addition to monthly stipends and grain salaries, metropolitan bannermen 
also received housing.  The state followed the banner housing standard of the eighteenth 
                                                        
56 See Fujun and Fudeng’a’s memorial on 1822.2.11 (SCPTTJL, p.51). 
57 See Yinghe’s memorial on 1825.7.11 (JJCLFZZ, microfilm, reel 232, 3388-21). 
58 See Huangchao jingshi wenbian (the Imperial Collection of State-craft Writings), book 18, juan. 35, pp. 
33-36. 
59 This calculation is based on the food rationing standard of the Qing granary system.  The Qing food 
ration followed a rate of 0.3 shi/month for adults and half this figure for children (Will and Wong 1991).  
Therefore, the 22 hu (11 shi) grain salary for a bubing could feed 3 adults for a whole year.  The 46 hu (23 




century, allocating two rooms to each bannerman with a cavalry post or higher.60  By the 
nineteenth century, some banner soldiers had sold their estates for money and become 
impoverished through extravagant spending.  While most were still able to afford a fair 
living in Beijing,61 bannermen with monthly stipends of only one and a half taels of silver 
might have found it difficult to support large households.  In the 1820s, one and a half 
taels of silver could purchase 0.7 to 0.8 shi of wheat or millet in Zhili, which was enough to 
feed a family of three (two adults and a child).62  Yet their situation was still better than the 
situation of unemployed xiansan bannermen without state stipends, who, nonetheless, 
accounted for only 21 percent of the first group of metropolitan banner households moving 
to Shuangcheng.   
Even after the court revised the relocation regulation in 1825, the pattern of high SES 
composition of the metropolitan immigrants persisted.  As table 3.1 shows, in that year, 37 
of the 77 households (48 percent) had a monthly stipend of three taels or more plus grain 
salary, and 31 households (41 percent) had a monthly stipend of one and a half taels of 
                                                        
60 DQHDSL, juan. 136, pp 10-11. Also see Liu Xiaomeng’s research on housing transaction of the 
bannermen in Beijing (Liu 1998c). 
61 While previous studies on the livelihood problem of the eight banners have identified the pauperization 
of the banner soldiers, it is still not clear that beginning in which period this pauperization became a really 
serious issue.  As Wei Qingyuan and Mark Elliott summarized, the poverty of bannermen was reflected in 
four major developments: government cuts and restrictions on their financial support, the increase of the 
banner population, the loss of landed property for some bannermen, and the corruption of some banner 
officials, which caused some banner soldiers not only to sell their gain salaries in exchange for instant 
money, but also to mortgage their future salary for loans (Elliott 2001; Wei 1995).  Some bannermen also 
sold their allocated banner land, and some even sold their weapons and equipment.  The above 
phenomena, although reflecting the deterioration of the financial status and living conditions of some 
bannermen, did not necessarily mean they were poorer than the average population of Beijing.  As the 
Qing emperors and officials described, most of these bannermen fell into poverty through extravagant 
spending and the pursuit of a luxurious life.  Moreover, in his recent research on the life of bannermen in 
Beijing, Liu Xiaomeng provided more detailed evidence and analyses on the povertization of the banner 
population (2008).  However, most evidence of the hardship of banner soldiers’ life only emerged after the 
mid-nineteenth century.  Therefore, in the 1820s, the banner soldiers probably could still live a better life 
than average people in Beijing.  
62 Data for grain prices come from Lilian Li’s research on famine relief in North China (Li 2007).  In 





silver.  Only 9 households in that year had no state stipend.  In 1826, the socioeconomic 
composition of the Beijing immigrants remained the same as in 1824 and 1825; 111 of the 
189 households had a monthly stipend of three or more taels of silver plus grain salary.  
Moreover, 9 households even had a total of thirteen servants.  Therefore, from 1824 to 
1827, of the 389 households that moved to Shuangcheng, 56 percent could have continued 
to live a decent life in Beijing. 
These higher-status bannermen, mainly middle- to low-rank banner officials and 
soldiers, chose to move to Shuangcheng to enjoy greater social mobility.  Although they 
were assured a living, the banner hierarchy and wealth stratification in Beijing significantly 
restricted their social mobility.  In contrast to the high-rank officials, imperial lineage 
members, and rich people who owned several thousand hectares of land in the suburbs, 
these bannermen were nobody.63  The city life in Beijing was therefore a golden cage to 
those who were ambitious and desirous of greater power and prestige.  Moving to 
Shuangcheng provided these bannermen with opportunities to rise to the top of society.  
Although Shuangcheng was a backward rural frontier, these metropolitan bannermen 
enjoyed life as managerial landlords, with abundant land, state-supplied housing, and rural 
bannermen to serve as laborers.  
When recruitment concluded in 1830, the 3,698 households of banner immigrants 
included bannermen with a wide variety of backgrounds in terms of place of origin, 
lifestyle, and social status.  Their places of origin ranged from urban Beijing to rural 
Liaoning and Jilin.  In terms of socioeconomic status, metropolitan bannermen were in 
general better off than their rural counterparts.  Situated inside the metropolis, they 
                                                        
63 The wealth stratification among metropolitan bannermen had intensified since the mid-eighteenth 
century.  While many banner officials and soldiers sold their land and housing, other bannermen managed 




enjoyed all the cultural and economic benefits a big city could provide.  Despite the Qing 
document that described the unemployed xiansan bannermen in Beijing as destitute 
paupers who could not make ends meet, these bannermen were still able to have leisurely 
city lives, with, if not their own money, borrowed money.   
At the same time, differences in lifestyle and social status not only divided 
metropolitan and rural bannermen, but also persisted within each of the two population 
categories.  For example, the Liaoning bannermen were often experienced farmers, while 
most of the Jilin bannermen were still unfamiliar with farming.  Moreover, metropolitan 
bannermen included both former banner officials with monthly stipends of four taels plus 
grain salaries and xiansan without banner posts.  The next challenge for Fujun and the 
court officials, therefore, was to settle this heterogeneous population in rural Shuangcheng. 
 
Settling the population 
The work of settling the immigrants in Shuangcheng lasted more than thirty years 
from 1815 to 1844 and beyond.  Beginning with the settlement of the first 1,000 
individual Jilin bannermen in 1815, the state closely inspected every stage of the process.  
Especially after the arrival of metropolitan bannermen in Shuangcheng in 1824, the 
Daoguang emperor frequently sent imperial envoys to investigate the site to ensure their 
smooth transition to rural life.  As late as 1844, court officials were still discussing 
policies to relieve the hardships faced by metropolitan bannermen in adjusting to their lives 
as landlords in rural Shuangcheng.  Under the intense care of enthusiastic officials, the 
settlement of the Shuangcheng state farm included elements of both state-organized 






To settle these banner immigrants, the state invested huge amounts of money in 
preparing the basics of housing, farming and living, and paying relocation stipends.  The 
two generals of Jilin, Fujun and Songning, carefully planned the relocation budget, which 
included not only the cost of building new houses, but also the cost of farming tools, draft 
animals, and such basic living goods as pots and bowls.  In addition to the expense of 
preparing homes and farms, each metropolitan banner household was also given thirty taels 
of silver with which to hire laborers on the state farm.  In comparison, each Liaoning rural 
banner household received only eight taels of silver, and each Jilin rural banner household 
received just four taels of silver as relocation stipend.  As table 3.2 shows, the total 
moving expenditure for a metropolitan banner household was 200 taels of silver, while 
expenditures for banner households from Rehe, Liaoning, and Jilin ranged from 45 to 49 
taels of silver.  According to Fujun’s budget, moving 2,000 Liaoning and Jilin banner 
households in 1820 alone cost 94,090 taels of silver, and relocating all 3,698 households 
would cost about 272,000 taels of silver,64 which was even greater than the budget of some 
populous provinces inside China Proper.65  In addition to the expenses paid to and for the 
immigrants, establishing the local government cost 46,364 taels of silver.66   
 
                                                        
64 See Fujun’s memorial on 1818.12.6 (SCPTTJL, pp. 33-37). 
65 The provincial budget of Anhui in 1729 was 179,244 taels of silver (Zelin, 1984, 158-159), about 
100,000 taels less than the budget of relocating bannermen to Shuangcheng. Even after taking the possible 
rise in price in the nineteenth century into consideration, the expense on the relocation project is still 
extrodinary. 




Table 3. 2 Government budget for relocation and settlement, per household. 
  The places of origin of banner immigrants 
  Beijing Rehe Liaoning  Jilin 
Housing 120 6 6  6 
Farming and living basics 50 35.045 35.045  35.045 
Moving stipend 30 8 8  4 
Total 200 49.045 49.045  45.045 
 Sources: The budget attached to Fujun’s memorial on 1821.1.6 (SCPTTJL, 43) and the budget attached to 
Fujun’s memorial on 1818.12.6 (SCPTTJL,35). XZSL, juan. 167, 1830.4, book 35, pp587b. 
 
The state counted on both government revenue and the rent collected from state land 
in Shuangcheng to finance the relocation.  As Fujun planned, the settlement and farming 
costs for the first ten years came from the tax collected from ginseng merchants, a major 
source of revenue for the Imperial Household Agency.67  Three years after its opening, 
rural bannermen would begin to pay rent for part of the land they farmed.  Thereby, in ten 
years, rent income would offset settlement expenses.  Moreover, from the eleventh year 
on, the state farm would become self-sufficient and even generate a surplus.68 
The huge investment in government care indicates the importance of the Shuangcheng 
state farm.  First, compared to other state farms in Qing history, the Shuangcheng 
relocation was better financed.  In the beginning of the Qing dynasty, the state had tried to 
establish a series of state farms on the wastelands of North, South, and Southwest China.  
In these projects, the government did not provide farmers with stipends, but only promised 
loans to finance the acquisition of farming basics.  The financial sources of promised 
                                                        
67 In the Qing, the Imperial Household Agency (neiwufu) controlled the collection and sale of ginseng.  
Jilin Province is a major site for ginseng collection.  The Jilin provincial government therefore controlled 
one important source of the revenue of the Imperial Household Agency.  The type of money Fujun used to 
subside the relocation expense was “shenyu yin,” a special tax collected from merchants who bought 
ginseng from the collectors.  Depending on the quality of the ginseng they bought, merchants had to pay 
up to 20 taels (760 grams) of silver for each tael of ginseng.  The estimated income from “shenyu yin” in 
Jilin Province was 30,000 to 40,000 taels of silver (Song and Wang 1991).  




loans, however, were such unstable revenue streams as fines from official salaries (Guo 
1997).  Moreover, in other military state farms established in Xinjiang and Sichuan, the 
state only invested in one-time funding for the purchase of farming basics (Wang, Liu, and 
Guo 1991).  The settlement of the Shuangcheng state farm, in contrast, had solid financial 
support from the revenue of the Imperial Household Agency (neiwufu).   
Second, compared to other Qing immigration projects, the banner immigrants to 
Shuangcheng had much better governmental care.69  In the government-organized 
migration to the Southwest frontier in the eighteenth century, the government gave each 
immigrant household only twelve taels of silver as start-up funds.  This twelve-tael 
stipend was expected to equip a family of four for over a year.70  In Shuangcheng, 
however, the government provided immigrants with housing and basic living and farming 
essentials together with transportation and accommodation on their route to 
Shuangcheng.71  In addition to all the above, the immigrants were given relocation 
stipends to start their lives in Shuangcheng.  The state treated metropolitan bannermen 
especially well.  While rural bannermen only had thatched houses worth six taels of silver, 
metropolitan bannermen were given four-room houses with walled yards, which cost 120 
taels of silver (table 3.2).  While every four households of rural bannermen shared a set of 
farming supplies, consisting of four cows and a plow, each metropolitan banner household 
                                                        
69 The only comparable immigration is the relocation of 3,000 metropolitan banner households to Lalin 
from 1742 to 1758.  In this relocation, the government provided housing for the Metropolitan bannermen, 
but did not provide living and farming basics.  Instead, the government gave each household forty taels of 
silver as a relocation stipend, and, after their arrival, fifty taels of silver as start-up funds to buy farming 
and living essentials (Ding 1985).  
70 Cite from James Lee’s manuscript on southwest China (Forthcoming). 
71 All the Metropolitan bannermen and most of the Liaoning and Jilin bannermen moved to Shuangcheng 
in groups under government supervision.  Each Metropolitan banner household was provided a wagon.  
Several officials accompanied the wagon trains and provided accommodation along the way.  The 
memorial of Jiang Jikuo, 1824.2.2, JJCLFZZ microfilm reel 232, 3387-38; Lucheng, 1825.3.7, JJCLFZZ 




had its own set of farming supplies.  Moreover, the Metropolitan bannermen had 
relocation stipends of thirty taels of silver, with which they were expected to hire two rural 
bannermen as long-term laborers.72  In addition, for the first five years in Shuangcheng, 
each metropolitan banner household also had a stipend of twelve strings of copper coins 
with which to purchase clothes.  
 
Settlement 
The major settlement of these banner immigrants took place from 1815 to 1830.  The 
3,000 rural banner households arrived in Shuangcheng in three waves in 1815, 1819, and 
1820.  The first 1,000 individual rural bannermen from Jilin who arrived in 1815 were 
assigned to villages in the central tun; the additional 2,000 rural banner households from 
Jilin and Liaoning who arrived in 1819 and 1820 were assigned to villages in the left and 
right tun.  Upon arrival, the state allocated a plot of village land to each banner household.  
Fujun sized the villages to accommodate 24 to 28 rural banner households each.  Villages 
for 24 households spread about 0.25 square kilometers, and those for 28 households spread 
0.3 square kilometers.  Surrounding the villages, the bannermen built entrenchments to 
mark their borders.  From 1824 on, the government assigned metropolitan bannermen into 
the 40 villages of the central tun.  Rural bannermen ultimately settled in all 120 villages, 
while metropolitan bannermen settled only in the 40 villages of the central tun.   
As early as the planning stage, Fujun had designed the villages to include both rural 
                                                        
72 In 1822, Songlin, the general of Jilin, had planned to hire rural bannermen as laborers to farm the land 
for metropolitan bannermen.  The wage for the hired labor was 3,000 copper coins each year (the 
memorial of Songlin on 1822.7.12, SCPTTJL, p 58).  In 1825, Fujun reported that the Jilin Provincial 
government changed the thirty taels of silver into copper coins and used the money to hire labor for the 
Metropolitan bannermen.  The thirty taels of silver hired two long-term laborers with 12,100 copper coins 




northeastern and urban Beijing banner immigrants.  In the 40 villages of the central tun, he 
paired residences of rural bannermen with those of metropolitan bannermen.73  The living 
area for each pair of rural and metropolitan banner households occupied 4,444 square 
meters, of which the rural banner household had 2,000 and the metropolitan banner 
household had 2,400 square meters.74  Fujun matched rural and metropolitan bannermen 
in this way because he hoped that the experienced farmers from Northeast China would 
help the metropolitan bannermen farm and settle down.75 
The early planning produced a remarkable heterogeneity in the Shuangcheng banner 
villages.  When settling rural bannermen, the government scattered households from the 
same banner administration and descent group and thereby destroyed most previous social 
ties among rural bannermen.  In most resettlement projects, the government settled 
immigrants in homogeneous groups by place of origin, village, and descent group, using 
the authority of these organic units as a convenient way to organize and control immigrants.  
The settlement experiences in other parts of the world also demonstrate that settlement is 
more likely to succeed if new social organizations are quickly established at the destination 
(Colson 1971; Guggenheim and Cernea 1993).  The settlement of bannermen in 
Shuangcheng, however, ignored not only immigrants’ previous lineage organizations, but 
also their previous banner affiliation.  As table 3.3 shows, only two of the 120 villages had 
                                                        
73 Fujun had planned to mix the residences of rural and metropolitan bannermen in the right and left tun as 
well.  Yet due to the topographical constraints, the villages in the right and left tun were not as regularly 
shaped as those in the central tun.  The pairing of the residences of the rural and metropolitan bannermen 
was not carried out.  In the end, because the quota of metropolitan bannermen was cut to 1,000, no 
metropolitan banner households settled in the right or left tun. 
74 In addition to the space Fujun planned for the Liaoning and Jilin bannermen’s housing, he also reserved 
extra space for each household to expand its residence in the future to accommodate the increasing 
population. See the memorial of Fujun on 1822.7.4, SCPTTJL, p.61. 
75 In his initial planning of the Shuangcheng state farm, Fujun had planned to mix rural bannermen with 
metropolitan bannermen: “Indenting the metropolitan bannermen’s [residence] with that of rural bannermen 
in Shuangcheng makes it easy [for metropolitan bannermen] to learn farming and work with rural 





homogeneous populations; the households of these two villages belonged to the same 
banner captain at their places of origin.  In contrast, 76 villages (63.3 percent of the 120) 
contained households from 11 to 22 different banner captains.  Thus, on average, in each 
village only two or three households were from the same banner administration back in 
their places of origin.  The state apparently used this heterogeneous residential 
arrangement intentionally to undercut rural bannermen’s previous social organizations.  
 
Table 3. 3 The diversity of Shuangcheng banner villages, measured by rural bannermen’s 
banner affiliation in their places of origin, 1866-1869. 
N. of banner 




1 2 1.7 
2-5 19 15.8 
6-10 23 19.2 
11-15 58 48.3 
16-20 17 14.2 
21-22 1 0.8 
   
Total 120 100.0 
  Sources: the 1866 rural banner population registers (SCPGBTDHKDM, reel 1834661, vol. 3 and 4; reel 
1834686, vol. 209, 210, and 216) and the 1869 banner population register of the rural bannermen of the left 
wing of the Central tun (SCPGBTDHKDM, reel 1834662, vol.17).  I chose the population registers in the 
1860s in the analysis because the distribution of households in this period was most close to the situation in 
the early stage of the state farm. 
  *In this table, the number of different banner administration was identified by immigrants’ place of 
origin, immigrants’ original banner affiliation, and the name of the captain the household originally 
belonged to.   
 
Although not directed by government intentions, metropolitan banner households 
were also diffused across the forty villages in which they settled.  This diffusion initially 
resulted from slow progress in land opening.  In 1822, Songlin, the general of Jilin, found 
that the land cleared by the rural bannermen in the central tun was limited, and the land 




household.76  Songlin thus memorialized to assign the first 53 metropolitan banner 
households evenly among the 40 villages of the central tun, with one or two households in 
each village, so that all the rural banner households in a village could work together to clear 
enough land to support the one or two metropolitan banner households.  However, Fujun 
allowed the 77 metropolitan banner households who arrived in 1825 to settle in the same 
village as their relatives and friends who had moved to Shuangcheng in 1824, hoping to 
strengthen social ties among metropolitan bannermen and smooth the transition to their 
new lives.77  Despite Fujun’s effort, due to their relatively small number, the metropolitan 
banner households were still scattered.  As table 3.4 shows, in 1866, with only one 
exception,78 the metropolitan bannermen in each village came from at least five different 
banner administrations.  In 30 villages, the metropolitan immigrants came from 6 to 10 
banner administrations, which accounted for 73.2 percent of the 41 villages that contained 
metropolitan banner households.  The metropolitan bannermen in another 8 villages came 
from 11 to 15 different banner administrations.  Given the fact that the mean of 
metropolitan banner households in each village was 12, the settlement of metropolitan 
bannermen was also heterogeneous. 
                                                        
76 See the memorial of Songlin on 1822. 7.20 (SCPTTJL, p.60). 
77 In Fujun’s memorial on 1825.3.9, he reported that in 1825, when settling the metropolitan bannermen 
who arrived that year, the officials asked the newcomers whether they had relatives or friends who had 
arrived in the previous year and, if there were any, the officials would settle them into the same village.  
However, because each banner administration in Beijing only sent a handful of immigrants, there was no 
strong social organization among metropolitan banner immigrants. 
78 The only village of which the metropolitan banner households came from the same banner captain in 
their place of origin is an exceptional case.  While, according to the official document, all metropolitan 
bannermen were settled to the 40 villages of the central tun, in the 1866 population registers, two 
households with a place of origin of Beijing resided in the third village of the Bordered White bannermen 
of the Right tun (SCPGBTDHKDM, reel 1834661, vol. 4).  These two households, headed by Jizhang and 
Jizeng, were from the same descent group (see the 1903 three generation register of the Bordered Red 
banner, SCPGBTDHKDM, reel 1834712, vol. 428).  Although these two households were noted with a 
Beijing origin, each only had 18.33 shang of jichan land, the standard amount of rural bannermen (see the 
1876 land register, SCPGBTDHKDM, reel 1834696, vol. 285).  Therefore, these two households were 




Table 3. 4 The diversity of Shuangcheng banner villages, measured by metropolitan 
bannermen’s banner affiliation in their places of origin, 1866. 
N. of banner 




1 1 2.4 
5 2 4.9 
6-10 30 73.2 
11-15 8 19.5 
   
Total 41 100.0 
Sources: the 1866 metropolitan banner population registers (SCPGBTDHKDM, reel 1834661, vol. 4; reel 
1834686, vol. 218). 
 
This heterogeneous settlement in Shuangcheng favored metropolitan bannermen.  In 
contrast to rural bannermen, who had been used to a homogeneous social environment, 
metropolitan bannermen had been familiar with this heterogeneous residential 
arrangement back in Beijing.  Although the Qing government had initially assigned 
Beijing residents into zones on the basis of their ethnicity and banner affiliation, the 
residential boundaries had been blurred since the early eighteenth century (Liu 1998b).  
By the early nineteenth century, metropolitan bannermen in Beijing had grown accustomed 
to residing not only with bannermen of different banner affiliations but also with civilian 
commoners.  For metropolitan bannermen, the social setting in Shuangcheng was no more 
heterogeneous than that in Beijing and thus was easy to adjust to.   
Moreover, dismantling preexisting social organizations among rural bannermen was 
an indispensable step toward preventing potential resistance from the rural bannermen to 
the hierarchical population categories that established metropolitan bannermen as the top 
elite.  For the state, the purpose of the Shuangcheng settlement was not to simply transport 




on a hierarchy of state-designed population categories, with metropolitan bannermen at the 
top and rural bannermen providing continuous support to the top elite.  The previous 
social organizations – lineage and banner community – comprised potential threats to the 
hierarchy of state categories, as these organizations could generate powerful resistance to 
joining metropolitan bannermen, who were neither familiar to the rural environment nor 
backed up by strong lineage organizations.  Therefore, dismantling previous social 
organizations among rural bannermen excluded any power structure that could generate 
potential resistance to the state-created social order. 
By the same token, the banner villages also had a heterogeneous ethnic composition.  
Banner immigrants to Shuangcheng included a total of six ethnic groups: the four common 
ethnicities in the banner system (Manchu, Mongol, Han, and Xibe) and two small ethnic 
groups (Taimanzi and Baerhu).79  As table 3.5 shows, Manchu and Han were the two 
biggest ethnic groups; the Manchu accounted for 48.5 percent and the Han accounted for 
32.2 percent of the banner households.  The Xibe and Mongol, which respectively 
accounted for 11 percent and 7.5 percent of the banner households, were relatively smaller 
ethnic groups in Shuangcheng.  In addition to the above four common ethnic groups, the 
two small ethnic groups of Taimanzi and Baerhu were represented by only a handful of 
households.   
                                                        
79 Baerhu was a Mongol ethnic group originating in the area of today’s Mongolia.  In 1691, the Baerhu 
chief submitted to the Kangxi emperor and was enrolled into the Eight Banners.  In 1692, 5,000 Baerhu 








bannermen   Rural bannermen   Total 
  N. Percent   N. Percent   N. Percent 
Manchu 406 81.0  1,335 43.2  1,741 48.5 
Mongol 91 18.2  178 5.8  269 7.5 
Xibe 4 0.8  390 12.6  394 11.0 
Han    1,157 37.5  1,157 32.2 
Taimanzi    4 0.1  4 0.1 
Baerhu    16 0.5  16 0.4 
Unkown    9 0.3  9 0.3 
         
Total 501 100.0   3,089 100.0   3,590 100.0 
Sources: the 1866 rural banner population registers (SCPGBTDHKDM, reel 1834661, vol. 3 and 4; reel 
1834686, vol. 209, 210, 216, and 218) and the 1869 banner population register of the rural bannermen of 
the left wing of the Central tun (SCPGBTDHKDM, reel 1834662, vol.17).   
 
 
While in other regions of China Proper the banner administration organized 
bannermen of different ethnicities separately, the Shuangcheng settlement mixed different 
ethnicities in the same village.  As table 3.6 shows, most banner villages in Shuangcheng 
consisted of two or more ethnic groups.  If we consider the four common ethnic groups, 
only 11 villages had a unitary ethnic component, accounting for 9.2 percent of the 120 
banner villages.  50 villages (41.7 percent) had three ethnic groups, and 41 villages (34.2 
percent) had four ethnic groups.  Moreover, if we take Taimanzi and Baerhu into 
consideration, the number of villages with four ethnic groups increased to 44 (36.7 percent).  
The heterogeneous ethnic composition of banner villages, if not a state design, at least 
indicated that ethnicity was not a principle in organizing bannermen in Shuangcheng, a 





Table 3. 6 Number of ethnicities in the banner villages of Shuangcheng, 1866-1869. 
The four major 





villages Percent  
N. of 
villages Percent 
      
1 11 9.2  11 9.2 
2 18 15.0  18 15.0 
3 50 41.7  43 35.8 
4 41 34.2  44 36.7 
5    4 3.3 
      
Total 120 100.0   120 100.0 
Sources: the 1866 rural banner population registers (SCPGBTDHKDM, reel 1834661, vol. 3 and 4; reel 
1834686, vol. 209, 210, 216, and 218) and the 1869 banner population register of the rural bannermen of 
the left wing of the Central tun (SCPGBTDHKDM, reel 1834662, vol.17).   
 
 
The heterogeneous settlement of Shuangcheng banner immigrants exemplified the 
state’s efforts to clear the existing social boundaries between immigrants and thereby to 
enforce the new boundary between the state-created categories of metropolitan and rural 
bannermen.  In this sense, this designed heterogeneity in fact marked a process of 
homogenization.  By mixing immigrants from various descent groups, banner 
administrations, and ethnicities, the state intentionally extenuated all previous social 
boundaries and delivered the message that in Shuangcheng the previous social categories – 
lineage, banner community, and ethnicity – were no longer important.  Within the frame 
of the metropolitan-rural hierarchy, all immigrant households were equal.  This state 








immigrants, Fujun focused on building new social organizations and institutions.  When 
planning the state farm villages, he intentionally built the five villages in each banner as 
new communities that would replace the immigrants’ old social organizations.  Fujun 
evenly distributed the five villages over the land allocated to each banner.  As map 3.1 
shows, the first village in each banner was located in the center; the other four villages 
surrounded the first village at the four corners.  This distribution of banner villages 
resembled the shape of a plum blossom.  Fujun designed this distribution to ensure that the 
distances between these villages were equal; each village was 5 li (2.9 kilometers) away 
from its neighbors.  This even spacing facilitated both state control and self-surveillance 
between villages.  With the efforts of Fujun and subsequent officials, close bonds 
developed in these five-village units.  Not only have the village distributions sustained 
themselves to the present day, but the close bond of the five villages in each banner created 
a broader sense of community among the villagers.  In 1934, the Japanese field 
investigator Komekura Jirou reported that in Shuangcheng, on occasions of local sacrifices 
and festivals, the five villages in each banner participated in celebrations together as a 
community (1941). 
In addition to creating new communities, Fujun also worked hard to establish a 
reliable and capable local government.  In 1819, Fujun found that the banner officials 
assigned to Shuangcheng were incapable of settling and controlling the immigrants; by 
then, four years after the settlement of the first 1,000 individual bannermen from Jilin, 
these bannermen had neither cleared enough land nor built enough houses to accommodate 
themselves.  He therefore asked the Jiaqing emperor to assign some cashiered 




former magistrate Dou Xinchuan.  Dou Xinchuan, a native of Shanxi Province, was a 
typical Han-Chinese official who had attained his position through the civil service exam.80  
Since 1801, Dou had worked in the posts of magistrate in Jiangxi, Shengjing, and Hebei 
provinces and was experienced in local governance.  When Fujun worked as the general 
of Shengjing, he had worked with Dou and trusted his ability.  Fujun therefore requested 
to send Dou to Shuangcheng to supervise the settlement.81  In 1820, Fujun also demoted 
and removed some banner officials in Shuangcheng for their inability to organize the 
settlement.82   
With Dou’s assistance, the settlement of rural bannermen made significant progress, 
ensuring the subsequent smooth settlement of metropolitan bannermen.  Instead of 
assigning Dou to a formal official post in the local government, Fujun appointed him to 
work as Fujun’s representative.  Dou took charge of all the basic settlement work, 
including residential construction for the immigrants, building the granary system, and 
recruiting merchants to Shuangcheng to produce construction supplies and thereby reduce 
government expenditure.  Moreover, Dou also diligently visited all 120 villages to 
investigate and resolve any problems the immigrants faced in living or farming.  When the 
first group of metropolitan bannermen arrived in Shuangcheng in 1824, they found a total 
of 1,164 households of rural bannermen from Jilin and 1,836 households of rural 
bannermen from Liaoning.83  These rural bannermen from Northeast China had already 
opened a total of 22,841 shang (42,027.4 hectares) of land.  In contrast to the barren 
                                                        
80 QSG, book 37, juan 342, p. 11122.  Also see Fujun’s memorials on 1819.8.1 and 1822.1.11, in which 
Fujun introduced Dou’s career history (SCPTTJL, pp. 38, 46).  
81 In 1818, Dou was dismissed from his position because he failed to maintain a good road condition for 
the emperor’s tour. Ibid. 
82 See the memorial of Fujun on 1820.5.17, SCPTTJL, p.41. 





landscape of 1815, by 1824 the three tun of Shuangcheng had seen the erection of forty 
shops, including four wineries and seven grocery stores.  Moreover, the government also 
built one charity granary (yicang) in each tun and an additional public granary (gongcang) 
in the central tun.84  These granaries loaned seeds to the farmers, ensuring timely farming 
in good times and providing famine relief in bad times.  
The government offered even more attention and assistance to the settlement of 
metropolitan bannermen.  In 1832, the government established a separate wing, the 
Metropolitan Banner Wing (jingqi yi), to administer them.85  It took an especially long 
time for metropolitan bannermen to adjust to the rural environment.  In 1844, Jing’ebu, 
the imperial envoy sent by the Daoguang emperor, completed a site investigation and 
reported that, of the 598 metropolitan households, only 228 households had sufficient food 
but no clothes and could thus be considered poor.  The remaining 370 households were 
better off and could afford both food and clothes.86   
These state efforts finally succeeded.  By 1869, while 225 of the 698 metropolitan 
banner households had died out or abandoned the state farm, 473 households had survived 
and settled in for the long term.  In 1869, 225 new households were created from the 
existing 473 households to fill the quota of 698.  In 1878, another 302 households were 
created from the existing metropolitan banner households.  The population of 
metropolitan bannermen almost doubled from 2,359 in 1869 to 4,599 in 1912.  This 
growth rate was higher than that of the rural bannermen, whose population increased from 
                                                        
84 Ibid. 
85 See the report of survey of the Shuangcheng area on 1864.6.28 (SCPZGYMDA, reel 158, vol. 628, 
p.155). 




27,028 in 1869 to 43,948 in the 1910s, a 62.7 percent increase.87   
The success of Shuangcheng continues to the present day.  By 1985, Shuangcheng 
had a population of 800,000 people and had become an important site of grain production.  
In 1982, when Nestle Inc. sought to invest in a dairy in China, the Chinese government 
included Shuangcheng as one of the proposed sites.  In 1986, the county government 
signed an agreement with Nestle to jointly invest in a dairy in Shuangcheng, which became 
the first dairy Nestle established in China and its largest dairy outside of Europe.  Since 
2000, Shuangcheng has been among the top 10 counties in China in grain production. 
 
Conclusion: the state role in settlement 
Shuangcheng’s settlement history illustrates the state’s determination to relocate the 
bannermen and organize them into new population categories.  The state faced 
tremendous difficulties at all the three stages – planning, recruitment, and settlement.  
Despite all the difficulties, the state succeeded in settling the population.  Even the failure 
in the recruitment of metropolitan bannermen did not prevent the state from bringing the 
state farm to reality.88  The Shuangcheng settlement represented the state’s ambition in 
institution building: this settlement brought in bannermen with diverse origins and 
contrasting lifestyles; while settling this population, the state simultaneously eliminated 
the previous social boundaries between these immigrants and built a new social order on 
the hierarchy of metropolitan bannermen, rural bannermen, and civilian commoners. 
The ambitious plan created its own challenges, making the settlement of Shuangcheng 
                                                        
87 The population data for the rural bannermen come from population registers in 1909-1912. 
88 While previous studies characterized the Shuangcheng settlement as a failure because of the inability to 
meet the recruitment quota for metropolitan bannermen, my study reveals that failure in recruitment did not 
prevent success in settlement.  From the perspective of settlement, the small number of metropolitan 
households in fact reduced the government’s burden in settling these urban families, which was obviously 




a unique case in population resettlement history both for its planned heterogeneity and for 
its intentional mix of urban-rural and rural-rural immigrants.  From the perspective of the 
classic framework of resettlement studies, the difficulties of the Shuangcheng resettlement 
should have been overwhelming.  First of all, the metropolitan bannermen’s transition 
from an urban lifestyle to a rural one was stressful.  In contrast to most other resettlement 
projects in the world, which involve only rural-to-rural migration, the metropolitan 
bannermen had to move to a frontier region more than one thousand kilometers away and 
moreover from a city to an unpopulated countryside.  Even in rural-to-rural migrations, 
anthropologists and sociologists have identified tremendous stress created by the 
relocation on immigrants’ adjustment to new social and physical environments (Colson 
1971; Scudder and Colson 1982).  Therefore, as urban-to-rural migrants, the metropolitan 
bannermen faced an even harder adjustment to rural life.   
The metropolitan bannermen’s adaptation to their new environment did take a long 
time.  In 1870-1890, half a century after their initial settlement, male mortality rates were 
still higher for metropolitan bannermen than for rural bannermen in all age groups except 
the old (Chen, Campbell, and Lee 2006).  The infants and children of metropolitan 
bannermen were especially vulnerable; the mortality rate for metropolitan banner children 
at ages 1-2 was three times that of their rural counterparts, and their mortality rate at ages 
3-10 was 1.7 times that of rural banner children.  In the period 1890-1912, the long-term 
adaptation process closed the gaps in infant mortality rates between metropolitan and rural 
bannermen; mortality rates for children aged 1-5 were eventually the same for both groups.  
The metropolitan bannermen’s mortality deficit, however, persisted in other age groups. 




Scholars studying resettlement processes have agreed on the importance of immigrants’ 
original social organizations in helping them adjust to their new environments (Scudder 
and Colson 1982; Guggenheim and Cernea 1993).  According to Scudder and Colson’s 
classic framework of resettlement processes, all immigrants will go through a “transition” 
stage.  In this stage, immigrants tend to behave conservatively and turn inwardly to such 
social organizations as household or lineage for support.  The whole community forms a 
closed social system (Scudder and Colson 1982; Scudder 1985).  In the settlement of the 
Shuangcheng state farm, however, none of these supporting organizations exited.  The 
immigrants to Shuangcheng were not only a mix of urban and rural populations from 
various locations, but also were moved and settled by household rather than lineage or 
village.  From the inception of the relocation, the state had intended to create a “great 
commonality” in the banner villages by eliminating the previous social boundaries of 
lineage, banner administration, and ethnicity.  In so doing, the state cleared the ground for 
its own institution of population category.  This ambitious move, however, challenged the 
state’s ability to organize and control the heterogeneous population as the sole authority. 
Yet, from a long-term perspective, the resettlement of the Shuangcheng state farm was 
indeed successful.  Scudder and Colson consider a resettlement successful if the 
immigrants manage to adapt to the environment, seeking new opportunities and exhibiting 
more individualism and, accordingly, if the authority of previous social organizations 
weakens.  This successful settlement, characterized as “potential development,” usually 
occurs after the “transition” stage (Scudder and Colson 1982; Scudder 1985).  In 
Shuangcheng, the state weakened the authority of previous social organizations far in 




to confront the “potential development” directly.  Both metropolitan and rural bannermen 
stayed and prospered in Shuangcheng.  The population grew and, beginning in the 1840s, 
the immigrants privately opened more land for themselves on top of what had been 
allocated to them by the state.  Stratification had emerged in the villages themselves.  As 
I will show in the following chapters, the Shuangcheng immigrants managed to tactically 
manipulate the state institution to pursue their own interests.  Moreover, Yan Yunxiang, in 
his study of village life in Shuangcheng during the 1980s and 1990s, identified a strongly 
pronounced individualism and weak family and lineage control (2003).  This weakened 
family and lineage control is probably the legacy of the government’s breaking down of 
kinship organizations.89  Furthermore, while most resettled communities in Africa and 
Southeast Asia have never reached the fourth stage of “handling over or incorporation,” 
where the resettled community achieves long-term success and is incorporated into a larger 
territorial framework and plays a role in production and commerce, Shuangcheng has been 
an important locus of grain production in Northeast China since the mid-nineteenth 
century.   
Three factors contributed to the success of Shuangcheng resettlement: the rich natural 
environment, the state’s tremendous efforts in planning, and the state’s power in institution 
building and population control.  First, Shuangcheng’s geographical conditions and fertile 
land made it a good site for resettlement.  Compared to other involuntary migrations 
where immigrants settled barren land, the high quality of land in Shuangcheng provided an 
incentive to immigrants to move and stay.  These benefits were especially attractive to the 
                                                        
89 In Yan Yunxiang’s research on changes in village life in one village in Shuangcheng from 1949 to 1999, 
he identified a strong individualism and weak patriarchal control during the socialist reform period (Yan 
2003).  He therefore concludes that it is the socialist state in its early stages that destroyed the traditional 
culture and values and patriarchal power.  Yet he neglected the historical roots of the lack of traditional 
values.  As the Qing government dispersed the immigrants’ descent groups during the settlement period, 




rural bannermen in Liaoning, a hilly region without enough arable land.  Shuangcheng’s 
spacious landscape provided the raw materials necessary for them to prosper and achieve 
upward mobility.  For metropolitan bannermen, although the settlement experience was 
intimidating, the attention paid them by the government established them as the elite in the 
state farm.  The promise of life as what China calls managerial landlords ensured the 
loyalty of metropolitan bannermen and the success of those who survived the initial 
resettlement stage. 
Second, before the settlement began in earnest, the emperor and officials had carefully 
planned the site selection, residential arrangements, and financial support.  Although the 
Chinese state had a long tradition of planning settlements, Shuangcheng has, by far the 
most detailed documentation of state efforts.  Shuangcheng thus serves as an example of 
how much the state could do and had done in many places.  It took three years (1812-1815) 
for the government to identify the site of relocation and eight years (1815-1823) to prepare 
the farming and living conditions for metropolitan bannermen.  In the eight years from 
1815 to 1823, the state successfully settled the rural bannermen and prepared land and 
housing for the metropolitan bannermen.  Therefore, by the time the metropolitan 
bannermen arrived, Shuangcheng was no longer an empty land but a well-organized rural 
society with constant supplies of labor provided by the rural banner population.   
Finally, the well-organized village institution and the dedication and experience of 
local officials also ensured the proper control of immigrants as well as their transition to 
state farm life.  Current theoretical frameworks fail to include the type of resettlement 
experience found in Shuangcheng because scholars of resettlement studies generally 




are initiated by such non-governmental organizations as the World Bank, the conventional 
view in this field presumes an oppositional relationship between the state and the 
involuntary migrants.  The presumption of an oppositional relationship is often accurate, 
as state-organized national construction projects are a major cause of involuntary 
migration (McDowell 1996).  The Shuangcheng resettlement, however, demonstrates that 
state authority could provide a major contribution to the successful settlement of 




Chapter IV    
Land Allocation, Population Registration and the Creation of Categories 
 
Throughout its history, the Chinese state’s use of political power to differentiate 
populations through resource distribution has been well known.  A contemporary example 
is the urban-rural division created by the state in the 1950s.  From the 1950s to the 1980s, 
in order to speed up the pace of industrialization, the state privileged the urban sector.  
Consequently, urban employees enjoyed stability in their wages, housing, pensions, and 
medical care, while the rural population had to depend on local farming for its livelihood.  
The state also established a strict household registration system to segregate urban and 
rural populations.  This registration system not only prevented free migration to urban 
areas, but also differentiated the entitlements of urban and rural dwellers; those with an 
urban registration had the benefits.  Despite the economic reforms launched in the late 
1970s that allowed greater geographic mobility, this urban-rural inequality has persisted to 
the present day (Solinger 1999; Wang 2008; Wu and Treiman 2004).1 
The Shuangcheng state farm offers a well-documented historical example of this 
governmental practice.  In 1814, the state established policies that would determine land 
allocation and social structure in Shuangcheng for the next century.  A total of 90,000 
shang (165,888 hectares) of uncultivated land was assigned to the official banner 
                                                        
1 This urban-rural division is the institutional background for the study of contemporary Chinese society.  
This household registration system not only created persistent inequality in access to education, medical 




immigrants, metropolitan and rural bannermen.2  Designating this land jichan (private 
property), the state allowed the banner immigrants to use their allocated plots as private 
property; they paid neither rent nor taxes and could pass the land down to their descendants.  
Through land allocation, the state endowed the banner immigrants with an elite status.  
Civilian commoners and floating bannermen, who entered this area later, were not eligible 
for jichan land.  Entitlement to this type of land, which accounted for 54 percent of 
registered farmland in Shuangcheng during the Qing dynasty,3 was an important marker of 
immigrants’ social and economic status.   
In this chapter, I examine the population categories created under the state land 
allocation policy to explore the social structure of Shuangcheng.  In so doing, I place 
metropolitan and rural bannermen, the focus of my analyses in this dissertation, in their 
social context.  While metropolitan and rural bannermen held the majority of landed 
wealth, floating bannermen and civilian commoners, by working as laborers on the land, 
were also important members of Shuangcheng society.  Moreover, I study the four 
population categories with the intention of testing an influential assumption in scholarship 
on the history of Northeast China.  Studies of the demographic and institutional history of 
Northeast China show that, by the end of the nineteenth century, the increasing civilian 
immigrant population outnumbered the banner population (Liang 1980), and that, 
                                                        
2 When measuring the land in Shuangcheng, the government used the standard of 720 bu as one mu and 
five chi (one chi in the Qing equals 0.32 meter) as one bu. See the order from the local banner government 
to the banner immigrants on 1822.10.10 (SCPTTJL, p.201).  Therefore, in Shuangcheng, one shang equals 
about 1.84 hectares. 
3 There were three major categories of land: individual-property land (jichan di), rent-paying land (nazu di), 
and salary land (suique di).  The jichan land was designated along with the establishment of the state farm.  
The nazu land was the land the immigrants farmed and registered under the government to pay rent.  The 
majority of nazu land was allocated in the 1850s.  The salary land was allocated to officials and soldiers 
with active banner posts.  In 1870, there were 90,000 shang of jichan land, 665,638.9 shang of nazu land, 
and 92,20 shang of salary land.  If we only consider the land within the borders of Shuangcheng, jichan 
land accounted for 54 percent of the farmland.  Throughout the history of Shuangcheng, jichan remained 




beginning in the late nineteenth century, the administration gradually transformed from the 
Eight Banner system to a civilian government (Fan 2007).  Drawing on the aggregate data 
that demonstrate this shift, some scholars assume that the history of Northeast China in the 
late nineteenth century is a history of the triumph of civilian immigrants; their narratives 
thus neglect the existence of banner populations (Diao and Yi 1994; Isett 2004, 2006; Yi 
1990).  In this chapter, by examining the shifting balance of population between the four 
categories in the history of Shuangcheng, I assess whether the civilian population 
outnumbered the banner population in this specific society. 
I base my analyses largely on the banner population registers and other archival 
documents.  In Shuangcheng, population registration went hand in hand with resource 
allocation to create population categories, differentiating populations and maintaining the 
boundaries between them.  The government kept separate registers for the four population 
categories: metropolitan bannermen, rural bannermen, floating bannermen, and civilian 
commoners.  Registration defined an individual’s membership in the corresponding 
category.  The population registers served as official references for land allocation; only 
those on the metropolitan and rural banner registers had access to jichan land.  I begin 
with a brief introduction of population registration in Chinese history, and then analyze the 
formation of the four population categories and their changing sizes over the history of 
Shuangcheng.   
 
Population registration in Chinese history and in Shuangcheng 
As early as the sixth century B.C., China had developed a systematic population 




members and property (Liang 1980; Xin 2007; Yang 2007).4  This practice emerged in 
response to rulers’ needs for taxation and control.  Between the seventh and sixth 
centuries B.C., as the feudal relationship between the king of Zhou and the lords of the 
various states started to dissolve, those lords began to strengthen their own power and 
compete with one another.  Accompanying this transformation, the importance of clans as 
a major factor in controlling population declined, allowing rulers to control the population 
by households, registering them and collecting taxes (Yang 2007).  This population 
registration system continued to develop in the Qin (221 B.C.-206 B.C.) and Western Han 
dynasties (202 B.C.-25 A.D.).  By then, household registration involved not only 
recording biographical information about the household head and his dependents – 
including name, occupation, residence, the rank of nobility, and age – but also registering 
household property, including house, land, slaves, and livestock (Song 1991; Yang 2007). 
 The state maintained a population registry not only to collect taxes but also to define 
entitlement rights by population category.  Population registration is closely associated 
with rights.  By registering its subject population, the state built up a contractual 
relationship with the people: the registered population provided tax and labor services to 
the state; in return, the state acknowledged the rights of the registered.  Moreover, the 
Chinese state not only differentiated the rights of the registered from those of the 
unregistered, but also maintained separate registers for different registered population 
categories.  For example, in the Qin and Han dynasties, the state kept separate registers for 
                                                        
4 Scholars have different opinions about the earliest practice of population registration in China.  Some 
maintain that, as early as the eleventh century B.C., the king of Zhou had a registered population (Song 
1991; Chen 2007a).  Others argue that the records about population registration in the Zhou are not 
reliable and therefore the population registration system did not come into being until the seventh to sixth 
centuries B.C. (Xin 2007; Yang 2007).  Despite the debate about its emergence, all scholars agree that 
only after the sixth century did the population registration system become systematic enough to function as 




imperial lineage members, officials, peasants, merchants, and government students, 
differentiating their entitlements: imperial lineage members and officials enjoyed political 
and economic privileges; peasants were the major population category who paid tax and 
labor services; merchants were discriminated against and were at one time not allowed to 
become officials; government students were exempted from labor services and enjoyed 
better access to government positions (Song 1991).  The dynasties following the Qin and 
Han inherited this practice of classifying people’s rights and obligations.5   
The Eight Banner registration system in the Qing was a particularly efficient example 
of this practice.  Since bannermen did not pay tax and instead served the state as soldiers, 
the Eight Banner population registers defined each bannerman’s membership and 
concurrently differentiated the obligations and privileges of banner populations (Ding 
2009).  Initially, the banner population registers only recorded adult males, excluding 
children, the elderly, and the disabled.  Beginning in 1727, the banner administration 
revised the registration system to register population by household, and to record every 
male household member.6  Every three years, each banner captain would update the 
registry data and send the updated register to the banner commander.  Inclusion in the 
                                                        
5 For example, from the second to the sixth century, although China fell apart and various dynasties ruled 
different parts of China Proper, the categories of population registration were more or less the same.  The 
state kept separate registers for noble lineages, clerks, peasants, military households, monks, and ethnic 
minorities (Song 1991).  A notable phenomenon during this period is the emergence of specialized 
population categories, such as clerks and military households.  Specialization resulted mainly from the 
migration caused by wars during this period, which significantly reduced the size of the population 
controlled by the state.  In order to ensure the necessary supply of manpower, the state created special 
population categories to fix occupations.  In the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), the state kept separate 
registers for officials, peasants, military households, artisans, merchants, and paupers.  In the Qing, the 
state kept separate registers for bannermen and civilian commoners, and further separated merchants from 
the rest of the civilian commoners (Song 1991). 
6 See QDBQTZ, juan. 31, pp538-539.  In 1727, the court ordered the registration of all males.  In the 
registers, the captain recorded every adult male as one household and wrote down his name, age, and 
occupation and then noted the names and occupations of his father and brothers. The captain then recorded 





banner registers thus became the prerequisite for securing banner posts and their associated 
state stipends.  In order to maintain strict population tracking, the banner administration 
stipulated in 1729 that each bannerman had to register newborns with his captain within 
one month of the child’s birth.7 
Banner population registration in Shuangcheng was the most important instrument 
with which the state controlled banner immigrants.  Beginning in the recruitment and 
settlement stages, the state paid close attention to transferring the registration records of 
banner immigrants from their places of origin to Shuangcheng.  Once a household 
volunteered to move to Shuangcheng, the banner captain would transfer its records to a 
separate register, listing in sequence each household’s place of origin, banner affiliation, 
and ethnicity, and then each member’s banner post, name, and age.8  When these 
households set off for Shuangcheng, the banner governments of the immigrants’ places of 
origin would hand a copy of the register to the Shuangcheng banner government.  The 
Shuangcheng banner government then compiled these immigrants’ records into the local 
register by their residence and new banner affiliation, preserving all information 
transferred from their place of origin.  Throughout the history of the Shuangcheng state 
farm, the state inscribed metropolitan and rural bannermen into different registers. 
Upon the establishment of the initial registration, population registers in Shuangcheng 
served as the official reference for land allocation, differentiating the rights and obligations 
of each population group.  The state used three types of criteria to define population 
categories in Shuangcheng: banner affiliation, official immigration status, and place of 
origin.  Civilian commoners were have-nots because they were not members of the Eight 
                                                        
7 QDBQTZ, juan. 31, p.540. 
8 Only a few of these early registers are still preserved.  For an example, see the register of bannermen 




Banners and thus were not on the banner population registers; floating bannermen were 
likewise compromised because they had moved to Shuangcheng on their own – without 
state sponsorship – and thus were not on the original registers compiled for the official 
immigrants. Among the haves, metropolitan bannermen were granted twice as much land 
as rural bannermen because they came from the capital.  Due to the importance of 
population registers in land allocation in Shuangcheng, the state paid special attention to 
their maintenance; while banner captains in other parts of China only updated population 
registers every three years, in Shuangcheng they did so annually.  In the following 
sections, I will draw on information from the population registers and other archival 
documents to examine the formation and development of the four population categories in 
Shuangcheng. 
 
The haves: metropolitan and rural bannermen (jingqi and tunding) 
 
As early as the planning stage, Fujun had defined the haves as two separate population 
categories: metropolitan bannermen (jingqi) and rural bannermen (tunding).  
Metropolitan bannermen – bannermen from Beijing and Rehe – were those for whom the 
state farm had been established; they were thus the top elite.  Rural bannermen – 
bannermen from Liaoning and Jilin – were the designated laborers for metropolitan 
bannermen.  In his plan for the Shuangcheng state farm, Fujun decided to allocate 20 
shang (36.8 hectares) of jichan land to each metropolitan banner household and only 10 
shang (18.4 hectares) to each rural banner household.  The 3,000 metropolitan banner 
households therefore occupied two thirds of the 90,000 shang of jichan land.  Moreover, 




required rural bannermen to open land for the metropolitan bannermen prior to their arrival.  
Consequently, all jichan land was first farmed by rural bannermen and then passed to 
metropolitan bannermen. 
From 1815 to 1820, the state allocated equally-sized plots of 30 shang (55.2 hectares) 
of jichan land to rural bannermen.  Each village held between 24 and 28 plots, one for 
each settled rural banner household.  To separate these plots, the government intentionally 
left between them a waste area of less than two meters (five to six chi).9  In addition, the 
rural bannermen also built several mounds along the borders of the plots and waste area to 
mark boundaries.  In each plot, the banner officials stuck a peg of wood denoting banner 
and village affiliations to indicate the property’s provenance.  The Captain’s Offices then 
drew a map showing the location of each plot and assigned the plots to the rural bannermen 
according to the name order on the household registers.10 
After the initial allocation, the Captain’s Office then compiled land registers to 
document the results, indicating which households had been assigned to which plots.  The 
land register followed a structure similar to the population register.  The principal 
bannerman, or household head, was recorded as the owner of the allocated plot.  The 
register organized landowners by their residential banner affiliation and village.  
Following the name of the landowner was the type and amount of land.  In some instances, 
the registers also recorded the location and boundaries of the plot.11  While the population 
register officially proved individuals’ eligibility to acquire state land, the land register 
officially documented their ownership of a specific plot.   
                                                        
9 See the order from Fujun to the Shuangcheng government on 1819.9.23 (SCPTTJL, p. 104).   
10 Ibid. 
11 In the land registers preserved in the local banner government archives, the 1876 and 1889 registers 




In accepting their land allocation, the rural bannermen simultaneously became 
landlords in their own right and laborers to metropolitan bannermen.  The thirty-shang 
plot a rural banner household received included both the land to be kept for itself and the 
land to be allocated to an adjacent metropolitan household.  Before the arrival of 
metropolitan bannermen, rural bannermen had to work exclusively as laborers to open 
these plots.  The government gave rural bannermen a three year cushion during which 
each household was required to first clear twenty shang of land.  Upon the arrival of the 
metropolitan bannermen to Shuangcheng, these rural bannermen would pass these 20 
shang (36.8 hectares) of land, 15 shang (27.6 hectares) cultivated and 5 shang uncultivated, 
to their metropolitan neighbors.  They could then enjoy the remaining 10 shang of land, 5 
shang (9.2 hectares) cultivated and 5 shang uncultivated, as their own property.   
In 1829, as the state adjusted the relocation and land allocation policy, metropolitan 
and rural bannermen had an opportunity to increase their land holdings.  In that year, 
Boqitu, the former general of Jilin (1827-1828), sought to amend the settlement plan and 
land allocation policy in Shuangcheng to solve two problems: first, the relocation quota of 
3,000 metropolitan banner households could not be met; second, current settlers in 
Shuangcheng had reported that the allocated land was not sufficient to support an entire 
family.12  Boqitu therefore proposed reducing the quota for metropolitan households to 
1,000 and allocating the land prepared for the additional 2,000 metropolitan households to 
the current settlers.  The emperor approved Boqitu’s proposal.  The government then 
divided the 40,000 shang of jichan land into 4,000 plots for the rural and metropolitan 
households, granting an additional 8.33 (15.33 hectares) shang to each of the 3,000 rural 
households and an additional 15 shang (27.6 hectares) to each of the 1,000 metropolitan 
                                                        




households.  Each rural household then had a total of 18.33 shang (33.7 hectares) of 
jichan land, and each metropolitan household had a total of 35 shang (64.4 hectares), 
which was still about twice the size of the plots held by rural bannermen.   
In Shuangcheng, the household was the unit of land allocation; the number of 
households is therefore closely associated with land allocation policy.  Upon adjusting the 
land allocation policy in 1829, the government fixed the number of rural banner 
households at 3,000 and the number of metropolitan banner households at 1,000, 
corresponding to the number of jichan plots.  Thereafter, throughout the history of the 
Shuangcheng state farm, the number of metropolitan and rural banner households did not 
change significantly.  In 1847, local officials registered 3,000 households of rural 
bannermen and 598 households of metropolitan bannermen, a total of 3,598 (table 4.1).  
By 1866, 698 metropolitan banner households had settled in Shuangcheng.  However, due 
to the extinction of some households, the total number of metropolitan and rural banner 
households in that year in the population registers dropped to 3,525 (table 4.1).  Between 
1866 and 1878, the government set 698 as the standard number of metropolitan banner 
households, and tried to reach this standard number by dividing the existing households to 
create new households and assigning them the jichan plots left behind by the extinct 
households.13  Thus, before 1878, the number of metropolitan and rural banner 
households fluctuated around 3,698.  In 1878, in response to requests from some 
metropolitan bannermen, the government finally allocated the 302 additional plots of 
jichan land reserved for metropolitan bannermen to new households created from existing 
                                                        
13 See the local government order regarding allocating the land from extinct households to existing 




metropolitan banner households, making the number of metropolitan households 1,000.14  
From then on, the number of metropolitan and rural banner households fluctuated around 
4,000.  Despite their fixed number, from the 1820s to 1890, the metropolitan and rural 
banner households always accounted for the majority of the registered households in 
Shuangcheng (table 4.1).    
 
Table 4.1 Number of registered households under the Shuangcheng administration by 








bannermen   Total 
  N. Percent  N. Percent  N. Percent   N. Percent
1816-20 190* 6.0  3,000 94.0  0 0.0  3,190 100.0
1844-47 565 7.9  3,598 50.0  3,026 42.1  7,189 100.0
1864-66 1,272* 18.6  3,525 51.5  2,049 29.9  6,846 100.0
1890 1,831 23.2  4,053 51.3  2,023 25.6   7,907 100.0
Sources: The government admonishment to rural bannermen on 1816.6.28 (SCPTTJL, p.194); the local 
government order to civilian commoners residing in the designated areas of the Right and Left tun 
(SCPTTJL, pp. 197-198); Jing’ebu’s memorial in 1844 on policies in Shuangcheng (HCDXTGZY, juan 31, 
6b); the government report on the establishment of baojia system in 1866 (SCPZGYMDA, reel 160, vol. 
636, pp. 354-360); SCXZ (1990), p.829; the 1866 and 1890 banner population registers; local government’s 
retrospective summary of floating banner registration in 1879 (SCPZGYMDA, reel. 202, vol. 838-3, 
pp.337-341). 
* The number of households was estimated based on various sources. 
 
 
Although the numbers of households were more or less fixed, the sizes of these two 
population categories – metropolitan and rural bannermen – significantly increased over 
time.  As figure 4.1 shows, based on the available data, the population of metropolitan 
bannermen started at 187 in 1824.  As a consequence of immigration and natural increase, 
the metropolitan banner population reached 2,324 in 1866 and then further increased to 
4,838 in 1912, an average annual growth rate of 2.4 percent.15  The population of rural 
bannermen increased from 14,670 in 1824 to 27,028 in 1869, and then to 43,948 in 1910, 
                                                        
14 (SCPZGYMDA, reel 201, vol. 833-1, pp. 53-66). 
15 Since the population increase between 1824 and 1866 was the result of a combination of immigration 
and natural increase, the measure the rate of natural increase, the annual growth rate of the metropolitan 




an average annual growth rate of 2.3 percent.16  The total population of metropolitan and 
rural bannermen therefore grew from 14,857 in 1824 to 48,721 in 1910.  
 
Figure 4. 1 Size of registered population in Shuangcheng (by population category), 
1866-1912.* 
Sources: see sources of table 4.1. 
* The size of the metropolitan and rural banner populations in 1824 were derived from Fujun’s memorial 
on 1824.11.26 (JJCLFZZ, reel 232, 3387-55). The sizes of the banner populations after 1866 are calculated 




Upon the allocation of jichan land in Shuangcheng, the two categories of have-nots – 
floating bannermen and civilian commoners – also came into being.  Although Fujun did 
not include these two populations in his original blueprint for the state farm, floating 
bannermen and civilian commoners soon found their position as laborers there.  Although 
excluded from land allocation, the great demand for labor in Shuangcheng still provided 
                                                        
16 The annual growth rate of rural banner population was calculated from the population data of 1824 and 




opportunities for these have-nots.  
  
The precondition of the existence of have-nots 
In his original proposal to the emperor, Fujun designed Shuangcheng as a 
self-sufficient society for metropolitan and rural bannermen only.  According to Fujun’s 
plan, rural bannermen would provide all the labor in the early years.  Upon receiving their 
land, rural bannermen not only would clear and farm the land for both metropolitan 
bannermen and themselves, but also would help finance the relocation of metropolitan 
bannermen; once a rural bannerman cleared 20 of the 30 shang of land, he would keep 5 
shang for his own household and then pay rent on the 15 shang designated for a 
metropolitan banner household during the short interval before its owner’s arrival.17  At a 
rate of one imperial shi (128.3 kilograms) of grain for each shang, the government 
collected this rent to subsidize relocation costs for metropolitan bannermen.18  According 
to Fujun’s plan, rural bannermen could open the first twenty shang within three years, and 
thus the government could begin to collect rent in the fourth year, 1819 for the central tun 
                                                        
17 See Fujun’s memorial on 1818.10.20 (SCPTTJL, pp. 25-28). 
18 In Shuangcheng, two measurements of grain existed, the market shi and the imperial shi.  Both 
measurements referred to the volume of grain.  The standards for the two measurements, however, were 
different.  One market shi equaled to two and a half imperial shi (HCZDLZ, book 3, p.14b; 
SCPZGYMDA, reel 335, vol. 1488, p.9).  However, Wang Lvtai, in his report to the assistant commandant 
of Shuangcheng on 1821.8.4, gave an opposite conversion of the two measurements, indicating that one 
market shi equaled to 0.4 imperial shi (SCPTTJL, p.165).  Wang’s information was probably wrong.  
Therefore, I follow the conversion standard of one market shi to two and half imperial shi.  The weight of 
one shi of grain was the average of three kinds of grains: millet, sorghum, and soybean (SCPZGYMDA, 
reel 209, vol. 873, p. 113).  In Shuangcheng, the grain rent usually consisted of a mix of the three kinds.  
According to Yi Baozhong, one imperial shi of millet weighs 126.9 kilograms, one imperial shi of sorghum 
weighs 127.9 kilograms, and one imperial shi of soybean weighs 130.1 kilograms (1990).  Therefore, the 
averaged weight of one imperial shi of the three grains is 128.3 kilograms (231 pounds).  One market shi 
of grain in Shuangcheng therefore equals 320.8 kilograms (577 pounds).  Compared to the imperial shi, 
the market shi was a more commonly used measurement in local society.  The ‘shi’ used in this 
dissertation, unless otherwise specified, refers to market shi. 
    As for the beginning date of rent collection, the government postponed it to the seventh year, due to 




and 1823 or 1824 for the right and left tun.19   
The progress of land opening, however, was much slower than Fujun had planned.  
As table 4.2 shows, by 1823, eight years after the establishment of the state farm and one 
year before the arrival of the first group of metropolitan bannermen, rural bannermen had 
only cleared 21,497.6 shang of land, which accounted for about one fourth of the 90,000 
shang of jichan land.  The 1,000 rural households in the central tun, who had begun to 
settle in 1815, were the slowest; in eight years, they only cleared 7,006.5 shang of land, an 
average speed of 850 shang each year.  The 2,000 rural households in the right and left tun 
who settled later in 1819 and 1820 were faster; in three to four years, they cleared 12,669.1 
shang of land, with each thousand households annually clearing 1,800 shang.  Thus, by 
1823, each rural household had, on average, cleared 7.15 shang of land, which was far 
below the government requirement of 20 shang and was only slightly more than the 5 
shang of cultivated land allocated to rural banner households.  The government therefore 
not only failed to collect enough rent to subsidize the relocation cost, but also began to 
worry that the state farm would not have enough land to allocate to metropolitan 
bannermen upon their arrival.20   
 
Table 4.2 The amount of jichan land cleared by rural bannermen before 1824 (unit: 
shang). 
Time  Central tun Right tun Left tun Subtotal 
Settlement-1821 5,552.1 3,796.5 2,931.9  12,280.5 
1822 1,000.0 1,231.5 1,546.5  5,600.0 
1823 454.4 1,122.0 2,040.7  3,617.1 
Total 7,006.5 6,150.0 6,519.1  21,497.6 
Source: Songlin’s memorial on 1822.5.15 (SCPTTJL, PP. 54-56) and on 1823.6.5 (SCPTTJL, pp. 71). 
                                                        
19 See Fujun and Lucheng’s memorial on 1816.10.26 (SCPTTJL, p. 20) and Fujun’s memorial on 
1818.10.20 (SCPTTJL, p. 28).  Fujun originally planned to collect rent on land in the central tun 
beginning in 1819.  However, due to harvest failure, the initial rent collection was postponed by one year 
to 1820. 





This slow progress of land clearing was mainly due to a shortage of labor, from which 
the central tun suffered most.  According to Songlin, the general of Jilin (1822-1824), of 
the original 1,000 rural bannermen from Jilin who settled in the central tun, 209 fled and 
241 died or became disabled because of illness.  The government had to fill these 
vacancies with latecomers, which delayed the farm work.21  Moreover, only 96 of these 
1,000 households had additional adult males to help the household head with farming, and 
only 24 households had hired labor, which means that the majority of rural households in 
the central tun only had one adult male to do the farming.  Being concerned that the slow 
progress of land opening would hinder the relocation of metropolitan bannermen, in 1823 
and 1824 the government provided funds to rural bannermen who cleared more than eight 
shang of land to hire laborers.22   
This labor deficit among metropolitan and rural bannermen probably persisted in the 
state farm for at least two generations.  According to Songlin, an adult male could clear 
and farm 6 to 7 shang of land on average and 12 or 13 shang at most.23  At this average 
rate, clearing and farming the full 90,000 shang of land would require about 13,000 adult 
males.  In the early years, immigrant households were relatively small: according to 
Songlin, the majority of rural banner households in the central tun in the 1820s had only 
one adult male; only some households in the right and left tun had additional adult males, 
but none had more than four.  The average number of adult males per household can thus 
be estimated at two,24 suggesting a total of 6,000 adult males in the rural banner population.  
                                                        
21 See the memorial of Songlin on 1822.5.15 (SCPTTJL, p.54). 
22 See the memorial of Songlin on 1822.7.20 (SCPTTJL, p. 58).  In order to facilitate the farming work, 
he then proposed in the two years of 1823 and 1824 that the government would provide 3,000 copper coins 
to enable households farming more than eight shang of land to hire one laborer. 
23 Ibid. 




Therefore, to farm all the jichan land, the state farm needed an additional 7,000 adult males.  
The arrival of metropolitan bannermen did not remedy this labor deficit, as they had little 
farming experience.  It would have thus taken at least two generations’ time to fill the 
labor gap with metropolitan and rural bannermen.  Consequently, floating bannermen and 
civilian commoners became an important source of laborer. 
 
Floating bannermen (fuding) 
The term floating bannermen (fuding) referred in general to any bannermen who 
moved to Shuangcheng without a state order.  In Shuangcheng’s history, floating 
bannermen came mainly from  Liaoning.25  As early as 1820, when rural bannermen 
from Liaoning began to move to Shuangcheng, the general of Shengjing had noticed that, 
because of the poor organizational work of the banner officials, some bannermen not listed 
on the rosters had also moved to Shuangcheng along with the official immigrants.26  
Between 1822 and 1829, Liaoning suffered from harvest failure due to a drought, and more 
and more bannermen moved to Shuangcheng on their own.27  In 1835, Yijing, the general 
                                                                                                                                                                     
smaller households.  Therefore, the estimated number of adult males per household could be 2 or even 
less. 
25 In the floating banner population registers, households originated from Liaoning accounted for 99.94 
percent of the total number of households, and those from Jilin only accounted for 0.06 percent. 
26 See the reply from the office of the general of Jilin to the office of the general of Shengjing on 1820.2.18 
regarding the assignment of rural bannermen from Liaoning who did not move to Shuangcheng under the 
government organization (SCPTTJL, pp.139-142).  The office of the general of Shengjing had 
reprimanded the official of Jinzhou, a garrison in Liaoning, for letting the banner immigrants move to 
Shuangcheng individually, resulting in the move of bannermen not listed on the official roster: “In principle, 
all the principal adult males who move to Shuangcheng should be first verified with the rosters and handed 
to the Tax Preceptor (lingcui) and soldiers who escort them.  Only after the Tax Preceptor  and soldiers 
see them in person, can they set off for [Shuangcheng].  [Now] although we have a fixed quota, [you] go 
so far as to let them move to Shuangcheng by themselves, resulting in extra households.” (SCPTTJL, 
p.139) 
27 According to the grain price data collected by James Lee and Cameron Campbell (1997), between 1822 
and 1829, the monthly low grain price significantly increased, which pointed to a harvest failure during this 
period.  The peak of the crisis occurred around 1825 and 1826.  Moreover, in 1870, the local banner 




of Shengjing, also noticed the increasing number of Liaoning bannermen who had moved 
to Shuangcheng individually and without state orders.  He therefore proposed at the court 
to investigate these unassigned banner migrants.28    
In 1845, while this unassigned banner population grew, the state formally accepted 
them as residents in Shuangcheng and classified them with the term “floating bannermen 
(fuding).”  In that year, each Captain’s Office surveyed all the floating bannermen who 
resided in its administrative precinct and registered them in separate registers.  In 1847, 
the government followed up on its initial survey to capture more floating bannermen, and 
registered a total of 3,026 households.29  After the initial registration, the Captain’s 
Offices would check their administrative areas every three months to identify any 
additional floating bannermen who were not registered.   
The registers organized the floating bannermen by population type and household.  
Like the registers for metropolitan and rural bannermen, those for floating bannermen 
recorded, for each household, the head’s place of origin and original banner affiliation, 
ethnicity, name, and age; the records for each of his family members followed.  Due to the 
status of these people as the Eight Banner national elite, the state paid close attention to the 
accuracy of their registration.  The government not only recorded the floating 
bannermen’s self-reported information, but also verified it against the records in their 
places of origin.  In 1870, the state farm government investigated 12 floating bannermen 
who misreported their original banner affiliations, so as to ensure the authenticity of their 
membership in the Eight Banners.  As the local officials commented: 
                                                                                                                                                                     
deposition of those floating bannermen who came to Shuangcheng in the 1820s also indicated that there 
had been a drought in that period, which caused these bannermen move to Shuangcheng (SCPZGYMDA, 
reel 312, vol. 1400, pp.1-8).  
28 JJCLFZZ, reel 232, 3389-13. 




“Most of these floating bannermen are farmers.  They do not understand 
that the banner affiliation is the most important thing … The reason we 
investigate them is that we are afraid that these floating bannermen have left 
their places of origin for years and will lose their banner registration.  This is 
against the state’s kindness of raising the banner population.”30  
 
Therefore, although floating bannermen were unofficial immigrants, the state still 
considered them members of the Eight Banners and felt obliged to control them and ensure 
their livelihood. 
In addition to sharing their places of origin with rural bannermen, floating bannermen 
mainly came from the same descent groups as their rural banner counterparts.  Each 
Captain’s Office classified the floating bannermen into five to eight types, demarcated by 
reasons for staying, relationship to the rural bannermen, or occupation.  As table 4.3 
summarizes, there were mainly six types of floating bannermen: close kin of rural 
bannermen, assistant farmers and hired laborers who had relatives among the rural 
bannermen, hired laborers without relatives to depend on, floating bannermen engaging in 
commerce, widows or widowers and orphans raised by the state, and laborers hired by 
metropolitan bannermen.  As table 4.3 shows, in terms of their relationship to rural 
bannermen, floating bannermen can be labeled as kin, non-kin, and kin relationship 
unknown.  In 1870, 67 percent of the floating banner households were kin of rural 
bannermen.  Only 14 percent of the floating banner households were explicitly noted as 
non-kin.  Even 30 years later, the composition of the kin relationship between the 
registered floating bannermen and rural bannermen remained the same; in 1901, 66 percent 
of the floating banner households were kin of the rural bannermen and 14 percent were 
non-kin.  Therefore, the floating bannermen were allowed to reside in the banner villages. 
                                                        




Table 4. 3 Types of registered floating bannermen, by their reasons to stay in 
Shuangcheng and their relationship to the rural bannermen, 1870 and 1901. 
Date 




Types of floating 
bannermen 
Freq. Percent  Freq. Percent
Close kin of rural 
bannermen  783 40.0  779 42.0 Kin 
Those who would like 
to stay to assist farming 
or as hired labor 537 27.4  442 23.8 
Non-kin Hired labor without 
relatives to depend on 277 14.1  253 13.6 
Those who were 
engaged in commerce 61 3.1  62 3.3 
Those who were 
vulnerable and looked 
after out of generosity 196 10.0  178 9.6 
Kin relation not 
specified 
Those who farmed land 
for the metropolitan 
bannermen 104 5.3  141 7.6 
       
Total 1,958 100.0   1,855 100.0 
Sources: The registers of the floating bannermen, 1870 and 1901 (SCPGBTDHKDM, reel 1834668, vol. 87; 
reel 1834674, vol. 137; reel 1834688, vol. 226; reel 1834700, vol. 345; reel 1834707, vol. 399; reel 
1834715, vol. 444; reel 1834672, vol. 124; reel 1834705, vol. 387; reel 1834719, vol. 476).   
 
 
Despite sharing a geographical and family background with the rural bannermen, the 
floating bannermen were excluded from the local elite system of the state farm and thus 
were not eligible for land allocation.  The only reason for their exclusion from land 
allocation was that they were not official migrants.31  Floating bannermen could therefore 
only work in Shuangcheng as hired laborers or commercial personnel.  Not only did 
metropolitan and rural banner households individually hire floating bannermen to farm 
                                                        
31 The government exclusively used the immigrants’ registers compiled by the banner administrations in 
the immigrants’ places of origin to identify official immigrants.  In his communication with the general of 
Shengjing on 1819.11.24, Fujun mentioned that some relatives of the rural bannermen who accompanied 
the official immigrants to Shuangcheng petitioned in front of him, asking to become rural bannermen 
(SCPTTJL, p. 111).  Fujun, however, rejected their request because they were not on the rosters of official 




their land, but the government also officially used them to farm land for the metropolitan 
bannermen.  As table 4.3 shows, in 1870, 104 floating banner households comprised a 
separate type, designated “floating bannermen assigned to farm the land of the 
metropolitan bannermen (chengzhong jingqi di fuding).”  In 1901, although the number of 
households in the other types decreased, this type of household increased to 141.  The 
existence of this type of floating banner household reveals that the government kept a 
constant population of laborers to assist in the farming of the metropolitan bannermen’s 
land. 
Among the have-nots, floating bannermen had an even lower level of entitlement to 
land than civilian commoners; while civilian commoners were still able to farm some land 
as state tenants, the official denial of land use rights to floating bannermen was so strict that 
they could not even work as state tenants.32  This refusal of land entitlement persisted even 
as the social status of floating bannermen in the state farm improved.  Starting in the 
1850s, due to the state’s needs for military power to suppress the various rebellions that 
arose in China proper, the government allowed floating bannermen to serve as soldiers or 
enter the examination system.33  However, the government still clearly stated that “(these 
floating bannermen) still shall not interfere with the livelihood of those local bannermen 
(bendi qiren).”34   
                                                        
32 SCPZGYMDA, reel 208, vol. 865, pp. 9-17.  Although the official policy prohibited floating 
bannermen from working as state tenants, some floating bannermen managed to rent land from the 
government.  For example, in 1881, the local government identified an illegal land rental between a 
floating bannermen named Wang Shiqiang and the post-house of Shuangcheng (SCPZGYMDA, reel 207, 
vol. 860, pp. 173-181).  In 1863, the clerk of the post-house rented 69 shang of land, which belonged to 
the post-house, to Wang and collected rent from Wang to subsidize the office expenditure.  In the land 
registers, other than metropolitan bannermen, rural bannermen, and civilian commoners, there was a 
category of “banner tenants (qidian).”  These banner tenants mainly consisted of bannermen in Lalin, the 
banner garrison adjacent to Shuangcheng, and probably some floating bannermen.  The population of 
banner tenants, however, was small.    





In 1879, the petition of Wulintai, a floating bannerman who had earned honorific titles 
for fighting the local revolts, best illustrated the unfortunate situation of floating 
bannermen.  Wulintai’s family moved from Liaoning to Shuangcheng in 1843, registering 
under the Plain Red banner.  In 1866, he, together with other floating bannermen, 
defended the city from a revolt led by a civilian commoner.35  Because of his significant 
contribution, Wulintai’s eldest son was enlisted as a soldier, and his second son passed the 
entrance exam to the government school and became a student.  Although Wulintai’s 
family had a decent occupational status in the state farm, they had no landed property.  He 
therefore compared his situation with that of metropolitan and rural bannermen and 
lamented: 
“Although all my sons serve the state, my entire family has not even an 
inch of land to make a living.  I am not a metropolitan bannerman who can 
(have family members) replace the extinct households (and take their land) to 
support their descendants.  Neither am I a rural bannerman who at least has 
jichan land.”36 
 
Due to their lack of fixed property in Shuangcheng, floating bannermen were free to 
migrate away from the Shuangcheng area.  After 1869, despite the fact that more 
bannermen had arrived in Shuangcheng, the state stopped their large-scale registration, and 
instead called those who were not registered “floating bannermen not on the registers (bu 
zai ce fuding).”  Beginning in the 1850s and 1860s, the state finally opened land in 
northeastern China to free immigration.  Abundant land in such places in Jilin and 
Heilongjiang provinces as Bodune, Wuchang, Hulan and Bayansusu attracted both banner 
and civilian immigrants.37  While in the past, Shuangcheng was the only site that provided 
                                                        
35 SCPZGYMDA, reel 203, vol. 841, p. 294. 
36 Ibid. 




employment to floating bannermen, the opening of northeast China allowed them more 
opportunities for both employment and landed property.38   
Shuangcheng therefore saw a decrease in the registered floating banner population.  
Between 1847 and 1866, 977 of the original 3,026 floating banner households moved to 
other places or died out, leaving only 2,049 households in the population registers (table 
4.1).  Moreover, between 1866 and 1879, another 510 households moved out of 
Shuangcheng; of these, 243 listed their new destinations with the government, and 267 
moved out without giving notice of their new destinations (buzhi quxiang).  Therefore, in 
1879, only 1,903 registered floating banner households remained.39  In 1890, the number 
of households in the floating banner population register had increased slightly, to 2,023 
(table 4.1).  By 1901, however, the number of floating banner households in Shuangcheng 
had decreased to 1,855.  Consequently, the overall size of the floating banner population 
decreased from 11,364 in 1870 to 8,711 in 1901, and then to 4,359 in 1909 (figure 4.1). 
 
Civilian commoners (minren) 
In the Qing, the division between bannermen and civilian commoners marked the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the rent collected from the land to subsidize military expenditure.  In the floating banner population 
registers, Bodune, Wuchang, Hulan, and Bayansusu were the most common destinations of those who 
migrated away from Shuangcheng.  The court originally designed Bodune as another site to settle 
metropolitan bannermen relocated from Beijing and started to recruit registered civilian commoners to farm 
the land in 1824 (JJCLFZZ, reel 232, 3387-55).  Wuchang, a site south to Shuangcheng, was first opened 
in the 1860s.  Hulan and Bayansusu, locating in Heilongjiang Province, were first opened in 1857 and 
1860 respectively (QDHLJLSDAXB (1875-1881), pp.335-338).   
38 With the opening of other regions of Jilin, the government also intentionally provided floating 
bannermen with opportunities for employment and landed property.  For example, in 1867, when 
establishing the local government in Wuchang, the officials proposed to register all 1,800 households of 
unregistered floating bannermen who farmed the land there and recruit 200 adult males from among them 
as soldiers and government personnel (SCPZGYMDA, reel. 163, vol. 651, pp. 20-27).  In 1881, the 
Shuangcheng state farm government circulated among the floating bannermen an announcement about the 
opening of state land in Sanxing, a garrison in Jilin, hoping to recruit those floating bannermen who were 
willing to cultivate the land to work in Sanxing as state tenants (SCPZGYMDA, reel 208, vol. 865, 
pp.9-17).   




most prominent categorical boundary, reflecting the national priority of privileging the 
banner population.  Bannermen enjoyed state stipends and housing and, in return, served 
the state as officials and soldiers.  Civilian commoners, in general, were not eligible for 
any of the above economic and political privileges.  By the mid-eighteenth century, when 
civilian commoners had encroached on more and more banner land inside China Proper, 
the state especially considered civilian commoners the major threat to the Eight Banners.   
Therefore, as early as the planning stage of the Shuangcheng state farm, the state had 
prioritized the prevention of civilian commoners from occupying banner land and made 
careful plans to circumscribe their activities.  Before the settlement of bannermen, several 
hundred households of civilian commoners had resided in Shuangcheng.40  These civilian 
commoners were mainly Han-Chinese immigrants who had surreptitiously migrated to this 
area, and were later identified and then registered by the government.  Upon their 
registration, these civilian commoners became legal residents (ruding chenming), paying 
taxes and farming the land.  For example, in 1816, Fujun identified 321 civilian farmers 
who farmed a total of 8,250 shang (15,180 hectares) of land in the area designated for the 
central tun.41  To establish the Shuangcheng state farm, the government enclosed the 
planned area for banner villages and expelled these pre-existing residents, prohibiting them 
and their families from residing in the banner villages.  The emperor and central 
government was especially concerned with preventing civilian commoners from 
occupying banner land.  In 1822, when the Daoguang emperor learned from Songlin that 
civilian commoners occasionally resided inside the banner villages together with their 
families, he immediately sent an edict to Fujun, asking him to strictly prohibit this 
                                                        
40 See Fujun’s communication with the local banner government in Shuangcheng on 1815.5.10 (SCPTTJL, 
p. 190). 




arrangement.42  In 1824, when Daoguang emperor learned from the imperial envoy 
investigating Shuangcheng that some civilian commoners still resided in Shuangcheng, he 
further required Fujun to follow a hard line of “only allowing the extra adult males from the 
bannermen to help farm the land and not hiring laborers from civilian commoners.”43 
However, as the resettlement proceeded, the local government gradually loosened the 
restrictions on civilian commoners, allowing them to farm land as state tenants.  Although 
the central government formed a hard line to prevent civilian commoners from entering 
bannermen’s territory, both Fujun and the local government understood the importance of 
the civilian commoners as laborers and as a source of revenue.  Especially in the early 
stage of the state farm, when the local government was in need of revenue sources but the 
jichan land provided little rent income, civilian commoners were the only population from 
which the government could extract labor and money.  Therefore, Fujun intentionally kept 
civilian commoners on the empty land between the banner villages and the seats of 
Shuangcheng, the right tun, and the left tun (map 3.1).   
By the time Fujun established the right and left tun, he and the local government had 
decided not to expel all civilian commoners from these areas, instead allowing them to stay 
and collecting rent from their land for local use.44  For example, in 1819, Fujun ordered 
the captain of the left tun to collect rent from the land farmed by civilians in that area and 
                                                        
42 See the edict of Daoguang emperor on 1822.6.16 (SCPTTJL, p. 8). Also see Fujun’s memorial on 
1822.7.4 that replied Daoguang emperor’s edict (SCPTTJL, pp. 56-57). Beginning in 1836, the Captain’s 
Office would check the villages every three months to make sure this stipulation was met (SCPZGYMDA, 
reel. 174, vol. 717, pp.119-127). 
43 See Fujun’s summation of Daoguang’s edict on 1824.3.25 in his memorial filed on 1824.4.27 (JJCLFZZ, 
reel 232, 3387-42). 
44 For example, in 1871, a lawsuit between a civilian commoner Cheng De and two bannermen revealed 
that the Cheng family had remained within the banner division, occupying a plot adjacent to that of a 
bannerman (SCPZGYMDA, reel. 174, vol. 717, pp.119-127).  According to the local government, the 




allocate the rent income equally among the newly settled bannermen as a stipend.45  
Gradually, civilian divisions developed within the bannermen’s territory (Ren, Lee, and 
Campbell 2009).  As map 3.1 shows, however, these divisions were still separate from the 
banner villages; while all banner villages were located at some distance from the 
administrative center of each tun, the civilian divisions were adjacent to the administrative 
centers.  By keeping them close, Fujun was able to control these civilian commoners and 
utilize their labor. 
Prior to the 1840s, rent paid by civilian tenants comprised an important source of local 
government revenue (Ren, Lee, and Campbell 2009).46  Civilian commoners mainly 
registered three categories of land: gongzu (public rent) land; suique land, which was the 
land allocated to banner officials and soldiers as part of their salary; and hengchan 
(constant property) land.    In 1822, the government officially registered 3,284 shang 
(6,042.6 hectares) of land farmed by civilian commoners under the category of gongzu land, 
collecting a rent of 0.5 market shi (160.4 kilograms) for each shang of land.47  This rent 
income supplied the local government with money for routine administration.  Beginning 
in 1820, the local government consecutively opened the categories of suique and hengchan 
land, which civilian commoners could claim and pay rent for.48  While the rent from the 
suique land was allocated to banner officials and soldiers as part of their salary, the rent 
                                                        
45 See Tuming’s report to Fujun on 1819.11.7 (SCPTTJL, p. 136). 
46 Beginning in the 1840s, the state registered a large amount of land which was privately cultivated by 
bannermen and civilian commoners and collected rent on it.   
47 See the 1891 government report on the land types and amounts in Shuangcheng (SCPGBTDHKDM, reel. 
1834732, vol. 676).  The Cheng family, who later had land disputes with two bannermen, was an example 
of civilian commoners who managed to stay within the bannermen’s territory.  The Cheng family arrived 
in Shuangcheng in 1802.  After their arrival, they cleared and farmed 13.6 shang of land, which the 
government later registered as gongzu land (SCPZGYMDA, reel. 174, vol. 717, pp.119-127). 
48 The suique land was opened in 1820 (SCPTTJL, pp. 198-199), and the government began to collect rent 
on it in 1822 (SCPGBTDHKDM, reel. 1834732, vol. 676).  In 1820, Fujun also planned the opening of 
hengchan land (SCPTTJL, p. 56).  Although Fujun claimed that the rent income from the hengchan land 
was designated to support the officers and soldiers, the local government in fact used this rent income for 




from the hengchan land was mainly used to run the local government (Ren, Lee, and 
Campbell 2009).   
By working as state tenants, civilian commoners also officially acquired land use 
rights in Shuangcheng, an outcome of the pragmatic policy of Fujun and his successors.  
In contrast to the central government’s hard line, which insisted on expelling all civilian 
commoners from the bannermen’s territory, the local government’s use of civilian 
commoners solved the demand for labor and revenue.  Moreover, by granting land use 
rights to civilian commoners, the government could directly manage them and reduce the 
likelihood of their simply taking the land allocated to bannermen.  In 1844, Jing’ebu, the 
general of Jilin (1840-1848), justified this practice in front of the Daoguang emperor as 
follows: “When we recruited tenants to open land, the amount of land was fixed.  
Moreover, since they rent the land directly from the government, it is impossible for the 
civilian commoners to embezzle the land.”49  According to Jing’ebu, allowing civilian 
commoners to work as state tenants in fact enforced the state’s control over them.  The 
civilian commoners not only acquired land use rights, but could also pass these rights down 
to their descendants.  Under this government policy, by 1876, civilian commoners had 
managed to register 32,658 shang (60,090.7 hectares) – 16.5 percent — of the 198,326 
shang (364,919.8 hectares) of registered farm land in Shuangcheng.50  
In contrast to the equal distribution of jichan land among metropolitan and rural 
bannermen respectively, which was produced by the state’s land allocation policy, the 
distribution of land among these civilian tenants was very unequal.  The 1876 civilian 
land register reveals that the amount of land held by individual tenants ranged from 776.8 
                                                        
49 See the memorial of Jing’ebu in 1844, HCDXTGZY, juan 31, 6b. 




shang (1,429.3 hectares) at the largest to 2.6 shang (4.8 hectares) at the smallest.51   This 
huge variance in land distribution indicates that some civilian commoners in fact claimed 
large amounts of land and acted like rent contractors, controlling numerous farmers on 
these lands. 
The difference between the state’s management of jichan land and land in the civilian 
divisions indicated its differential interests in bannermen and civilian commoners; while 
the state mainly paid attention to resource allocation among metropolitan and rural 
bannermen, with civilian commoners the aim was to create a new channel of rent income.  
The government therefore applied different principles of land distribution to the two 
populations; among the bannermen, the egalitarian principle of equal allocation 
determined the pattern of land distribution, whereas among the civilian commoners, 
stratification created huge inequalities in land holding. 
Due to the state’s different interests in bannermen and civilian commoners, the 
registration system for these two groups differed.  Prior to 1866, when the state 
established a baojia system in Shuangcheng, it did not keep records for the civilian 
population; instead, civilian commoners were registered by tax-paying units, i.e. adult 
males (ding), or rent-paying units, i.e. households.  Therefore, before 1866, the 
government only registered civilian commoners who held land in Shuangcheng and paid 
rent.  In 1866, as Shuangcheng gradually developed into an important settlement in Jilin, 
more and more civilian commoners entered this area and become involved in commercial 
activities.  The population of Shuangcheng increased, especially at its seat.  In order to 
control the increasing population and maintain social order, the state organized all 
                                                        
51 See the 1876 land registers of the civilian division, SCPGBTDHKDM, reel 1834731, vol. 658.  The 
tenant with the largest land holding was Yang Fengshui, and that with the smallest land holding was Liu 




households that were not located in the banner villages into a baojia system.52  The 1,876 
households, including merchants, civilian tenants, and some bannermen who resided in the 
seat of Shuangcheng, were organized into 20 bao and 185 jia.   
Despite the growth of the civilian population over the course of Shuangcheng history, 
it remained smaller than the banner population.  As table 4.1 illustrates, from 1816 to 1820 
the government registered about 190 civilian households in the Shuangcheng area.  
Therefore, when the 3,000 rural banner households settled in Shuangcheng, the registered 
civilian households accounted for only 6 percent of total households.53  In the following 
25 years, the number of registered civilian tenant farmers did not significantly increase; in 
1844, 565 registered civilian households farmed land in Shuangcheng, accounting for 7.9 
percent of total households.54  In 1866, the number of civilian tenant households increased 
to 668;55 after taking the population residing in the seat of Shuangcheng into account, the 
estimated total number of civilian households was 1,272, comprising 18.6 percent of the 
total registered households.56   
Even after the state permitted free migration to Jilin in the 1860s, the registered 
civilian population remained smaller than the banner population.  In 1890, eight years 
                                                        
52 See the local government report to the general of Jilin on the baojia organization in Shuangcheng in 
1866 (SCPZGYMDA, vol. 636, pp. 354-360).  In the Qing, the baojia system was an administrative 
system to watch and check the number, movements, and activities of civilian commoners (Hsiao 1960).  In 
theory, every 10 households constituted one jia, and every 10 jia constituted one bao.  In practice, 
however, the number of households in each jia and bao varied according to context.  Due to its function of 
controlling population, the baojia would maintain a complete registration of the people. 
53 Although there were no individual-level population records for the civilian commoners in Shuangcheng, 
from the extant sources, we can estimate that their average household size was seven, which was not big. 
54 These 565 civilian households, located in the area outside the banner villages, contained 1,500 adult 
males and a total of 3,000 to 4,000 people (HCDXTGZY, juan 31, 6b) 
55 See the local government report to the general of Jilin on the baojia organization in Shuangcheng in 
1866 (SCPZGYMDA, vol. 636, pp. 354-360). 
56 The civilian commoners, however, comprised the majority of the merchant population in Shuangcheng.  
In 1867, of the 156 major shop owners in Shuangcheng, 109 were civilian commoners from Zhili (today’s 
Hebei Province), Shandong, and Shanxi (SCPZGYMDA, reel 163, vol. 647, pp. 8-36).  Some of the 
remaining 47 shop owners, whose places of origin were listed either as Shuangcheng or as other parts of 




after the establishment of a civilian government in Shuangcheng, the government surveyed 
the civilian population, which included the civilian population that had previously 
belonged to the administration of Lalin.57  The civilian population of that year was 1,831 
households (table 4.2).58  By contrast, the rural and metropolitan banner populations in the 
registers of that year totaled 4,053 households of 36,398 people.59  In addition, there were 
2,023 households of 10,375 floating bannermen.60  Therefore, by 1890, civilian 
commoners accounted for only 23.2 percent of the Shuangcheng population.   
 
The unregistered population 
The 1910 Shuangcheng census, conducted by the civilian government, significantly 
increased the size of the registered population.  This complete population census, 
covering residents of both Shuangcheng and Lalin, identified a total of 34,697 households 
of 227,321 Manchu and 27,950 households of 214,223 Han.61  Since this census identified 
households not by their banner affiliation but instead by their ethnicity, it was unclear how 
many households who reported themselves to be Han were actually Han-Chinese 
bannermen.  Nonetheless, the sizes of both the Manchu and Han populations far exceeded 
what we have observed in the population registers; the Manchu population was 4.7 times 
the sum of the metropolitan and rural banner populations in the equivalent period, and the 
Han population was about 15 times that in 1890.   
                                                        
57 In 1882, when the civilian government was established, the administrative area was accordingly 
expanded.  The civilian government administered not only Shuangcheng, but also the area previously 
belonging to Lalin. 
58 SCXZ (1990), pp. 829.  These 1,831 households included 26,237 civilian commoners. 
59 The size of the metropolitan and rural population was calculated from the banner population registers of 
1889 and 1890. 
60 The information on floating bannermen was drawn from extant registers of 1888 and 1894, whenever the 
date was closest to 1890.  As the estimate of the floating banner population only reflected those who were 
captured by the population registers, it may have actually been larger. 




This apparently large increase in the Shuangcheng population suggests the existence 
of a large, previously unregistered population of both bannermen and civilian commoners.  
For the Manchu population, three factors can explain the huge increase in the registered 
population: the expansion of the registration area from Shuangcheng to both Shuangcheng 
and Lalin, the influx of immigrants, and the under-registration of floating bannermen.  For 
the Han population, since the 1890 data already included the civilian population of Lalin, 
its huge increase can only be explained by the influx of immigrants and the existence of an 
unregistered population.  If we consider the population increase in the entire Jilin 
Province in the same period, we can see a large volume of immigration between the 1890s 
and 1912; according to Liang Fangzhong’s study, in 1897, the total population of Jilin 
province was 779,000, but by 1912, there were 5,538,405 civilian commoners plus 52,017 
banner households.  This estimate suggest a more than eight-fold increase since 1897 and 
an even greater increase since 1890 (1980).  Alongside immigration, the under 
registration of population in Shuangcheng was also an obvious cause of this increase. 
Lacking detailed data, we can only estimate the size of the unregistered population 
according to the land-labor ratio in the Shuangcheng area.  By 1891, when all the arable 
land in Shuangcheng was reclaimed, the local government had registered a total of 225,473 
shang (414,870.2 hectares) of land.62  If an adult male in the 1890s could farm 10 shang of 
land,63 farming these 225,473 shang of land required about 22,548 adult males.  In 1891, 
                                                        
62 See the government report on types of land and their amounts (SCPGBTDHKDM, reel 1834732, vol. 
676).  The total amount of land here included 24,766 shang of sanwangshang land, which was not on the 
land list reported by the government in 1891, as it belonged to Lalin and was not controlled by the 
Shuangcheng banner government.  I include this type of land in the total amount of land because the count 
of registered civilian households in 1890 included those residing in Lalin. 
63 In the 1820s, the officials estimated that an adult male on average could farm six to seven shang of land, 
and the most capable adult male could farm 12 to 13 shang.  Since in the early stage of the state farm, the 
farming conditions could be poorer, in 1890, an average adult male would probably farm more land.  So, I 




a total of 12,617 adult males were listed in the banner population registers, including 
metropolitan bannermen, rural bannermen, and floating bannermen.  After excluding 
those with official posts and government student titles as well as floating bannermen 
engaging in commerce, the total number of adult males drops to 12,183.  As for civilian 
commoners, since about half of the 1,831 registered households in 1890 resided in the seat 
of Shuangcheng,64 the number residing in rural areas was probably 900.  If the average 
number of adult males in each civilian household was 2.5, the estimated number of adult 
males in these registered civilian households would be 2,250.65  The total number of adult 
males in the registered banner and civilian populations was therefore probably about 
14,433.  Nonetheless, not all these 14,433 adult males were engaged in farming, as those 
civilian commoners registering massive amounts of land were more likely to be managers 
and some metropolitan bannermen lived as landlords.66  Thus, to meet the minimum 
requirement of 22,548 adult males, at least 9,000 additional adult males had to work on the 
land in Shuangcheng, which, after the inclusion of their families, led to at least 20,000 
unregistered bannermen and civilian commoners.67  Since this unregistered population of 
20,000 was only the minimum requirement to meet the demand for labor, it could have 
been even larger, as the land in Shuangcheng had the capacity to accommodate more 
people. 
                                                        
64 In 1866, when the local government established the baojia system, a total of 1,208 households resided in 
the seat of Shuangcheng.  According to my estimation, at least a half of them were civilian commoners.  
By 1890, the government had begun to permit free immigration, so there could have been more civilian 
commoners residing in the seat of Shuangcheng. 
65 According to the 1910 census, the mean household size among the Han was 7.6.  Given this household 
size and the fact that immigrant populations usually had younger age structures and lower dependency 
ratios, the estimated average number of adult males per household was 2.5.  
66 See Jing’ebu’s description of metropolitan bannermen in his memorial on adjusting policies in 
Shuangcheng in 1844, HCDXTGZY, juan 31, 7a. 
67 Since these unregistered residents mainly worked as tenants and hired laborers, they probably had 
smaller families.  Hired laborers in particular could be single males.  Thus, I estimate their average 




The government was aware of the existence of these unregistered bannermen and 
civilian commoners, as various government documents frequently mentioned “itinerant 
civilian commoners (liumin)” and “floating bannermen not on the registers.”  According 
to the local government archives, the Captain’s Office would check every three months for 
“itinerant civilian commoners” and “floating bannermen not on the registers” residing in 
the banner villages.68  However, the large unregistered population revealed by the 1910 
census indicates that these reports were only routine paperwork and that the government 
did not actually track the unregistered populations.   
While the existence of this large unregistered population can partly be explained by 
geographical mobility, which made it difficult to track people,69 it also suggests the 
government’s intention to delay their registration.  On the one hand, the government 
allowed these civilian and banner populations to reside in Shuangcheng and provide local 
residents with labor.  On the other hand, the government also used registration to 
manipulate people’s rights.  Since only the registered population had rights to officially 
register land and receive government support in Shuangcheng, by not registering those 
“itinerant civilian commoners” and floating bannermen, the state also denied their rights 
and protected the rights of the registered banner and civilian populations. Consequently, 
the unregistered floating bannermen and civilian commoners could only work as private 
tenants and hired laborers for Shuangcheng residents.  This practice especially benefitted 
metropolitan and rural bannermen; by not registering all floating bannermen and civilian 
commoners, metropolitan and rural bannermen were always the ‘majority’, at least in the 
official records.  
                                                        
68 See SCPZGYMDA. 
69 This is also true for the floating banner population, as many floating bannermen who were not registered 





Conclusion: categorical inequalities and opportunities 
Although the land allocation policy in Shuangcheng privileged metropolitan and rural 
bannermen by granting them entitlement to jichan land, it did not universally disfranchise 
floating bannermen and civilian commoners.   Two administrative systems—the banner 
and the civilian—organized the four populations in Shuangcheng.  The banner and the 
civilian system both provided the have-nots—floating bannermen and civilian 
commoners—with opportunities for upward mobility.  However, due to the different 
natures of the two systems, floating bannermen and civilian commoners had different 
channels of upward mobility; belonging to the banner system, floating bannermen had no 
official rights to land but only political rights to serve the government as soldiers and to 
become government students, whereas civilian commoners did not have political rights but 
did have opportunities to claim land from the government and become state tenants.  Thus, 
although the institution of population categories fundamentally defined entitlement rights 
and social status, it did not determine every aspect of social life.   
The existence of large land holders among the civilian commoners demonstrates that 
the government used different principles to control banner and civilian populations in 
Shuangcheng.  The banner population was highly institutionalized.  The state land 
allocated to bannermen gave equivalent importance to within-category equality and 
between-category inequality.  To achieve its goal of equal land allocation among 
metropolitan and rural bannermen respectively, the state established regulations to monitor 
land allocation and its future transfer, preventing land concentration.  Such measures, 




suique land, thus allowing powerful civilian commoners to hold massive amounts of land.  
Interestingly, although civilian commoners as a category were excluded from state land 
allocation, the land holding of some civilian tenants, totaling more than 700 shang, far 
exceeded that of most of the metropolitan and rural bannermen,70 revealing that while 
metropolitan and rural bannermen were privileged by the state institution, they were also 
constrained by the same system. 
However, despite the existence of alternative institutions and opportunities for the 
have-nots, the state institutions that generated the unequal population categories were still 
the most influential institution.  Over the history of the Shuangcheng state farm, 
metropolitan and rural bannermen accounted for the majority of the registered population.  
This finding is contrary to the assumption that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, the civilian population dominated Northeast China, and that Northeast society 
simply transformed from banner to civilian society.  While this assumption is probably 
true in some regions of the Northeast – as Liang Fangzhong shows, in 1912, there were 
800,099 Han-Chinese households but only 52,017 banner households in Jilin Province 
(1980) – it is not true in Shuangcheng.  In the Shuangcheng area, before the fall of the 
Qing, the civilian population never outnumbered the banner population; even in 1910, after 
taking into consideration the unregistered population and the possibility of 
overrepresentation, Han-Chinese households still comprise less than half of the total (48.5 
percent).71   Even by the end of the Qing, Shuangcheng was still largely a banner society 
                                                        
70 According to government land registers, in 1876, only two households among the metropolitan and rural 
bannermen had a land holding exceeding 700 shang.  This is after the government registration of the land 
privately cultivated by Shuangcheng residents.    
71 See SCXZ (1990), p. 829.  Han-Chinese accounted for 45 percent of the total households and 48.5 
percent of the total population.  Since the population data in 1910 only provided ethnicity but not the 
banner affiliation of the population, it is not clear how what proportion of the Han-Chinese population were 




with all the categorical boundaries and privileges this implied.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
their percentage of the civilian population should be much lower than the above figures. 
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Chapter V    
Banner Organization and Register Compilation 
 
For more than half a century, scholars have paid considerable attention to the nature of 
the interaction between the state and local society in late imperial and modern China; on 
the one hand, some scholars have identified a centralized, bureaucratized, and increasingly 
autocratic Chinese state that culminated in the founding of the People’s Republic of China 
in 1949;1 on the other, scholars have also revealed the persistence and increasingly 
autonomous nature of local society and local elites, culminating in the emergence of “civil 
society” beginning the late nineteenth century.2  Seeing these developments as being at 
odds with one another is, however, inaccurate, and results from the direct superimposition 
of a binary model of state-society relations developed under the Western tradition onto 
Chinese history.  Under this binary model, society is considered a rival of the state; the 
empowerment of social organizations undermines state authority.  This model, however, 
misrepresents the relationship between the state and local society in China, as the Chinese 
state, throughout numerous regimes, intentionally used and empowered institutions 
developed in local society to fulfill its administrative goals. 
While this western-framed view of the Chinese state-society relationship remains 
influential, China scholars have attempted to rectify this binary model by studying local 
                                                        
1 While numerous studies have revealed the increasingly autocratic nature of the Chinese state during the 
late imperial period (Bartlett 1991; Fu 1993; Huang 1981), Karl Wittfogel especially explored its 
characteristics and summarized this autocracy with the term “oriental despotism” (Wittfogel 1957).  
2 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a trend of searching for civil society and a public sphere in China  
arose in Chinese studies. These discussions and debates are best summarized in the “Public Sphere”/ “Civil 
Society” in China Symposium, Modern China, Vol.19, No.2, April 1993. 
 
 142
government and local society in detail (Ch'u 1962; Esherick and Rankin 1990; Fei 1948; 
Huang 1993, 1996; Hsiao 1960; Jones 1979; Reed 2000; Rowe 2001; Shue 1988; Scogin 
1994).3  As early as the late 1940s, Fei Xiaotong pointed out that Chinese society was 
founded on a series of social relationships and interlocking yet “self-sufficient” social 
networks (1948).  As he put it, the rulers of China “really rule by allowing people in rural 
society to manage their own affairs.”4  Ch’u T’ung-tsu and Hsiao Kung-chuan, in their 
pioneer studies on local government and local society in Qing China, revealed that, below 
the county level, the government relied heavily on such local social organizations as 
village and lineage to carry out administrative tasks (Ch'u 1962; Hsiao 1960).   
Along with this trend, later scholarship has revealed a more complex picture of 
state-society interaction in China.  Local social organizations led by local elites played a 
major role in maintaining social order, fulfilling administrative tasks, and mitigating 
conflicts and disputes (Esherick and Rankin 1990; Huang 1993, 1996, 2001; Jones 1979; 
Reed 2000; Scogin 1994).  Moreover, these local powers also overlapped and 
collaborated with state power.  These studies suggest that, while the Chinese state 
maintained tight political control over society, it intentionally stayed away from local 
social affairs, leaving local social organizations tremendous space to govern everyday life.  
Contrary to the conviction that this local autonomy was an encroachment on state authority, 
the state in fact was able to disseminate its ideology in local society through policies, 
thereby enforcing its control (Scogin 2001). 
Following the path laid out by the above-mentioned scholarship, in this chapter I 
examine the local banner organization in Shuangcheng to explore the nature of 
                                                        
3 Although these scholars have attempted to rectify the western-facing view, many of them were still more 
or less influenced by the same framework.  This process of rectification is slow and still incomplete. 
4 This quotation is from Gary G. Hamilton and Wang Zheng’s translation of Fei’s work (Fei 1992). 
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state-society interactions under the institution of population categories.  Since previous 
scholarship on state-society relations has focused largely on civilian societies, few studies 
have fully explored local governance in the banner society.5  Compared to civilian 
societies, banner societies were more institutionalized.  In the creation of the Eight 
Banners, for example, Nurhachi had modified the tribal unit of niru, which was based on 
blood ties, turning it into military and administrative units.  Moreover, in the 
Shuangcheng banner society, social organizations were especially weak.  During the 
recruitment and resettlement stages, the state deliberately corroded all existing or potential 
social organizations to clear the ground for state institutions.  State authority became the 
sole power in this immigrant society, and arranged households and villages according to its 
own interests.  Given this instance of an unusually strong state presence in a local society, 
I am especially interested in exploring how state policies shaped Shuangcheng society. 
I study the local banner organization in Shuangcheng through the lens of the 
compilation of population registers.  I focus on population registration because it was the 
basic institution that enabled both state control of local society and the creation of 
population categories, and also because it provides my major source for information about 
banner organization.  In my analysis, I consider the compilation of population registers to 
be an interactive process between households, villages, and the state.  In Shuangcheng, the 
information recorded in population registers moved from household to village head and 
then to local banner government: the household head was responsible for reporting any 
vital events occurring to household members – including death, birth, and marriage – to the 
                                                        
5 On this topic, James Lee and Cameron Campbell have studied in detail the family organization of the 
banner immigrant society in Daoyi, Liaoning (Lee and Campbell 1997).  In their recent study on local 
banner immigrant societies in the Liaodong area, Ding,Yizhuang, Songyi Guo, James Lee, and Cameron 
Campbell explored the immigrants’ lineage organizations (2004).  However, no study has looked at local 
government institutions and social institutions in banner society as a whole.  
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village head; the village head in turn reported these events to the local banner government, 
which updated the register.  Thus, through register compilation, the basic units of local 
societies—household and village—interacted and negotiated with state interests.  On the 
one hand, by registering and organizing households, the state controlled them for 
administrative purposes.  On the other hand, households and villages, by providing 
information for the registers, also acquired the autonomy to express their own interests.  In 
the following sections, I track the process of register compilation to analyze, in sequence, 
households, villages, and local government in Shuangcheng.  I start my analysis with 
households in order to explore the meaning of this basic social unit in Shuangcheng.  I 
then move to the village level to examine the local social organizations and their role in the 
life of the state farm.  Finally, I analyze the structure of the local banner government and 
its function in the registration system to explore the model of local governance in 
Shuangcheng.   
 
Household 
In China, the population registration system came into being as a consequence of the 
growing importance of the household as the basic organizational unit of social life.  Prior 
to the sixth century B.C., Chinese society was built on feudal relationships that emphasized 
blood ties and lineage organization; rulers therefore mainly controlled the population 
through clans and lineages.  Beginning in the seventh to sixth centuries B.C., however, 
this feudal relationship gradually dissolved, and the household emerged as the basic unit of 
social organization.  Therefore, with population registration, the state directly tackled the 
smallest social unit, the household, and registered its members for the purposes of 
 145
population control and tax collection (Xin 2007).  From then on, the household has been a 
unit of consumption, production, and residence, as well as a unit of administration, 
allocation, and categorization.   
Due to its multiple functions, in government documents the meaning of ‘household’ 
varies according to context.  For registration purposes, the household was the major unit 
to carry the rights and obligations associated with the category to which it belonged.  
Therefore, in the population register, both the government and household members could 
manipulate the household organization to accommodate their own interests.  As rulers 
mainly paid attention to those who fell within their interests, registration often omitted 
those who did not.6  Households themselves could also maneuver to secure benefits and 
avoid disadvantages.  One notable example of this phenomenon is the persistent practice 
of “hiding households (yinhu)” in Chinese history, wherein households faked household 
divisions to reduce their size and property, and thus avoid higher levels of taxation and 
labor service.7  Consequently, while a household on the registers sometimes reflected a 
residential reality, sometimes it did not.  Households in the Shuangcheng banner 
population register also shared this inherent flexibility. 
When planning the Shuangcheng relocation, Fujun defined the household as both a 
real residential group and a unit of land allocation.  In 1819, Fujun ruled that only a 
married adult bannerman could move to Shuangcheng, and that he could only do so along 
with his wife, children, and other household relatives.  In 1822, although Fujun allowed 
                                                        
6 For example, Liaoning bannermen belonging to the imperial household agent registered boys mainly for 
state positions.  Moreover, these Liaoning bannermen only registered daughters in the first half of the 
Qing dynasty for the selection of court ladies.  From 1735 on, when the court stopped selecting court 
ladies from the families of bannermen under the imperial household agent, their population registers 
stopped the registration of daughters (Ding et al. 2004). 
7 While such phenomena existed in many dynasties, it was especially prominent in the Song dynasty 
(960-1125), as the state decided the tax rate by household property (Wang 1986, 1996). 
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unmarried metropolitan bannermen to move to Shuangcheng, he still required that a 
household must consist of at least three individuals, an adult man and his relatives.8  
Initially, this regulation proved effective.  In the first two years of recruitment in Beijing, 
some single bannermen were excluded, even though they were willing to move to 
Shuangcheng.9  Fujun intended this regulation to promote both the stability of the 
settlement and the equitability of land allocation.  In 1822 and 1824, Fujun explained his 
exclusion of single metropolitan bannermen as follows: “I am especially concerned that 
these single bannermen, if settled in Shuangcheng, had to farm the land alone, without 
families cooking for them and doing housework.  [Moreover,] I am also concerned that 
these single bannermen are more likely to abandon the state farm and escape.”10 “Because 
these xiansan will be given 15 shang of cultivated land and 5 shang of uncultivated land, a 
house, and one set of draft animals as well as farming tools, if we count a single bannerman 
as one household, it is a bit too munificent.”11 
Upon receipt of the allocated land, an immigrant household also became an 
administrative unit of the state farm.  Every male member in the household was assigned 
to a state farm position.  The principal adult male (zhengding), who was the main farmer 
of the allocated plot, usually earned the title of household head.  Accordingly, in the land 
registers, the principal adult male owned the plot.  The Qing standard required the 
                                                        
8 See Fujun’s memorial on 1822.3.2, JJCLFZZ, reel 232, 3386-48. 
9 See Yinghe’s summation of an earlier memorial by Fujun on 1825.7.11, JJCLFZZ, reel 232, 3388-21.  In 
the memorial, Fujun listed some cases in which single bannermen could not count as households to move to 
Shuangcheng.  In 1824, Changqing, a yangyubing in the Manchu Plain White banner in Beijing, wanted to 
move to Shuangcheng but was rejected because he was not married.  Moreover, Hafeng’a and his nephew 
Qingfu, two bannermen in the Manchu Plain Red banner in Beijing, applied to move as one household.  
Their request was declined because both men were single, and they therfore could not be counted as a 
household. 
10 See Fujun’s memorial on 1822.3.2, JJCLFZZ, reel 232, 3386-48. 
11 See the cited memorial of Fujun by Yinghe on 1825.7.11, JJCLFZZ, reel 232, 3388-21. 
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principal adult male to be healthy and capable and between the ages of 20 and 50 sui.12  In 
1819 and 1820, the Shuangcheng local government rejected dozens of households for their 
lack of any man qualified to serve as the principal adult male.13  In households with a 
qualifying principal adult male, any remaining men assumed the position of assistant adult 
male (bangding).  The assistant adult male’s duty was to aid the principal adult male in 
farming the land; in addition, they could also work for any household short of labor.14   
Given these roles and assignations, the population register recorded a Shuangcheng 
household as both a domestic and an administrative unit.  It first recorded information 
about the principal adult male: his place of origin, ethnicity, original banner affiliation, 
occupation, name, age, and any vital demographic event that had happened since last 
update.  The registers subsequently recorded the name, age and, occupation of the 
principal adult male’s immediate family members (parents, wife, and children) and then of 
any other relatives living with him.  The register indexed all household members by their 
relationship to the principal adult male.15  This household, as an administrative unit, 
closely corresponded to land allocation.  As the number of plots was fixed in the state 
farm, so were the number of principal adult male positions and thus the number of 
households.  When a principal adult male retired or died, the official document would note 
that “a vacant position is available (quechu).”  Banner officials would then select an 
assistant adult male to adopt the position of principal adult male.  In the household 
                                                        
12 See the order disseminated by the Board of Revenue on 1819.2.16 (SCPTTJL, pp. 85-89).   
13 See the local government report on 1819.9.15, SCPTTJL, pp. 100-103. 
14 See the memorial by Songlin on 1822.7.20, SCPTTJL, pp. 58-59. In this memorial, Songlin advocated 
assigning every extra man in the banner villages to the position of assistant adult male and asking them to 
assist in the farming of their own household or those without sufficient labor.  This plan had the advantage 
of solving the shortage of labor in households in the central tun without recruiting too many civilian 
commoners as labor. 
15 The population register for the metropolitan bannermen followed the same structure even though, as the 
elite, they were not assigned to these state farm positions.  
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registers, an assistant adult male could only establish his household by inheriting the 
principal adult male’s position and his plot.  Therefore, in the state farm, the processes of 
land inheritance and land transfer were not private behaviors; rather, they occurred through 
the official assignment of the position of principal adult male, as determined by state farm 
officials.  
At the same time, Fujun and the local officials showed flexibly and adaptability in the 
registration of unusual household structures, so as to accommodate any unexpected issues 
that arose during the recruitment and settlement processes.  The first of these issues was 
the excessive household size of some rural bannermen.  In 1819, when checking the 
population register, local officials found that rural banner households ranged in size from 
the standard four members to sometimes more than twenty.16  Since the government had 
built only one thatched house for each rural banner household, the local official speculated 
that these government-allocated houses could not accommodate households with more 
than ten people, nor could one plot of land and one standard set of livestock support them.  
In order to ensure the settlement’s stability, local officials divided these large households 
by assigning additional principal adult male positions and allocating additional plots to all 
married adult males in these households; in 1919, 134 new households were thus separated 
from their original households.17  This adaptation resulted in household divisions made 
quickly upon arrival in Shuangcheng.  Consequently, some families with three or four 
principal adult males were thus divided into three or four households in the population 
registers.18 
                                                        
16 See the report of the local government of the Shuangcheng state farm on 1819.5.18, SCPTTJL, 
pp.98-99. 
17 Ibid.  
18 See the memorial of Fujun on 1821.1.6, SCPTTJL, p. 44. 
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Secondly, in order to recruit more metropolitan bannermen (and especially the poor), 
beginning in 1822 Fujun stretched the definition of a ‘household’ that was qualified to 
move.  Instead of recruiting only married bannermen, Fujun stipulated that henceforth all 
single bannermen without state stipends from the Manchu and Mongol banners would be 
counted as separate households.  At first, Fujun required that households include at least 
three members; any combination of three relatives could move as a household.19  This 
policy change produced households with fragmentary structures; for instance, households 
with only single adult males were relatively common, as well as combinations of single 
adult male with widowers and widows.  As recruitment proceeded, in 1825, Fujun further 
loosened the definition of household to allow one single bannerman to be counted as a 
household by himself.20  This expedient measure, however, resulted in high escape and 
extinction rates among the metropolitan banner households.  As the supply of unmarried 
women in the newly settled frontier was usually insufficient, single bannermen were likely 
to remain single in the state farm.  This may be why only 473 of the initial 698 
metropolitan banner households survived until 1869; the other 225 households had either 
died out or escaped from the state farm.21   
These early household registration policies documented how the government 
intervened in immigrant household formation and reorganized immigrants’ residential and 
production groups.  For rural bannermen, the allocation of additional plots and housing to 
large households expedited the process of household division.  In rural China, sons 
usually co-resided with parents for a long time before finally establishing their own 
                                                        
19 See Fujun’s memorial on 1822. 3.2, JJCLFZZ, reel 232, 3386-48. 
20 See Yinghe’s summation of an earlier memorial by Fujun on 1825.7.11, JJCLFZZ, 3388-21. 
21 SCPZGYMDA, reel 201, vol.835, pp.70-85.  While previous studies on Shuangcheng resettlement used 
this high die-out rate as evidence of the failure of this project (Ding 1985), it is probably not a reflection of 
failure, but rather of the high proportion of single-male households. 
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households, usually after their parents’ death.  Multiple-family households were therefore 
the most common type.  For instance, in Daoyi, a banner village in Liaoning Province, 
from 1792 to 1873, 47.2 percent of households were comprised of multiple families, and 
79.7 percent of the population in Daoyi lived in a multiple-family household (Lee and 
Campbell 1997).  Household division, when it occurred, usually took place after sons 
were married.  The settlement of Shuangcheng, however, favored stem households with 
only one conjugal unit.  While rural banner households moved as large but cohesive units, 
the government’s land allocation policy broke up these large household organizations.   
At the same time, as the policies of household registration were fixed in the early stage 
of the state farm, a household in the population registers more and more resembled an 
administrative unit for land allocation rather than a residential and production unit in real 
terms.  When the relocation project concluded in the 1830s, the quota of immigrant 
households was 3,000 for rural bannermen and 1,000 for metropolitan bannermen.22  
Once this quota had been met, the number of households in the Shuangcheng banner 
population registers was fixed, regardless of subsequent changes in household size.  Over 
time, this policy led to a great variance in household size among Shuangcheng banner 
immigrants.  As table 5.1 shows, in 1866 (about 40 years after the establishment of the 
state farm), the rural banner households ranged in size over a wide span from 1 member to 
over 50.  In that year, about 5.4 percent of rural banner households included more than 20 
living persons.  In 1904, the average household size among rural bannermen further 
expanded; the percentage of households with more than 20 living persons had increased to 
                                                        
22 By then, the quota of 3,000 rural banner households had been fulfilled, and 698 of the quota of 1,000 
metropolitan banner households had been fulfilled.  The remaining 302 households were finally created in 
1878, when the government allocated the 302 plots to those metropolitan bannermen who contributed 
money to subsidize the military expenses of Jilin Province. 
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16.7 percent.23   
Table 5. 1 Household size of metropolitan and rural bannermen in 1866 and 1904. 
Metropolitan bannermen Rural bannermen* 
1866 1904 1866  1904 Number of 
living persons N. Percent N. Percent N Percent  N Percent
0 30 6 63 6.3  43 1.7  37 1.4
1-3 221 44.4 392 39.2  385 14.9  268 10.1
4-8 196 39.4 474 47.4  1,047 40.4  884 33.3
9-15 44 8.8 65 6.5  746 28.8  728 27.4
16-20 4 0.8 5 0.5  230 8.9  297 11.2
21-30 3 0.6 1 0.1  115 4.4  268 10.1
31-40      23 0.9  111 4.2
41-50      2 0.1  43 1.6
50 and above      1 0  22 0.8
           
Total 498  1,000  2,592   2,658  
Sources: the Eight Banner population registers of metropolitan and rural bannermen in 1866 and 1904. 
*The series of rural banner population registers is missing one register in 1866 and one in 1904.  
Therefore, the total number of household in both years was less than 3,000. 
 
The large variance in household size inevitably resulted in an equivalent variance in 
residential arrangements, and thus allowed the immigrant households some flexibility in 
managing themselves.  For the large households (with more than 20 people), household 
members decided residential and production arrangements on their own.  As I will show 
in detail in chapter seven, by the mid-nineteenth century, some households had divided 
their land independently and established new households, a phenomenon not captured by 
the population registers.   
Moreover, in the process of register compilation, households also maintained some 
                                                        
23 At the same time, metropolitan banner households showed the opposite tendency.  In 1866, there were 
only 498 Metropolitan banner households, 502 less than the quota of 1,000.  In 1869 and again in 1878, 
the government divided the metropolitan banner households in Shuangcheng to make the number of 
households reach the quota.  The household size of the metropolitan bannermen, therefore, remained 
relatively small and stable.  As table 4.1 shows, throughout the history of the state farm, metropolitan 
banner households did not exceed 30 living persons.  Moreover, the majority of households had between 
one and eight members. 
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autonomy in deciding when and whether to register their new members.  Although the 
state required household heads to report vital events immediately after their occurrence, 
most heads delayed the report.  In Shuangcheng, the mean ages of first registration for the 
children of metropolitan bannermen were 3.02 sui for the boys and 3.73 sui for girls,24 and 
the mean ages of first registration for rural bannermen were 4.38 sui for boys and 4.45 sui 
for girls.  The difference in the mean ages of first registration between metropolitan and 
rural bannermen indicates that bannermen’s registration behavior was closely associated 
with institutional incentives.  In Shuangcheng, population registration was associated 
with land allocation.  The size of a metropolitan banner household especially influenced 
its landed property, as the state stipulated that a household with six to seven people but no 
land had precedence in the state reallocation of land from extinct households.25  Therefore, 
metropolitan bannermen registered their sons much earlier than rural bannermen.  
Furthermore, compared to banner communities without land grants, the mean ages of first 
registration for both metropolitan and rural bannermen were low, as the banner royal 
peasants in Liaoning registered their sons at an average of 5.8 sui and daughters at 6.1 sui.  
Although banner households maintained this autonomy, it was often achieved with the 
cooperation of the village head.     
 
Village 
In rural China, the village organization exemplifies both local autonomy and state 
control.  The state did not establish formal government institutions at the village level.  
                                                        
24 Sui is a traditional way for Chinese people to calculate age.  An infant is counted as one sui at birth and 
two sui at age one.  So, on average, a mean age measured in sui is one and a half years higher than the 
actual mean age. 
25 SCPZGYMDA, reel 201, vol.835, pp.70-85. 
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Instead, it largely relied on the lineage head and other local elites (or gentry), consisting of 
degree holders and wealthy families, to manage village affairs and maintain social order.26  
While allowing tremendous space for local elites to manage their own affairs, the state also 
supervised them to ensure that their activities were in accordance with the state’s interests.  
Therefore, while the state stayed away from local affairs, it also attempted to 
institutionalize local elites by appointing lineage heads or gentry as sanctioned village 
leaders.  Throughout the entire late imperial period and even until the present day, control 
and autonomy defined the power dynamic between the state and the local elites in village 
life (Chang 1955; Duara 1988; Hsiao 1960; Huang 1985; Shue 1988).27   
Compared to villages in other regions of China proper, banner villages in 
Shuangcheng experienced much stronger state control, as the power of local elites had 
been diluted by relocation.  While most villages were established with the settlement of 
their populations, Shuangcheng’s banner villages were well planned by the state long 
before the arrival of immigrants.  When planning his banner villages, Fujun applied the 
principle of equal distribution to keep the villages at an equal size of 24 to 28 rural banner 
households plus the same number of metropolitan banner households.  These initiatives 
                                                        
26 In the 1950s, scholars defined Chinese local elites as gentry and mainly included those who held degrees 
from the government exam (Chang 1955).  The term gentry, however, referred to a large and significantly 
stratified group.  During the past half century, scholarship on state-society relations has enriched the 
definition of local elites.  In addition to degree holders, local elites or gentry also include wealthy families 
and even families with strong military backgrounds (Esherick and Rankin 1990; Hsiao 1960).  Social 
status, landed wealth, and power often worked together to mark a family’s gentry status.  Moreover, some 
gentry families were also lineage leaders. 
27 In the voluminous literature on the nature of Chinese villages, scholars agree that villages were subject 
to the control of two types of power, the state and the local elite.  These scholars, however, do not totally 
agree with one another on the position of the local elite in the village power structure.  Hsiao Kung-ch’uan 
and Chang Chung-li use a binary framework to describe the village power structure and consider the local 
elite and the rest of the village commoners as an entity, as opposed to being completely subordinate to state 
power (Chang 1955; Hsiao 1960).  Later scholars Philip Huang, Prasenjit Duara, and Vivienne Shue 
consider the local elite/gentry as a group independent of the rest of the common villagers, thus positing a 
triangular framework of state-gentry-villagers to explain the power structure of Chinese villages (Duara 
1988; Huang 1985; Shue 1988).  This triangular framework helps to clarify the different interests of the 
three parties: state, local elites, and villagers.   
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translated banner villages into forms more like administrative units.  During the 
settlement stage, the state scattered the immigrants’ original kinship organizations and 
equally allocated land to metropolitan and rural bannermen respectively.  Consequently, 
at least during the first half of Shuangcheng’s history, all the characteristics that defined 
local elites – lineage head, degree holders, and wealthy families – were missing.  
In most of China, village society was run by local kinship groups (Fei 1948).  In the 
history of migration in China, the zu, or descent group, was one of the major means by 
which immigrants and their settlements have been organized.28  Therefore, most Chinese 
villages originated with the settlement of only a few descent groups.29  By looking at the 
surname distribution of Chinese villages, we can identify that this pattern occurred widely 
not only among civilian commoners but also among the immigrants to Liaoning, who were 
organized into the Eight Banners in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.  
For example, from 1749 to 1909, in about 350 banner villages in Liaoning, villages of a 
single descent group were dominant; villages with a single male surname accounted for 
more than 50 percent of households.  Throughout this period, only about 10 to 18 percent 
of villages had more than five surnames (Tso 2004). 
By contrast, during the settlement process in Shuangcheng, the government scattered 
rural banner immigrants from the same descent group, thereby eliminating a potential 
                                                        
28 There are different translations of the term zu or zongzu in previous scholarship.  The most commonly 
used terms are “clan” and “lineage.”  In his research on imperial control in rural China, Hsiao Kung-chuan 
used the definition of Hu Hsien Chin, who defined zu as “a group descended from one ancestor who settled 
in a certain locality or neighborhood.” (1967, 323)  James Watson stipulated that a lineage should have 
four characteristics: “corporate base, group consciousness, ritual unity, and demonstrated descent” (Watson 
1982).  Watson also gave a similar definition to clans, which were organized as corporations, with 
collectively-owned property and joint activities.   Due to the specific meanings to which the terms lineage 
and clan refer, here I use the term “descent group” to include a larger variety of kinship structures. 
29 For example, during the immigration to Sichuan Province in the second half of the seventeenth century, 
immigrants usually settled with their descent groups.  The same situation also happened in Fujian and 
Guangdong (Hsiao 1960).  
 155
disruptor of state power.  For example, the Zhao family from Fuzhou, Liaoning, was 
originally under the administration of a banner captain named Xiteku.  After moving to 
Shuangcheng in the early years, the Zhao family formed nine households.30  These nine 
households, however, were scattered in all three tun: two in the central tun, six in the right 
tun, and one in the left tun, expanding across a distance of more than 35 kilometers.31  
Moreover, even within the same tun, they were settled in different villages, and only four 
households were in the same village.    
Consequently, banner villages in Shuangcheng consisted of clusters of households 
from a variety of different descent groups.  As table 5.2 shows, in each of the 120 villages, 
the rural banner households came from at least five different descent groups.  49 villages 
(41 percent) contained households from eleven to fifteen different descent groups, and the 
households of another 43 villages represented 16 to 20 different descent groups.  Given 
the fact that each banner village included only 24 to 28 rural banner households, the large 
number of households from different descent groups meant that, in these villages, only a 
handful of households could be drawn from the same descent group.  In the extreme cases, 
the rural banner households in nine villages came from 21 to 24 different descent groups, 
which meant that almost every individual household in these villages represented a distinct 
descent group.  At the same time, the metropolitan bannermen, who mostly moved as 
individual households, also lacked kinship organizations. 
                                                        
30 I draw this example from the 1870 population registers.  I identify descent groups by households’ 
places of origin, original banner affiliations, the names of original banner captains, and family surnames.  
In the analysis, I only counted those households with a notation of “yihu (one household),” which means 
they were the original households formed at the settlement stage.  In Shuangcheng, new households 
formed through household division after the settlement usually have a notation of “linghu (another 
household).” 
31 The village where the household of the Zhao family in the left tun resided was located at the upper-right 
hand corner of the Shuangcheng map (map 3.1), while five households of the same family resided in 
villages located in the lower-left hand corner of the Shuangcheng map.  The distance between the two 
villages was more than 35 kilometers.  
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5-7 5 4.2 
8-10 14 11.7 
11-15 49 40.8 
16-20 43 35.8 
21-24 9 7.5 
 
Total 120 100.0 
Source: the banner population registers in 1866. 
Given the traditional importance of kinship organizations in the administration of 
banner populations, the government’s dispersion of these organizations in the 
Shuangcheng experiment represents an aggressive departure from prior governance.  
Descent groups or clans in the banner population originated from the tribal tradition of the 
Jurchen people.  Along with the development of the Eight Banners, these tribal 
organizations became highly institutionalized, such that clan heads often served the court 
as officials.  The court gradually established a clan-head (zuzhang) system and appointed 
clan heads as the official agents to control bannermen (Li 2008).  In the structure of 
banner population registers, the clan also became a formal unit; an individual bannerman 
was organized hierarchically from highest to lowest: captain, clan, and household (Ding et 
al. 2004).  The Qing emperors also paid much attention to the genealogies of bannermen 
as points of official reference when assigning official positions and noble titles as well as 
determining adoption and inheritance.  The government’s dispersion of descent group 
organizations thus indicated that, instead of relying on familial and familiar social 
organizations to control the immigrants, the government was determined to manage 
                                                        
32 The unique surnames here are identified by the immigrant’s place of origin, original banner affiliation, 
original banner captain, and surname.  Thus one unique surname represents a unique descent group origin. 
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households with state institutions alone.  This policy resulted in weak kinship bonds in the 
Shuangcheng area, which has had a lasting legacy, even to the present day.33     
Like lineage groups, other local elites, or gentry, were also absent from banner 
villages in Shuangcheng.  The Chinese gentry were usually distinguished from other 
members of local society by their degrees acquired from government exams, wealthy land 
holding, and ability to organize such public works as schools, granaries, and charities.  In 
Shuangcheng, however, the number of degree holders was small, and in the banner 
population registers, the highest level of degree was shengyuan, or “government student.”  
From 1866 to 1912, households with a shengyuan title only accounted for 0.48 percent of 
both the metropolitan and rural banner households.34  Moreover, of the 120 banner 
villages, 46 villages never had a single shengyuan in this forty-six-year period and perhaps 
in the entire history of the state farm.  Moreover, even the few shengyuan title-holders 
were soon absorbed into the Banner institution and therefore did not become a local elite; 
they started their official careers by working as clerks or soldiers, either of which would 
lead them to future promotions through the banner system.  This situation contrasted with 
that characteristic of civilian society, which had a large body of local elites with earned 
degrees but no active official titles. 
By the same token, such wealthy familes as were identified by scholars of the Chinese 
gentry were also missing in Shuangcheng.  As Shuangcheng was an immigrant society, 
banner families did not have accumulated wealth.  Moreover, through equal land 
allocation and the enforced within-category equality, the state prevented wealth 
                                                        
33 See my introduction of Yan, Yunxiang’s work in note 89 in chapter three.   
34 According the Chang Chung-li, at the national level, the total size of the degree-holding gentry class 
represented about 1.3 percent of the Chinese population (Chang 1955).  The shengyuan degree holders 
made up 87 percent of this degree-holding gentry population, thus accounting for 1.13 percent of the 
Chinese population.  Although the proportion of shengyuan degree holders was probably smaller in the 
rural area, it should be still greater than that in Shuangcheng. 
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concentration; wealth accumulation in Shuangcheng, if any, was therefore slow, thereby 
preventing a small number of families from distinguishing themselves as an elite. 
The absence of influential bannermen in public works also indicated weak gentry 
power in the banner villages themselves.  In 1866, the Shuangcheng government decided 
to rebuild the city wall of the seat of Shuangcheng.  In order to do so, it collected monetary 
contributions from the residents.  The 557 contributors to this project consisted of 304 
officials and soldiers of the local banner government and 253 merchants and shop owners 
in the Shuangcheng area.35  The majority of the 253 merchants and shop owners were 
Han-Chinese from Zhili and Shanxi provinces.36  In 1868, the government awarded 66 
honorific titles to those who had contributed in an exceptional way to the city wall 
construction project, either in labor or monetarily.37  Of the 66 awardees, only three were 
bannermen without official or soldier titles. 
The general absence of kinship organizations and gentry in the banner villages made 
the state-appointed village head, or tunda, the only authority at the village level.  In each 
banner village, the banner government appointed only one village head, accompanied by 
two appointed precinct heads, or shijia zhang, each in charge of about ten households.  
The five villages of each banner had a chief village head (zong tunda).  The duties of the 
head and chief head included supervising the population in the village, updating the 
population registers in a timely way, checking the progress of production, and, by the end 
of each year, collecting rent for the government.  Besides these regular duties, village 
heads were involved in every aspect of the village’s public life, including adoption, 
                                                        
35 See the report and attached list sent by the local government to the Provincial government in 1866, 12 
(SCPZGYMDA, reel 161, vol. 640-1, pp.125-173).   
36 The places of origins of the shop owners can be identified by a separate list of the shop owners, filed in 
1867.3 (SCPZGYMDA, reel 163, vol. 647, pp.8-36). 
37 SCPZGYMDA, reel 154, vol. 654, pp.116-124.  The awardees were those who contributed more than 
150 strings of copper coins, or those who provided great labor service in the construction project. 
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inheritance, and property transfer.  In cases of adoption and inheritance, village heads and 
precinct heads were the key witnesses to ensure the legitimacy of the procedures.  In land 
transfer, a bannerman reported his intention to relinquish the allocated plot, first to the 
village head and then to the Captain’s Office in the presence of the village head.  The 
village head would then participate in the process of selecting another qualified adult male 
to take the returned plot.  Because of his familiarity with the villagers, the village head 
was usually the most authoritative figure in deciding the heir.38  Once the heir was decided, 
the village head and precinct heads would sign a guarantee stating that this heir was 
capable of farming. 
Although the village head was not an official position, the appointment of the chief 
village head followed a strict official procedure.  A central figure, the chief village head 
connected the banner government and the villagers, and, like many typical state-appointed 
village heads in Chinese history, he had to travel to the Captain’s Offices repeatedly to 
report important events.  Therefore, with the requirement of tremendous energy, the work 
of a village head was, in fact, drudgery.39  It was quite common that a chief village head 
resigned his position due to an illness that limited his physical mobility and thus prevented 
him from fulfilling his tasks.40  Because of the troubles associated with the role, each chief 
village head wore a hat with a golden tip, an honor equivalent to that given to the jinshi and 
                                                        
38 The authority of the village head in selecting heirs was especially pronounced in selecting the person 
who would succeed an extinct metropolitan banner household. (SCPZGYMDA, reel 201, vol. 834-1, pp. 
85-98). 
39 This model of governance also has a counterpart in the civilian societies.  For example, the tax head 
(liangzhang) in the Ming dynasty had a similar relationship with the government (Liang 1957).  The tax 
head enjoyed a stipend but had to fulfill the heavy duty of collecting taxes among the villagers; he also 
gained authority in other village affairs. 
40 For example, in 1866, the chief village head of the Plain Red banner, Wang Zhili, and the chief village 
head of the Plain Blue banner, Zongfu, both resigned their positions because of illnesses that rendered them 
physically incapable of fulfilling their tasks. (SCPZGYMDA, reel 162, vol. 643, pp.81-82, 129-131).   
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juren degree holders.41  In addition, each chief village head also earned a monthly stipend 
of one tael of silver.  However, if the Captain’s Offices grew dissatisfied with the work of 
a chief village head, the government would remove him from his post.42  When a chief 
village head resigned or was removed from his post, the village head and precinct head in 
his banner automatically became candidates for the position.43  The banner captain then 
would send these candidates’ resumes, written in the Manchu language, to the state farm 
government to review and appoint a new chief village head.44  
While fulfilling their government duties, however, village heads in Shuangcheng, like 
those in other parts of China, also had the autonomy to exercise their power to 
accommodate the villagers’ interests.  For example, in a legal case from 1866, the state 
farm government found that Baocheng, the chief village head of the Bordered Blue banner, 
had not promptly reported the death of the eldest son of Wang Fushou, a metropolitan 
bannermen, to the Captain’s Office to update the population register.  Instead, Wang’s 
wife Née Yang used her illegitimate son, named Zhao Zhu, to impersonate the deceased 
eldest son.  By this chicanery, Née Yang acquired for Zhao Zhu a banner identity and thus 
entitlement to state land.  Through investigation, the captain determined that, although 
Wang had reported his eldest son’s death immediately to the chief village head Baocheng, 
Née Yang had surreptitiously persuaded Baocheng not to report the death to the Captain’s 
                                                        
41 See the addendum of the settlement plan Fujun submitted to the Jiaqing emperor on 1820.4.17 
(SCPTTJL, p. 40).  
42 The most common reasons for the governmental removal of chief village heads were their intentional 
resistance to government tasks or irresponsibility in fulfilling their duties.  Interestingly, in 1879, the chief 
village head of the Plain Red banner was removed because he seldom showed up in the banner offices for 
routine reports and other tasks (SCPZGYMDA, reel 202, vol. 839, pp.171-175). 
43 In 1866, when the chief village head of the Plain Red banner Wang Zhili resigned his position, the 
banner office then submitted the names of the tunda and shijia zhang to the state farm government as 
candidates for this position (SCPZGYMDA, reel 162, vol. 643, pp. 89-90).   
44 The resumes of the candidates for chief village head were preserved in the local archives.  For 
examples, see SCPZGYMDA, reel 202, vol. 839, pp.219-226 and pp.271-278. 
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Office.  Although this event occurred in 1854, it was not brought up to the government 
until 1866, when Wang’s other sons sued Zhao Zhu after he had grown up and acquired 
property.45   
The case, in which Baocheng helped Née Yang to acquire a banner identity for Zhao 
Zhu, revealed that, despite strong government control, banner villages in Shuangcheng still 
had autonomy.  Although the state undercut the power of kinship organizations and local 
elites, it still stayed out of local affairs, instead appointing a village head as its local agent 
to manage them.  With the official appointment, the state in fact empowered village heads.  
With this power from the state, a village head was able to work not only for the state’s 
interests but also for those of the villagers.  In this way, the state adhered to the traditional 
model of allowing local societies to manage themselves.  This state design of 
Shuangcheng society will be more explicit after we examine the structure of the local 
banner government. 
 
Local banner government 
The banner government in Shuangcheng had a dual nature as both a banner garrison 
and a county government.  Belonging to the Eight Banners, the structure of the local 
government followed the standard of a banner garrison; not only was the population 
organized into Eight Banners, but the government personnel also assumed military titles 
and served the state as officials and soldiers.  At the same time, as the first local authority 
established in the state farm, the banner government also functioned as a civil government 
to administer the banner immigrants; one of its primary functions was to produce and 
                                                        
45 See the documentation of the investigation on Wang and his sons as well as the government report in 
1865, 1866, and 1868, SCPZGYMDA, reel 158, vol. 629-1, p.28; reel 160, vol. 634, pp.12-16; reel 162, vol. 
643, pp. 133-136; and reel 164, vol. 658, p. 18-26. 
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maintain the population and land registers.  The state therefore adopted principles of 
traditional Chinese local government in organizing the local banner government.  This 
fusion of military and civilian administration thus generated fundamental consequences for 
local governance in Shuangcheng. 
The history of the Shuangcheng banner government can be divided into three stages: 
establishment (1820-1851), growth (1852-1882), and concession (1883-1929).  In 1815, 
upon the creation of the state farm, the state established a small-scale administration, 
equipped with a conditional assistant commandant (wei xieling), two conditional captains 
(wei zuoling), and two conditional banner lieutenants (wei xiaoqi xiao), to administer the 
first 1,000 immigrants from Jilin.46  This small banner administration was only a 
prototype government; without independent adjudication and fiscal rights, it was 
supervised by the banner government in Alchuka.  Under these circumstances, the power 
of the banner government was scattered; by 1820, when 2,000 rural banner households 
arrived from Liaoning, the state had established a total of three sets of eight banners, 
respectively located in the central, right, and left tun.   
As the immigrant population increased, the scale of government continued to expand.  
In 1851, the banner administration in Shuangcheng finally achieved independent 
adjudication and fiscal rights.  In that year, the rank of the government was upgraded to 
vice commander-in-chief (fudutong) and the chief official had the title of area 
commander-in-chief (zongguan).47  Consequently, two departments were established: the 
Left Department, in charge of military-related affairs, including public security, criminal 
                                                        
46 SCPXLYMDA, item no. 4506. 
47 See the official communications between the Shuangcheng government and other governments 
regarding the regulations of adjusting Shuangcheng banner administration on 1855.5.14 (SCPZGYMDA, 
reel 1, vol. 3, p. 35)  
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cases, personnel, and the military itself; and the Right Department, in charge of 
civil-related affairs, including finance, taxation, education, and population.  
Correspondingly, the government also consolidated the banner offices scattered in the 
central, right, and left tun into the Shuangcheng seat located in the central tun (map 3.1).  
As the only government authority, the banner government administered the entire area of 
Shuangcheng, including not only the 120 banner villages but also the areas where civilian 
commoners resided.  The area under the administration of the banner government thus 
was equivalent to that ruled by a county government.   
In 1882, when a civil government was established in Shuangcheng, the power of the 
banner government shrank to the 120 villages only (the area of banner division in map 3.2).  
Consequently, its administrator’s rank was downgraded to assistant commandant (xieling).  
Yet, the banner government maintained authority, adjudication, and taxation among the 
banner villages.48  Even after 1911, when the Qing dynasty was overthrown, the banner 
administration remained active as an office under the republican government.  Banner 
government in one form or another thus persisted in Shuangcheng for more than a century. 
 
The office of the area commander-in-chief 
Despite the military titles of its personnel, the structure of the Shuangcheng banner 
government after 1851 was in many ways analogous to that of a civil county government.49  
As figure 5.1 shows, the local banner government was equipped with an area 
commander-in-chief analogous to the magistrate, two assistant commandants analogous to 
                                                        
48 For a short period from 1882 to 1889, the banner government had handed the taxation of the banner land 
over to the civil government, but the banner government soon regained control of taxation. 
49 In this chapter, I mainly analyze the structure of the banner government after 1851, when it was 
upgraded to a formal government analogous to a county government. 
 164
the assistant magistrate, and six clerks.  The area commander-in-chief – the primary 
official of the banner government – acted as magistrate to supervise the running of the 
government, judged legal cases, made decisions on local affairs, and communicated with 
the general of Jilin.  Three departments comprised the core of the office of the area 
commander-in-chief: the Right Department, the Left Department, and the Seal Office, in 
charge of official seals and important documents.  Each of the two assistant commandants 
supervised one of the Right and Left Departments.50  The two assistant commandants also 
concurrently acted as the chief official of the respective wing divisions to supervise the 
banner captains.51 
 
Figure 5. 1 The structure of Shuangcheng local banner government. 
Sources: The regulations on adjusting the Shuangcheng banner administration in 1855.5 (SCPZGYMDA, 
reel 1, vol. 3, pp. 34-54); in 1856.2 (SCPZGYMDA, reel 1, vol. 1, pp. 34-47); and on 1870.2.5 
(SCPXLYMDA, item no. 4506).  
                                                        
50 SCPZGYMDA, reel 1, vol. 3, p. 35. 
51 All banner organizations in Shuangcheng were divided into two wings, right and left.  Each of the 
assistant commandants supervised one wing. 
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Like the civil county government, the Shuangcheng banner government also operated 
within a centralized bureaucratic system.  Under the Qing civil government system, the 
Board of Civil Office controlled the appointment of provincial and local officials, from the 
provincial governor general and governor to the magistrate.  Under the banner system, the 
central government also controlled the appointment of the chief officials in banner 
garrisons; only the emperor had the authority to appoint the general, commander-in-chief, 
and assistant commander-in-chief.  From the 1830s on, the Qing rule stipulated that all 
generals, commanders-in-chief, and assistant commanders-in-chief of banner garrisons 
should be nominated to the Grand Council by the Board of War, so that the emperor could 
conduct an audience interview (yinjian) with each nominee.  The Grand Council would 
then record the names of those who did sufficiently well in the audience interview in the 
“noted names” (jiming) lists, reserved for those who waited for job openings.  When a 
vacancy appeared, the Grand Council would then consult the “noted names” lists to choose 
an appropriate candidate and wait for the emperor’s special approval (Bartlett 1991).  This 
procedure, however, still left space for the general to nominate candidates with whom he 
had close personal connections.  In 1784, the Qianlong emperor further required the 
various banner organizations in Beijing to nominate qualified officials as candidates for the 
assistant commander-in-chief (Ding 2003).52  This policy thus ruled out the general’s 
control of the nomination for the Assistant Commander-in-chief and tightened the 
emperor’s control over the banner garrisons.  
The appointment of the area commander-in-chief of Shuangcheng followed the same 
procedure.  For example, Qingrui, the area commander-in-Chief of Shuangcheng 
                                                        
52 GZSL, juan. 1214, QSL, book 24, p. 284a. 
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(1879-1882),53 was a Manchu bannerman from the Bordered Yellow banner in Beijing.54  
He started his career as a clerk (bitieshi) and after fourteen years ascended to the position of 
colonel of the Guards’ Division in 1872.  In the same year, the captain-general of the 
Guards’ Division nominated him for promotion.  In 1877, Qingrui was recommended to 
the emperor by the Board of War and was approved for the nomination of assistant 
commander-in-chief.  Then, in 1879 the emperor appointed him to the post of area 
commandant-in-chief of Shuangcheng.  Given this close connection with the emperor, the 
banner government of Shuangcheng had as little autonomy as any civil county in Chinese 
history. 
The appointment of the assistant commandants, however, was controlled by the area 
commander-in-chief.  According to Qing rules, the chief official in banner garrisons held 
the authority to nominate the assistant commandants and any subordinate official posts to 
be reviewed by the Board of War.  At the same time, the banner administration in Beijing 
would send another nominee to compete with the nominee sent by the banner garrisons.  
The Board of War usually ended up choosing the one nominated by the banner garrisons 
(Ding 2003).  The personnel file (jingzhi ce) of Shuangcheng officials indicated that the 
appointment of the assistant commandant in Shuangcheng followed the same procedure as 
stipulated by national regulation.55   
The localization of the appointment of assistant commandant created space for two 
types of local autonomy: the power of the area commander-in-chief to appoint the assistant 
commandant, and the empowerment of local society under a native official.  Under the 
                                                        
53 See SCXZ (1926), book 1, p.107. 
54 For Qingrui’s career path, see the resume of Qingrui reported on 1880. 6, SCPZGYMDA, reel. 93, vol. 
364, pp. 201-202. 
55 For an example, see the personnel file compiled by the local government in 1880.8 (SCPZGYMDA, reel 
93, vol. 364, pp.199-373).   
 167
civil government system, the magistrate had no authority to appoint his subordinate 
officials; the Board of Civil Office appointed all officials, including the assistant 
magistrate.  This measure restricted the power of the magistrate and ensured centralization.  
At the same time, China had long practiced strict rules of avoidance which forbade local 
officials from taking posts in their places of origin.  This measure prevented the 
usurpation of political power by a hereby-empowered local society.  The absence of such 
measures as the rule of avoidance in the banner system has led such scholars as Ding 
Yizhuang to conclude that, within banner garrisons, close familial ties were built among 
officials/officers and soldiers (Ding 2003). 
Despite the localization of the assistant commandant, the banner government applied 
a set of mechanisms to prevent the development of local autonomy.  For the appointment 
of subordinate officials, the candidates’ personnel files were their most important 
qualifications to the posts (Ding 2003).  The area commander-in-chief had to send the 
resume of the nominee to the Board of War for approval.  Every year, the local 
government would compile a personnel file for all active officials and send them to the 
Board of War for the emperor to review.  This institution, by emphasizing experience 
instead of ability, restricted the power of the area commander-in-chief to choose anyone he 
might like.   
Moreover, the banner government of Shuangcheng also applied a rule of avoidance at 
the local level; the supervisor of any banner institution had to be an outsider to that specific 
institution.  For example, all banner captains in Shuangcheng were organized into two 
wings, right and left.56  The two assistant commandants, when supervising the Wing 
                                                        
56 The number and scale of the Wing office changed several times over the course of state farm history due 
to reforms to the bureaucratic system in Shuangcheng.  Prior to 1832, there were a total of six wings, two 
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divisions, had to avoid the wing in which he had worked as a banner captain.  In 1869, the 
official rule stipulated that the assistant commandant supervising the Right Wing should be 
selected from banner captains of the Left Wing, and vice versa.57 
 
The Captain’s Office 
Below the Wing division was the Banner Captain’s Office, analogous to a sub-county 
civilian government.  The banner organization in Shuangcheng fundamentally differed 
from that of the standard Eight Banner administration in the way it classified the 
population.  Standard banner administrations categorized populations by ethnicity, 
separating Manchu, Mongol, and Han-Chinese bannermen (hanjun) into different 
banners.58  In Shuangcheng, however, the government mixed immigrants with various 
ethnicities under one administration and only differentiated metropolitan bannermen from 
rural bannermen.  When rural bannermen arrived in Shuangcheng, the state established 
six captains to supervise the 120 villages, with each captain in charge of 20 villages.59  In 
                                                                                                                                                                     
in each tun.  When metropolitan bannermen settled in the villages, a separate Metropolitan Banner Wing 
was established to supervise their affairs.  In 1852, corresponding to the upgrade of the local government, 
the state cut the Metropolitan Banner Wing and combined all the wings into two. 
57 SCPXLYMDA, item no. 4506. 
58 In the founding stage of the Eight Banners, Nurhachi and Hongtaiji had established three sets of eight 
banners – the Manchu eight banners, Mongol eight banners, and Han eight banners – to separately 
administer the three major ethnicities.  After entering Beijing, the Qing rulers continued this practice and 
residentially separated these three sets of eight banners.  Even in banner garrisons, where the banner 
populations of different ethnicities resided in the small Manchu cities, bannermen with different ethnicities 
still belonged to different captains.  For example, in the banner garrison in Ningxia and Liangzhou, the 
state established separate banner captains for Manchu bannermen and Han bannermen. 
59 In the history of Shuangcheng state farm, the structure of the banner organization underwent a 
significant reform in 1869.  Before 1869, there were three sets of eight banners, organizing villages in the 
central, right, and left tun respectively.  Every five villages comprised a banner.  A banner captain, by 
administering 20 villages, actually took charge of four banners.  In 1869, the administrative reform in 
Shuangcheng consolidated the three sets of eight banners into one.  To do so, the state added one more 
layer of organization, jiala, between village and banner.  The previous banners formed by the five-village 
clusters were renamed jiala, and every four jiala comprised a banner.  Consequently, the previous four 
banners under the left wing of the central tun were renamed Plain White banner, the four banners under the 
right wing of the central tun were renamed Plain Red banner.  The left and right wings of the right tun 
were renamed Bordered Red banner and Bordered Blue banner respectively, and the left and right wings of 
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1832, the government established a separate Metropolitan Banner Wing to administer 
metropolitan bannermen.60  In 1851, when the banner administration was consolidated 
under the Area Commander-in- chief, the government dissolved the Metropolitan Banner 
Wing and merged the administration of the metropolitan bannermen with that of the rural 
bannermen.61  This mixed administration, however, only lasted for nineteen years.  In 
1870, the local government again established two captain’s posts to administer exclusively 
the affairs of metropolitan bannermen.62  The two assistant commandants worked 
concurrently as captains of the two metropolitan banners.  Therefore, in essence, the 
banner organization in Shuangcheng was geographically defined. 
As the lowest-level state institution, the Captain’s Office was responsible for rent 
collection, land allocation, population and land registration, and security maintenance.  In 
pursuit of these tasks, each Captain’s Office was staffed by one banner lieutenant 
(xiaoqixiao) in charge of public security, one or two clerks to process official documents, 
three tax preceptor (lingcui) to collect rent, and a team of 33 to 34 soldiers led by two 
vanguards (qianfeng).  Every three months, the Captain’s Office would routinely check its 
administrative area and send a report on such security issues as unofficial immigrants 
living inside the banner villages and the illegal production of explosives.  In addition, 
without juridical rights, the Captain’s Office would forward disputes to the assistant 
commandant and then to the area commander-in-chief for judgement.   
Interestingly, a large proportion of the major personnel in the Captain’s Office were 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the left tun were renamed Bordered White banner and Plain Blue banner.  The metropolitan bannermen 
were administered by the Plain Yellow banner and the Bordered Yellow banner.  Despite the 
administrative reforms that changed the number and structure of banner organizations, the number and 
structure of villages supervised by a captain remained the same. 
60 SCPZGYMDA, reel 158, vol. 628, p. 155. 
61 Ibid. 
62 SCPXLYMDA, item no. 4506. 
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non-local.  In table 5.3, a comparison of the banner population register and official/soldier 
register shows that in 1874, among the three most important officials – captain, lieutenant, 
and clerks – not one of the captains or lieutenants was from a village under the banner 
office in which he worked.  Of the eight captains, three were from villages other than 
those administered by the banner office in which they worked, and the other five were not 
found in the population registers of the banner villagers at all, indicating that they probably 
resided in the Shuangcheng seat.  Similarly, of the seven lieutenants, five were from 
villages other than those under the banner office in which they worked, and the other two 
were not from the banner villages at all.  The composition of clerks was slightly more 
localized than that of captains and lieutenants; four of the twelve clerks were from villages 
under the banner in which they worked.  Yet two thirds of the clerks were still from 
outside; four clerks were from villages outside the administration of the banner for which 
they worked, and four were not from the banner villages at all.  The composition of banner 
captains in 1880 reveals a similar pattern.  Six of the eight captains were from villages 
outside the administration of the banner for which they worked, and two were not from the 
banner villages at all.63   
                                                        
63 See the career record book of the officials and soldiers in 1880 (SCPZGYMDA, reel 93, vol. 364, 
p199-220). 
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Table 5. 3 The location of the government personnel’s residence relative to the banners in 
which they worked, 1874. 
  Relationship of home to the banner they worked 
 Inside  Outside 
      In the state farm 
Not in the state 
farm 
Captain 0  3 5 
Lieutenant 0  5 2 
Clerk 4   4 4 
Sources: The salary book of the officials and soldiers in Shuangcheng in 1874 (SCPZGYMDA, reel 184, 
vol. 759, pp. 21-39) and the 1874 population registers (SCPGBTDHKDM reel 1834668, vol. 92; reel 
1834675, vol. 145; reel 1834695, vol. 282; reel 1834700, vol. 351; reel 1834715, vol. 449; reel 1834724, 
vol. 537, vol. 539; reel 1834663, vol. 31). 
 
This “foreign” or outside composition of the personnel in the Captain’s Office reveals 
that the structure of the Shuangcheng banner government still followed the principle of 
separating the state institution from the society it governed.  Although the banner system 
had no clearly stated rule of avoidance in official appointment, the Shuangcheng 
government apparently incorporated an equivalent principle.  Even at the sub-county level, 
the appointment of the major officials, the captain and lieutenants, followed a rule of 
avoidance that prevented the localization of government power.  This rule not only 
facilitated the centralization of state control, but also distinguished the state from the local 
society.   
The military nature and the structure of the Shuangcheng banner government, 
moreover, increased this separation of state and society.  First, the banner officials 
sometimes had to respond to the state’s call for military force on the battlefield, and thus 
periodically left the Shuangcheng administration with insufficient personnel.  By 
definition, the officials and soldiers in Shuangcheng were part of the national Eight Banner 
army.  Therefore, in times of peace, they were local officials; in times of war, they were 
soldiers.  Throughout the history of the Shuangcheng state farm, the local government 
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constantly sent soldiers to fight various rebellions in China proper.64  For example, in 
1880, the Left Department reported that, although there were seven lieutenant posts and 
one conditional lieutenant post in Shuangcheng, two were on active battlefield duty and 
one was in charge of the training of armies.65  Thus, only four lieutenants could work on 
local administration.  In the same year, the captain of the Plain White banner also reported 
a personnel shortage for the same reason.66  Of the three tax preceptors in charge of the 
farming affairs, one was on active battlefield duty and one had to fulfill multiple tasks in 
the Shuangcheng seat.  Thereby, only one tax preceptor was available to collect rent and 
handle farming affairs for all twenty villages under the Plain White banner.  To solve the 
above personnel shortage, the local government had to petition the provincial government 
to use temporary personnel for reasons of expedience. 
Second, since all Captain’s Offices were located in the seat of Shuangcheng, there was 
a considerable distance between the formal seat of local government and the villages 
located in the right and left tun.  In 1851, the government moved all Captain’s Offices in 
the right and left tun to the seat in the central tun, requiring that the captains and their 
subordinates work in the county seat.  Only at times of rent collection and for special tasks 
would the tax preceptor and clerks set up temporary offices in locations close to the 
villages they administered.67   
Thus, even in the banner administration, in other words, geographic and 
administrative practices were designed to protect rural society from ‘excessive’ direct 
                                                        
64 Experience on the battlefield was an important qualification for these officials and soldiers in promotion.  
The career record books of Shuangcheng officials reveals that almost all officials above the rank of 
lieutenant in Shuangcheng had fought in battles before they were appointed to their current posts 
(SCPZGYMDA, reel 93, vol. 364, pp.199-220).  
65 SCPZGYMDA, reel 95, vol. 371, p.181.   
66 SCPZGYMDA, reel 93, vol. 364, pp.143-146. 
67 See the government expenditure on stipends for tax preceptors and clerks who traveled to the villages to 
collect rent. 
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government rule.  As had long been true in China proper, the state made the chief village 
head a central intermediary in all communication between village society and local 
government.68  The geographic distance between the seat of Shuangcheng and the villages 
increased the difficulty of communication.  The nearest village in the right tun was 16.7 
kilometers away from the county seat, and the farthest village was 35.7 kilometers away.  
Similarly, the nearest village in the left tun was 16.1 kilometers away from the county seat, 
and the farthest village was 44.3 kilometers away.69  To travel from the farthest villages to 
the county seat, therefore, could take more than a day.70  The distance between the 
Captain’s Office and the villages therefore limited the “reach” of the state and left space for 
local autonomy.   
Since the population registers were compiled centrally in the Captain’s Office, the 
distance between the Captain’s Office and the villages had fundamental consequences for 
the production and maintenance of registers.  The tax preceptor and clerks, the major 
personnel who processed the population registers, first created the registers according to 
the records transferred from the immigrants’ places of origin.  Then, once the chief village 
head reported any vital demographic events occurring to villagers, the Captain’s Office 
would promptly update the registers.  Occasionally, the tax preceptor would conduct a site 
                                                        
68 Despite the Chinese state’s high level of centralization, the rulers of Chinese dynasties were also careful 
not to put rural societies under excessive government control.  For example, in the Ming dynasty, the 
founding emperor Zhu Yuanzhang laid out the basic regulation of local government: local officials must 
live and work in the county government; without a sufficient excuse, officials should not leave the county 
government.  Thereby, the locally-recruited runners carried out most of the government policy and 
administrative tasks (He 2006).  Zhu Yuanzhang established these rules with the goal of protecting the 
local society from the officials’ exploitation and excessive extraction.  To the extreme, he even executed a 
Provincial Administration Commissioner (buzhengshi) for constantly going to the countryside to extort 
money from the people (Daogao xubian, no. 17, p. 275). In his study on Chen Hongmou, William Rowe 
analyzed Chen’s view of the state-society relation and revealed that some local officials in the Qing 
consciously restricted the scope of government behavior and provided society with autonomy (Rowe 2001). 
69 See SCPZGYMDA, reel 158, vol. 628, pp.148-194. 
70 According to the Qing regulation, the standard traveling speed of the government post office when 
sending official documents was 28.8 kilometers a day.  Therefore, traveling more than 30 kilometers a day 
even exceeded the standard speed of government personnel with a horse. 
 174
investigation to get more accurate information about the villagers.71  In the eleventh 
month of each year, the Captain’s Office would send an updated copy of the population 
register to the area commander-in-chief.  Given the work of the Captain’s Office, the area 
commander-in-chief then totally relied on the records in the population registers as 
references in judging legal cases.  The Captain’s Office was required to check and provide 
accurate information to the state government whenever asked to do so.  By the end of each 
year, the local banner government would have “cleaned up” the registers submitted by the 
Captain’s Office and sent them to the general of Jilin to review and archive.  The 
insufficient personnel in the Captain’s Office and the distance between the office and 
villages therefore determined that the production of population registers was still largely 
controlled by the local societies.  As Baocheng’s case illustrated, the chief village head 
and even the villagers themselves thus had the autonomy to pursue their own interests. 
Consequently, the population registration process presented an ironic relationship 
between superiors and inferiors.  On the one hand, in institutional terms, the immigrant 
households and village heads were controlled by the registration system, as the area 
commander-in-chief and the general of Jilin crafted registration policy.  On the other hand, 
in terms of the production of population registers, the immigrant households, village heads, 
and Captain’s Office produced the population registers, while the area commander-in-chief 
and the general of Jilin mainly consumed those registers.  Since the population registers 
were formed from the reports of villagers and their heads, along with the work of the clerks, 
these “inferiors” gained control over the production of the records.  Ironically, the policy 
                                                        
71 In the Shuangcheng population registers, the registration of such vital demographic events as deaths and 
births were not evenly distributed over the years.  The distribution of vital demographic events in the 
registers suggests that the Captain’s Office probably conducted a site investigation to check the quality of 
population registers once every three years. 
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makers had no control over the actual processes of documentation and maintenance.  
These dynamic relationships therefore nurtured the flexibility of the state institution and 
the agency of its alleged subordinates. 
 
Conclusion: control and autonomy 
The banner institutions in Shuangcheng presented an ironic confluence of state control 
and local autonomy.  At first glance, the Shuangcheng state farm represents a successful 
case of state control over local society.  First, the settlement not only equalized the 
physical residence of the banner immigrants, but also successfully disassembled organic 
units like descent groups, thus eliminating potentially competitive organizations.  The 
state’s equal allocation of land also prevented the emergence of wealthy and powerful 
families as local elites.  Through these arrangements, the state institution was able to 
directly tackle these immigrant households.  Consequently, all banner immigrants in 
Shuangcheng were exposed to state power and became equally subordinate – equal 
because they were uniformly displaced and organized by household, and equal because 
they had identical rights and entitlements defined by the state. 
Moreover, the state-managed population registration system succeeded as the most 
important instrument for organizing life in the state farm.  As the official record that 
defined the immigrants’ entitlement rights, the population registers intertwined social 
elements and state institutions, uniting everything from the household to the provincial 
government.  These immigrant households actively responded to population registration 
because it marked the official guarantee of their land ownership.  The village head and the 
Captain’s Office updated population registers to fulfill their duties.  The area 
commander-in-chief relied on population registration as a reference for governance, e.g. 
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judging property disputes to protect the haves.  The provincial government documented 
population registers to supervise the work of the local government. 
However, despite these forms of strong state control, the design of the local banner 
government still prohibited the state from directly managing local affairs.  When planning 
the state farm government, the central government apparently incorporated principles that 
prevented the localization of the county and sub-county government and thus distinguished 
the state from local society.  The separation between state and society was subsequently 
reinforced by the banner government’s inherent military inadequacy.  The foreign 
composition of major officials, the insufficient personnel, and the distance between banner 
offices and the villages therefore rendered much space for local society to manage its own 
affairs. 
These limitations on state control, together with the absence of a local gentry in 
Shuangcheng generated an unusual model of local autonomy—an autonomy with limited 
control.  While in the civilian world, the separation of state and society left space for 
kinship groups and local gentry to function as an indispensable power in maintaining social 
order, in Shuangcheng the state eliminated the power of gentry and kinship organizations, 
thereby creating a power vacuum in the banner villages.  The interaction between the state 
and local society therefore differed from the traditional framework, where the state faced a 
society represented by an authoritative local gentry.  Instead, in Shuangcheng, the state 
directly faced individual families who tried to manipulate state policies to pursue their own 
interests.  The absence of an authoritative local power thus rendered individuals and 
households greater autonomy.  As I will show in part three, this local autonomy provided 
each level of local society—village, household, and individual—with opportunities to use 
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its own methods to accumulate landed wealth and manage landed property.  Thereby, the 
within-category equality established by the state land allocation was vulnerable to various 





Part Three  Local Practice 
Chapter VI  Land Acquisition 
 
The Qing dynasty saw both increasing autocracy and growing flexibility in the 
imperial rule. On the one hand, policy-making became highly centralized.  Beginning in 
the 1730s, the emperor established a Grand Council and moved the decision-making center 
from the outer court to the inner court to enforce his control over it (Bartlett 1991).  On the 
other hand, the procedures of policy implementation and institutional operationalization at 
local society were highly flexible.  Officials enjoyed flexibility in adapting state policies 
to local contexts (Huang 2001; Rowe 2001).  With this flexibility, local elites also 
empowered themselves and played an important role in local governance, mediating 
disputes, running charity organizations, and even organizing local militia (Huang 2001; 
Kuhn 1980; Liang 1997).  This flexibility thus allowed the Chinese bureaucratic system to 
constantly develop new institutions while maintaining its core. 
Although previous studies have thoroughly documented this institutional flexibility, 
its implications for Qing Northeast China still need to be better understood.  Because of 
state hegemony over land ownership in Northeast China, the court strictly prohibited 
private land transactions to protect state control.  Therefore, customary practices of land 
transfer acceptable under private ownership became ‘illegal’ under the state ownership 
system.  For a long time, scholars studying Northeast China have over-emphasized the 
antagonistic relationship between state regulations and forbidden customary practices 
(Diao and Yi 1994; Ding 1985; Isett 2004, 2006; Lee 1970; Yi, Chen, and Li 1992), which 
continued despite their illegality.  This scholarship emphasizes the antagonistic 
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relationship between state regulation and local practice because they mainly focus on the 
central government as the representation of state while neglecting the ramification of 
government’s interests at the local level; in local governance, the provincial and local 
governments do not necessarily share the same interests as the central government.  In fact, 
even in Shuangcheng, where the state had a stronger dominance over social lives, the local 
government never eradicated local practices that contradicted official rules.  Instead, it not 
only tolerated these practices but also formalized some of them to achieve its goal of 
governance.  In this sense, Shuangcheng and Northeast China were similar to other 
regions of China Proper.   
The history of land acquisition in Shuangcheng illustrates the flexibility of state policy 
to accommodate the needs of both government and local society.  In Shuangcheng, 
alongside formal state land allocations to metropolitan and rural bannermen, residents 
developed informal practices to accumulate landed wealth.  These practices included the 
private cultivation of unassigned land, land rental, and land sales.  While these methods of 
land acquisition initially developed outside the state’s purview, beginning in the 1840s, the 
state eventually formalized and regulated them, thereby expanding its control and sources 
of revenue.  Residents of Shuangcheng were thus able to accumulate landed wealth both 
through formal state policies of land allocation and through informal practices of land 
acquisition.   
In this chapter, I explore three types of informal land cultivation and land transactions 
among the bannermen of Shuangcheng: the residents’ cultivation of nazu land, the 
metropolitan bannermen’s exchanging money for 302 jichan plots in 1878, and private 
land transactions between bannermen.  In the following section, I examine the history of 
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the reclamation of the category of nazu land beginning in the 1840s.  While the category 
of nazu land was mainly opened by Shuangcheng residents’ private cultivation of 
unassigned land, the state finally registered this land to increase revenue.  In section two, I 
study the 1878 government allocation of 302 jichan plots to metropolitan bannermen.  In 
contrast to previous land allocations that emphasized equity, this time the state allocated 
land for money and therefore enabled stratification.  Finally, in section three, I disentangle 
the private land transactions between bannermen from the official practices of land transfer; 
most private land transactions between bannermen took the form of official land transfers, 
and moreover, this was with connivance of local officials.  Through these studies, I show 
the process by which state representatives at various levels gradually adjusted government 
policy to accommodate local practices, and, at the same time, how state policy deeply 
influenced local practice and wealth stratification.   
 
The cultivation of nazu land 
 
In Shuangcheng, the category of nazu land, or rent-paying land, included three types 
of farmland—baqianshang, ziken, and maohuang—for which landowners paid rent to the 
government.1  As table 6.1 shows, these three types of land emerged between 1845 and 
1856.  By 1856, the state had registered a total of 58,320.22 shang (107,309.2 hectares) of 
nazu land.  In 1883, the amount of nazu land in Shuangcheng reached 79,344.24 shang 
                                                        
1 I followed the names used by the Shuangcheng government to classify categories of land.  In the land 
registers, the category of nazu land referred to three types of land—baqianshang, ziken, and 
maohuang—which the government registered and started to collect rent for during the period 1845-1856.  
In addition to nazu land, the government also collected rent from several other types of land—gongzu, 
suique, hengchan, sanwanshang (please refer to Appendix 1).  The two categories—jichan and nazu— 
comprised the majority of registered farmland in Shuangcheng and the majority of landed wealth for 
metropolitan and rural bannermen.  The other types of land were either small in amount or temporary in 
administration.  In addition, farmers who cultivated the other types of land were mainly civilian 
commoners and bannermen whose population category was not specified.  Therefore, in this dissertation, I 
mainly analyze the two major land categories, jichan and nazu.  
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(145,993.4 hectares).  By then, nazu land accounted for 47 percent of registered farmland, 
ranking second among the five major land categories in Shuangcheng (preceded only by 
jichan land).2  For each shang of nazu land, the government collected an annual rent of 
660 copper coins.  Therefore, nazu land constituted not only an important part to the 
Shuangcheng residents’ landed wealth but also an important source of local government 
revenue.  
Table 6. 1 Land types and amount under the category of nazu. 
Time of first 









1845  baqianshang 8,000.00 8,000.00 14,720.00 
1853  ziken 42,502.32 50,502.32 92,924.27 
1856  maohuang 7,817.90 58,320.22 107,309.20 
1881  fuduo 19,528.82 77,849.04 143,242.23 
1883   fuduo 1,495.20 79,344.24 145,993.40 
Sources: The government reports of land types and amount in 1891 and 1904.  SCPGBTDHKDM, reel 
1834732, vol. 676; reel 1834733, vol. 688. 
 
 
In contrast to the allocation of jichan land, which the state dominated, the opening of 
nazu land occurred under a combination of forces from both state and society.  Beginning 
in the mid-nineteenth century, the worsening fiscal crisis pushed the state to open land in 
Northeast China in order to increase revenue.  However, the Shuangcheng residents’ 
private cultivation of unassigned land continued unabated.  In response, the state adjusted 
its policy to register the unassigned land, thereby meeting the needs of both government 
and residents.  Thus, while the allocation of jichan land demonstrated the state’s 
domination, the development of nazu land revealed the flexibility of state policy. 
 
                                                        
2 The five major categories of land in Shuangcheng were jichan, nazu, suique, gongzu, and hengchan (See 
Appendix One). 
 182
The development of nazu land 
The government first opened nazu land in the 1840s in order to increase revenue.  In 
1844, Jing’ebu, the general of Jilin (1840-1848),3 proposed to open about 8,000 shang of 
unassigned land around the banner villages to the metropolitan and rural bannermen, and 
collect rent on this land.4  These 8,000 shang of land, named baqianshang (eight thousand 
shang), became the first type of nazu land.  For each shang of land, the government 
collected 500 copper coins (0.5 string) as rent.  Baqianshang land generated an annual 
rent income of 4,300 strings of copper coins, which was equivalent to 1,869 taels of sliver,5 
and could purchase 4672.5 market shi (345,765 pounds) of grain in the local market.6  
According to Jing’ebu, the government would use this rent as a special fund to support the 
metropolitan bannermen’s farming.7   
The residents’ private cultivation of unassigned land in Shuangcheng predated the 
government’s action of opening it. Conflicts over the private cultivation of unassigned land 
emerged as an issue for the state in the 1840s.  Between the late 1840s and early 1850s, 
quite a few discontented bannermen traveled to Beijing and filed capital appeals, 
disclosing that bannermen in Shuangcheng were cultivating unassigned land without 
                                                        
3 See Li 2004, p. 23 
4 See Jing’ebu’s memorial in 1844, HCDXTGZY, juan 31, 6a. 
5 The exchange rate of silver in 1845 in the capital was 2 strings of copper coins for 1 tael of silver; in the 
provinces, the exchange rate was 2.2 to 2.3 strings of copper coins for 1 tael of silver.  In Shuangcheng in 
1867, the exchange rate of silver was 2.6 strings of copper coins for 1 tael of silver (SCPZGYMDA, reel. 
162, vol. 645, pp. 57-58).  Since the price of silver was increasing in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century, the silver price in Shuangcheng in 1845 would have been around 2.2 to 2.3 strings of copper coins 
per tael. 
6 According to Jing’ebu, the lowest grain price in contemporary Shuangcheng was 0.3 tael of silver.  Here 
I use a higher price of 0.4 tael of silver, which frequently appeared as the grain price in the 1860s. 
7 The government not only provided the initial farming supplies for the metropolitan bannermen, but also 
continued to provide funds for the maintenance of their farming and living essentials [more specificity or 
less]. 
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official permission.8  In response to these capital appeals, the provincial government sent 
personnel to investigate and re-measure the land cultivated by metropolitan and rural 
bannermen.  This re-measurement identified a total of 42,502 shang (78,204 hectares) of 
unassigned land under cultivation by Shuangcheng residents.   
The Shuangcheng bannermen had acquired the unassigned land by both encroaching 
on the area surrounding their jichan plots and clearing land at new locations.  The farmers 
first began to blur the plot boundaries and encroach on the waste areas between plots to 
expand their land holding.  Moreover, some banner villagers even organized themselves 
as an entire village to appropriate unassigned land.  For example, in a lawsuit concerning a 
land dispute in 1882, a metropolitan bannerman named De’an recounted a collective action 
of private land cultivation by his grandfather and the fellow villagers.9  In the early years, 
the villagers in the first village of the Plain White banner in the central tun (later the first 
village of the first jiala of the Bordered Yellow banner), where De’an’s family resided, 
collectively cleared about 400 shang (736 hectares) of unassigned land northwest of their 
village.  De’an’s grandfather and another metropolitan bannerman organized this action.   
The universal practice of private land cultivation in Shuangcheng finally pushed the 
state to officially recognize the farmers’ ownership of these plots.  In 1853, the state 
formally registered the 42,502 shang of unassigned land and collected rent on it.10  In the 
land register, this land was titled ziken land (additionally cultivated land).  Under the 
household heads’ name, the state recorded the number of plots and their sizes to indicate 
ownership.  In return, the household head would pay an annual rent of 660 copper coins 
                                                        
8 See the government report to the provincial government regarding the tracking of fuduo land in 1880.6 
(SCPZGYMDA, reel 205, vol. 849-2, p. 195).   
9 See the closing report of the case regarding the land disputes between De’an and Shuanzhu 
(SCPZGYMDA, reel 209, vol. 871-2, pp. 135-141). 
10 See the government report to the provincial government regarding the tracking of fuduo land in 1880.6 
(SCPZGYMDA, reel 205, vol. 849-2, p. 195) and SCXZ (1990) p. 15. 
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for each shang of land, a standard rate that had applied to all rent-paying land in Jilin 
Province since 1852.  Of the 660-cooper-coin rent, 600 were allocated to government 
revenue, and 60 were used to cover expenses incurred in rent collection, including office 
supplies and a stipend for government personnel. 
The development of ziken land illustrated how the state adjusted policies to 
accommodate national and local changes, and thus to strengthen control.  In this scenario, 
the force of change originated in local society.  While Shuangcheng residents had long 
cultivated land privately, prior to 1853, the government had never tried to officially 
manage privately-cultivated land.  Previously, officials who discovered private 
cultivation simply ordered the farmers to abandon their plots.  For example, the 8,000 
shang of land the government opened to the bannermen in 1845 had been previously 
cultivated and then abandoned.11  The government, by denying farmers’ official rights to 
cultivate land privately, tried to maintain the authority of the state as the sole power in land 
distribution.  However, the pervasiveness of unregulated cultivation eventually 
overwhelmed the capacity of the old state policies.  In order to effectively control the land 
and the people, the state then chose to turn unofficial land cultivators into official tenants; 
by giving people official rights, the state gained control. 
The fact that it was not the local government but the central and provincial 
government that initiated the registration of ziken land also reveals the different interests of 
the central and local governments.  Although the local government was well aware of the 
residents’ private land cultivation, it did not provide any effective solution.  Only when 
Shuangcheng residents filed capital appeals, did the state pay attention to this local issue.  
In this case, the local and central governments did not cooperate with each other because 
                                                        
11 See Jing’ebu’s memorial in 1844, HCDXTGZY, juan 31, 6a. 
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they did not share the same interest.  Therefore, when discontented Shuangcheng 
residents failed to secure their interests under the local government, they turned to the 
central government for institutional support. 
Through capital appeals, Shuangcheng residents placed the central and local 
governments in an antagonistic position toward one another.  In the Qing, any local legal 
cases first went through the county government for an initial judgment.  The county 
government would then send the case, along with the initial judgment, to its supervising 
institution for review.  In Shuangcheng, the provincial government reviewed and finalized 
the judgment in all cases except death sentences.  Only when the involved parties were 
dissatisfied with the judgment of local and provincial governments, would they appeal 
directly to the capital.  In most capital appeals, the plaintiffs not only appealed their 
original cases, but also complained about local officials’ unjust judgments (Zhao 1998).  
Although the central government usually chose to support the local government, in the case 
of Shuangcheng, the central government acted from the top to correct the local officials’ 
behavior.  
The registration of ziken land in Shuangcheng also reflected the national trend toward 
state recognition of the private ownership of banner land in the early 1850s.  In the second 
half of the nineteenth century, the increasing military expenditure necessary to quell 
foreign invasion and inner rebellions aggravated the state’s fiscal crisis.  To ameliorate 
this crisis, the state turned to banner land, which had previously been allocated to 
bannermen for free, as a new source of revenue.  In 1852, the state started to collect rent 
on banner land in Beijing and North China.12  In a related move, the state accepted land 
                                                        
12 WZSL, juan 62, QSL, Book 40, pp. 830b-831a.  In 1852, the state allowed land transactions between 
bannermen and civilian commoners in Beijing and Zhili, but still restricted free land transactions between 
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transactions between bannermen and civilian commoners and recognized civilian 
commoners’ ownership of banner land in other regions of China proper.  In Shuangcheng, 
although the state still strictly prevented land transactions between bannermen and civilian 
commoners, its recognition of the private cultivators’ ownership of ziken land met the need 
for rent income. 
From 1853 to 1860, the state took more proactive steps to open unassigned land in 
Shuangcheng as nazu land.  When checking the amount of registered ziken land, the Board 
of Revenue decided to open all unassigned land in Shuangcheng in order to prevent future 
private cultivation and conflicts.  By calculating the acreage of Shuangcheng, the board 
officials determined that 7,817.9 shang (14,385 hectares) of land remained unassigned, and 
should be opened for Shuangcheng residents to claim.13  Receiving this order, the 
provincial government again sent personnel to survey the land and identify the unassigned 
plots.  In 1856, the government classified this 7,817.9 shang as maohuang land, or raw 
and uncultivated land, and opened it to Shuangcheng residents in return for rent.  By then, 
all the farmland in Shuangcheng had been opened.  The rent from nazu land constituted an 
important source of provincial revenue.  In 1867, in addition to supporting the local 
government’s regular administrative expenses, the rent also covered 30 percent of the 
salaries of local government officials and soldiers.14  In 1882, the percentage of officials’ 
and soldiers’ salaries paid by the rent increased to 60.15  Moreover, as a portion of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the two population categories in Liaoning Province.  The archive in Jilin and Shuangcheng shows that in 
Jilin and Shuangcheng, land transactions between bannermen and civilian commoners were still prohibited. 
13 See the government report to the provincial government regarding the tracking of fuduo land in 1880.6 
(SCPZGYMDA, reel 205, vol. 849-2, p.195). 
14 See the official report regarding the distribution of the officials and soldiers’ salaries (SCPZGYMDA, 
reel 162, vol. 645, pp.40-43).  In 1867, 70 percent of the salaries came from the provincial government, 
and the other 30 percent, amounting to 2,657.25 strings of copper coins, came from the rent income 
preserved in Shuangcheng.   
15 See the notice of distributing the soldiers’ and clerks’ salaries on 1882. 8.9 (SCPZGYMDA, reel 209, vol. 
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provincial revenue, Shuangcheng also regularly provided 10,000 taels of sliver from its 
rent income to Sanxing, a banner garrison in Jilin, to pay officials’ and soldiers’ salaries.16 
After the initial registration of the above nazu land types, the state continued to track 
the land in Shuangcheng to identify further unregulated cultivation.  Once identified, the 
government could register the privately-cultivated land and collect rent.17  Since all arable 
land in Shuangcheng had been opened by 1856, further private cultivation mainly took two 
forms: the encroachment of plot boundaries and the reclamation and cultivation of 
previously-waterlogged land.  In 1879, driven by the urgent demand for revenue, the state 
made another large-scale survey of land in Shuangcheng.18  The officials measured the 
size of each plot and compared it to the registered size.  If the actual size exceeded the 
registered size, the officials registered the extra size under the category of fuduo land, or 
extra land.  From inception to completion, this survey took two years.  In 1881, the 
government registered a total of 19,528.82 shang (35,933 hectares) of fuduo land.19  In 
1883, an additional 1495.2 shang (2751.2 hectares) of fuduo land was registered.  In a 
related move, the government started to issue a certificate to the owner of each nazu plot, 
stating the plot size and boundaries.  This certificate served as official proof of the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
874, p. 31).  The salary of high officials came from the provincial government, while 60 percent of the 
salaries of soldiers and clerks, amounting to 7,846.2 strings of copper coins, came from local rent income.  
16 See the notice from the provincial government regarding the distribution of salaries in the locations in 
Jilin province (SCPZGYMDA, reel 204, vol. 846, pp. 220-225). 
17 See the government report to the provincial government regarding the tracking of fuduo land in 1880 
(SCPZGYMDA, reel 205, vol. 849-2, p. 197). 
18 See the order of the Shuangcheng government regarding checking extra land in the local area 
(SCPZGYMDA, 202, vol. 838-1, pp.39-43).  In this document, the provincial government emphasized the 
importance of rent income for provincial revenue.  Moreover, the government especially stated the 
difficult situation faced by the government: the drought affected grain yield, assistance from other 
provinces had not arrived yet, and it was time to recruit and train the army.  Thus, the government urgently 
needed money.  Although the government had been ordering the residents to voluntarily report their extra 
land for a year, few people had done so.  Therefore, the government had to send personnel to conduct a 
large-scale investigation. 
19 See the government-reported list of land types and amounts in Shuangcheng in 1891.4 
(SCPGBTDHKDM, vol. 676). 
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farmer’s ownership.  In order to acquire a certificate, a bannerman paid a one-time 
certificate fee (zhaofei qian) of 200 copper coins for each shang of land.20  By 1904, the 
Shuangcheng banner government maintained a total of 605,468.6 shang (1,114,062.2 
hectares) of nazu land.21 
In addition to providing state revenue, nazu land also constituted an indispensable part 
of Shuangcheng residents’ landed wealth.  Compared to the typical yield from the land, 
the rent paid was low.  In the mid-1820s, the estimated yield of one shang of land was 6 
market shi.  If the yield remained the same in the 1850s, at the grain price of 0.4 taels of 
silver per shi, a farmer could receive 2.4 taels of silver (about 5,000 coins) from one shang 
of land.  The 660 coins of rent therefore only amounted to one sixth of the typical yield of 
the land.  Compared to the rate of rent in the Yangzi delta, which was usually half of the 
yield from the land, this rent was indeed low.  Moreover, even landowners who rented out 
their nazu plots still made a considerable gain.  The estimated fee for private land rental 
was 2.3 market shi of grain,22 which equaled about 2,000 coins.  After paying the 
660-coin rent, the landowner could still net 1,200 coins of income for each shang of land. 
 
 
Principles of nazu land distribution 
The opening of nazu land not only provided a new source of landed wealth to 
Shuangcheng residents but also introduced the principle of stratification by ability.  
                                                        
20 See the order of the Shuangcheng government in 1880.9 regarding the issuing of land certificates 
(SCPZGYMDA, reel 205, vol. 850, p.202).  Regarding the amount of the certificate fee, see the 
government judgment of a land dispute in 1880.6 (SCPZGYMDA, reel 203, vol. 844, pp. 319-321). 
21 See the government list of land types and amounts in 1904 (SCPGBTDHKDM, vol. 688).  The total 
amount of registered nazu land was 609,554.7 shang.  Due to the construction of the railway, which 
occupied 4090.35 shang, the actual amount of nazu land was 605,468.6 shang. 
22 SCPMGDA, item no. 270 
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Beginning with the initial opening of nazu land, the government allowed stratification in its 
distribution.  As Jing’ebu proposed in 1844, assistant banner adult males in Shuangcheng 
could claim as much baqianshang land as their abilities allowed; there was no restriction 
on the amount a household could claim.23  The principle of stratification in nazu land 
possession distinguished nazu land from jichan land and revealed the different purposes 
the two types of land served: while the state allocated jichan land to bannermen as welfare, 
it relied on the rent from nazu land for revenue; while the state gave out jichan land to 
secure loyalty from metropolitan and rural bannermen, it distributed nazu land in exchange 
for money.  Therefore, the state’s purpose of rent collection determined that the most 
important trait of nazu landowners was their ability to produce rent. 
By the same token, in principle, metropolitan and rural bannermen and civilian 
commoners enjoyed equivalent entitlement to nazu land.  Since ability was the most 
important trait in allocating nazu land, state policy did not discriminate among different 
population categories, with the one exception of floating bannermen.  Therefore, in nazu 
land ownership, there was no preordained inequality between metropolitan and rural 
bannermen.  While in jichan land possession, metropolitan bannermen enjoyed more 
favorable land grants than did rural bannermen, in nazu land possession, opportunities for 
rural bannermen were equal to those of metropolitan bannermen.  The amount of nazu 
land owned by rural bannermen was equivalent to their share of the population.  As table 
6.2 shows, in 1870, rural bannermen possessed a total of 314,858.6 shang (579,339.8 
hectares) of nazu land, which accounted for 82.6 percent of all nazu land owned by 
                                                        
23 See Jing’ebu’s memorial in 1844, HCDXTGZY, juan 31, 6a: “This part of uncultivated land should be 
designated to generate rent for the government and thus should not be designated as constant property 
(hengchan).  Let the brothers and sons of the officials, soldiers, and principal adult males claim [this part 
of land] according to their ability.  There is no need to restrict on the number of shang [a household could 
claim], neither the number of households [who could claim this part of land].”  
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bannermen.  This percentage was about the same as the rural banner households’ 81.8 
percent share of total banner households, demonstrating equality of opportunity in nazu 
landownership between metropolitan and rural bannermen.  Moreover, as time passed, the 
rural bannermen’s share of nazu land even gradually increased.  In 1889, while the rural 
banner households accounted for 75.9 percent of the banner households, they possessed 
339,274.9 shang (624,265.8 hectares) of nazu land, which accounted for 87.9 percent of 
the total nazu land owned by metropolitan and rural bannermen. 
 
Table 6. 2 The distribution of nazu land by household and population category, 
1870-1889. 
  1870   1889 
 Household Land  Household Land 
  N.  Percent 
Amount 
(shang) Percent   N. Percent 
Amount 
(shang) Percent 
Metro. 696 18.2 66,493.0 17.4   1,000 24.1 46,901.3 12.1 
Rural 3,133 81.8 314,858.6 82.6  3,141 75.9 339,274.9 87.9 
          
Total 3,829 100.0 381,351.6 100.0   4,141 100.0 386,176.2 100.0 
Sources: The 1870 and 1889 population and land registers of metropolitan and rural bannermen. 
 
 
Not only did rural and metropolitan bannermen have equal access to nazu land, but 
civilian commoners and the floating bannermen, though excluded from jichan land 
allocation, also enjoyed opportunities to own nazu land.  Civilian commoners had official 
rights to nazu land.  In 1876, of the three types of nazu land –ziken, baqianshang, and 
maohuang— civilian commoners possessed 902.5 shang (1,660.6 hectares).  Although 
this was a small fraction of all nazu land, it indicates civilian commoners’ official 
ownership of nazu land.  Moreover, civilian commoners also enjoyed considerable 
ownership of some other land categories, farming the land and paying rent to the 
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government.24  In total, civilian commoners owned 21,132.2 shang (38,883.2 hectares) of 
land that was regularly under the administration of the Shuangcheng government.25   
The right of floating bannermen to own nazu land was less clear. On one hand, the 
state policy that prevented floating bannermen from officially owning land remained in 
effect.  In land disputes involving floating bannermen, metropolitan and rural bannermen 
frequently used this policy to defend their interests; and reference to this policy placed 
floating bannermen in a disadvantaged position.  On the other hand, however, the 
government’s restrictions on landownership by floating bannermen did loosen.  In official 
documents, government officials never used this policy to deny land registration to any 
individual floating bannerman.  Instead, it was the metropolitan and rural bannermen who 
frequently used the policy to prevent floating bannermen from registering land.  Moreover, 
the recorded population status of nazu land owners included a category separate from 
metropolitan and rural bannermen and civilian commoners, titled ‘banner tenants (qidian).’  
The title ‘banner tenants’ revealed the landowners’ banner affiliation and their distinction 
from the metropolitan and rural bannermen.  These ‘banner tenants’ were probably 
floating bannermen who managed to register nazu land as individuals.  In 1876, 
individuals listed as ‘banner tenants’ owned a total of 5,624.4 shang (10,348.9 hectares) of 
nazu land.  
Interestingly, however, despite the fact that stratification characterized the distribution 
of nazu land, egalitarian principles still influenced state and local people’s practices of land 
distribution.  In the distribution of baqianshang land, the government divided the land 
equally into 20.6-shang (37.9-hectare) plots to prevent land concentration.  Each 
                                                        
24 All hengchan and gongzu land, half of sanwanshang land, and majority of suique land. 
25 This total amount of land did not include that of the sanwanshang land, since the Shuangcheng banner 
government did not control it for a long time. 
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individual could only claim one plot.  Therefore, the majority of Shuangcheng households 
that claimed this land still owned only one plot.  As the 1876 land registers reveal, of the 
164 households that owned baqianshang land, 111 households, or 67.7 percent, owned 
only one plot; 22 households, or 13.4 percent, owned two plots; 31 households, or 18.9 
percent, owned three or more plots.26   
Moreover, in villager-organized private cultivation, the villagers also emulated the 
government’s allocation of jichan land to distribute privately-opened land, maintaining 
between-category inequality and within-category equality.  For example, in the collective 
opening of the 400 shang of land by De’an’s grandfather and his fellow villagers, the 
villagers allocated more land to metropolitan bannermen than to rural bannermen, but 
equally divided the land among the bannermen within each category: each metropolitan 
household had a share of 13.1 shang (24.1 hectares), and each rural household had a share 
of 8.4 shang (15.5 hectares).27  After this equal land division, 16 shang (29.4 hectares) of 
land remained.  The villagers then agreed to give this 16 shang to the two organizers, 8 
shang for each, as compensation for their work.  This distribution of the 400 shang of land 
strictly followed the egalitarian model established by the state; the metropolitan 
bannermen enjoyed better entitlement than the rural bannermen, and the land distribution 
within each population category was equal.  Therefore, the egalitarian principle in wealth 
distribution had been a norm not only of state practice but also in the practice of local social 
organizations. 
The allocation of nazu land revealed both the autonomy of local society and the 
effectiveness of government control.  The residents’ organized or individual activities of 
                                                        
26 Calculation based on the linked population and land database. 
27 See the closing report of the case regarding the land disputes between De’an and Shuanzhu 
(SCPZGYMDA, reel 209, vol. 871-2, pp. 135-141). 
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private land cultivation reveal local agency that remained beyond state control.  These 
activities of private land cultivation constituted an important force in the distribution of 
nazu land.  The opening of nazu land thus provided Shuangcheng residents an opportunity 
to overcome the limits of state categories and exhibit and benefit from their ability.  In this 
process, not only did the metropolitan and rural bannermen increase their landed wealth, 
but some capable civilian commoners and floating bannermen also acquired nazu land.  
At the same time, however, the principles of between-category inequality and 
within-category equality in state land allocation deeply influenced social behavior.  Not 
only did bannermen voluntarily maintain this state-designed social structure in their 
privately-organized land cultivation, but metropolitan and rural bannermen also constantly 
used the official policies to shoulder out floating bannermen in the process of nazu land 
acquisition.  Therefore, opportunities for the possession of nazu land were limited for 
civilian commoners and floating bannermen.  Thus, despite the opening of nazu land, the 
Shuangcheng social structure still largely followed the state’s design. 
 
Exchanging money for land 
As the state exhausted nazu land in Shuangcheng after more than twenty years of 
opening and registration, in 1878, it distributed 302 remaining jichan plots, totaled 10,570 
shang (19,448.8 hectares), to the metropolitan bannermen.  Since ultimately only 698 
metropolitan households arrived in Shuangcheng, the government left the 302 plots, which 
remained from the 1,000 plots of land designated to metropolitan bannermen, with the rural 
households that had originally cleared and farmed them.  These rural households 
continued to farm the plots, paying an annual rent of 660 copper coins per shang.  In 1876, 
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the court planned to relocate more metropolitan bannermen to Northeast China to solve 
their livelihood problem and thus ordered Ming’an, the general of Jilin (1877, 1879-1883), 
to investigate the reserved plots in Shuangcheng.28  Upon hearing this news, in 1878, the 
existing metropolitan bannermen in Shuangcheng expressed their great need for these plots 
in order to secure landed property for themselves rather than the possible newcomers.  The 
state finally allocated these plots to them.  However, contrary to the previous practice of 
equal allocation, the state allocated these plots in return for monetary contributions from 
the metropolitan bannermen. 
The bannermen themselves first proposed contributing money in exchange for these 
jichan plots.  In the second month of 1878, when the provincial government sent 
personnel to investigate these plots, the assistant adult males in the metropolitan banners 
filed a petition to the provincial officials to request the 302 remaining jichan plots:  
“Our grandfathers and fathers are all banner servants from the capital.  
Starting from the fourth year of Daoguang [1824], (they) were relocated to 
Shuangchengpu in groups.  Each household received a plot of thirty-five shang.  
Other than this [land grant], [we] had no additional property.  To date, fifty 
years have passed and our households grow larger and larger.  In each village, 
there are more than five hundred households of assistant adult males who used 
to work as wage labors to make a living.  Many of the elderly and young 
children are suffering from cold and hunger.  Since there are still 10,570 shang 
of land which have been allocated to the Metropolitan bannermen, [we] 
sincerely supplicate [you] to allocate the land to us assistant adult males as 
private property without rent and thus support [our living].”29 
                                                        
28 In 1876, the court planned to relocate more metropolitan bannermen from Beijing to Northeast China 
and ordered the various banner governments in Northeast China to report unassigned farmland within their 
administration to accommodate these metropolitan bannermen.  Four places—Ningguta, Huichun, Bodune, 
and Shuangcheng—reported unassigned farmland.  The court thus ordered officials to investigate these 
sites for a detailed plan of relocating metropolitan bannermen.  See the communication between the 
general of Jilin and the Ningguta assistant commander-in-chief on 1876.11.5 (QDHLJLSDAXB 
(1875-1881), pp. 123-125).  Also see the attached official documents in the note from the general of Jilin 
regarding allocating the reserved metropolitan jichan plots in Shuangcheng and Bodune to the original 
farmers in return for monetary contributions (SCPZGYMDA, reel 201, vol. 833-1, pp. 53-66). 
29 This petition was filed on 1878.2.25.  See the petition filed by the metropolitan bannermen from the 
Plain Yellow banner (SCPZGYMDA, reel 200, vol. 826-3, pp. 360-366). The metropolitan bannermen from 
the Bordered Yellow banner also filed a petition with similar language (SCPZGYMDA, reel 200, vol. 826-3, 
pp. 398-402).    
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In order to secure government approval, these metropolitan bannermen relieved the 
government of its economic obligation to jichan landowners.  In previous land allocations, 
the government had not only granted land to the metropolitan bannermen, but had also 
provided them with all of their living and farming essentials, including housing, farming 
tools, and livestock.  In their petition, the metropolitan bannermen stated that this time the 
government need not provide them with living and farming support.  Moreover, they even 
offered the government economic benefits for allocating these plots:  
“Having received the heavenly kindness that fed us for years, (we) all have 
consciences. (Since) it is currently the time of putting down the bandits, we are 
happy to contribute three strings of coins for each shang of land to subsidize 
military expenses. This monetary contribution adds up to more than 30,000 
strings of coins. (We do this) with the intention of rendering service to repay the 
heavenly kindness.”30 
 
In addition to the military subsidy, these metropolitan bannermen also agreed as a group to 
contribute a total of 1,000 taels of silver as reward funds to the armies.31 
Ming’an enthusiastically received the metropolitan bannermen’s proposal and carried 
it out in spite of the central government’s reservations.  In the third month of 1878, 
Ming’an sent a memorandum to the emperor, stating that relocating more metropolitan 
bannermen to Northeast China was a difficult task with a huge cost.  He therefore 
requested that the emperor allocate the reserved plots to the original farmers and collect the 
money the bannermen contributed to support military expenditures.32  The emperor 
                                                        
30 Ibid. 
31 SCPXLYMDA, items no. 10543 and no. 10557. 
32 See SCPZGYMDA, reel 201, vol. 833-1, pp. 95-110.  Ming’an’s plan to allocate the jichan plots to the 
original farmers included plots in both Shuangcheng and Bodune.  While in Shuangcheng, it was still the 
bannermen who farmed these plots, in Bodune, the majority of the farmers of these plots were civilian 
commoners.  Therefore, Ming’an’s proposal to allocate these plots to the original farmers in Bodune 
indicated official recognition of civilian commoners’ landownership, which might have sounded radical to 
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agreed to Ming’an’s general proposal.  However, the Board of Revenue still had 
reservations about the request to allocate these reserved plots to the original farmers, and 
thus ordered Ming’an to hold off on this action until the board had deliberated on it.  In the 
same month, upon receiving the emperor’s edict of approval, Ming’an immediately began 
to allocate these plots.  In the ninth month of 1878, when the Board of Revenue turned 
down Ming’an’s request, Ming’an claimed that he was not aware of the Board’s earlier 
order; by that time the bannermen had already taken these plots, and it was impossible to 
retrieve them. 
Ming’an was determined to allocate these plots to relieve the provincial government’s 
fiscal difficulties.  Like many other provincial governments in China, in the second half of 
the nineteenth century, the Jilin provincial government faced serious obstacles to making 
ends meet.  In order to fight various rebellions throughout the nation, the provincial 
government recruited a large number of armies.  Every year, the officials’ and soldiers’ 
salaries alone came to 400,000 taels of silver.33  Given this situation, following the 
practice of the 1820s and relocating metropolitan bannermen from Beijing would have 
been a huge burden for the provincial government.  At the same time, the existing 
bannermen’s offer to contribute money was attractive; by allocating the 302 remaining 
jichan plots, the government could collect a one-time donation of 31,710 strings of coins, 
equivalent to 10,000 taels of silver.  The officials in the Board of Revenue also discerned 
Ming’an’s rationale and summarized it as follows:  
“Since the salary assistance from other provinces has been delayed, this 
province has a large number of armies and is thus short on salaries.  [The 
provincial government] wanted this monetary contribution just to solve the 
[fiscal problem] for the time being… Thus, [the provincial government] ignored 
                                                                                                                                                                     
some Board officials. 
33 See SCPZGYMDA, reel 161, vol. 639, pp. 155-162. 
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the order from the Board of Revenue and insisted on [allocating the land to 
present residents].”34 
 
Due to the emphasis on the monetary contribution, in this land allocation, the local 
government gave up the egalitarian principle that had characterized previous practices and 
allocated land only to those who were able to pay.  In the history of Shuangcheng, after the 
initial allocation, the state had engaged in two other large-scale jichan land (re)allocations: 
the 1869 reallocation of 225 plots from extinct households, and this 1878 allocation of the 
302 remaining plots.  In contrast to the 1869 reallocation, in which the government still 
equitably allocated the plots to those with larger households but less land, in the 1878 
reallocation, a monetary contribution qualified a household for a plot.  When offering 
their opinions on the land allocation procedure, the two assistant commandants 
Mukedeng’e and Wuerxingbao, who were in charge of the metropolitan banners, described 
how this procedure differed from the previous practice:  
“This time each of the assistant adult males who acquires a plot should pay 
more than one hundred strings of coins as salary-aid.  Although they claimed 
that they would not delay [the monetary contribution], this contribution adds up 
to more than 31,700 strings of coins and is indeed a huge amount.  Therefore, 
it is impossible to follow the previous practice.  [Instead,] any households, 
regardless of household size, must be able to pay the money to acquire the plots.  
If we carry out the allocation in this way, not only will the assistant adult males 
eagerly contribute money but [we] can also finish collecting this salary-aid 
money in no time.”35 
 
To assure the government officials, every chief village head in charge of metropolitan 
bannermen pledged to see that every bannerman who received a plot made the donation.   
The collection of monetary contributions in exchange for land proceeded smoothly.  
By the fifth month of 1878, the local government had collected 21,710 strings of coins and 
                                                        
34 See SCPZGYMDA, reel 201, vol. 833-1, pp. 59-60. 
35 SCPZGYMDA, reel 200, vol. 826-3, pp. 360-366. 
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had started to transport the collected revenue to the Provincial government.36  In the fourth 
month of 1879, the government completed the allocation of 285 jichan plots to 285 
metropolitan bannermen.37  The government signed a contract with each individual 
bannerman to finalize the transaction.  The contract noted the size and location of the 
allocated plot, which were verified by the recipient, the officials, and a group of villagers as 
witness.38  If a household received a plot but failed to make the contribution on time, the 
government would retrieve the plot and assign it to another household.  For example, in 
1870, the government retrieved a plot from Yisengbao, a metropolitan bannerman from the 
Plain Yellow banner, because of Yisengbao’s failure to pay.39  In the seventh month of 
1879, the local government finished this allocation and transported the remaining 1,000 
taels of silver to the provincial government.40 
The 1878 allocation of jichan plots benefited rich households, as only metropolitan 
bannermen of relatively substantial means had the resources to acquire them.  First of all, 
these bannermen had to be well-equipped with housing and farming essentials, in order to 
do without government support in living and farming.  In addition, they also needed extra 
money to pay the required contribution.  At the rate of three strings (3,000) of coins per 
shang of land, to acquire one plot of jichan land, a family needed to pay 105 strings 
(105,000) of coins as military subsidy and 3.3 taels of silver as reward funds to the armies.  
                                                        
36 For the amount of money collected, see SCPXLYMDA, item no. 10557.  
37 See the name list of bannermen who signed the paperwork to take the 1878 rent from their allocated plot 
(SCPGBTDHKDM, vol. 665).  285 bannermen took the jichan plots in the fourth month of 1879.  The 
government also allocated the remaining 17 plots later in the same year.  As Mingshan, the principal clerk 
in charge of this allocation, later recounted, some plots remained unallocated because their lower elevation 
made them vulnerable to flooding.  The government then issued a deadline and ordered the personnel in 
charge of this allocation to complete the allocation by all means, following which Mingshan completed the 
allocation in the same year (SCPZGYMDA, reel 204, vol. 845, pp. 92-98.) 
38 These signed contracts were preserved in the collection of Shuangcheng Land and Household registers.  
SCPGBTDHKDM, vol. 666). 
39 SCPZGYMDA, reel 209, vol. 870, pp.197-203. 
40 SCPZGYMDA, reel 200, vol. 829, p. 135. 
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This amount of money was equivalent to the rent on 159 shang (292.7 hectares) of nazu 
land, or twelve months’ salary for a tax preceptor (lingcui) or a vanguard (qianfeng), who 
ranked the highest among soldiers, or more than six months’ salary for a colonel, a middle 
level official.41 
The sizes of the households that successfully acquired these plots also confirm the 
government’s departure from equitable allocation.  I have identified 261 of the first 285 
bannermen who acquired jichan plots in the 1878 population registers, and 278 of the 285 
bannermen in the 1879 population registers.42  As table 6.3 shows, the 261 metropolitan 
bannermen in the 1878 registers belonged to 206 households, of which 159 had only one 
plot, 39 had two plots, and 8 had as many as three plots.  Although the households 
acquiring more plots were, on average, slightly larger than those acquiring fewer plots, 
household size did not determine the distribution of these jichan plots; some households 
with only four members acquired three plots, while some households with thirteen 
members acquired only one plot. 
                                                        
41 In the 1870s, twelve months’ salary for a Tax Preceptor or a qianfeng was 36 taels of sliver, and six 
months’ salary for a colonel was 30 taels of silver.  See the 1878 salary book of the Shuangcheng officials 
and soldiers (SCPZGYMDA, reel 201, vol. 833-1, pp. 95-110).  The Qing government usually converted 
soldiers’ salaries into copper coins at a rate of three strings of coins for one tael of sliver.  Therefore, the 
105 strings paid as the monetary contribution for one plot of jichan land was equivalent to 35 taels of silver.  
Including the 3.3 taels of reward funds, each bannerman had to pay a total of 38.3 taels of silver. 
42 The name lists were acquired from the pledges of metropolitan bannermen who obtained land in the 
1878 jichan land allocation (SCPGBTDHKDM, reel 1834732, vol. 665 and 666).  More bannermen are 
identified in 1879 than in 1878 because some of the bannermen who registered the new plots were young 
children who had not yet registered in 1878.  Their parents registered them in the following year to take 
the land from government. 
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Table 6. 3 Stratification of metropolitan banner households in the 1878 jichan land 
allocation. 










0 490 2.97 0 10 
1 159 5.25 2 13 
2 39 6.92 4 12 
3 8 7.5 4 11 
Sources: The name lists acquired from the pledges of metropolitan bannermen who obtained land in the 
1878 jichan land allocation (SCPGBTDHKDM, reel 1834732, vol. 665 and 666), which were linked to the 
1878 and 1879 population and land database. 
 
 
This land allocation also differed from previous practices of jichan land distribution in 
that the ages of the plot owners deviated from the official range of 20-50 sui, and many 
young children were registered as independent land owners.  As table 6.4 shows, the 
majority of new plot owners were children or adolescents younger than 20 sui.  Of the 278 
plot owners I identified in the 1879 population registers, 88 were between 1 and 9 sui, and 
104 were between 10 and 19 sui.  Altogether, young children and adolescents accounted 
for 69.1 percent of the bannermen who acquired jichan plots in 1878.  Only 81 plot 
owners were between 20 and 50 sui, accounting for 29.1 percent of all plot owners.   
 
Table 6. 4 The age of land owners who acquired jichan land in the 1878 land allocation. 
Age (sui) N. of plot owner Percent
1-9 88 31.7 
10-19 104 37.4 
20-50 81 29.1 
51+ 3 1.1 
Missing 2 0.7 
   
Total 278 100.0 
Sources: The name lists acquired from the pledges of metropolitan bannermen who obtained land in the 
1878 jichan land allocation (SCPGBTDHKDM, reel 1834732, vol. 665 and 666), which were linked to the 
1878 and 1879 population and land database. 
 
 
The large proportion of child owners in the 1878 land allocation revealed that many 
families who acquired these jichan plots in fact did not have additional adult males, other 
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than the household head, who could register them.  Since only males could register land 
and head households, and as official regulations allowed a principal adult male to register 
only one plot of jichan land, families without additional adult males could only register 
their new plots in the names of their underage children.  After the land allocation, in 1879, 
the government followed the rules of registration and registered these young plot owners as 
separate households.  Yet, these young children, especially those under 10 sui, continued 
to live with their parents due to their inability to manage their plots and live alone.  
Therefore, after the 1878 land allocation, some families in fact owned two or more plots of 
jichan land. 
The 1878 allocation of the 302 plots of jichan land differed from other land allocations 
in Shuangcheng in its deviation from the egalitarian principle of land allocation.  The 
process of this land allocation reveals the varying interests of representatives of the state.  
In this case, the central government represented the egalitarian ideal, while the provincial 
government and local society represented inequality.  The force of change not only 
originated in local society, but also emerged from within the government.  General 
Ming’an played an especially important role in carrying out the allocation, as he was 
willing to resist the central government and succeeded in doing so.  This story reveals that, 
as a result of the mounting fiscal crisis, government policies gradually left space for 
increasing inequality in local society.   
 
Land transactions 
Types of land transaction 
Shuangcheng residents practiced land transactions at two levels: official land transfers, 
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which resulted in ownership change; and customary practices of land rental and 
conditional sale, in which the original owner retained ultimate ownership while the tenant 
acquired usufruct.  These two levels of land transaction complemented one another to 
shape residents’ economic life on the land.  Official land transfers formally secured 
residents’ land ownership.  However, the official land transfer was segmented; since the 
state population categories corresponded to different levels of entitlement to land, land 
could only be transferred between people from the same population category.  In this 
process, civilian commoners and floating bannermen were disadvantaged by their limited 
rights to land. 
Customary practices of land rental emerged in response to low labor-to-land ratios in 
banner households.  In Shuangcheng, the majority of metropolitan and rural bannermen 
owned more land than they could farm on their own.  In 1876, including both jichan and 
nazu land, per-adult-male (aged 20-50 sui) land holdings ranged from 0.8 to 434.1 shang 
for metropolitan bannermen and 0.3 to 276.8 shang for rural bannermen.  In Shuangcheng, 
one adult male could farm approximately 10 shang of land.43  As table 6.5 shows, only 2.7 
percent of metropolitan and 34.9 percent of rural banner households held fewer than 10 
shang per adult male, while 69.2 percent of metropolitan and 53.3 percent of rural 
bannermen held more than 10 shang per adult male.  A further, 11.8 percent of rural and 
28.03 percent of metropolitan households owned land but had no adult male.  Therefore, 
97.3 percent of metropolitan and 65.1 percent of rural banner households needed farming 
assistance from either hired labor or tenants.  If we take disability into consideration, this 
proportion could have been even higher. 
 
                                                        
43 See note 63 in chapter four for the explanation of estimation. 
 203
Table 6. 5 The household per-adult-male land holding of metropolitan and rural 
bannermen who had land, 1876. 
  Metropolitan Rural 
  N. Percent N. Percent 
No adult male 164 28.0  272 11.8  
0.1-10 shang 16 2.7  806 34.9  
10.1-25 shang 58 9.9  738 31.9  
25.1 and above 347 59.3  494 21.4  
  0.0    
Total 585 100.0 2,310 100.0  
Sources: The linked population and land database. 
 
 
Land rental not only met the metropolitan and rural bannermen’s demand for laborers, 
but also provided the have-nots with land usufruct.  Since the settlement stage, the state 
had allowed land rental and designated the metropolitan bannermen as landlords.  In 1844, 
Jing’ebu had pointed out that the metropolitan bannermen with higher standards of living 
were those who rented all their land out.44  Because it was officially sanctioned, land 
rental existed widely across population categories.  Not only did floating bannermen and 
civilian commoners constitute an important proportion of the tenant population, but a 
considerable number of rural bannermen also rented land from others.  In addition, some 
civilian commoners with large amounts of registered land also rented their land out.45  
This land rental relationship took the form of permanent tenancy, which secured the 
tenants’ usufruct.46  In the late imperial period, permanent tenancy became common 
                                                        
44 See Jing’ebu’s memorial in 1844, HCDXTGZY, juan 31, 6a. 
45 For example, a lawsuit in 1879 involving two civilian commoners in a land dispute revealed that some 
civilian commoners took a large amount of land in the settlement stage and became landlords 
(SCPZGYMDA, reel 203, vol. 844, pp. 9-25).  In this case, a civilian commoner named Yu Yuanxun 
registered a total of 183.2 shang of land during the period 1820-1852.  Due to his inability to farm all the 
land, he rented out 50 shang to a civilian commoner named Xun Yongzhi.  This land rental later resulted 
in disputes between their descendants. 
46 For example, in a legal case regarding land disputes between two bannermen in 1881, the plaintiff stated 
that the defendant recruited him as tenant and signed a contract with him, affirming that the landlord would 
never increase the rent and retrieve the land from his tenant (SCPZGYMDA, reel 208, vol. 865, 
pp.123-136). 
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throughout China proper (Jiang 2000).47  Under the permanent tenancy system, as long as 
the tenants paid their rent on time, the landlords had no right to withdraw the plot (Huang 
1990).  This permanent tenancy system not only secured land usufruct for tenants, but also 
granted them partial property rights (Jiang 2000). 
The customary practice of conditional sale (dian) also provided civilian commoners 
and floating bannermen with opportunities to possess land.  The term ‘conditional sale’ 
referred to land sales in which the seller still held ultimate ownership of the plot.  
Consequently, the buyer (dian-holder) only paid part of the value of the land.  By 
reserving ultimate ownership, the seller could not only redeem the land but also could ask 
for additional money when land values increased (Huang 2001).  In research on 
customary practices on banner land in Liaoning and southern Jilin Provinces, Christopher 
Isett identified the existence of conditional sales and noted that they were conducted 
outside formal institutions and supported by customary laws (Isett 2004, 2006).  The same 
was true of conditional sales in Shuangcheng.   
Shuangcheng residents used contracts to protect their private land transactions.  The 
Chinese use of contracts to protect property rights in transactions had a wide temporal and 
geographical span; contracts had appeared in property transactions since the third century 
B.C. and in both inland and frontier regions (Scogin 1990; Zelin, Ocko, and Gardella 2004).  
Contracts not only played an important role in protecting transactions and mitigating land 
disputes, but also had legal power in litigations (Scogin 1994, 2001; Allee 2004).  In 
Shuangcheng, villagers also established contracts in land transactions and, at times of 
litigation, presented them in court as proof.  For example, in 1871, two bannermen 
                                                        
47 The region with the best preserved records about permanent tenancy is Yangzi delta, but scholars have 
also identified the existence of permanent tenancy in Gansu, Rehe, and Taiwan (Jiang 2000). 
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brought their land dispute to the court because both claimed that they had ownership over a 
plot.  To defend his property rights, the plaintiff provided the court with the contract of 
land rental signed between his father and the civilian tenant who farmed this plot.  This 
contract clearly stated the time and reason of land rental, the size of land, and the rate of 
rent, signed by the landlord and tenant as well as witnesses.48 
However, although customary laws supported land rental and conditional sale in 
Shuangcheng, in litigation, officials sometimes overrode customary practices to enforce 
state regulations.  In regions where private land ownership was honored, contracts were 
legal proof of land transactions; in Shuangcheng, however, the state still dominated land 
ownership.  For example, in 1881, the government overrode a contract regarding a 
conditional land sale between a bannerman and a civilian commoner.49  In that year, a 
bannerman named Changfa sued a civilian commoner named Liang Zhongwen for not 
allowing him to withdraw land his father had conditionally sold to Liang’s father.  
Between 1820 and 1850, Changfa’s father had registered a total of 291 shang of land, 
including 100 shang of suique land and 191 shang of ziken land.  Changfa’s father then 
conditionally sold 10 shang of suique land to Liang’s father.  The two established a 
contract, stating that Liang’s father paid 200 strings of coins to Changfa’s father and took 
over payment of the government rent.  The contract also stated that Changfa’s father could 
never withdraw the plot.  When judging this case, the government admonished both 
Changfa and Liang for their fathers’ illegal behavior; Changfa could not privately sell state 
land, and Liang was in fact an unregistered civilian commoner who could not own any land 
in Shuangcheng.  Following this judgment, the government retrieved the ten-shang plot 
                                                        
48 SCPXLYMDA, item no. 5239. 
49 SCPZGYMDA, reel 206, vol. 859, pp.233-241. 
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from the two parties and rented it to somebody else. 
Thus, in Shuangcheng, officially-sanctioned land ownership was still the most 
authoritative form.  The state’s principle of maintaining banner land ownership and state 
categories had priority in judging land-related cases.  Although the government allowed 
land rental and conditional sales, it only honored customary practices that did not violate 
official rules.  The dominance of state rule in Shuangcheng therefore pushed official 
residents – metropolitan and rural bannermen and registered civilian commoners – to 
formalize their transactions through official channels of land transfer.  Formalization of 
customary transactions served to entangle official land transfers and private transactions.  
In the rest of this section, I will analyze official land transfers to reveal their relationship 
with private land sales and to examine the consequences of the interaction between 
government and local society for land ownership.   
 
Official land transfers 
In Shuangcheng, the government was the only authority to grant land ownership.  
Official regulations prevented land transactions not only between bannermen and civilian 
commoners, but also among bannermen.  The government had laid out the rules in the 
initial allocation of jichan land in 1820: although a jichan plot was considered a 
household’s property, the household could not sell it.  When the government identified a 
land sale, it would retrieve the plot, require the seller to forfeit the land and land price, and 
punish any parties involved in the transaction.50  In 1868, the government also decreed 
that all changes in nazu land ownership should follow the procedures set out for jichan 
                                                        
50 See the order of Shuangcheng banner government on 1815.2.16 (SCPTTJL, pp. 75-55) 
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land.51 
Any changes in land ownership therefore had to go through the official procedures of 
“returning land (tuidi)” and “selecting a replacement (jianbu).”  According to the official 
report on landownership change, these procedures consisted of four steps.  First, when a 
bannerman decided to give up ownership of a plot, he and the chief village head went to the 
Captain’s Office to report his decision and file a petition.  The petition followed a standard 
format, summarizing the types and amount of land and the reasons the owner gave for 
relinquishing it.  For example, in 1880, in a report regarding a landownership change 
between two rural bannermen, Wulibu and Yongcheng, the Captain’s Office of the 
Bordered Blue banner first cited Wulibu’s petition as follows: 
“A zhengding Wulibu, who resides in the fifth village of the first Jiala of 
my banner, sincerely petitioned [at the office]: ‘I originally farmed thirty shang 
of dingque land,52 thirty shang of ziken land, and thirteen shang and seven mu 
of maohuang land. Now, I am suffering from diseases on my waist and legs. 
Although I sought to cure them for a long time, there was no improvement at all 
and I ended up being disabled. Nobody in my household can help me farm (the 
land).  Moreover, I have exceeded the age range of (principal adult male) and 
indeed have no ability to farm the land.  In the fear of delaying the government 
rent, I would like to give up my dingque plot as well as my ziken and maohuang 
plots and allow the government to select a capable adult male to replace me.  
Thereby, the land will not be wasted and the government rent will not be 
delayed.’” 
 
Following the petition of the original plot owner, in the second step, the Captain’s 
Office then selected the replacement and allocated the returned plot to him.  In Wulibu’s 
case, the Captain’s Office selected a bannerman from the same village as Wulibu: 
“According to this petition, [the office] verified that Wulibu is willing to 
                                                        
51 SCPZGYMDA, reel 164, vol. 656, pp.158-161. 
52 Dingque land was the title for the 30 shang of land each rural banner household received from the 
government upon arrival at Shuangcheng.  Thus, for the rural bannermen in the right and left tun, each 
plot of dingque land consisted of 18.33 shang of jichan land, which belonged to the rural household, and 
11.67 shang of land that belonged to the central-tun residents but was farmed by the right and left tun 
residents. 
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give up his dingque, ziken, and maohuang plots, a total of 73 shang and 7 mu of 
land and allow the government to select an adult male to replace him, because 
he is disabled and exceeded the age of principle adult male, without an assistant 
adult male in his household. [Wulibu’s proposal] seems reasonable. These plots 
concern both the dingque and rated nazu land, and thus, it is not appropriate to 
let [the ownership] remain unassigned.  Thus, [the office] followed the rules to 
select the bangding Yongcheng, who is registered under the household of the 
zhengding Chengxi in the second village of the second jiala, to replace [Wulibu].  
[We] verify that the selected adult male Yongcheng is really strong and capable 
of farming.  Therefore, [we] handed all the farming tools Wulibu originally 
acquired from [the government] to Yongcheng.” 
 
The third step was to document the landownership change.  First, the original owner 
of the plot and his kin would sign a statement confirming that they had given up the plot.  
Next, the selected bannerman and the village head and precinct head, from his village 
would sign a written guarantee, attesting to the take-over of the plot and the capability of 
the selected bannerman to farm it.  If the ownership change involved nazu land, the 
selected bannerman also needed to state his willingness to pay the rent on time.  Finally, 
the Captain’s Office completed the paperwork and reported the result of the ownership 
change to the area commander-in-chief: 
“In addition to obtaining a written guarantee from Wulibu’s relatives, 
stating that there is no dispute regarding this change in landownership, and a 
guarantee from the zong tunda, tunda, and jiazhang [or], stating that the 
replacement adult male Yongcheng will not waste the land and delay the rent, 
[we] also attach a sealed verification.  Here we submit all the paperwork and 
report to your office.”53 
 
The above procedures in the official report convey the impression that the Captain’s 
Office controlled the selection of the replacement bannerman and thus made the land 
transfer an official act.  According to the sequence of land transfer, in which the plot first 
went back to the Captain’s Office before the selection of a replacement bannerman, the 
                                                        
53 SCPZGYMDA, reel 204, vol. 847, pp.54-55. 
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Captain’s Office acted as both authority and intermediate in the land transfer.  The 
standard language used in the official report also signaled the government’s firm control 
over the land.  Almost every petition from an original owner used the standard phrase, 
“allow the government to select a replacement (jiao guan ling ding buchong).”  Similarly, 
every Captain’s Office reported that the office “followed the rules to select (zhaozhang jian 
de)” the replacement bannerman.  In addition, the official document did not mention any 
payment involved in the land transfer.  It thus appeared from the official report that the 
Captain’s Office selected the replacement bannerman, for whom land acquisition was free. 
The state controlled the selection of replacement bannermen to maintain the stability 
of local society.  According to the official rules, the replacement bannerman should be one 
of the assistant adult males in the original plot owner’s four-household unit (tongtun 
tongju), which had formed in the settlement to share draft animals and farming tools.54  
This rule reflected customary land-transfer practices in other regions of China proper, in 
which the plot owner’s relatives and neighbors had priority (Wang 2004).  Local Chinese 
society favored relatives and neighbors in land transactions because kinship and 
geographical ties played major roles in village life.  State laws also accommodated this 
customary practice.  In Shuangcheng, since the state had scattered descent groups in the 
settlement, the official rules gave priority to the geographical residential unit.   
The state also evaluated the replacement bannerman’s physiological and economic 
conditions in order to maintain equity in land distribution.  The state would first verify that 
the replacement bannerman was of prime age and capable of farming (nianli jingzhuang 
kanneng wunong).  Moreover, in the transfer of a jichan plot, the state would make sure 
                                                        
54 See the admonishment of the Area Commander-in-chief in 1882.2 (SCPZGYMDA, reel 208, vol. 869, 
pp. 151-157.)  This is only applied to the rural bannermen. 
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that the replacement bannerman was an assistant adult male who had no land.  These 
measures ensured that the land was assigned to a capable farmer who could sustain its 
cultivation.  At the same time, by monitoring the replacement bannerman’s wealth status, 
the state prevented land concentration. 
 
Official transfers and private transactions 
Despite the seemingly dominant role of the state, in reality, villagers who wished to 
give up land had considerable influence over the selection of replacement bannermen.  
Given the limited government personnel and the geographical distance between the office 
and the villages, it was impossible for the Captain’s Office to do the detailed work of 
identifying a replacement bannerman.  Instead, the original plot owner, along with his 
tunda and fellow villagers, played a major role in selecting his replacement.  Once the 
original plot owner or the villagers had identified a replacement bannerman, the Captain’s 
Office usually accepted the replacement and legitimized the transfer. 
In some cases, the original owner identified a replacement bannerman before he 
reported his desire to relinquish land to the government.  For example, in 1879, two 
official reports from the Bordered Blue banner regarding land transfer differed from the 
standard text and revealed that the actual land transfer had probably taken place before the 
Captain’s Office recorded it.  One of the two cases concerned an ownership transfer 
between a rural bannerman, named Qifa, and his plot neighbor (dilin), named Dekun, on 15 
shang of maohuang land.  In this report, following Qifa’s petition to give up his plot, 
instead of displaying the office’s authority to select a replacement bannerman, the 
Captain’s Office cited Dekun’s petition to acquire Qifa’s plot: 
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“My plot neighbor Qifa originally had a plot of land located north of the 
city of Xisuo. This plot is next to my plot. Due to his poverty and inability to 
farm the land, Qifa gave up the ownership of 15 shang of land from his plot, 
allowing the government to select another tenant. I would like to take this plot 
and pay the government rent annually, so that the rent payment will not missing 
or be delayed.”55 
 
The appearance of Dekun’s petition right after Qifa’s revealed that Qifa and Dekun had 
negotiated the land transfer beforehand and probably went to the Captain’s Office together 
to file their petitions.  In this case, as Qifa’s plot neighbor, Dekun had the advantage in 
acquiring and managing the land.  Similarly, in another land transfer, two rural bannermen, 
Jinxiang and Wang Shangqian, filed their petitions requesting the transfer in sequence.56  
In both cases, the Captain’s Office simply verified the selected persons’ ability to farm the 
land and assigned this plot to him. 
Villagers’ control over the selection of replacement bannermen indicates that official 
land transfers left space for private land sales and conditional sales.  For example, in 1879, 
a land dispute between two rural bannermen, Ren Shicheng and Li Sheng, reveals that 
some land transfers were in fact sales.57  In 1879, Ren filed a lawsuit with the local 
government, suing Li for surreptitiously taking the ownership of his dingque land.  Ren 
claimed that he originally had a 30-shang dingque plot and, in the 1860s, conditionally sold 
it to Li Sheng, still preserving his ultimate ownership.  In this conditional sale, Li paid Ren 
60 strings of coins without any rent obligation.  However, Ren later found that Li had 
changed the landownership status at the Captain’s Office, and he ended up owning no land.  
Yet, according to Li Sheng, in 1867, Ren had given up his landownership at the Captain’s 
Office because of his poverty and disability, and the Captain’s Office had reassigned the 
                                                        
55 SCPZGYMDA, reel 202, vol. 839, pp.339-344. 
56 SCPZGYMDA, reel 202, vol. 839, pp. 321-328. 
57 SCPZGYMDA, reel 203, vol. 844, pp. 245-251. 
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plot to his younger brother Li Ming.  In this land transfer, Li had paid Ren 120 strings of 
coins as “plow and spade money (lihua qian).”   
The original report on the ownership transfer between Ren and Li from the Captain’s 
Office resolved the two bannermen’s disputes.  The official record showed that, in 1868, 
Ren had gone to the Captain’s Office together with another bannerman to report their 
decision to give up their zhengding positions and the associated dingque plots,58 citing 
disability as the reason.  The Captain’s Office had then selected Li Sheng’s younger 
brother, Li Ming, as the replacement.  At the same time, both the tunda and precinct head, 
as witnesses, had verified the existence of the official land transfer between Ren and Li.  
Ren finally lost this lawsuit when official proof of the ownership transfer was produced. 
Ren and Li’s case reveals that, behind the scenes of an official land transfer, the 
original owner and the replacement bannerman engaged in more complicated negotiations 
and land transactions.  The official process of land transfer only served as the final step in 
legitimizing private transactions between bannermen.  Before they completed the official 
land transfer, Ren had sold his land to Li.  The “plow and spade money,” which refers to 
the monetary compensation paid to the original owner for his efforts in clearing the plot, 
was in fact the land price.59  The government was also aware of the private land 
transactions behind official land transfers.  In 1867, the Shuangcheng area 
commander-in-chief ordered the Captain’s Office to place a hold on all land transfer cases 
during the spring ploughing period to make sure farmers focused on farming.60  In this 
document, the area commander-in-chief clearly pointed out that, among the various 
                                                        
58 SCPZGYMDA, reel 164, vol. 659, pp. 8-15. 
59 Although in Ren and Li’s case, whether the “plow and spade money” was actually the land price was not 
explicated, in another case involving a land transaction between two civilian commoners, the “plow and 
spade money” clearly referred to the land price (SCPZGYMDA, reel 203, vol. 844, pp.9-21). 
60 SCPZGYMDA, reel 163, vol. 647, pp. 158-162. 
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land-transfer cases, “some must be farmers selling off their plots to pay their debt.”  
Therefore, “it is hard to avoid the situation that [some people] set up others to extort the 
land.  I assume all [captains] have discerned this situation.”  This statement indicates the 
state’s awareness that bannermen used land transfers as a source of income. 
While the standard language in official reports usually concealed private land 
transactions, in 1882, the official of the Bordered Yellow banner misinterpreted the state 
policy and wrote the terms “sell” and “buy” into an official report.61  In the second month 
of 1882, Tinghe, the lieutenant of the Bordered Yellow banner who had temporarily taken 
over the captain’s duty, processed two land-transfer cases: one between two metropolitan 
bannermen, Qinglin and Chengshun, and the other between three metropolitan bannermen, 
Qingxiang and Qingde as the original owners and Shuangquan as the replacement.  In 
both cases, after summarizing the types and amounts of land they intended to relinquish, 
the original owners stated that they had sold these plots to the replacement bannermen.  
For example, in Qinglin’s petition, he wrote: “Now, [I] have sold [these plots] to 
Chengshun, who resides in the same village as mine, and handed the original land 
certificates to him, so that Chengshun could acquire new certificates with his name on 
them.”  The other petition used the same language.   
Interestingly, Tinghe approved these land transactions according to the official 
instructions on the land certificates.62  The instructions stated that “in the future, if the 
owner had no ability to farm [this plot] and would like to sell it to others, [he] must report it 
to the local government and acquire a new land certificate.”  Tinghe was therefore under 
the impression that the land transactions between these metropolitan bannermen were in 
                                                        
61 SCPZGYMDA, reel 208, vol. 869, pp. 151-157. 
62 Ibid. 
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accordance with the official rules.  Accordingly, Tinghe sent personnel to the villages to 
verify the capability of the two replacement bannermen and completed the paperwork. 
However, the area commander-in-chief returned Tinghe’s report and admonished him 
for deviating from the rules of land transfer and writing the terms “sell” and “buy” into the 
official report.63  The area commander-in-chief explained that the official instructions on 
land certificates in fact only allowed for sales of nazu land between civilian commoners.  
Civilian commoners constituted the majority of nazu land owners in other parts of Jilin 
Province, so the provincial government used a uniform land certificate to accommodate 
their needs.  Thus, the official instructions on the certificate only applied to civilian 
commoners.  While pointing this out, the area commander-in-chief reemphasized the 
prohibition on land transactions between Shuangcheng bannermen.   
Having received the admonishment, in the fourth month of 1882, Tinghe submitted a 
revised report.64  In this report, the parties involved in the land transfers remained the 
same as before.  Following the standard format, the original owners, Qinglin, Qingxiang, 
and Qingde petitioned to relinquish their ownership over those plots and allow the 
government to select replacements.  The report then stated that the Captain’s Office 
followed the rules to respectively select Chengshun and Shuangquan as the replacements.  
Obviously, Tinghe still accepted the fact of the transactions between these metropolitan 
bannermen and only changed the language in the report to bring them into accordance with 
the law. 
The above case reveals that, although the state was aware of the persistence of private 
land sales, it was only willing to formalize them using the instrument of the official land 
                                                        
63 Ibid. 
64 SCPZGYMDA, reel 208, vol. 870, pp. 97-103. 
 215
transfer.  Both the area commander-in-chief and Tinghe understood that, in the above land 
transfers, the original owners had sold their plots to the replacement bannermen.  
Interestingly, what the area commander-in-chief was discontented about was not the 
private transaction itself, but the way Tinghe wrote the report, which officially sanctioned 
the transaction.  The state prohibited private land transactions between Shuangcheng 
bannermen not only to maintain equity in land distribution among the bannermen but also 
to protect banner landownership.  In his admonishment to Tinghe, the area 
commander-in-chief explained that the state prohibited the terms “sell” and “buy” in 
official land transfers out of a concern that such language would open the door for land 
transactions between bannermen and civilian commoners.  He therefore pointed out that 
allowing land transactions would not benefit the bannermen in the long-term65 and, in 





The government and residents’ use of official land transfers to formalize private land 
sales revealed that official rules and local practices in fact formed a reciprocal relationship 
in local governance.  Some scholars have identified this reciprocal relationship in regions 
where private ownership was the norm (Scogin 1994, 2001; Huang 2001).  For example, 
Hugh Scogin points out that, in local governance, the state relied on the customary use of 
contracts to “receive the administration convenience of regularization and control,” and 
that private parties benefited from the use of contracts in “the clarification of their 
relationships and the protection of their arrangements” (Scogin 2001).  In regions where 
                                                        
65 SCPZGYMDA, reel 208, vol. 869, pp. 151-157. 
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state land ownership was predominant, traditional opinions still over-emphasize the 
antagonistic relationship between private practices and state rules.  For example, in his 
study on customary practices of conditional sale in Liaoning and southern Jilin Provinces, 
Chris Isett generally considered a conditional sale a deviance from state rules (Isett 2004, 
2006).  The stories in Shuangcheng, however, reveal that, even in regions where the state 
was more dominant, official rules and private practices still interacted with one another to 
achieve the goal of local governance. 
Official procedures of land transfer still accommodated local customs that prioritized 
the land owner’s kin.  Since the state had scattered immigrants’ descent groups in the 
settlement, the original official rules only prioritized geographic proximity, requiring that 
the replacement bannerman be selected from the four-household unit that shared farming 
tools and draft animals.  However, by the 1870s, descent groups had grown as a result of 
two generations’ reproduction.  Therefore, the success of an actual land transfer depended 
on the consent of the original owner’s descent group.  In the third step, in which 
government functionaries obtained written guarantees from the two parties involved in the 
land transfer, the descent group members also had to sign a guarantee, stating that they 
were willing to give up the land and attesting that they would not engage in future disputes 
over the plot.  For example, in Wulibu and Yongcheng’s case, both Wulibu and his 
grandson Zhao Jingchun signed a written statement of their decision to give up the land.66  
In another land-transfer case in 1882, a rural bannerman named Dahu directly requested to 
transfer his plot to his cousin’s son, who resided in a different village.67  The government 
honored his request. 
                                                        
66 SCPZGYMDA, reel 204, vol. 847, pp.52-56. 
67 SCPZGYMDA, reel 209, vol. 870, pp.109-117. 
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Just as private land transactions imparted the principle of kinship to official land 
transfers, the official land transfer also disseminated the state principle of population 
categories into private land transactions.  By using official procedures to formalize their 
private land sales, Shuangcheng residents in fact enforced state population categories.  
Since the official land transfer provided better protection for land ownership, residents 
were willing to formalize their private land sales as long as they agreed with the basic 
principle of the law.  In Shuangcheng, this basic principle was to protect banner land 
ownership and maintain the differential entitlements embedded in state population 
categories.  Therefore, only private sales between members of the same population 
category could be formalized through official land transfers.  Thus, in the selection of 
buyers and sellers, the two parties had to calculate the possibility of acquiring official 
protection for their transaction and the gains and losses of doing or not doing so.  Buyers 
and sellers who wanted official protection would have been more willing to keep their 
private land sales within their own population categories. 
Moreover, the official requirement that a replacement bannerman be “strong and 
capable of farming” was also the norm in selecting the buyers in private land sales; the 
majority of replacement bannermen were of prime age or had large households to provide 
farming assistance.  Of the 21 replacement bannermen who completed the official 
procedures of land transfer between 1880 and 1881, 11 aged between 20 and 40 sui and 5 
aged between 41 and 50 sui.68  Only 3 of these 21 replacement bannermen were aged 
below 20 sui, and 2 aged above 50 sui.  In contrast, the bannermen who gave up their 
                                                        
68 Cases collected from the local banner government archives between 1880 and 1881 (SCPZGYMDA, 
reel 203, vol. 844, pp. 237-242; reel 204, vol. 845, p. 154; vol. 847, pp.44-48, 52-56, 212-216; vol. 848, pp. 
10-14; reel 205, vol. 851, pp. 16-23, 82-87, 194-200, 206-209, 210-215; vol. 852, pp. 56-63; reel 206, vol. 
859, pp. 105-110; reel 208, vol. 866, pp. 229-233, 353-357; vol. 869, pp. 83-87; vol. 870, pp. 97-103, 
109-117, 141-146, 149, and 151).  The age information of these bannermen was acquired from the 
corresponding banner population registers. 
 218
ownership between 1880 and 1881 were generally old and disabled.  Poverty, disability, 
and illness were the three major reasons cited by bannermen who gave up their plots.  Of 
15 plot owners whose age information was collected, 9 were aged above 60 sui, and two 
aged between 50 and 60 sui.  Only 4 of these plot owners were aged below 40 sui.  The 
accordance between the official requirement and the results of private selection on the age 
of replacement bannermen revealed that, after economic conditions, physiological 
suitability was also an important determinant of land acquisition. 
 
Conclusion: state, market, and stratification 
From the mid-nineteenth century on, the state’s fiscal crisis intersected with local 
practices of land cultivation and transaction to open the door to stratification in landed 
wealth in Shuangcheng.  The opening of nazu land provided opportunities for 
Shuangcheng residents to expand their household wealth.  Contrary to the allocation of 
jichan land, which featured an egalitarian distribution within each population category, the 
acquisition of nazu land allowed for stratification.  A household could own more than one 
hundred shang of land or none at all.  The government’s simultaneous allocation of jichan 
plots to metropolitan bannermen in exchange for monetary contributions also resulted in 
the stratification in landed wealth.  The existence of nazu land therefore posed a challenge 
to the egalitarian elite system. 
The persistence of private land transactions alongside official allocations also 
nurtured a land market in Shuangcheng.  Transactions in the land market took various 
forms, including land rental, conditional sale, and sale, all of which were supported by 
customary laws.  Individual ability and economic and biographical conditions were 
important determinants of failure and success on the market.  The existence of a land 
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market thus provided a new venue for increasing land stratification.  Private transactions 
not only offered successful metropolitan and rural bannermen greater mobility in land 
acquisition, but also provided floating bannermen and unregistered civilian commoners 
with opportunities for land usufruct.  The land market in Shuangcheng thus played a 
crucial role in maintaining the Shuangcheng social structure.  While the system privileged 
metropolitan and rural bannermen, floating bannermen and unregistered civilian 
commoners were willing to stay and provide their labor because the land market offered 
them an opportunity for partial ownership. 
However, despite the emergence of a land market in Shuangcheng, state control only 
left a limited space for its development.  Laws prohibited private land transactions and 
enforced strict procedures of official land transfer.  Yet in local governance, the state 
allowed enough flexibility in official land transfers to accommodate private land 
transactions.  Both the government and Shuangcheng residents were willing to use official 
land transfers to formalize land sales that adhered to the rules of the state population 
categories.  Government practice thus significantly influenced the functioning of the 
market.  The market was largely segmented; official registration only formalized and 
protected land sales within the same population category.  Through this practice, the 
government privileged the metropolitan and rural bannermen in the market.  Since the 
metropolitan and rural bannermen owned the majority of registered farm land in 
Shuangcheng, prohibiting land transactions between population categories effectively 
protected banner ownership and the privilege of the haves.  Floating bannermen and 
unregistered civilian commoners, despite access to partial land ownership under customary 
laws, were still disprivileged by their lack of government protection. 
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Moreover, state policies also shaped the metropolitan and rural bannermen’s land 
acquisition practices.  In general, rural bannermen were more active in land acquisition 
than were metropolitan bannermen.  As table 6.6 shows, during the 20-year period of 
1870-1889, 55 percent of the rural banner households were involved in activities of nazu 
land acquisition that resulted in changes to their household nazu land size.  In contrast, 
only 13.7 percent of the metropolitan banner households engaged in activities of nazu land 
acquisition during the same period.  The differential scale of land acquisition between the 
metropolitan and rural bannermen resulted from state policies of differential land 
allocation.  As the elite members of the state farm, the metropolitan bannermen had as 
much as twice the jichan land allocated to rural bannermen.  This inequality in land 
holding was even greater because metropolitan bannermen in general had much smaller 
households than did rural bannermen.  Given the abundant land, the majority of 
metropolitan bannermen were less likely to desire more land.  On the contrary, with larger 
households and less jichan land, rural bannermen had a more pressing need for additional 
land.  Therefore, state rules and private behaviors reached a ‘harmony’ in Shuangcheng.  
Despite the increasing stratification brought about by private land cultivation and 
transaction, state principles of between-category inequality and within-category equality 
were deeply embedded in Shuangcheng residents’ behaviors. 
                         
 
                       [Table 6.6 on the next page]
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Rural bannermen   
Changes in nazu land 
amount N. 
households Percent  
N. 
households Percent
Constantly increased 0 0 12 0.58
No change at all 830 86.28 926 45.08
Constantly reduced 3 0.31 2 0.1
Size changes in both 
ways 129 13.41 1,114 54.24
     
Total 962 100  2,054 100
Sources: The linked population and land database. 










Chapter VII    
Land Transfer: Kin and Non-kin Inheritance 
 
Inheritance, or the intergenerational transmission of wealth, has been an essential tool 
for the reproduction of social status across a wide variety of historical and contemporary 
human societies.1  By transferring property to descendants, families maintain their wealth, 
provide their members with material support,, and transmit their social status to future 
generations.  The richer a family, the more wealth its offspring can acquire.  In his 
research on wealth distribution throughout the world, Schneider reveals that inherited 
wealth has accounted for a major source of inequality, as the inequality in wealth 
distribution is far greater than that in income distribution (Schneider 2004).  Therefore, 
understanding inheritance patterns in a society is important to understanding how social 
inequalities are transmitted. 
Shuangcheng is no exception to this understanding; state regulation of inheritance 
practices was crucial to the maintenance of within-category equality in land distribution.  
In allocating land, the state granted metropolitan and rural bannermen permanent land use 
rights.  Bannermen were, therefore, allowed to transmit their landed property from 
generation to generation.  In the early years, when the settlement scattered descent groups, 
inheritance was a relatively simple practice among brothers.  However, beginning in the 
                                                        
1 There are two types of inter-generational wealth transmission: inheritance, which keeps property within 
families; and wealth redistribution, through which individuals return property to the society (or village 
commune) for redistribution upon aging or death.  Although the practice of social redistribution persists in 
contemporary societies in the form of donation, only in communal societies was the practice of wealth 
redistribution a norm.  In most Chinese dynasties with a written record, land was inheritable.  The only 
exception was the Northern Wei, the emperor of which, under the equal land system (juntian), required 
farmers to return their land to the state at the age of seventy sui (Han 1984).   
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mid-nineteenth century when families grew in size, inheritance became more and more 
complicated.  By the 1870s, after a half century’s reproduction, most immigrant families 
included two or three generations and therefore formed small descent groups. With the 
production of new generations, descent groups began to re-emerge as a form of social 
organization among these immigrants. As family structures grew more complex, 
inheritance became an increasingly contested tool with which family members pursued 
their diverging interests; while some followed either state or customary rules to carry out 
peaceful inheritance, others considered inheritance a means of wealth accumulation and 
sought to acquire more land by taking advantage of their relatives.  Inheritance-based 
strategies of wealth accumulation posed a potential threat to the equal distribution of land, 
which ensured each household one jichan plot.  
In this chapter, I examine inheritance practices in Shuangcheng to explore how the 
equality of land distribution within population categories was passed down to the 
descendants of banner immigrants.  To do so, I focus on the interaction between state 
regulations and local practices.  On the one hand, due to the importance of inheritance in 
determining wealth distribution, the state established regulations to prevent land 
concentration.  In Shuangcheng, the state used population and land registration to closely 
monitor land transfers and ensure that each household possessed exactly one plot of jichan 
land.  On the other hand, the state also granted tremendous autonomy to local society in 
the realm of inheritance, resulting in the persistence of customary practices that differed 
from state regulations.  In inheritance, therefore, bannermen could follow either state 
regulations or customary practices.  Moreover, in adjudicating disputes over inheritance, 
local officials also used both state regulations and customary laws to make decisions.  
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State regulations and customary practices thus interacted with one another to shape 
inheritance outcomes in Shuangcheng.   
I organize my narrative into four sections to delineate the coexistence of state 
regulations and customary practices, and to demonstrate how the multitude of 
representatives of state and local society—local officials, villagers, and household 
members—used this system to pursue their own interests.  In the next section, I first 
situate inheritance practices in Shuangcheng in the context of Chinese history to briefly 
review the patterns of inheritance that existed in China.  Then, in sections two and three, I 
examine the state regulations and local practices surrounding inheritance respectively.  I 
reveal that, although the state stipulated primogeniture inheritance, partible inheritance still 
persisted in some banner families, and I show how some individuals used the discrepancy 
between state regulation and local practice to pursue their personal interests in wealth 
accumulation.  Finally, in section four, I explore how local officials thoughtfully used 
both state regulations and customary practices to achieve their goals in local governance.   
 
Primogeniture and partible inheritance in China 
Inheritance practices in late imperial China reflected both state control and local 
autonomy, a typical Chinese pattern of governance.  On the one hand, from very early on, 
the state had established rules to direct inheritance practices that supported two conflicting 
principles of inheritance: non-partible primogeniture and partibility.  Regarding the 
inheritance of noble and official titles, the state always followed the rule of primogeniture, 
in which only the eldest son could inherit a father’s titles.  In terms of property 
transmission, however, the state always tried to implement partible inheritance, through 
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which family property was divided among children.2  The state supported both principles 
because it sought to sustain and protect its rule through the concentration of political 
privilege and the diffusion of private wealth.  For example, in the second century B.C., the 
rulers of the Western Han dynasty tried to weaken the political and economic power of the 
kings by dividing their property.  In 129, emperor Wu of the Western Han dynasty finally 
succeeded in forcing the kings to equally divide their territories and material property 
among all of their sons.  In the Decree of Tang, it is clearly stated that all property should 
be equally divided among brothers (Niida 1964).3 
At the same time, however, the state also left tremendous space for families to 
determine the results of inheritance.  The codified civil law only provided general 
guidelines, while the actual process of inheritance was largely controlled by families and 
local communities.4  David Wakefield, in his study of household division cases, reveals 
that the household division process took place in five stages: making the decision, calling 
in the witnesses, negotiating the division of property, writing the household division 
document, and concluding ceremonies (1998).  In these five stages, while kinship 
members and neighbors played important roles as witnesses and mediators, helping to 
publicize and legitimize the results of the household division, family members remained 
largely in charge.  In the Qing Code, only two statutes addressed inheritance, and they did 
                                                        
2 In the practice of partible inheritance in China, in general, all sons had inheritance rights, but daughters’ 
inheritance rights varied from dynasty to dynasty.  In the Ming and Qing, daughters did not have 
inheritance rights. 
3 See Niida, 1964, p. 245. 
4 This degree of local autonomy is a very typical Chinese pattern of governance.  Early scholars of 
Chinese civil law observed that Chinese legal code emphasized administrative and criminal issues over 
civil affairs (Bodde and Morris 1973), and that most civil disputes were resolved under a combination of 
the formal legal system based on the imperial code and an informal justice system based on customary laws 
(Huang 1996, 2001; Scogin 1994).  While previously scholars have attributed this duality to the imperfect 
nature of Chinese institutions, recent studies reveal that in fact the state intentionally left space for local 
society to operate civil affairs (Scogin 2001; Zelin, Ocko, and Gardella 2004). 
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so in very general terms.5  When various disputes arose in practice, therefore, local 
magistrates usually could not find applicable rules in the code and had to make 
case-by-case decisions that reflected both the principles of the code and customary 
practices (Zhang 2002).   
By late imperial times, state regulations and family practices surrounding the 
inheritance of private property prescribed more or less the same outcome: all patrilineal 
sons equally inherited family property with the eldest son keeping up the ancestral sacrifice.  
Following the rules of partibility, inheritance was largely carried out within families and 
descent groups under customary laws.  Unless serious disputes arose among family 
members, the government stayed away from household division procedures.6   
However, for state property, primogeniture inheritance, in which property was not 
partible, took precedence over partible inheritance as the official form of wealth transfer.  
For example, in the Ming dynasty, the military state farm (juntun) recognized the 
family/household as the basic unit of land allocation and production.  Each family had one 
plot of land and had a principal adult male who was responsible for production, while other 
men in the family worked as assistants.  This plot of land could not be divided, so its 
transfer took the form of primogeniture inheritance (Wang 1965).  In Shuangcheng, the 
government followed the same regulatory procedure in land inheritance; jichan plots were 
to remain intact upon the death or retirement of a household head, so only one member of 
the family, usually the eldest son, could officially become the new household head and the 
                                                        
5 The two statutes are Statute 78, “Violating the Law of Establishing a Son of the Official Wife [as One’s 
Successor],” and Statute 87, “Establishing Separate Household Registration and Dividing [the Family] 
Property.” (DQLL, pp. 195-197 and p. 201) The two statutes addressed respectively the selection of an heir 
and the division of family property.  However, with the statutes stating the principles and the sub-statutes 
stating exceptions, the regulations themselves were, in practice, quite flexible. 
6 According to Wakefield’s research, none of the household division cases he studies were reported to the 
government.  Nor did any of the cases indicate the involvement of the government. (1998 p. 62) 
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registered land owner.  At the same time, however, as a statute in the Great Qing Code, 
partible inheritance persisted as a “legal” practice within families.   
 
State regulations 
In Shuangcheng, under state regulations, inheritance followed the principles of 
primogeniture, with the eldest son having the first right to inherit.  These principles 
dictated two modes of land transfer: inheritance by close kin, where a son or other available 
patrilineal relative in the household inherited the land after the death or retirement of the 
household head; and inheritance by non-kin, wherein the government transferred land from 
extinct households – households in which all members had died without heirs – to indirect 
kin or other fellow villagers.  In each of these two ways, family land was transferred in its 
entirety and without any division.  These inheritance procedures were carried out under a 
combination of formal and informal institutions that involved the local government, the 
village community, the kinship network, and the family. 
 
Close kin 
Because the household in Shuangcheng was considered the basic unit of 
administration and land allocation, state regulations stipulated that only one household 
member at a time could become the household head through inheritance.  The quota of 
4,000 households and the number of plots on the official land registers remained 
unchanged throughout the history of the state farm.  Therefore, from the state’s 
perspective, household head succession and property inheritance were one and the same – 
the administrative task of replacing a state position: principal adult male (zhengding).  
When a household head died or retired, an heir from the same household would fill the 
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vacancy, becoming the new household head and principal adult male.  At the same time, 
the government kept all members of the original household intact on the population 
registers, maintaining their rights to share the family’s plot. 
Under this state regulation, headship succession in the household registers followed 
the form of primogeniture.  Whenever the eldest son was available, he had the first rights 
to succeed the household headship.  As Table 7.1 shows, when the eldest son was eligible, 
94.9 percent of deceased or retired household heads were succeeded by their eldest sons.  
If grandsons of the eldest son’s descent are taken into consideration, the percentage was as 
high as 97.7.  Instances in which other sons or relatives in the household took the headship 
only accounted for a very small percentage.  Moreover, the same table also shows that, 
when the eldest son was not eligible but other sons were, 45 percent of household 
headships were transmitted to second sons and 20 percent of headships were transmitted to 
other sons.  At the same time, however, some families stuck to the rules of primogeniture 
so strictly that, even when other sons were eligible, in 30.6 percent of the cases, the 
grandson from the eldest son inherited the headship.  Only when no son was eligible did 
such family members as brothers, nephews, or cousins have a significant chance to inherit 
the household headship.  
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Table 7. 1 Heir’s relationship to previous household head, 1866-1912. 
 Eldest son eligible 
Sons other than the 
eldest eligible  No son eligible 
  Number Percent Number  Percent  Number Percent 
Eldest son 1656 94.9  0 0.0  0 0.0 
Second son 15 0.9  153 45.0  0 0.0 
Other sons 5 0.3  68 20.0  0 0.0 
Widow 10 0.6  3 0.9  54 12.6 
Grandsons of the eldest 
son's descent 48 2.8  104 30.6  111 26.0 
Other grandsons 1 0.1  11 3.2  8 1.9 
Brothers and Nephews 5 0.3  1 0.3  224 52.5 
Cousin or cousin's 
children 5 0.3  0 0.0  28 6.6 
Daughters 0 0.0  0 0.0  2 0.5 
         
Total 1,745 100.0 340 100.0 427 100.0 




Other assistant adult males in the household, however, could still become heads of 
their own households by inheriting land from extinct households.  State land ownership 
facilitated the transfer of land between households without kinship ties.  Assistant adult 
males could therefore officially become household heads when vacant principal adult male 
positions became available due to the death or infirmity of principal adult males from other 
households without heirs.  Each time an assistant adult male successfully filled a vacant 
principal adult male position, he and his immediate family would appear on the official 
record as a new household, next to his original yihu but annotated as “linghu”, or separate 
household.7  Consequently, the original yihu on the population register would appear as 
being divided into two households.  The descriptive results in table 7.2 reveal that, 
although most of the families still adhered to primogeniture when inheriting land from 
                                                        
7 The family members registered under linghu varied from family to family.  Usually, if the new 
household head was married, his wife and children would also be listed under the separate household.  
Sometimes the new household head’s brothers or sisters and uncles also appeared under the separate 
household, which probably did not reflect actual residential arrangements.  
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other households, the chances for adult males other than the eldest son to inherit land 
greatly increased.  In 37.1 percent of the 642 cases where the eldest son was eligible, heirs 
other than the eldest son or grandson inherited the land; comparing this figure to the rate of 
2.3 percent for inheritance by these relatives from their own household heads suggests 
much better chances when inheriting from another household. 
 
Table 7. 2 The linghu household head’s position in his original household, 1870-1912. 
  Eldest Son eligible 
Sons other than the 
eldest eligible  No son eligible 
  Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Eldest son 379 59.0  0 0.0  0 0.0 
Second son 71 11.1  71 53.0  0 0.0 
Other sons 30 4.7  30 22.4  0 0.0 
Grandsons of the eldest 
son's descent 25 3.9  9 6.7  8 7.8 
Other grandsons 0 0.0  6 4.5  0 0.0 
Brothers and Nephews 97 15.1  12 9.0  73 71.6 
Cousin or cousin's children 40 6.2  6 4.5  21 20.6 
         
Total 642 100.0 134 100.0 102 100.0 




Moreover, under the state regulations, families and individuals could still exercise 
considerable power over this process, as the formal regulations did not stipulate the 
specific family member who would inherit the headship.  The selection of an heir 
therefore involved competition and negotiation among family members.  The descriptive 
results displayed in Table 7.1 and Table 7.2 illustrate a full range of power dynamics in 
families.  On one hand, the patrilineal rules of seniority exerted a strong influence.  To 
conform to state policy, the majority of families chose the primogeniture form of 
inheritance.  On the other hand, some family members other than the sons of the 
household heads still managed to inherit headships.  This was especially true in the 
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establishment of linghu.  Even when the eldest son of the household head was eligible, in 
15.1 percent of cases, brothers and brothers’ children inherited the land.  The percentage 
for cousins was 6.2 (table 7.2).   
Despite the flexibility that families enjoyed in land inheritance, the local government 
policed the accumulation of property within families.  As the local representative of state 
interests in land management, the local government upheld the principle of equitable 
distribution of land by forbidding the holding of more than one plot of jichan land by any 
adult male (“yiren buzhun chengling liangfen dingque”).  This rule even, at times, 
prevented the biological kin of household heads from inheriting land.   
The following inheritance case exemplifies both the opportunities inheritance 
presented to families and the government’s restrictions on land inheritance.  In 1866, a 
rural bannerman named Jiushizi filed a lawsuit against his cousin Shuangzhu for 
fraudulently taking the jichan land belonging to Jiushizi (see figure 7.1 for illustration).  
Jiushizi’s father and elder uncle had arrived in Shuangcheng from Jilin in 1815, and 
received one plot of jichan land.  The elder uncle was the household head, while Jiushizi’s 
father worked as assistant adult male.  When Jiushizi’s elder uncle and father both died in 
1838, Jiushizi was the only heir in the household.8  In theory, Jiushizi would inherit the 
land and the position of principal adult male.  However, Jiushizi temporarily left 
Shuangcheng to send his father’s and elder uncle’s coffins back to their place of origin.  
While Jiushizi was away, his father’s cousin Duiyinbao, a principal adult male, 
fraudulently obtained this plot for his own son Shuangzhu by claiming the extinction of 
Jiushizi’s household.  Therefore, Duiyinbao’s family held two plots of jichan land: the 
                                                        
8 It is also very interesting that Jiushizi filed the lawsuit 27 years after Shuangzhu possessed the plot. The 
archive did not indicate when Jiushizhi came back from his hometown in Jilin.  It is possible that Jiushizi 
stayed in his hometown for a relatively long time, which allowed Duiyinbao to successfully take his land.  
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one originally allocated to Duiyinbao and the one allocated to Jiushizi’s elder uncle. 
 
 
Figure 7. 1 Lawsuit between Jiushizi and Shuangzhu. 
Source: SCPZGYMDA, reel 162, vol. 643, pp.374-375 and reel 164, vol.657, pp. 6-15. 
 
 
Ironically, when Duiyinbao died in 1848, his son Shuangzhu, the only heir in the 
household, failed to officially inherit Duiyinbao’s land because of the rule prohibiting one 
person from taking two plots of jichan land.  As a result, Duiyinbao’s position of principal 
adult male, together with the ownership of his land, remained unassigned for eighteen 
years, until Jiushizi finally filed the lawsuit to reclaim his elder uncle’s land.  In their 
depositions, Jiushizi and Shuangzhu agreed that Shuangzhu should return the land held 
under his name back to Jiushizi; Shuangzhu would then be allowed to officially inherit the 
land left behind by his father Duiyinbao.  The court sanctioned this solution, commenting 
that it fit the principle of the “son inheriting his father’s property and the nephew inheriting 
his uncle’s property.”9  
This case illustrated both the agency of the individual in accumulating property for his 
                                                        
9 SCPZGYMDA, reel 162, vol. 643, pp.374-375 and reel 164, vol.657, pp. 6-15. 
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family and the local government’s use of state regulations to maintain local governance.  
In the beginning, Duiyinbao managed to use the state regulation to officially obtain land for 
his family.  Although Shuangzhu finally lost the extra plot of land, the irony is that what 
caused the loss of the land was not the exposure of his father’s initial fraud but the state’s 
interest in preventing land concentration, and the fact that Shuangzhu was the only heir in 
the household.  If Duiyinbao had had more than one son, his family could have succeeded 
in keeping both plots.  On the other hand, even though Duiyinbao had manipulated the 
state’s regulations to acquire more land, the local government was able to use its authority 
as state representative and the principle of equitable distribution to successfully prevent the 
concentration of land.  Although it may seem odd that a biological son failed to inherit his 
father’s property, the official rules were faithfully followed.  As we see from this case, the 




The use of fictive kinship is a common strategy in China that allows households 
without heirs to continue their lineages and transfer household property through adoption.  
Qing legal regulations followed the patrilineal rules in choosing adoptive heirs for 
households without sons: according to Qing Code, for these households the preference of 
inheritance should go first to relatives of the same father, and then, in order, to the cousin’s 
families, to the second cousin’s families, and to cousins of the same clan; only if none of 
the above relatives were available could the household choose its heir from remote 
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relatives or other people of the same surname.10  Despite these general principles of 
adoption, however, the Qing code also left flexibility to the adoptive parents.  Under the 
same statute, another sub-statute allowed adoptive parents to select other heirs if the 
designated heir did not get along with the adoptive parents; moreover, as long as the 
adoptive son was a worthy person and followed the ethics of generational order, other 
members of the clan could not use their proximity to the household to claim inheritance 
rights.11  Such competitive rules opened spaces both for tension within families and for 
individual agency.  In reality, there were examples in which the adoptive parents selected 
an indirect relative instead of a nephew (Zhang 2002). 
In most regions of China, adoption took place through a series of customary practices.  
First, the adoptive parents made the decision to adopt an heir and negotiated his selection 
among kinship members.  After the adoptive parents and the heir’s parents reached an 
agreement, the adoptive parents would invite kin and neighbors to the formal 
announcement of adoption.  Accompanying the announcement, the adoptive parents 
wrote a verification of adoption (guodan) to define the rights and obligations of the 
adoptive son.  Kinship members and neighbors present at the announcement would serve 
as witnesses, and the completion of these procedures legitimized the adoption.  Unless 
disputes rose and escalated to lawsuits, the government would not interfere in either the 
process or the results of adoption. 
However, due to the privileges of bannermen in accessing government stipends and 
land grants in the Qing dynasty, adoption in banner communities required not only 
consensus among kinship members, but also government recognition.  In the population 
                                                        
10 DQLL statute 78, sub-statute 317, p.195. 
11 DQLL statute 78, sub-statute 319, p.195. 
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registers, the government recorded adopted children with the annotation of “adopted in (ji 
ru).”12  In theory, no adoption was legitimate until the government reviewed and recorded 
it following the clan head’s (zuzhang) report.  Moreover, the government also regulated 
adoption among bannermen.  In the early years of banner history, bannermen enjoyed 
more flexibility in adopting children from either within or outside their descent groups.  
Some even adopted the children of their Han-Chinese bond-servants (Elliott 2001).  
Beginning in the mid-eighteenth century, however, in response to the increasing fiscal 
burden of the banner budget, the government enforced ethnic and patrilineal rules in 
adoption.13  In 1823, the Daoguang emperor issued a decree forbidding inheritance by 
sons adopted from outside the descent group of abanner family, and the Qing government 
also forced out a large number of sons of civilian commoners who had previously been 
adopted by bannermen (Lai 2005). 
Therefore, in Shuangcheng, according to the national regulation, adoptive children 
could only inherit property after the government reviewed and recorded the adoption in 
official registers; adoption in Shuangcheng thus had to go through two procedures, the 
customary process among kin and neighbors, and the government review.  After the 
completion of the customary process, the adoptive parents in theory were to report to the 
local banner government to update the record.  Before updating the household register, the 
government would go through a rigorous procedure to verify that the adoption had 
occurred between male patrilineal relatives generally from the same generation.  
According to local archival sources, the complete paperwork for adoption included a 
                                                        
12 In the Liaoning and Shuangcheng banner population registers we have collected so far, the government 
annotated all the adoption cases with “adopted in.” 
13 In 1730, Batu, a captain in the imperial guard, had expressed such caution by suggesting that if 
bannerman would like to adopt heirs, they should adopt children from within the clan, and if there were no 
suitable children for adoption within the clan, then Manchu children from within the company or the banner 
should be adopted (Elliott 2001). 
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genealogy; signed agreements of adoption from the child’s adoptive mother and biological 
mother, the head of the descent group, and relatives from the same descent group; and a 
report from the Captain’s Office that clearly stated the adoptive child’s banner affiliation at 
his place of origin.14  The government would first review the genealogy to verify that the 
adoptive son was from the appropriate generation and a close patrilineal relative, and then 
verify the authenticity of the adoptive son’s banner affiliation in his place of origin. Any 
flaw in these documents would result in the return of the case by the government.15  
Moreover, all the adoption documents – the report and testimonies – had to follow a 
rigorous bilingual format with Manchu and Chinese texts juxtaposed together.  Separate 
documentation was not allowed, and in 1880 the government even returned a case of 
adoption reported by the Plain Red banner because the Manchu and Chinese texts of each 
report and agreement were written as separate documents.16  
Despite the rigorous review procedure, the local government also respected customary 
practices, giving equal weight to government records and to the written verification of 
adoption by the adoptive parents when judging the authenticity of adoption.  When a 
record of adoption could not be found in official registers, the government did not simply 
reject its authenticity.  Instead, officials would look for such evidence as the verification 
of adoption and the depositions of neighbors.  Only when none of the evidence indicated 
                                                        
14 It is interesting to note that mothers’ opinions were highly respected, if not indispensible, in the official 
adoption procedures in the banner society. In 1879, the government refused an adoption reported by the 
Bordered Red banner because the genealogy did not list either the adoptive mother or the biological mother.  
Moreover, the biological mother’s testimony was not among the paperwork.  Therefore the government 
ordered the Captain’s Office to redo the paperwork according to the official format. (SCPZGYMDA, reel 
201, vol. 837, pp. 62-65) 
15 In 1879, the government returned a case of adoption because the genealogy of the adoptive parents did 
not include the name and status of the adoptive mother, and because the adoptive mother’s statement of 
willingness to adopt was missing from the file. (SCPZGYMDA, reel 201, vol. 837, pp. 62-65)   
16 SCPZGYMDA, reel 204, vol.846, pp. 256-260. 
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the occurrence of adoption did the government deny its authenticity.17  For example, in 
1879, the government ruled against a floating bannerman named Chenghe, who claimed to 
have been adopted by his father’s cousin, the late Jichengbu.  To investigate the 
authenticity of this adoption, the clerks first checked the government population registers 
and found no record of an adoption by Jichengbu’s household.  The clerks proceeded to 
investigate eleven of Jichengbu’s fellow villagers.  All these witnesses testified that they 
had only learned the news orally from Chenghe himself, and had not seen the written 
verification of adoption from Jichengbu.  Ultimately, the local government judged that 
Chenghe’s claim of adoption by Jichengbu was a fraud.18 
Moreover, as the following case shows, the government only recorded as legitimate an 
adoption that had completed the customary procedures.  In 1882 the local banner 
government received a lawsuit from Dong Fuju, a floating bannerman from the fifth village 
of the first Jiala of the Bordered White banner, accusing née Wu, the widow of his late 
cousin Geji, of breaching the adoption agreement between Fuju’s son and Geji.  Fuju sued 
because, rather than recognizing Fuju’s son as Geji’s heir, née Wu had adopted another 
cousin’s son.19  (See figure 7.2 for illustration.)  Fuju claimed that when Geji was ill, he 
had agreed to adopt Fuju’s son as heir.  However, the two neither wrote a verification of 
adoption (guo dan) nor reported the adoption to the government to record it.  After Geji 
died, née Wu adopted Shengzi, the son of Dong Hai, another cousin of Geji.  Née Wu 
made the adoption of Shengzi an elaborate event; she wrote a verification of adoption right 
after the agreement was made and invited her husband, relatives, and village head, as well 
                                                        
17 In the judgment of cases regarding adoption, the government usually listed two reasons for the denial of 
an adoption: the lack of government records and the lack of verification of adoption from the adoptive 
parents (202-839-2).  
18 SCPZGYMDA, reel 201, vol.835, pp. 100-108. 
19 SCPZGYMDA, reel 209, vol. 873, pp. 9-18. 
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as the 28 households residing in the same village, as witnesses.  Before the government 
recorded the adoption of Shengzi, Fuju informed née Wu of the adoption agreement 
between Geji and himself.  Née Wu denied the agreement and went ahead to request that 
the government record the adoption of Shengzi.  Disappointed by née Wu’s decision, Fuju 
filed the lawsuit.  
 
 
Figure 7. 2 Lawsuit between Dong Fuju and née Wu. 
Source: SCPZGYMDA, reel 209, vol. 873, pp. 9-18. 
 
 
After considering both sides of the dispute, the government gave full credit to 
customary practices and ruled that the oral adoption agreement between Dong Fuju and 
Geji was unreliable.20  Consequently, Dong Fuju received a punishment of 40 lashes for 
his attempt to take née Wu’s property with a fraudulent claim of adoption.  It is obvious 
that, in this case, the government fully respected the custom of witness by relatives and 
fellow villagers and the legitimacy of the written verification of adoption.  Although the 
                                                        
20 Ibid. 
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government did not have a record of the adoption of Shengzi, the signed verification 
strongly backed née Wu’s case.  However, on Dong Fuju’s side, the oral adoption 
agreement was considered null because none of the customary practices had been 
followed. 
The above rules and practices indicate the importance of kin and neighbors in the 
formation of fictive kinship.  Although the government review process decided whether 
an adoption could be recorded, this procedure usually hung not on the selection of an heir 
but merely on the completeness of paperwork.  Therefore, as long as families followed the 
general principles, they enjoyed great flexibility in selecting heirs.  More challenges, 
however, might come from within the kinship network.  As the case of Dong Fuju and née 
Wu indicates, kinship members motivated by the prospect of property inheritance 
competed with each other for the designation of heir.  Achieving the support of relatives 
and neighbors was therefore crucial for the formation of fictive kinship.  This complex 
process, although often remaining hidden from historians due to the scarcity of records, 
was rife with competition and realpolitik among kin. 
 
Distant-kin and non-kin inheritance 
In the absence of male heirs, all households fall extinct.  Under this circumstance, 
governments can step in to transfer the property to other households.  The tradition of 
government disposition of property from extinct households has a long history in China.  
In Shuangcheng, when a household head died with no heirs, the government reallocated the 
land, together with the position of principal adult male, either to distant kin or to a neighbor.  
From 1866 to 1912, about 10 percent of metropolitan and rural banner households fell 
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extinct.21  Therefore, distant-kin and non-kin inheritance provided important 
opportunities for bannermen to acquire landed property.  
In Shuangcheng, the government applied different policies to metropolitan and rural 
bannermen regarding their inheritance of land from extinct households, creating two 
distinct fields of power dynamics between the local government, village communities, and 
kinship networks.  Compared to rural bannermen, metropolitan bannermen had smaller 
households and more fragmented kinship structures.  At the same time, as the elite 
population in the state farm, the distant kin of metropolitan bannermen enjoyed greater 
rights in inheriting property when households held by their family members went extinct.  
Rural bannermen, with larger households and stronger kinship structures, had to compete 
from time to time with fellow villagers to secure the inheritance of property from extinct 
branches of their families. 
 
Metropolitan bannermen 
The reallocation of plots from extinct metropolitan banner households began in 1869.  
Previously, the state had simply retained this land, but, in 1869, the local government 
began to reallocate the plots, either to distant relatives of the extinct household (enque) or 
to other metropolitan banner households (gongque) with adult males eligible to become 
household heads.22  By that year, 225 of the 698 metropolitan households had fallen 
extinct, and the local government was in possession of 225 plots of land.  Moreover, the 
government had also noticed a shortage of land among the remaining metropolitan 
                                                        
21 This percentage is calculated from the linked population database created from banner population 
registers. 
22 See the government recount of the history of the allocation of distinct household land (SCPZGYMDA, 
reel 201, vol.835, pp.70-85). 
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bannermen, resulting from population growth.  In his memorial, Fumin’a, the general of 
Jilin, summarized that, of the 473 remaining metropolitan banner households, 158 were 
quite large.23  Moreover, “90 households indeed had no support (yangshan), and 62 
households had barely sufficient support.”  Thus, Fumin’a proposed to allocate the 225 
jichan plots left behind by the extinct households to large metropolitan households that did 
not have enough land to support themselves.24  
In the case of enque, inheritance rights belonged to existing relatives of the extinct 
household; the closeness of blood and birth order decided the precedence.  Following this 
guideline, the Captain’s Office and the village head took full responsibility in handling the 
inheritance of enque, while the assistant commandant and area commander-in-chief 
usually stayed away from these cases.25  In practice, the Captain’s Office usually followed 
the decisions of the kin group.  Therefore, in the inheritance of enque, kinship groups 
wielded great power and authority in deciding the heir. 
Although in theory the closest relative had the strongest claim to the property, the 
local banner government reserved the right to adjudicate disputes between relatives when 
they arose.  An 1880 case involving a dispute between two brothers over a plot of land 
released by an extinct household exemplifies the state adjudication process.26  Qishisi, a 
metropolitan bannerman, struggled with his late younger brother’s wife, née Lü, over a plot 
of jichan land left by Woxi, their deceased uncle (figure 7.3).  Each household wanted one 
                                                        
23 Ibid. 
24 In her unpublished master’s thesis about the Shuangchengpu relocation, Ding Yizhuang cited the same 
document to illustrate the poverty of the metropolitan bannermen. However, my interpretation of this 
document is different. I consider it an illustration of the shortage of land among metropolitan bannermen. 
The key divergence between the two interpretations lies in the understanding of “support (yang shan).” 
Although a common interpretation of support would be general material supplies for living, in the present 
context, I think “support” refers to the jichan land. 
25 See SCPZGYMDA, reel 201, vol. 834-1, pp. 85-98. 
26 SCPZGYMDA, reel 205, vol. 852, pp. 199-211; reel 204, vol. 845, p. 187. 
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of its sons to inherit the plot.  According to customary practices, Qishisi’s son had priority 
since Qishisi was the elder brother. However, confusion arose when née Lü claimed that 
her late husband had been adopted by Woxi’s wife, the late née Guan, and her household 
was thus the de facto manager of Woxi’s land and housing. Without such reliable 
documentation as the verification of adoption, which née Lü claimed to have lost, the 
Bordered Yellow Captain’s Office found it difficult to make a judgment and reported this 
case, together with the records of the two households, to the area commander-in-chief.  
 
Figure 7. 3 Land disputes between Qishisi and née Lü. 
Sources: SCPZGYMDA, reel 205, vol. 852, pp. 199-211; reel 204, vol. 845, pp. 187. 
 
 
Interestingly, the final decision of the local banner government was determined not 
just by degree of kinship but also by state preferences for equitable land distribution.  The 
court awarded the plot to née Lü’s son for two reasons: first, the claimed adoption of née 
Lü’s late husband sounded reasonable.  Since née Lü’s late husband was the younger 
brother in the household, if there had been an adoption between the families of née Guan 
and Qishisi, it was née Lü’s late husband who would have been adopted.  Moreover, given 
that née Lü’s household was the de facto manager of Woxi’s property, the adoption was 
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probably real.  Equally important, however, this decision better served the principle of 
equitable distribution of land.  In the adjudication, the area commander-in-chief compared 
the demographic and property composition of the two households as follows:  
“It is verified that Qishisi has three sons and one grandson under his name.  
His household now has two plots of jichan land.  [Moreover,] he also has one 
plot of ziken land27, the amount of which is forty shang.  These three 
generations indeed have three plots of landed property.  [In addition,] their 
family is fairly affluent and has no difficulty in [living].  It is verified that 
although Qingfu died, his wife is still alive, and also has three sons and one 
grandson.  Their household right now only has two plots of jichan land.  
Other than [these two plots of land], they do not have subsistence.  Moreover, 
their family is pretty poor.  If they inherit this plot, they will end up having 
three plots of land as well, which is equally comparable to the property of the 
elder brother Qishisi’s household.”28  
 
Obviously, in this adjudication, the principle of equitable land distribution directed the 
local government’s attitudes.  Although the authenticity of née Lü’s late husband’s 
adoption was questioned due to the lack of supporting documentation, the local 
government chose to legitimize the adoption because its existence facilitated the equitable 
distribution of land. 
The principle of equitable land distribution was even more prominent in the 
inheritance of gongque; all of these plots were distributed according to the demographic 
and wealth composition of eligible metropolitan banner households.  In the 1870 
reallocation of the 225 public plots, the local government laid out the rule as follows: 
“(We should) differentiate those who had support from those who had not.  
For those households who had no support, every four people, men or women, 
could receive a plot.  For those who had more or less support with a large 
household, every six or seven people, men or women, could receive one plot.”29  
 
                                                        
27 Ziken land is a type of nazu land. 
28 SCPZGYMDA, reel 204, vol. 845, p. 187 
29 SCPZGYMDA, reel 201, vol.835, pp.70-85. 
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Consequently, gongque plots were usually transferred to assistant adult males of large 
households with relatively less land support.  From 1870 on, each time a gongque plot 
appeared, the Captain’s Office would list four or five households from which the heir 
would be selected.  In addition to a complete record of household members, the Captain’s 
Office would also note the economic situation of each household, using such terms as 
“poor (pin),” “extremely poor (ji pin),” and “having more or less support (shao you yang 
shan).”  The local government would then review these reports and select the heir 
according to the demographic and economic conditions of the candidates’ households. 
 
Rural bannermen 
In contrast, the rules of land inheritance from extinct rural banner households favored 
residence over blood.  The local government established this principle in adjudicating a 
land dispute in 1878.  In that year, Qingxi, a retired soldier in the Bordered Red banner, 
sued Zhao Shiyu, a village head of the Plain White banner, for illicitly taking a plot of 
extinct household land (figure 7.4).30  This plot originally belonged to Qingxi’s father’s 
cousin Jichengbu.  According to Qingxi, the late Jichengbu had adopted Chenghe, 
Qingxi’s cousin, as heir.  After Jichengbu’s death in 1874, Chenghe rented the land to 
Zhao Shiyu, the head of the village where Jichengbu resided.  However, Chenghe later 
discovered that, in 1877, Zhao Shiyu had reported this plot as extinct-household land and 
had it officially assigned to his brother Changlin.  After checking the registers and 
interrogating villagers, the Captain’s Office of the Plain White banner found that Chenghe 
was an unregistered floating bannerman, and determined that his adoption by Jichengbu 
was not authentic.  Therefore, Chenghe’s inheritance of the plot was not legitimate.  
                                                        
30 SCPZGYMDA, reel 200, vol. 829, pp. 69-74.   
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Having failed in securing the land for his cousin Chenghe, Qingxi went on to request this 
plot for his own brothers, who were rural bannerman and, in Qingxi’s understanding, 
eligible to inherit the land.  Nevertheless, the local government refused Qingxi’s request 
and stated the rules for reallocating land among rural bannermen as follows: 
 “All the land assigned to rural bannermen in the state farm belongs to 
state land.  It is quite different from private property.  Each time someone dies 
without heir or is unable to farm the land, he is allowed to return it to the 
government.  The Captain’s Office will inspect and select an assistant adult 
male from the adult males in the four households who share one draft animal in 
the same village to inherit the plot. …If there is no capable assistant adult male 
in the (four households) who share one draft animal, (the Captain’s office) is 
allowed to select (heirs) from (those) in the same village.  However there is no 
such regulation as inspecting kinship members of the deceased or retired. ”31  
 
According to this policy, the inheritance of land from extinct households by distant kin was 
not guaranteed to rural bannermen. 
 
 
Figure 7. 4 Lawsuit between Qingxi and Zhao Shiyu. 
Source: SCPZGYMDA, reel 200, vol. 829, pp. 69-74. 
 
 
For rural bannermen the village community emerged as the rival of distant kin in 
acquiring land from extinct households.  This practice has its precedence in Chinese 
history.  In rural China, the village community was always an important element of social 
                                                        
31 SCPZGYMDA, reel 201, vol.835, pp.100-108. 
 246
life.  As early as the tenth century, rules had defined the order of precedence in the land 
market: kin in the same descent group, neighbors, and, only if all kin and neighbors 
declined the land, someone outside of the neighborhood.32  In Shuangcheng, village 
organization played an important role in managing the population and land.  The village 
head routinely reported births, deaths, marriages, and land transfers occurring among 
villagers to the Captain’s Office, where the official records were updated.  Village heads 
who failed to update these events would incur punishment.33  In theory, the village head 
could manipulate village politics to secure his interests, especially when a household fell 
extinct and had no kin in the same village.  In the case of Qingxi, Zhao Shiyu’s 
advantageous position as village head might have helped secure his brother’s possession of 
the plot. 
In practice, however, the local government still gave full consideration to the rights of 
kin.  Whenever an extinct rural banner household had kin in the same village, kin 
precedence was honored.  Table 7.3 summarizes the cases concerning inheritance of 
extinct-household land among rural bannermen I have collected so far.  In four of the five 
cases, the plots were first offered to kin.  Only when the kin denied their rights of 
inheritance with a clear statement of their inability to farm the land and their willingness 
for public reallocation, did the government reallocate the land to non-kin.  In two cases, 
non-kin inherited the extinct household land through the above process.34  In only one 
case – the lawsuit Qingxi filed against Zhao Shiyu – did the government reallocate the 
extinct household land to non-kin without first considering the opinion of the kinship 
                                                        
32 SHYJG 139 ce. p.5448b.  
33 In a case of illegal registration in 1866, the village head was punished for not reporting to the Captain’s 
Office the death of a bannerman’s son (SCPZGYMDA, reel 164, vol. 658, pp.18-26). 
34 SCPZGYMDA, reel. 205, vol. 851, pp. 24-27; reel 208, vol. 865, pp. 65-69.   
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members.  In all of these cases, the kin who were first considered as the heir resided in the 
same village as the extinct household.  Thus, although the official regulation emphasized 
geographic proximity in the selection of heirs, local kinship members were still privileged 
over unrelated neighbors.   
 
Table 7. 3 Cases concerning the reallocation of extinct-household land among rural 
banner farmers. 
Character of the newly replaced farmer Case 
No. Year Month 
Consider kin 
first 
Kin in the 
same village In the same village Kinship member 
1 1879 5 No No Yes No 
2 1879 10 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
3 1880 2 Yes Yes Yes No 
4 1881 11 Yes Yes Yes No 
5 1881 11 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sources: SCPZGYMDA, reel 200, vol. 829, pp.69-74; reel 201, vol. 835, pp.100-108; reel 202, vol. 839, pp. 
411-418; reel. 205, vol. 851, pp. 24-27; reel 208, vol. 865, pp. 65-69; reel 208, vol. 865, pp. 65-69; and reel 
208, vol. 865, pp. 91-103.   
 
 
Local practices and partible inheritance 
Despite the primogeniture rules of land inheritance, partible inheritance persisted as a 
customary practice in Shuangcheng.  The voluminous disputes over land indicated that 
some families did divide properties equally among all sons, and that the local government 
permitted this practice.  Moreover, the practices of primogeniture inheritance and partible 
inheritance not only coexisted but also interacted with each other to provide spaces for both 
individual bannermen and local officials to exercise greater agency. 
In 1879 a petition from a rural bannerman exposed the practice of partible inheritance 
in the state farm.  Tongxi, a rural bannerman in the fifth village in the second Jiala of the 
Plain Red banner, filed a petition after fourteen years of household division in his family to 
request permission to register the nazu land in his household under the name of the de-facto 
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owner.35  This petition therefore requested a reform of the current registration system, 
which registered all land under the principal adult male’s name.  According to Tongxi, his 
father and uncle had each received one plot of jichan land upon their arrival in 
Shuangcheng.  In the following years, Tongxi’s father and uncle had gradually cleared 
more land, which each registered as nazu land under his own name.  By 1864, when 
Tongxi’s father and uncle had both died, the family divided their property.  By then, 
Tongxi had three brothers and one cousin, the uncle’s son.  The family divided Tongxi’s 
father’s jichan land and a small plot of nazu land equally among the four brothers in 
Tongxi’s household, and divided the other property among the five men – Tongxi, his three 
brothers, and his cousin.  Because partible inheritance was not permitted by official rules, 
they did not report this division to the government and the land records were not updated.  
Consequently, Tongxi, as the principal adult male in his household, was still responsible 
for the rent on all land registered under his name.  He therefore filed the petition with the 
hope of delegating some of this responsibility to his brothers and cousin.  
The Captain’s Office receiving this petition supported Tongxi’s request.  
Interestingly, the reason cited by the Captain’s Office for supporting this proposal was the 
peacefulness of this property division: “Although the brothers are common farmers, they 
are aware of the affection between brothers.  It seems good that (they) divided (the 
property) in this way, and there was no dispute at all.”36  Therefore, in its report, the 
Captain’s Office recommended that Tongxi’s proposal to update the land registration be 
approved. 
This case reveals the pragmatic nature of the local government’s authority, but the 
                                                        
35 SCPZGYMDA, reel. 202, vol. 839, pp.71-78. 
36 Ibid. 
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local government was also a representative of state interests.  As such, the local banner 
government followed state regulations regarding land inheritance and maintained the land 
records.  The local government therefore upheld the principle of equitable land 
distribution when policing land inheritance and adjudicating disputes.  At the same time, 
however, the local government supported such practices as partible inheritance and relied 
heavily on such basic social organizations as the family and kin group to maintain local 
order.  As the Captain’s Office’s comments on Tongxi’s case indicate, the peaceful 
settlement of local affairs was the local government’s major interest.  In practice, 
therefore, the local government balanced its administration between state regulations and 
local practices to maintain social order; the customary practice of partible inheritance was 
supported when it served the interests of the local government.   
Several other lawsuits regarding property division affirm that partible inheritance was 
not a rare practice in Shuangcheng.  A case filed by Wang Desheng, a rural bannerman in 
the first village of the fourth Jiala of the Bordered White banner, recounts his family’s 
story of household division.37  Desheng’s father was the third brother in his family.  In 
the late 1810s, Desheng’s father and his two elder brothers moved to Shuangcheng under 
the government order.  At first, only the second brother, Anping, was allocated a plot of 
jichan land.  In 1828 the three brothers equally divided the family property, including this 
plot of land, but only Anping set up a separate household, while Desheng’s father 
continued to live with the eldest brother, Anquan.  In 1830, Anquan’s son Zengxi received 
a principal adult male position and a plot of jichan land by replacing an extinct household.  
In 1842 Desheng’s father and Anquan divided the land under Zengxi’s name among 
themselves, excluding Anping from this second household division.  
                                                        
37 SCPZGYMDA, reel 207, vol. 860, pp. 45-53. 
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The above cases reveal that families in Shuangcheng strategically used both 
primogeniture and partible inheritance as methods of property accumulation and 
transmission.  As Desheng’s case indicates, the primogeniture rule was mainly used when 
land was transferred between households.  Therefore, families used primogeniture as a 
strategy to acquire land from outside sources.  After the acquisition of land, families took 
full control over the division of their property, with some following partible inheritance 
rules to distribute land among family members.  Moreover, in Shuangcheng, families 
repeated these activities over the course of the family life cycle to accumulate and 
distribute property.   
In fact, the co-existence of primogeniture and partible inheritance reflects the dual 
nature of family in Shuangcheng: each family was both an administrative unit and a social 
organization.  In areas where private land ownership is recognized, families are mainly 
social organizations responsible for their own consumption and production.  Thus, a 
family takes full responsibility for organizing wealth transmission.  However, in 
Shuangcheng, the state control of land made its transfer a government job; from the state 
perspective, families and village communities were primarily units of land allocation and 
management.  At the same time, the local government still left space for and relied on 
families’ social functions.  This flexibility allowed families to tactically employ official 
rules to acquire land on the one hand and then reallocate property among their members on 
the other. 
This combination of official primogeniture and local partible practice, however, 
brought up questions about defining family members’ property rights.  In China, partible 
inheritance could take place in several steps, and family property could be divided several 
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times.  In theory all property of the family, including land, housing, leasehold, household 
items, and debt, were divisible.38  After the initial household division, once a son 
established a separate household, he enjoyed exclusive rights over the property of the new 
household, including both the property he had inherited and any property he acquired 
afterwards on his own.  In future divisions of the original household, he retained only his 
equal share of the property in the original household, but his own property was not up for 
division among non-coresident brothers.  In Shuangcheng, however, since the official 
registers did not record the results of partible inheritance, the registration of land 
ownership could not protect the property rights of those who acquired property through 
household division.  Therefore, in reality, customary laws were important in maintaining 
family member’s property rights. 
As we see in the cases of both Tongxi and Wang Desheng, in practice, families in 
Shuangcheng exclusively followed customary notions in defining their members’ property 
rights.  In the official records of Tongxi’s family the four brothers and their cousin 
appeared as two respective households, one under Tongxi’s name and the other under his 
cousin Dexi’s name.39  However, in the actual process of property division, the brothers 
and their cousin combined the property of the two households (figure 7.5).  First, Tongxi 
and his three brothers equally divided the plot of jichan land assigned to their father,  
along with an adjacent plot of nazu land, leaving Tongxi and his fourth younger brother 
with 26 shang each.  Then, the 58.4 shang of nazu land registered under Dexi’s name were 
divided, with Tongxi’s second and third younger brothers each receiving 29.2 shang.  
                                                        
38 In the household division agreements our research group collected in villages in Liaoning Province, the 
lists of family property were so specific that they included such small items as a pot and a broken jar. 
(Liaoning document 159) 
39 See the 1878 and 1880 household registers of the Plain Red banner (sorted 1878 pp.249-254 and 1880 
pp.262-268).  
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Dexi was left with only a plot of jichan land and an adjacent plot of nazu land, totaling 
25.63 shang.  Besides the landed property, each of the brothers – but not Dexi – was 
responsible for debts worth more than 1,200 strings of coins.  Finally, Tongxi and each of 
his brothers controlled between 33 and 36.4 shang of land and a debt of 1,200 strings of 
coins, while their cousin held 25.63 shang of land.  Although a total of 84.03 shang of 
land was registered under Dexi’s name, it was in fact considered the common property of 
the larger family.  After the property division, despite the fact that Tongxi and his cousin 
were the only owners listed in the official registers, in reality all the brothers had property 
rights on the shares they received.  Similarly, in Wang Desheng’s case, the plot Zengxi 
acquired was considered the common property only of the co-residing brothers, so the 
brother with his own household was excluded from its division. 
 
 
Figure 7. 5 Household division in Tongxi’s family. 
Sources: SCPZGYMDA, reel. 202, vol. 839, pp.71-78 and the 1878 and 1880 household registers of the 




Above all, the persistence of partible inheritance highlighted the competition between 
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customary laws and the official rules of primogeniture inheritance.  Since the state rules of 
land inheritance served as the official code of behavior, Shuangcheng residents only 
reported the results of primogeniture inheritance.  For example, in Tongxi’s case, they 
chose not to report the household division because it deviated from the state regulation on 
inheritance.  At the same time, rules of partible inheritance existed outside the official 
records as important guidelines for practice.  In applying this practice, villagers 
maintained their flexibility in managing their family property on the one hand and 
satisfying the official rules on the other.  Ironically, local officials also played by both sets 
of rules.  On the one hand, by maintaining a clean population and land record, the local 
government satisfied the provincial and central governments’ interests of governance.  On 
the other, local officials recognized customary practices in order to facilitate the 
management of civil affairs among the villagers. 
 
Local governance 
The coexistence of the official law of primogeniture inheritance and the customary 
practice of partible inheritance provided both the local government and villagers with a full 
range of competitive and flexible rules they could use to secure land use rights.  In 
practice, both local officials and villagers tactically chose either rule to defend their 
interests depending on the context.  The most intriguing part of local governance 
surrounding inheritance in Shuangcheng is not the rules themselves, but the ability of 
different actors to exercise their agency in the spaces between these flexible and 
contradictory rules. 
The following lawsuit illustrates villagers’ strategies in using government records to 
secure their rights.  In 1879 Changshun, a rural bannerman from the third village of the 
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second Jiala of the Plain White banner, filed a lawsuit against his cousin Mingyue for 
usurping twenty shang of nazu land that belonged to Changshun.40  Changshun had two 
older uncles who had lived with Changshun’s father in the same household in early years.  
While the eldest uncle had no son, Changshun’s second uncle and father each had one son, 
Mingyue and Changshun.  Their household had two plots of jichan land – one registered 
to Changshun’s eldest uncle and one to Changshun’s father.  In 1843, this household 
equally divided the two plots of jichan land into four shares of eight shang.  Each of the 
three brothers and Changshun’s grandfather took one share.  After the property division, 
only Changshun’s father set up a separate household, while Changshun’s two older uncles 
still lived together.  After the establishment of his own household, Changshun’s father 
opened 40 shang of land and registered them under his name as nazu land.  However, in 
1861 Changshun’s father died, leaving his widow and the fourteen-year-old Changshun 
behind.  Without an adult male to serve as household head, Changshun and his mother 
went back to his older uncles’ household and lived with them again.  During this period, 
Mingyue, Changshun’s cousin, managed all family properties, including the land 
registered under Changshun’s name.  In 1875, Minguye divided this family’s household 
property again, but this time this division  incurred a dispute.  
From Changshun’s perspective, in the second household division, the way Mingyue 
divided their family property deviated from the notion of family property rights backed by 
customs.  By the time of the second household division, only Mingyue and Changshun 
and their wives and children survived.  Mingyue included the 40 shang of land opened by 
Changshun’s father after the first division as part of the family’s common property.  He 
                                                        
40 SCPZGYMDA, reel 202, vol. 839, pp.91-96. and The 1870 population registers of Plain White banner.  
SCPGBTDHKDM reel 1834668, vol. 86, pp.179-180. 
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equally divided all this property into three shares, according to the number of descent 
groups from their father’s generation, and gave Changshun one share. Mingyue then 
assigned the third share to his own son by claiming that his deceased elder uncle had 
adopted his son as heir.  From Changshun’s point of view, the 40 shang of land had been 
acquired by his father after the first household division and thus should not have been 
included in the family’s common property for the second household division.  Moreover, 
the adoption of Mingyue’s son had neither been agreed upon by the two brothers nor 
witnessed by kin and neighbors. 
Interestingly, when making his case in court, Changshun did not cite the customary 
notion of family property rights but instead used government land records to defend his 
rights.  In the household registers, the forty shang of land was registered under 
Changshun’s name.  Changshun’s reliance on the official records to protect his rights to 
the land indicates the authority of official records in securing land ownership.  Although 
Changshun could have found support in either the official records or the customary notions, 
he obviously considered the official records to be hard evidence.  Therefore, whenever 
official records were available, villagers still tended to rely on them. 
The Captain’s Office, when adjudicating this case, used the government records to 
form its opinion.  The government had recorded none of the changes in residential and 
property arrangements that had occurred in Changshun’s family.  In the household 
register, Changshun and Mingyue always appeared in two separate households with 
Changshun as the head of one, and Mingyue living with their late eldest uncle in the 
other.41  The Captain’s Office reported to the local banner government that the land was 
                                                        
41 This is the observation according to the banner household registers preserved in the Liaoning Provincial 
Archives. 
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registered under Changshun’s name, and, moreover, there was no record of the adoption of 
Mingyue’s son in the household register.  Therefore, the Captain’s Office drew the 
conclusion that it was Mingyue who had fraudulently manipulated the property division. 
In other cases, however, villagers tried to use government records to seize property 
while the local government relied on customary laws to adjudicate the cases.  The lawsuit 
Wang Desheng filed against his cousin Dequan illustrates a failed example of villagers 
trying to take advantage of the official register to seize property.42  After the second 
household division described above, Desheng’s father Antai started to accrue property for 
himself.  Antai first managed to clear 30 shang of waterlogged land that had originally 
been assigned to Anping, and then farmed 10 shang of waterlogged land that had originally 
been registered under Zengxi’s name.43  In 1852, Antai registered these two plots as nazu 
land.  However, since Antai himself was not a principal adult male and was thus not 
qualified to hold any landed property, he had to register the two plots of land respectively 
under Anping’s and Zengxi’s names.  In1881, when the government allowed the de facto 
owners of nazu land to register it under their own names and acquire certificates, the 
discrepancy between registered owner and de facto owner sharpened.  Dequan, Anping’s 
son and Desheng’s cousin, went to the Captain’s Office to apply, on behalf of his brother, 
for the certificate for the 30 shang of land that Desheng had registered under his name, 
without notifying Desheng.  As Desheng was still the de facto owner, Desheng accused 
Dequan of secretly drawing from the government the certificate of 30 shang of nazu land 
that ultimately belonged to Desheng.  Obviously, in this case, Dequan was trying to use 
the fact that he was the registered owner to seize this property for his own family. 
                                                        
42 SCPZGYMDA, reel 207, vol. 860, pp. 45-53.   
43 These were the original jichan plots assigned to Anping and Zengxi, but once the government discovered 
that these plots were waterlogged, Anping and Zengxi were assigned jichan land elsewhere. 
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Interestingly, when judging this case, the government did not follow the official 
records but gave full consideration to customary practices.  The local officials recognized 
that, in registering this plot of land under Dequan’s name, Desheng had only been 
“borrowing the name to register (land) to facilitate the rent collection (jie ming bao guan, yi 
bei shu zu).”  Therefore the government explicitly recognized Desheng’s ownership of the 
thirty shang of land and denounced Dequan for plotting to seize Desheng’s land.  Finally, 
Dequan returned the land certificate and received his punishment.44  
The meaning of this case is two-fold.  On one hand, it reveals the pragmatic stance 
taken by the local government in solving disputes.  The local officials were well aware of 
the various customary practices.  Moreover, in practice, by allowing Desheng to “borrow 
the name to register (land) to facilitate the rent collection,” the local officials manipulated 
the land registration system to accommodate the customary practice of partible inheritance.  
Thus, in the judgment of the above case, the government did not follow the official record 
but used the customary law as the standard of justice.  On the other hand, it also reveals 
that individual villagers used official records as a strategy to gain property.  Although this 
case illustrates a failed attempt, it still indicates the possibility of exploiting discrepancies 
between official rules and customary practices to seize property from other family 
members. 
Finally, this interaction between primogeniture inheritance rules and partible 
inheritance practices led to the modification of the government land registration system.  
After Tongxi’s petition in 1879, the government started to register nazu land under the de 
facto owner’s name.  Although I did not find any official announcement of this policy 
change in the archives, in the years between 1880 and 1881 the increase in the number of 
                                                        
44 SCPZGYMDA, reel 207, vol. 860, pp. 45-53.   
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disputes over property divisions and land certificate applications for the de facto owners 
points to its occurrence.  In these cases, the villagers mentioned the important policy 
change that had occurred: “now (the government) followed the order to ask (people) to 
apply for their (land) certificate, allowing those who divided their property receive a 
separate certificate.”45  While this change in land registration pertained to nazu land, the 
registration of households and of jichan land remained unchanged.  This indicates that the 
government made this policy change to facilitate rent collection; since no rent was 
collected from the jichan land, its registration still followed the rules of primogeniture. 
Moreover, the results of descriptive statistics on nazu land records reveal that the 
relaxation of land registration in fact started even earlier than the official change.  I list in 
table 7.4 the change in the number of registered owners of nazu land by household from 
1870 to 1889.  In 1870, the state rules of primogeniture registration were more or less 
maintained; more than 93 percent of the households only had one registered owner of nazu 
land.  The maximum number of registered owners in a single household was three.  
Between 1876 and 1878, however, the percentage of single-land-owner households was 
reduced to 89.7.  As for multiple land-owner households, not only did their percentage in 
the land registers increase, but the number of registered owners in a single household 
greatly increased as well.  A little more than 10 percent of the households had two or more 
registered owners.  In one extreme case, a household even had twenty-one registered 
owners.  The increase in multiple land-owner households continued in the period 
1887-1889.  In 1887-1889, 88.1 percent of households had only one registered landowner, 
while 11.9 percent had two or more registered owners.  These figures indicate an 
interesting relationship between policy and practice in local society; practices preceded 
                                                        
45 SCPZGYMDA, reel 207, vol. 860, pp. 45-53.   
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policy change.  Policies usually reflected a post-facto recognition of existing reality.  It 
was the existence of contradiction and variation that changed the rules in Shuangcheng, as 
the constant interaction between contradictory rules and behaviors constituted a slow but 
strong force for change. 
 
Table 7. 4 Number of registered owners of nazu land by household, 1870-1889. 
1870 1876-1878 1887-1889 
 Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
         
1 1,031 93.1  1,135 89.7  2,009 88.1 
2 69 6.2  95 7.5  219 9.6 
3 8 0.7  12 1.0  39 1.7 
4 0 0.0  5 0.4  7 0.3 
5 0 0.0  5 0.4  3 0.1 
6 0 0.0  3 0.2  1 0.0 
7 0 0.0  1 0.1  2 0.1 
8 0 0.0  0 0.0  1 0.0 
9 0 0.0  2 0.2  0 0.0 
10 0 0.0  3 0.2  0 0.0 
11 0 0.0  1 0.1  0 0.0 
13 0 0.0  1 0.1  0 0.0 
16 0 0.0  1 0.1  0 0.0 
21 0 0.0  1 0.1  0 0.0 
         
Total 1,108 100.0 1,265 100.0 2,281 100.0 
Sources: The linked population and land database. 
 
 
Conclusion: inheritance practices and their consequences 
Inheritance practices in Shuangcheng illustrate the state’s flexibility in local 
governance.  Despite the government’s policies regarding state land ownership, it 
considered land inheritance largely a family procedure and allowed family members 
considerable autonomy to determine their own method of wealth transmission.  Therefore, 
although the state stipulated primogeniture inheritance as the standard practice, partible 
inheritance persisted among metropolitan and rural bannermen.   
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The coexistence of primogeniture and partible inheritance in Shuangcheng offers an 
alternative model to the traditional view of the relationship between state regulation and 
local practice.  Traditional scholarship often applies a binary model of public and private 
to analyze the relationship between state regulation and local practice in China, with state 
regulation representing the public and local practice representing the private.  Moreover, 
when looking at wealth distribution, these studies always associate public with equal and 
private with unequal.  For example, scholars have agreed that the major cause of land 
concentration in Chinese history was private land accumulation by powerful landlords, 
which often opposed the state’s interest.46  Although this view is held true regarding land 
transactions, in Shuangcheng, both the state regulation of primogeniture inheritance and 
private partible inheritance pursued the ideal of equality.    
The two types of inheritance practices in Shuangcheng, however, pursued equality at 
different levels; primogeniture inheritance emphasized equality across households in the 
metropolitan and rural banner populations, while partible inheritance emphasized equality 
among individual heirs within a household.  The persistence of these two types of 
inheritance, in the long term, would lead to different outcomes in wealth stratification at 
the household level, with primogeniture promoting equality and partibility leading to 
growing inequality.  In their empirical study on partible inheritance in North China, 
William Lavely and R. Bin Wong have demonstrated that, since partible inheritance split a 
family’s land holding equally among heirs, over the long term, familial wealth is closely 
associated with reproductive behavior; large households with more heirs experienced 
greater downward mobility in their wealth status (1992).  Therefore, in the long term, 
partible inheritance led to growing stratification among metropolitan and rural banner 
                                                        
46 For the elaboration of this argument, see chapter eight. 
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families. 
In contrast to partible inheritance, the state stipulated primogeniture inheritance as the 
standard practice in order to concentrate household wealth and maintain within-category 
equality at the household level.  Although the state only registered land in Shuangcheng 
under the household head’s name, it also granted other household members the ability to 
share the land.  In China, both state and society consider property to be held in common 
within households (Zelin 2004).  Thus, by registering all members under the same 
household, the state defined their entitlement to household property.  Furthermore, by 
concentrating its members’ common property in the household, the state maintained 
equality among the metropolitan banner households and among the rural banner 
households.  Therefore, although the state began to allow the separate registration of nazu 
land by bannermen who practiced partible inheritance, it still maintained the registration of 
jichan land in the primogeniture form. 
Yet, regardless of variations in practice, in Shuangcheng, both primogeniture 
inheritance and local partible inheritance prevented land concentration. On the one hand, 
the state regulation prevented a household from possessing two plots of jichan land; on the 
other, partible inheritance, if practiced, broke up large land holdings.  Therefore, although 
flexibility in inheritance practices in Shuangcheng would probably have led to growing 
stratification among metropolitan and rural bannermen, inheritance practices per se would 
not have led to land concentration.  This proposition can be tested: having looked at the 
various local practices of land acquisition, transaction, and inheritance in chapters six and 
seven, in chapter eight, I explore land distribution as an outcome of the interaction between 
state policies and these local practices.     
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Part Four  Wealth Stratification and Social Formation 
Chapter VIII    
Wealth Stratification: 
State Categories and Individual Agency 
 
In agrarian societies, the distribution of landed wealth has been considered the major 
indicator of the level of social stratification.  Land not only provided farm families the 
wherewithal to live but also defined their social standing.  In China, even in 1995, that is 
seventeen years after the beginning of economic reform, land still accounted for 46.8 
percent of per-capita net wealth and explained 40.4 percent of total inequality in rural 
China (Li and Zhao 2007).  These proportions were likely to be far greater in historical 
China, especially in regions that were less urbanized and less commercialized.   
The level of land concentration is also important in China because it is an indicator of 
state power.  In historical China, the transition from relatively egalitarian land distribution 
to highly concentrated land ownership has been a central component of the canonical 
‘dynastic cycle’ (He 1956, 1958).  In early Chinese dynasties, because of the state 
ownership of land, the state did not levy tax on land but instead allocated land to people and 
levied poll tax and service from them.  The functioning of the state largely relied on its 
control of population.  Since peasants only paid poll tax and provided service when they 
owned a parcel of land, an equal land distribution ensured the state’s control of 
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population.1  At the beginning of almost every Chinese dynasty, the new state 
redistributed the concentrated land of the previous dynasty to create a relatively equal land 
distribution among the populations who provided the state with labor and service.  Private 
land transactions and acquisitions, however, eventually led to the reconcentration of wealth, 
growing inequality, social and political unrest, and declining control of manpower.  The 
rise of large landowners always marked the decline of state power. 
Therefore, the Chinese state always sought to maintain equality by manipulating the 
distribution of land.  In historical dynasties, the state struggled with large landlords over 
the control of small peasants.  The Communist revolution and the subsequent Land 
Reform also prioritized elimination of the landlord class.  In post-revolutionary China, the 
state maintained an egalitarian distribution of land by enforcing a public land system and 
forbidding private land transactions.  Even in the recent economic reform period during 
which the state reintroduced the market economy, under the household responsibility 
system in rural China land was still equally allocated on a per-capita basis.  The state 
policy maintained a relatively equal distribution of land in late twentieth century rural 
China (Brenner 2001).2 
In this chapter, I analyze longitudinal household level data on landholding from 1870 
to 1906 to examine the land distribution in Shuangcheng half a century after the initial 
settlement.  In so doing, I assess how well the institution of population categories was 
maintained in Shuangcheng.  As I documented in previous chapters, state policy created 
population categories and prioritized banner land ownership and equal land distribution 
                                                        
1 As I discussed in chapter one, only beginning in the late eighth century, when the state started to tax land, 
did the importance of service tax decline.  However, this transformation from poll tax and service to land 
tax took a long time.  It was not until the mid-eighteenth century that  this transformation was completed.   
2 According to Brenner’s analysis of land distribution data in China from two waves of survey in 1988 and 
1995, the Gini coefficient of the distribution of land value was 0.323 in 1988 and 0.393 in 1995 (2001). 
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within metropolitan and rural bannermen.  At the same time, this state policy also 
constantly interacted with local practices of land acquisition, which were characterized by 
stratification based on the ability of individual households.  Moreover, beginning in the 
mid-nineteenth century, the worsening fiscal crisis pushed the state to adjust its land 
management policy.  The opening of nazu land in the 1840s and the expedient allocation 
of jichan plots in 1878 both created possibilities for greater stratification in land 
distribution.  Therefore, changes in the level of equality in land distribution in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century reveal how successful the state was at maintaining the 
categorical equality and inequality in the fact of social and economic changes.   
To assess the durability of state population categories, I look not only at the overall 
level of equality in land distribution, but also examine the persistence and mobility of 
individual households within and across strata of landholding in Shuangcheng.  The 
period for which the household-level land holding data is available, 1870 to 1906, was full 
of changes, including the immigration of civilian commoners, the establishment of a 
civilian government in this area, and elevated tension regarding land ownership.  
Therefore, the persistence of households in the upper and lower strata of land distribution 
indicated how these societal changes altered social fluidity.   
In the next part of this chapter, I present an overview of previous findings on 
categorical inequality and within category equality in land distribution in Shuangcheng.  
In the third part, I examine the distribution of landed wealth among the entire metropolitan 
and rural banner population to observe the functioning of population categories in wealth 
distribution and the mobility generated by local practices of land acquisition.  In the fourth 
part, I examine persistence and mobility in land stratification.  Based on descriptive 
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statistics, I also present three case studies of wealth accumulation by specific families to 
illuminate the strategies and processes of land stratification in Shuangcheng. Finally, by 
comparing the histories of families that were successful or unsuccessful at wealth 
accumulation, I demonstrate how upward and downward mobility occurred and how the 
agency of successful families was constructed.  
 
State categories and land distribution 
Throughout the history of the state farm, the metropolitan and rural bannermen owned 
the majority of landed wealth.  As figure 8.1 shows, the metropolitan and rural bannermen 
owned 72 percent of Shuangcheng’s registered farm land in 1876, including both jichan 
and nazu land.3  A group classified as “banner tenants,” bannermen who were not 
registered under the metropolitan or rural bannermen categories, owned 9 percent of the 
registered farmland.  Therefore, in Shuangcheng bannermen owned 83 percent of the 
registered farmland, and civilian commoners only owned 16 percent.  Because of the state 
regulations that prevented land transactions between bannermen and civilian commoners, 
the shares of registered ownership between the two remained unchanged until the early 
twentieth century.  
                                                        
3 Although the land registers did not refer to their population category, these banner tenants probably 
consisted of bannermen from such adjacent areas as Lalin and some floating bannermen, who were either 
registered on the population registers or not.  Floating bannermen as a category was not officially allowed 
















Figure 8. 1 The distribution of all land among different population categories, 1876.* 
Sources: The 1876 land registers of banner and civilian divisions.  SCPGBTDHKDM, reel 1834696, vol. 
285; reel 1834731, vol. 658, vol. 659. SCPZGYMDA, reel 160, vol. 635, pp.147-295.   
* The total amount of land used for the generation of this figure includes the amount of sanwanshang land, 
the land located between Shuangcheng and Lalin.  In the Shuangcheng banner government only controlled 
this land category for a short period of time.  In a strict sense, this land category was not a regular property 
of Shuangcheng.  The owners of sangwanshang land consist of both bannermen from Lalin (banner 
tenants in land registers) and civilian commoners.  Therefore, if the category sangwanshang land is 
excluded from the total amount of land, the share of land for metropolitan and rural bannermen is even 
larger. 
 
Within the haves, under the egalitarian principle, the state managed to maintain a 
relatively equal distribution of land between the metropolitan and the rural bannermen.  
This equality was especially evident in the distribution of the jichan land (Chen, Lee, and 
Campbell 2008).  In 1876, among the metropolitan bannermen, 72 percent of households 
had one plot; 17 percent of households had no jichan land; and only about 11 percent of the 
households had more than one plot.  Most of the households that had no jichan land had no 
adult males.  Similarly, among the rural bannermen, 64 percent of households had one 
plot; 13 percent of households had no jichan land, and 23 percent of households, mostly 
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very large ones, had more than one plot.  This pattern of equality continued into the early 
twentieth century (Chen, Lee, and Campbell 2008). 
At the same time, however, local practices in Shuangcheng created dynamics in land 
management and accumulation.  First, the existence of land rental and conditional sale 
ensured that the have-nots had land use rights.4  The have-nots, floating bannermen and 
the civilian commoners, therefore, made their living as hired laborers or tenants or through 
customary institutions of conditional sale.  As table 6.5 showed, the disproportionate 
labor-land ratio of some of the metropolitan and rural banner households created demand 
for hired labor.  Renting land out was another easy solution for families without sufficient 
family labor to farm and/or manage their property.  With the development of land rental, 
conditional sale as a means to maintain stable land use rights took root in the state farm 
villages.  While the state prevented the have-nots from officially owning state land, they 
tolerated the existence of conditional sales under customary law.  Through such 
conditional sales, some have-nots were even able to accumulate ‘rights’ to large parcels of 
land.   
Second, the bannermen’s cultivation of nazu land also affected the land distribution.  
The concentrated distribution of nazu land increased the level of inequality by adding more 
land to the metropolitan and rural households who owned it.  The distributions of nazu 
land were extremely unequal within both the metropolitan and rural bannermen; in 1876, 
70 percent of the metropolitan and 60 percent of the rural banner households had no nazu 
land (Chen, Lee, and Campbell 2008).  When nazu land is also considered, the land 
controlled by the top 10 percent of metropolitan households rose from 28 percent to 40 
percent, and the share controlled by the top 10 percent of rural households rose from 28 
                                                        
4 See chapter six. 
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percent to 32 percent (Chen, Lee, and Campbell 2008).5 
Whereas in previous chapters, I focused on inequality between categories and equality 
within categories, in the rest of this chapter, I break down the boundary between categories 
and examine the land distribution in the entire metropolitan and rural banner population.  
In so doing, I identify that to what extent state categories contributed to overall inequality 
in land distribution.  To do so, I divide the metropolitan and rural households into three 
strata—the haves, have-nots, and the have-a-lots—and focus on the have-nots and 
have-a-lots.6  By have-nots, I refer to households who were landless or nearlylandless.  




When measuring inequality in the distributions of wealth and income, social scientists 
commonly use the Gini coefficient to measure the level of inequality.  As a single 
measurement, the Gini coefficient provides a convenient index and facilitates comparison 
across societies.  At the same time, however, measures like the Gini coefficient have 
drawbacks.  First, as a singular measurement, the Gini coefficient only measures the 
overall level of inequality in the society as a whole and by itself does not distinguish 
                                                        
5 Previous study shows that although the acquisition of nazu land increased the level of inequality, it also 
balanced the hidden inequality at the household per-capita level, a product of the state’s land allocation 
policy, which only emphasized equal distribution of land at the household level (Chen, Lee, and Campbell 
2008).  Since the state allocated land not to individuals but to households, variations in household size 
created greater variations between households in their amount of land per member.  The seemingly equal 
land distribution at the household level, therefore, became less equal at the household per-capita level.  
Thus, nazu land satisfied some large households who were disadvantaged in per-capita jichan land 
distribution. 
6 Although land distribution at the per-capita level is an important indicator of stratification, in 
Shuangcheng, since land ownership mainly marked social and political status, being a member of a 
household with substantial amount of land itself is meaningful.  Thus, in this chapter, I focus my analysis 
on the stratification of landed wealth at the household level. 
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between-category inequalities.  Second, the Gini coefficient only reflect the level of 
inequality at a very aggregated level but does not directly reflect the level of poverty or 
wealth concentration (Blackwood and Lynch 1994).  Therefore, its analytical power is 
constrained in measuring inequality in land distribution, especially when the focus is the 
differences between the have-nots, or landless, and the have-a-lots, those who have 
especially large landholdings. 
In an agrarian society where land provides the basic means of livelihood, the major 
source of inequality is not in the slight differences within the middle strata of land 
distribution, but at the two extremes, between the landless and the large landowners.  
During a short-term economic crisis, the landless, or the have-nots, are the most vulnerable 
group.  For example, in nineteenth-century Sweden, the landless suffered significantly 
because of their low wages; when the real wage declined by 10 percent, the adult mortality 
of the landless increased by 13 percent.  The landed, however, were not affected by 
reductions in real wages, which suggests that in the short term, they could meet the 
consumption needs of their families by drawing on savings or taking other measures 
(Bengtsson 2004).  By the same token, the have-a-lots were the most powerful.  Wealth 
constitutes an important resource for people to exercise power, “the ability to produce 
intended effects” (Russell 1938).  In Chinese history, whenever land was highly 
concentrated, major landowners who controlled the majority of land were powerful enough 
to compete with the Emperor and the central government (He 1956, 1958). 
In Shuangcheng, given the relatively equal land distribution in the metropolitan and 
rural bannermen, the tails of the distribution, that is the have-nots and have-a-lots, are of 
special interest.  As figure 8.2 shows, the overall distribution of jichan and nazu land in 
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the entire metropolitan and rural banner households exhibit a pattern of stratification 
without concentration.  What stratification there was existed in the top and bottom deciles, 
who owned 30.9 percent and one percent of landed wealth, respectively.  This level of 
stratification is similar to wealth stratification in present-day rural China.  In 2002, the top 
decile of the population in rural China accounted for 30.5 percent of wealth, and the bottom 



































Figure 8. 2 Distribution of jichan and nazu land among the metropolitan and rural banner 
households, 1876. 
Sources: the 1876 land registers of metropolitan and rural bannermen and the linked population and land 
database.  In 1876, there were land records for 2,748 households, 648 from metropolitan banner and 2,100 
from rural banner. 
 
However, if we compare the level of stratification in Shuangcheng to other locations, 
it is still moderate.  For example, in the United States in 1774, the top decile of individuals 
accounted for 59 percent of total wealth. In 1860, the same proportion of individuals 
occupied 71 percent of total wealth (Schneider 2004).  Compared to several other 
                                                        
7 Compared to that in 1995 China, the stratification in 2002 has increased; in 1995, the top declie of 
population shared 26.2 percent of wealth, and the bottom decile shared 3.1 percent. 
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European and Asian communities for which data are available, Shuangcheng is the 
location with the least land concentration. Among the communities for which we have 
been able to locate relevant estimates, we have only found one, in Japan, that is comparable 
to Shuangcheng (Bengtsson, Campbell, and Lee 2004).8  Therefore, the landless and those 
with substantial landholdings were indeed distinguished from this population. 
In light of the state’s egalitarian principle in land allocation, the have-nots and 
have-a-lots in the metropolitan and rural bannermen tell stories of failure and success that 
transcend state policy.  As members of the category of haves, every metropolitan and rural 
household in principle was eligible for one plot of jichan land, and thus, should have been 
landed.  The existence of landless among this elite group therefore reveals the failures of 
some of the privileged.  At the same time, despite the strong presence of the state, some 
households were still able to accumulate substantive amounts of land and thereby became 
have-a-lots.  As figure 8.2 shows, the bottom 70 percent of households had less than their 
fair share of land, while the top 30 percent of households had far more than their fair share 
of land.  The top decile of the households was the have-a-lots with almost one third of all 
land.  The top one percent of households had 7.3 percent of land, 7.3 times their share of 
the banner households.  The next four percent of households had 13.2 percent of land, 
which was 3.3 times their share.  The next five percent of households accounted for 10.6 
percent of land, twice their proportional share. The rise and fall of the families, therefore, 
reflected the interaction between state policy and local practice.   
 
 
                                                        
8 In Casalguidi, the top 10 percent households had 35 percent of wealth, and in Scania, the top 10 percent 
households had 40 percent of wealth. 
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Between-category inequality and mobility 
Although the overall distribution of land was egalitarian, this relatively equal 
distribution at the aggregate level concealed between-category inequality that left the 
majority of the rural bannermen at the lower strata of land holding.  As figure 8.3 shows, 
the metropolitan and rural banner households in Shuangcheng were clearly divided into 
two layers. 57.8 percent of the rural households were in the bottom half of the distribution, 
while 86.5 percent metropolitan households were in the top half.  This clear division 
between the metropolitan and rural bannermen in wealth revealed the effectiveness of the 
state land allocation policy in maintaining the between-category inequality.   
1.1





































































Figure 8. 3 Proportional distribution of metropolitan and rural banner households at 
different strata of land holding, 1876. 
Sources: The linked population and land database. 
 
At the same time, however, in the have-nots and have-a-lots, there is no prominent 
between-category inequality.  Among both the have-nots and haves-a-lots, the two state 
categories had considerable shares; 13.6 percent of the metropolitan banner households 
were have-nots, and 31.5 percent of the rural households were among the top 30 percent of 
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households.  Therefore, the state policy that enforced between-category inequality was 
only effectively maintained for the middle strata, whereas the land distributions among the 
have-nots and have-a-lots were mainly consequence of individual ability. 
 
The have-nots 
The proportion of landless households in Shuangcheng was very low; as figure 8.2 
shows, only about 10 percent of the households had no land.  The low percentage of 
landless households distinguished Shuangcheng’s unique position among the agrarian 
communities for which historical land distribution data was available.  For example, in 
Casalguidi, Italy, about 30 percent of households had no land; in Ou, Japan, about 20 
percent of households had no land; and in Scania, Southern Sweden, about 50 percent of 
households had no land (Bengtsson, Campbell, and Lee 2004).  Only in the banner 
communities serving the imperial lineages in Liaoning, another Northeast province of 
China, does the percentage of landless households resemble that of Shuangcheng.  The 
low percentage of landless in Shuangcheng therefore contributed to the overall low levels 
of land concentration.   
The majority of the have-nots, moreover, had no land because of a demographic 
disadvantage: they did not have enough adult males between 20 and 50 sui.9  This is 
especially evident for the metropolitan bannermen.  As table 8.1 shows, 51 of the 79 
have-not metropolitan households, 64.6 percent, had no adult males.  Another 30.4 
percent of these metropolitan households only had one adult male.  Although the 
demographic composition of the rural banner have-nots exhibits was more diverse, the 
                                                        
9 According to the official regulation, at least for rural bannermen, an adult male (chengding) should be 
aged between 20 and 50 sui.  A male above age 50 sui would be considered exceeded the age (yusui), and 
a male below 20 sui would be considered young male (youding).  
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rural have-not households were still demographically more disadvantaged than their 
counterparts who had land.  As table 8.2 shows, only 28 of the 138 have-not households, 
20.3 percent, had no adult male.  36.2 percent of the have-not households had one adult 
male.  Thus, 56.5 percent of the rural banner have-nots had no or only one adult male.  In 
comparison, the mean number of adult males in the rural have-not households was 1.8, 
while that of the rural haves was 2.4.  Above all, although demography is not the only 
explanation for the existence of have-nots, it is an important contributing factor.   
 
Table 8. 1 Number of adult males in the landless households, 1876. 
Metropolitan  Rural 
N. of adult male N. Percentage  N. Percentage 
0 51 64.6  28 20.3 
1 24 30.4  50 36.2 
2 3 3.8  27 19.6 
3 1 1.3  14 10.1 
4 0 0.0  8 5.8 
5 0 0.0  5 3.6 
6 0 0.0  3 2.2 
7 0 0.0  3 2.2 
      
Total 79 100.0   138 100.0 
Sources: The linked population and land database. 
 
The have-a-lots 
Whereas the low percentage of landless households indicates the effectiveness of state 
land allocation policy, the composition of the have-a-lots in terms of population category 
reveals mobility beyond the state designation.  A considerable proportion of the top decile 
of households was rural banner households.  As figure 8.3 shows, one percent of the rural 
households were in the top one percent of households in land possession, which indicate 
that although the rural bannermen as a population category were underprivileged by state 
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policy, some rural banner households was not disadvantaged at all.  Moreover, 3.3 percent 
and 4.7 percent of the rural banner households were respectively distributed in the next 
four and next five percent strata.  Thereby, a total of 9 percent of rural banner households 
were among the top decile of households, a proportion only slightly less than their equal 
share of the population. 
The above stratification of landed wealth beyond the state-defined category was 
mainly due to concentration in the distribution of nazu land.  As figure 8.4 shows, in 1870, 
about 60 percent of households had no nazu land.  At the same time, the top decile had 
67.9 percent of the nazu land.  The share of land for the top one percent of households was 
22.1 percent; the next four percent of households shared 27.5 percent, and the next five 
percent of households had 18.3 percent.  Although the distribution of nazu land was 
ostensibly equalized in the 1876 and 1889, it remained concentrated.  In 1889, the share of 
land owned by the top one percent of households declined substantially, to 17.1 percent.  
At the same time, the shares of land accounted for by the next four percent and the next five 
percent of households increased slightly to 28.6 and 19.2 percent.  Therefore, the share of 











































Figure 8. 4 Distribution of nazu land among metropolitan and rural banner households, 
1870-1889. 
Sources: The linked population and land database. 
 
 
This unequal distribution of nazu land not only enabled some metropolitan bannermen 
to become rich, but also provided the rural bannermen opportunities to overcome their 
initially disadvantaged status and become have-a-lots.  Although the rural bannermen 
were disadvantaged in the allocation of jichan land, they were not disadvantaged at all in 
the possession of nazu land.  As table 6.2 shows, in 1870, the rural bannermen had a total 
of 314,858.6 shang of nazu land, which is 4.7 times the amount owned by the metropolitan 
bannermen, 66,493 shang.  In 1889, the nazu land owned by the rural bannermen was 7.2 
times the amount owned by the metropolitan bannermen.  In addition, analysis of the 
land-type composition for the top decile households reveals that 68 percent of the rural 
households and 55 percent of the metropolitan households had more nazu land than jichan 
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land.  Therefore, the majority of top households became wealthy because of their 
possession of nazu land, and, moreover, the rural bannermen benefited more from this 
game. 
Between 1870 and 1889, moreover, the rural banner households exhibited great 
upward mobility in the possession of nazu land.  As figure 8.5 reveals, in 1889 the 
proportion of rural bannermen in the top decile households was much higher than it was in 
the 1870s.  This increase is most prominent in the top one percent of households.  In 1870, 
the rural banner households accounted for 76.9 percent of the top one percent of 
households in nazu land possession; although the share of the rural bannermen in the top 
one percent of households experienced a slight drop in 1876, in 1889, it increased to 83.3.  
In both the next four percent and the next five percent of households, the rural bannermen 
accounted for a larger proportion in 1889 than in 1870; in the next four percent, the 
percentage of rural bannermen increased from 88.3 to 90.4, and in the next five percent, it 
increased from 84.3 to 88.  At the same time, the proportion of rural bannermen in the 
bottom 60 percent of households in nazu land possession, the landless and nearly landless, 
dropped by 10 percentage points, from 77.9 percent to 67.4 percent.  The results above 
reveal that during the twenty years between 1870 and 1889, the rural bannermen, as a 
whole, moved from lower to higher strata.  This upward mobility of the rural bannermen 
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Figure 8. 5 The proportions of rural banner households in each land possession stratum, 
1870-1889. 
Sources: The linked population and land database. 
 
 
Persistence and mobility 
The land distribution in Shuangcheng, therefore, tells a story enriched by both 
persistence of wealth status and mobility among the strata of land possession.  In this 
section, I examine the level of persistence and mobility of the have-nots and have-a-lots.  I 
thereby assess the degree of fluidity in Shuangcheng society for the metropolitan and rural 
bannermen, as reflected in wealth accumulation.  Since only the data on nazu 
landholdings are longitudinal and available for the entire metropolitan and rural population, 
I restrict my analyses of persistence and mobility to household possession of nazu land.  
Besides the data availability issue, analyzing the mobility of nazu landholding fits with our 
interests in wealth stratification for two other reasons: first, compared to jichan land, nazu 
 279
land as self-cultivated land was subject to less state control.  Therefore the acquisition of 
nazu land allowed for greater individual agency.  Second, nazu land was also the major 
land type that drove wealth stratification and created the have-a-lots.  In the analyses of 
have-a-lots, I focus on the extremes, which are the top 5 percent and especially the top 1 
percent of households.  In the analysis of have-nots, I focus on the bottom 60 percent of 
households who were landless or nearly landless between 1870 and 1889. 
Among the bottom 60 percent of households in terms of nazu land possession, the rate 
of persistence between 1870 and 1889 was high.  Table 8.2 presents the 1889 wealth 
status of the bottom 60 percent of households in nazu land possession.  As table 8.2 shows, 
69.2 percent of the bottom 60 percent of households in 1870 remained in the same stratum 
in 1889.  This rate of persistence is the same for both metropolitan and rural bannermen; 
69.7 percent of the landless rural households remained landless. 
 
Table 8. 2 The 1889 nazu land holding status of the households who had been among the 
bottom 60 percent in nazu land ownership in 1870. 
  Metropolitan Rural Total 
 Percent N. Percent N. Percent N. Percent 
Top 1 2  0.4  4 0.2  6  0.3 
2-5 6  1.2  34 1.9  40  1.7 
6-10 12  2.4  56 3.1  68  3.0 
11-20 18  3.6  92 5.1  110  4.8 
21-40 29  5.7  245 13.7  274  11.9 
Bottom 60 351  69.2  1,246 69.7  1,597  69.6 
Disappeared 89  17.6  111 6.2  200  8.7 
         
Total 507  100.0 1,788 100.0 2,295  100.0 
Sources: The linked population and land database. 
 
 
Despite the fact that the persistence rate for the have-a-lots was not as high as that of 
the have-nots, there were still considerable cases of persisting households.  As table 8.3 
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shows, 76 of the 193, or 39.4 percent, of the top 5 percent of households in nazu land 
possession remained the same in 1889.  Compared to the metropolitan bannermen, the 
rural bannermen had a higher rate of persistence.  40.4 percent of the rural households in 
the top 5 percent stratum in 1870 remained in the same stratum in 1889, while only 33.3 
percent of the metropolitan households originally in the top 5 percent remained there in 
1889.  At the same time, there was also significant downward mobility; 21.2 percent of 
these households joined the landless bottom 60 percent in 1889.  The metropolitan banner 
households experienced especially dramatic downward mobility; 29.6 percent of the 
metropolitan households became landless in 1889, which was about 10 percentage points 
more than in the rural banner households. 
 
Table 8. 3 The 1889 landholding status of the households who had been among the top 5 
percent in nazu land ownership in 1870. 
  Jingqi Tunding Total 
 Percent N. Percent N. Percent N. Percent 
Top 5 9 33.3 67 40.4 76 39.4  
6-10 3 11.1 24 14.5 27 14.0  
11-20 3 11.1 27 16.3 30 15.5  
21-40 3 11.1 5 3.0 8 4.1  
Bottom 60 8 29.6 33 19.9 41 21.2  
Disappeared 1 3.7 10 6.0 11 5.7  
       
Total 27 100.0 166 100.0 193 100.0  
Sources: The linked population and land database. 
 
 
However, if we look only at the top 1 percent of households in 1870, the metropolitan 
and rural bannermen exhibited a pattern of persistence opposite that of the top 5 percent of 
households.  Of the top 1 percent of households in nazu possession in 1870, 35.9 percent 
remained in the top 1 percent in 1889.  This overall percentage was reflected a mixture of 
a higher rate of persistence in the metropolitan bannermen with a lower rate in the rural 
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bannermen; 5 of the 9, or 55.6 percent of, metropolitan households in the top 1 percent in 
1870 remained in the same stratum in 1889, whereas only 9 of 30, rural households, 30 
percent, remained in the top one percent in 1889.  The metropolitan bannermen’s high 
persistence rate for the top one percent of households and relatively low persistence rate for 
the top five percent (which included the top 1 percent) households suggests that the 
majority of the metropolitan have-a-lots who sustained their wealth status were the ones 
who were among the top one percent.  Although the rest of the top five percent of the 
metropolitan households enjoyed high wealth status in the early years, they experienced 
substantial downward mobility between 1870 and 1889. 
Although the persistence rate of the top one percent of households is slightly lower 
than that of the top five percent, the majority of these households still remained in a high 
stratum.  As table 8.4 shows, although only 30 percent of the top one percent of rural 
banner households in 1870 remained in the same stratum in 1889, another 36.7 percent 
were located nearby, in the top 2 to 5 percent.  Therefore, 66.7 percent of the top one 
percent of rural households in 1870 remained in the top five percent in 1889.  Similarly, 
including those who remained in the top one percent, 66.7 percent of the top one percent of 
metropolitan households in 1870 was located in the top five percent in 1889.  This 
percentage reveals that, in fact, the persistence rate of the top one percent of households in 
1870 was high. 
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Table 8. 4 The 1889 landholding status of the households who had been among the top 1 
percent in nazu land ownership in 1870. 
  Jingqi Tunding Total 
 Percent N. Percent N. Percent N. Percent 
Top 1 5 55.6  9 30.0  14 35.9  
2-5 1 11.1  11 36.7  12 30.8  
6-10 0 0.0  2 6.7  2 5.1  
11-20 1 11.1  2 6.7  3 7.7  
21-40 0 0.0  0 0.0  0 0.0  
bottom 60 2 22.2  5 16.7  7 17.9  
Disappeared 0 0.0  1 3.3  1 2.6  
         
Total 9 100.0 30 100.0 39 100.0  
Sources: The linked population and land database. 
 
 
In the above results, we also see considerable downward mobility among the 
have-a-lots.  As table 8.3 shows, 14 percent of the top 5 percent of households in 1870 fell 
to the sixth to tenth percentile, 15.5 percent fell to the top second decile, 4.1 percent fell to 
the third to fourth decile, and 26.9 percent became have-nots or disappeared.  Interestingly, 
in Shuangcheng, movement from one end o fthe distribution to the other, from have-a-lots 
to have-nots, accounted for the majority of the downward mobility.  This is especially true 
for the metropolitan bannermen.  Moreover, in the downward mobility of the top 1 percent 
of households in 1870, 20.5 percent became have-nots or disappeared (table 8.4), which is 
the second largest group. Moving down from the top 1 percent to the second to fifth 
percentile, of course, can be considered as persistence. 
Moreover, the upward mobility in land possession in Shuangcheng represented 
another type of persistence of previous wealth status; among the landed households, only 
those who had already achieved a high wealth status in 1870 were able to rise to the top 
stratum in 1889.  This was apparent in an examination of the origins of the top 5 percent of 
households in nazu land possession in 1889.  As table 8.5 shows, as we decompose the 
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1870 wealth status of these households and proceed down the ladder of nazu land 
possession, the proportion of households from each stratum declines; while 14 percent of 
these households were from the top six to ten percent, only 10.1 percent were from the 
second decile, and 9.2 percent from the third and fourth decile.  This pattern is especially 
prominent for the metropolitan bannermen; no households were from the third to fourth 
decile.  This phenomenon is, in fact, an extension of the high persistence of wealth status 
in Shuangcheng; those who had achieved a relatively higher wealth status were more likely 
to sustain and expand their landed wealth. 
 
Table 8. 5 The 1870 landholding status of the households who were among the top 5 
percent in nazu land ownership in 1889. 
  Jingqi  Tunding Total 
 Percent N. Percent  N. Percent N. Percent 
Top 5 9 31.0  73 36.7  82 36.0 
6-10 3 10.3  29 14.6  32 14.0 
11-20 2 6.9  21 10.6  23 10.1 
21-40 0 0.0  21 10.6  21 9.2 
bottom 60 9 31.0  39 19.6  48 21.1 
New 6 20.7  16 8.0  22 9.6 
         
Total 29 100.0 199 100.0 228 100.0 
Sources: The linked population and land database. 
 
 
On the other hand, the upward mobility also meant dramatic change in wealth status 
for some have-nots; the landless and newly established households accounted for more of 
the have-a-lots than those who had been landed but in a lower wealth stratum.  As table 
8.5 shows, 48 of the 228 households, or 21.1 percent, were from the previous bottom 60 
percent, that is the landless.  With the exception of the persisting households, this 
percentage is higher than those from the other land possession strata.  Moreover, 22 of the 
228 top 5 percent households were established after 1870, which accounted for 9.6 percent.  
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These new households were established by inheriting the land from extinct households.  
Therefore, through inheritance and land accumulation afterwards, these new households 
rose from nowhere to the stratum of top 5 percent.  This pattern is especially prominent for 
the metropolitan bannermen.  9 of the 29 metropolitan households in the top 5 percent in 
1889 were from the previous bottom 60 percent group, and 6 were from households 
established after 1870.  These households therefore accounted for 51.7 percent of the 
metropolitan top 5 percent of households.  In addition, landless and newly established 
households accounted for the only upward mobility in the metropolitan households in the 
top 1 percent group in 1889.  As table 8.6 shows, of the 10 metropolitan households in the 
top 1 percent stratum, 3 were from the previous bottom 60 percent, and 2 were from 
households established after 1870, which accounted for 50 percent of the metropolitan top 
1 percent of households. 
 
Table 8. 6 The 1870 landholding status of the households who had been among the top 1 
percent in nazu land ownership in 1889. 
Jingqi Tunding Total  
Percent N. Percent N. Percent N. Percent 
Top 1 5 50.0 9 23.7 14 29.2 
2-5 0 0.0 8 21.1 8 16.7 
6-10 0 0.0 2 5.3 2 4.2 
11-20 0 0.0 7 18.4 7 14.6 
21-40 0 0.0 4 10.5 4 8.3 
Bottom 60 3 30.0 4 10.5 7 14.6 
New 2 20.0 4 10.5 6 12.5 
         
Total 10 100.0 38 100.0 48 100.0 
Sources: The linked population and land database. 
 
Above all, the stratification in landed wealth in Shuangcheng exhibits a high degree of 
persistence and, at the same time, dramatic downward and upward mobility in nazu land 
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possession.  Persistence among the have-nots was especially high; about 80 percent of the 
have-nots in 1870 remained have-nots in 1889 or became extinct.  Compared to that of the 
have-nots, the persistence rate for the have-a-lots was much lower, creating opportunities 
for upward mobility.  Yet, the majority of the very rich (top 1 percent of households) were 
able to maintain a high wealth status, remaining close to the top of the distribution though 
not necessarily in the top 1 percent.  At the same time, some households also experienced 
dramatic downward or upward mobility, moving from the have-a-lots to the have-nots or 
vice versa in twenty years, or about one generation.  Although we are familiar with 
anecdotes about individuals becoming rich or poor overnight, it is still quite striking that 
mobility took such a dramatic form in this frontier society.  Exploring the histories of 
those who maintained their status, experienced dramatic downward mobility from 
have-a-lots to have-nots, or experienced upward mobility from have-nots to have-a-lots 
illuminates processes of stratification in Shuangcheng.  Therefore, in the following 
sections I investigate several cases of stratification of landed wealth to explore the 
mechanisms of wealth stratification in Shuangcheng. 
 
Stories of land accumulation 
Land accumulation and Wenbo’s household 
The story of land accumulation by Wenbo and Wenkai’s family, two metropolitan 
households who remained among the top households in the nazu land possession from 
1870 to 1889, exemplifies how political achievement and family size contributed to the 
stratification of landed wealth.  Wenbo’s family originally belonged to the Manchu Plain 
Red banner in Beijing.  In 1825, Wenbo’s grandfather, a cavalryman named Deminan, 
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moved to Shuangcheng.10  Wenkai’s father, a yangyubing from the same descent group 
named Anping, also relocated to Shuangcheng together with Deminan.11  At the time of 
relocation, Deminan only had two other family members, and Anping only had one.  They 
settled in the third village of the Bordered Blue banner in the central tun as two households, 
and each received one plot of jichan land.  By 1866, the household sizes and political 
statuses of the two had significantly increased.  Deminan’s households, then headed by 
Wenbo’s father Mingtong, had grown to a family of 23 members; Mingtong had five 
present sons, three present daughters, four grandsons, and four granddaughters.12  At the 
time, Mingtong held the post of Conditional assistant commandant (wei xieling), a position 
equivalent to assistant magistrate, and Wenbo himself also worked as a clerk (bitieshi) in 
the banner government.  Anping, who then held the official title of conditional tax 
preceptor (lingcui), also expanded his household size to eight, with two present sons and 
three present daughters.  Wenbo and Wenkai’s descent group was therefore one of the 
local families that was especially successful at producing high officials. 
Together with demographic and political prosperity, Wenbo’s households enjoyed 
economic success.  In 1867, after his father’s death in 1866, Wenbo succeeded his father 
as household head.  In 1869, when the government decided to reallocate 225 plots of 
jichan land from extinct households among the metropolitan bannermen, three of Wenbo’s 
four brothers received one plot each and established new households.  Upon receiving 
their allocations, these three brothers moved to the village where the plots were located.  
                                                        
10 See the name list of the metropolitan bannermen who volunteered to move to Shuangcheng in 1825 
(NGTFDTYMDA, 1824. Reel 52, p559.) 
11 Deminan and Anping were not the first ones in their descent group to move to Shuangcheng.  In 1824, 
a cavalry Deqing’an, together with three family members, moved to Shuangcheng with the first group of 
metropolitan bannermen.  Therefore, Deqing’an was the pioneer of their descent group to settle in 
Shuangcheng.  According to the population registers, Deqing’an’s descendants settled in the first village 
of the Bordered Blue banner in the central tun, 5 li away from Deminan and Anping’s village.   
12 By 1866, Deminan had died. 
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Wenbo’s household size was then reduced to ten, now consisting of three sons, two 
daughters, the youngest brother who died in that year, and three younger sisters.  In 1870, 
Wenbo acquired the title of commandant of cavalry (qiduwei), a hereditary rank of the 
seventh grade, and owned one plot of jichan land and 103.4 shang (190.3 hectares) nazu 
land.  The size of nazu land made Wenbo’s household the 48th largest landholder among 
all metropolitan and rural banner households, a location close to the top one percent 
stratum in land possession.   
Despite frequent changes in the headship of Wenbo’s family, its political and 
economic status continued.  In 1873, Wenbo died, and his eldest son, Xingquan, inherited 
his title of commandant of cavalry and succeeded to the household headship at the age of 
23.  In 1878, when the government allowed the metropolitan bannermen to acquire the 
302 plots of not-yet-allocated jichan land by making a  monetary contribution, 
Xingquan’s family was able to get three plots; whereby Xingquan’s two younger brothers, 
aged 19 and 18, and his son, aged eight, were registered as separate households.  Given 
that Xingquan’s two younger brothers were still single and his son was so young, it is very 
possible that these family members still lived and managed their property together.  
Therefore, by 1879 Wenbo’s sons who remained in the village had accumulated four plots, 
140 shang (257.6 hectares) of jichan land.  In addition, in 1876, Xingquan also had 138.4 
shang (254.7 hectares) registered nazu land.  
The other household in Wenbo’s descent group, Wenkai’s household, also achieved 
great economic prosperity.  In 1870, Wenkai had one plot of jichan land and 289.3 shang 
(532.3 hectares) of nazu land, which put his household in the top one percent in nazu land 
possession.  Together with increases in landed wealth, the family also managed to raise 
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their social and political status.  In 1876, Wenkai acquired the title of shengyuan, and the 
registered nazu land under his name also increased to 374.3 shang (668.7 hectares).  The 
409.3 shang (753.1 hectares) of land of Anping’s descendants’ placed them within the top 
3 households in jichan and nazu land possession.  In contrast with Wenbo’s household, 
who managed to expand their landed wealth through the acquisition of jichan land as well 
as nazu land, Anping and his descendants mainly achieved their status through the 
acquisition of nazu land.  Due to their shortage of males, Anping’s family only had one 
plot of jichan land; Anping had two sons and three daughters, of which the second son died 
in 1872, and Anping’s surviving son Wenkai had no son but only one daughter.  This 
demographic composition circumscribed their chances of acquiring jichan land, which 
required the owner of a plot to be a male.  Anping’s descendants enjoyed the landed 
wealth until 1880. 
When Wenkai died in 1880, the two families used adoption to sustain his line and 
property status.  Wenkai died at the age of 35, leaving behind his wife, daughter, and three 
younger sisters.  Wenkai’s household therefore faced the threat of extinction.  In 1885, 
Wenkai’s wife adopted Xingren, Wenbo’s second son,13 to facilitate the inheritance of 
Wenkai’s property.  This adoption benefited both families.  Because Xingren originally 
owned a plot of jichan land in 1878, he had to transfer his original plot to his nephew, 
Xingquan’s second son, to inherit Wenkai’s plot.  Xingquan’s household thereby 
inherited one more plot of jichan land, and his second son was registered as a separate 
household at the age of seven.  Despite the death of the male head, Wenkai’s family 
managed to sustain their property through adoption.  Xingren inherited not only Wenkai’s 
                                                        
13 In the population registers, in 1883, the name of Wenbo’s second son was changed from Xingyin to 
Xingren. 
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jichan plot but also all his nazu land.   
The two households succeeded in maintaining and expanding their landed property 
into the early twentieth century.  In 1889, Xingquan’s household, in which only himself, 
his wife, his third son and two daughters were formally registered as members, had one plot 
of jichan land and 103.4 shang (190.3 hectares) of nazu land.  At the same time, 
Xingquan’s other two sons had already acquired their own jichan plots.  In 1904, the 
amount of registered land under Xingquan’s name remained the same.  After his 
succession of Wenkai’s headship, Xingren was even able to expand the household’s landed 
property.  In 1889, not only did Xingren maintain the allocated jichan plot, but also the 
nazu land registered under his name increased to 419.7 shang (772.2 hectares).  In 1904, 
Xingquan’s registered nazu land further increased to 500.9 shang (921.7 hectares).14  
Therefore, during the entire period of 1870-1904 for which we have land records, Wenbo 
and Wenkai’s households were two of the wealthiest among the metropolitan and rural 
bannermen. 
 
Declining wealth and Jiertukan’s family 
The following story about two metropolitan households, Jiertukan’s and Mingshan’s 
families, illustrates how political achievement and land transaction could result in dramatic 
downward and upward mobility in landed wealth.  One of these households, Jiertukan’s, 
fell from the have-a-lots, the top one percent in nazu land possession in 1870, to a have-not 
household in nazu land in 1889.  The other household, Mingshan’s, rose from a newly 
established household, who previously had no right to officially register land, to one of the 
                                                        
14 See the 1904 land register of the Plain Yellow banner (SCPGBTDHKDM vol. 326). 
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top 1 percent of households in nazu land possession. 
Jiertukan’s family originally belonged to the Manchu Bordered Yellow banner in 
Beijing.  In 1826, Jiertukan’s father, a xiansan named Hualiantai, moved to Shuangcheng 
with five other family members.  Hualiantai settled in the fifth village of the Plain White 
banner in the central tun and received one plot of jichan land.  Hualiantai’s family 
remained as one household until 1869, which by when was headed by Hualiantai’s eldest 
son, a retired tax preceptor named Jiertahun.  The household then had sixteen members, 
including the three sons of Hualiantaiand their families, of which Jiertukan was the third 
son.  
From 1869 to 1878, Jiertukan and his extended families took advantage of 
opportunities to expand their landed wealth through the acquisition of jichan and nazu land.  
In 1869, when the government reallocated 225 plots of jichan land from extinct 
metropolitan households, Jiertukan acquired one of these plots and established his own 
independent household.  At the same time, his second brother’s family also managed to 
obtain another plot.  In 1870, in addition to the one plot of jichan land, Jiertukan also had 
107.7 shang (198.2 hectares) of registered nazu land, which put him and his household in 
the top one percent of households in nazu land possession.15  Still not satisfied with their 
land possession, both Jiertukan and his eldest brother’s households further expanded their 
possession of jichan land in 1878 by contributing money to the government.  Jiertukan’s 
two sons, who were 29 and 18 sui, each received one plot of land and registered 
independent households.  This frequent expansion of jichan land and subsequent 
household division significantly reduced Jiertukan’s household size to only two –he and 
                                                        
15 The other new household, headed by the son of his second brother, also had 92.2 shang (169.7 hectares) 
registered nazu land.   
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his wife –by 1879.  At the same time, in the newly established households, the household 
of his eldest living son, Kuijun, only had three members: Kuijun, his wife, and their 
daughter.  His youngest son, Kuixiang, lived alone in a singleton household. 
However, when Jiertukan’s acquisition of jichan land reached its peak, his possession 
of nazu land declined.  In 1876, his registered nazu land had been reduced to 66.8 shang 
(122.9 hectares), a reduction of 40.9 shang (75.3 hectares) from his 1870 possession.  
Moreover, even the ownership of the 66.8 shang of remaining land was in question; under 
Jiertukan’s name, two new names, Mingshan and Changling, appeared, indicating these 
two people had shares of these plots.  In 1879, an official document regarding the transfer 
of two of Jiertukan’s plots to Changling was issued.  According to this document, 
Jiertukan went to the Captain’s Office, stating that he no longer had the ability to manage 
two plots, one 20.6 shang and the other 14.1 shang in size, due to their geographic distance 
and wanted to return these two plots to the government to be reassigned to someone 
capable of farming them.  The Captain’s Office therefore selected Changling, who resided 
in the third village, 10 li from Jiertukan’s village.  The two households then completed the 
paperwork and formally transferred ownership.  In that year, the nazu land registered 
under Jiertukan’s name was further reduced to 32.1 shang. 
The period when Jiertukan gradually lost his nazu land is also the period when his 
family faced a demographic downturn.  In 1876, Jiertukan was already 51 years old.  
Kuijun, who was 25 of age, only had one daughter, and his third son, aged 18, was single.  
In 1879, when the two sons had established their separate households, Jiertukan also 
became reached an age which no longer allow him to manage his land.  At the same time, 
his two sons were not fortunate enough to have large households.  Although Kuijun 
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managed to have two more daughters and one son from 1881 to 1891, the son died at seven 
sui, leaving Kuijun only daughters.  The other son Kuixiang remained single throughout 
his whole life.16  The decline of Jiertukan’s family also coincided with the downturn of its 
wealth status.  By 1887, Jiertukan and his son’s names had disappeared from the nazu land 
registers.  Jiertukan died in 1896 at the age of 71.  Therefore, in 1906, only his two sons 
owned two plots of jichan land.   At the same time, two new names, Mingshan and 
Changling, gradually became prominent among the land owners. 
 
The ascent of Mingshan 
Mingshan’s land accumulation tells the prosperous side of the above story.  Although 
Mingshan did not reside in Jiertukan’s village, in 1887 he and his son Changling owned a 
total of 148.2 shang (272.7 hectares) of nazu land, of which a considerable amount was 
from Jiertukan’s family.17  Mingshan was the second son of a high official family.  His 
father Fuqing’e, a metropolitan bannermen who originally belonged to the Manchu Plain 
Red banner in Beijing, settled in the second village of the Plain Red banner in the central 
tun (the later second village of the second Jiala of the Plain Yellow banner) and became a 
banner captain who supervised 20 villages.18  After Fuqing’e’s death, Mingshan’s eldest 
brother Ming’an succeeded to the household headship.  In 1866, Mingshan’s household 
had five registered members: two young couples—Ming’an’s and Mingshan’s –and their 
sister.19  At the same time, Mingshan himself started his official career.  He started out as 
                                                        
16 Kuixiang died in 1904 at age 40 (the 1904 population register of the Bordered Yellow banner). 
17 In 1887, Mingshan had 103 shang and Changling had 45.2 shang registered nazu land in the village 
Jiertukan resided. 
18 See the 1903 Three Generation Book of the Bordered Yellow banner (SCPGBTDHKDM, reel 1834666, 
vol. 74.)  The exact year when Fuqing’e moved to Shuangcheng, however, was unclear. 
19 See the 1866 population register of the Plain Yellow banner. 
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a conditional clerk and then became a clerk in the banner government.  As a clerk, 
Mingshan was responsible to process such paperwork as salary books of the officials and 
soldiers.20  In 1869, Mingshan acquired one of the 225 reallocated jichan plots from the 
extinct metropolitan households and established his household in the third village of the 
second Jiala of the Bordered Yellow banner, a village outside of his previous banner 
administration.21 
After Mingshan established his own household, he successfully accumulated a large 
amount of nazu land.  In 1870, Mingshan already had 114.2 shang (210.1 hectares) of 
registered nazu land in his previous residential village.22  In 1876, his registered nazu land 
under his previous residential village increased to 139.4 shang.  Moreover, Mingshan also 
accumulated more land in his new residential village; in 1876, Mingshan already owned 
71.6 shang of nazu land registered under Jiertukan’s village.  At this time, Mingshan was 
working as a clerk in charge of the public granary (cangwu bitieshi).  His position as a 
granary clerk probably served as a special resource that facilitated  his land acquisition 
outside of his residential village.   
From 1878 on, Mingshan’s official position provided him great opportunity to expand 
his family wealth and social status.  In that year, Mingshan was the principal clerk who 
took charge of the allocation of the 302 jichan plots for bannermen’s monetary 
contribution.23  In this reallocation, he not only acquired a plot of jichan land for his son 
                                                        
20 The local archives shows Mingshan was responsible to check and finalize the salary book of government 
personnel. See the salary book of 1874.7, (SCPZGYMDA, reel 184, vol. 759, p. 9) and 1879.7.10 
(SCPZGYMDA, reel 201, vol. 837-1, p.65).   
21 See the 1870 population register of the Bordered Yellow banner (SCPGBTDHKDM, reel 1834663, vol. 
26).  Although Mingshan established his own household under the Bordered Yellow banner, his and his 
families’ records were still kept in his previous residential village under the Plain Yellow banner.  Under 
the Plain Yellow banner, Mingshan was registered under his nephew Lianzhu’s household. 
22 See the 1870 land register of the Plain Yellow banner (SCPGBTDHKDM, reel 1834731, vol. 653). 
23 See Mingshan’s court demonstration for the land dispute between his brother and cousin’s households 
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Changling, who was aged only two sui and had just recently appeared in the population 
register, but also reserved one plot for his cousin’s son.24  In 1879, Mingshan was 
promoted to the post of granary official (cangguan),25 and his family’s land acquisition 
continued.  In 1887, although Mingshan lost some registered nazu land under his previous 
village administration, he still kept 88.3 shang (162.5 hectares).26  His son Changling, 
who was then only 11 sui old, also owned 8.1 shang (14.9 hectares) of land in the same 
village.  At the same time, in their current residential banner administration, Mingshan 
owned another 186.2 shang (342.6 hectares) and Changling owned another 45.2 shang 
(83.2 hectares) of nazu land.  Therefore, altogether, in 1887 Mingshan and his son owned 
two plots of jichan land and 327.8 shang (603.2 hectares) of nazu land, a total of 397.8 
shang (732 hectares).   
As was typical in Chinese stories of upward mobility, political achievement, wealth, 
and social status grew hand in hand to signal this family’s prosperity.  Although Mingshan 
did not develop a big household,27 he was fortunate to have two sons.  In 1895, Mingshan 
also acquired one jichan plot from an extinct household for his second son, who was only 
                                                                                                                                                                     
(1880.10.10, SCPZGYMDA, reel 204, vol. 845, p.96.). 
24 In 1878, Mingshan managed to acquire one plot of jichan land for Liuzhu, Mingshan’s cousin Minglu’s 
second son, who was probably just born and had not yet been registered.  In this process, Mingshan 
handled all the work and even paid the monetary contribution for Minglu.  Minglu’s family however failed 
to secure this plot due to Liuzhu’s immediate death even before the completion of paperwork.  In response 
to Liuzhu’s death, Minglu first tried to negotiate with Ming’an, Mingshan’s elder brother, to use Ming’an’s 
second son Zhanzhu’s name to secure this plot for his household.  Since Zhanzhu was also young and had 
not appeared on the population register, Ming’an at first agreed Minglu’s proposal.  One year after, 
however, Minglu changed his mind and filed a lawsuit to get this plot for his own household.  After 
Mingshan’s mitigation, the two families reached a settlement: Minglu returned the plot he got by using 
Zhanzhu’s name to Mingshan’s family, which was still registered under Zhanzhu’s name.  To compensate 
Minglu’s loss, Mingshan gave one plot of his nazu land, 20.2 shang (37.2 hectares) in size, to Minglu’s 
family. See the case summary of Ming’an’s case (1880.10.10, SCPZGYMDA, reel 204, vol. 845, p.96.). 
25 See Mingshan’s resume for the promotion to Granary Official on 1879.11.6 (SCPZGYMDA, reel 203, 
vol. 841, pp.232-235). 
26 See the 1887 land registers of the Plain Yellow banner.  In fact, Mingshan and his son had more land in 
the 1882 land register; in that year, Mingshan had 147.5 shang and Changling had 28.7 shang of registered 
nazu land under the Plain Yellow banner. (See the 1882 land register of the Plain Yellow banner.) 
27 For his entire life, Mingshan had two sons and four daughters. 
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nine sui.  At least until the last year of the extant land registers, they sustained their landed 
wealth.28  Wealth also brought Mingshan’s family social status; in 1896, Mingshan’s 
eldest son earned the title of shengyuan through monetary donation.   
 
Paths of wealth accumulation 
The above stories reveal that both land inheritance and land transfer/transaction were 
important pathways for Shuangcheng residents’ wealth accumulation.  While land 
transaction was important for wealth accumulation, the most dramatic change was 
explained by inheritance and land transfers that granted the new household all the landed 
property held by the previous owner.   
At the same time, family demographic characteristics, including family size and 
gender composition, and political achievement were also two major determinants of a 
family’s fortune in wealth accumulation in Shuangcheng.  Of these two determinants, 
family size and gender composition are the products of biology, while political 
achievement reflects more individual aspiration and ability.  In spite of the availability of 
adoption and other options for securing the descent line, family size is much harder to 
control than political achievement and resulted in dramatic downward mobility.  
 
Family size and gender composition 
In Shuangcheng, family size and gender composition influenced households’ landed 
                                                        
28 The last available land register for Mingshan’s previous residential village was in 1904 and for his 
current residential village was in 1889.  In 1889, Mingshan and Changling owned a total of 317.4 nazu 
land (Under the Plain Yellow banner, Mingshang owned 89.1 shang and Changling owned 7.3 shang.  
Under the Bordered Yellow banner, Mingshang owned 175.8 shang and Changling owned 45.2 shang).  In 
1904, the extant land register of the Plain Yellow banner reveals that in their previous residential village 
Mingshan and Changling even expanded their nazu land possession; While Mingshan owned 89.7 shang, 
Changling who was then owned 75.7 shang, which was a 68.4 shang increase of his 1889 possession. 
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wealth both in terms of the number of family laborers and qualification for official land 
ownership.  In agrarian societies, family size is an important indicator of a family’s 
consumption and production abilities.  While consumption explains a family’s demands 
for land, production determines a family’s ability to farm or manage their landed wealth.  
Therefore, in both the metropolitan and rural bannermen, the mean household size is 
positively associated with wealth status; the higher the wealth status, the larger the 
household.  As table 8.7 shows, the have-nots had the smallest family size, which was 2.6 
for metropolitan bannermen and 6.5 for rural bannermen.  Among the metropolitan 
bannermen, the top two deciles had a mean household size above 5, and the other landed 
households had a mean size of between 3.8 and 4.3.  The association between household 
size and wealth status is especially strong among the rural bannermen.  The top 1 percent 
of households had a mean size of 18.8, which was 5.3 more than those in the second to fifth 
percentiles.  For the landed rural banner households in the second to fifth percentiles and 
lower, the mean household size started from 13.5 and respectively declined to 11.2, 9.8, 9.2, 
and 8.3.  These results underline how demographic success and economic prosperity in 
Shuangcheng typically went hand in hand. 
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Table 8. 7 Mean household size and number of adult males by jichan and nazu land 
ownership, 1876. 
  Metropolitan   Rural 
  
Household 





Top 1% 5.4 1.3  18.8 4.3 
Next 4% 5.2 1.1  13.5 3.0 
Next 5% 5.2 1.1  11.2 2.7 
Next 10% 5.3 1.2  10.8 2.6 
Next 10% 4.3 0.6  9.8 2.5 
Next 20% 3.8 0.9  9.2 2.3 
Next 40% 4.0 0.5  8.3 2.2 
Bottom 10% 2.6 0.5   6.5 1.9 
Sources: The linked population and land database. 
 
 
Households’ age-sex composition also influenced their wealth status; the majority of 
wealthy households had capable adult males.  In the three stories on wealth accumulation, 
the heads of successful households were always young or at their middle age.  For 
example, at the time they inherited household headship, both Wenbo, aged 38 sui, and 
Wenkai, aged 25 sui, were in the prime of life and physically strong.  Although Wenbo 
and Wenkai ultimately died early, the two families were able to secure suitable heirs to 
sustain their wealth.  Similarly, when Mingshan established his household in 1870, he was 
only 30 sui.  This prime age enabled him to accumulate and sustain his wealth despite his 
sons’ young ages.  Jiertukan’s story best illustrated the wax and wane of wealth along with 
a household’s demographic cycle.  When Jiertukan first established his household in 1869, 
he was already 45 sui old.  Yet this age still fell in the range that the government defined 
as adult male (ding), and Jiertukan’s family still enjoyed several years’ prosperity.  In 
1876, when Jiertukan reached 51 sui, his family’s wealth status began to decline. 
Although less prominent, the number of adult males in a household is also positively 
associated its wealth status.  As table 8.7 shows, for rural bannermen, the mean of adult 
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males for the top 1 percent of household was 4.3, which is the highest among all strata.  In 
the subsequent wealth strata, the mean number of adult males gradually declined from 3 to 
1.9.  For metropolitan bannermen, the top two deciles of households on average had more 
than 1 adult male, while the bottom half of households only had a mean of 0.5.  This 
overview indicated that although metropolitan and rural banner households did not 
necessarily rely on family labor, having members of working age was still important, since 
they still need capable personnel to manage their land. 
In addition to the way family size influenced landed wealth, in Shuangcheng, the 
presence of male members also determined whether a household could officially own land.  
The state stipulated that only the principal adult males (zhengding) could register jichan 
land and be considered as a household.  In theory, a principal adult male in Shuangcheng 
was defined to be between 20 and 50 sui.  In practice, the state allowed household heads to 
be older or younger as long as there were males in the family.  This situation was 
especially true for the metropolitan bannermen, who in the state land allocation in 1878 
established 88 households with household heads who were children, that is under 10 sui.  
Even under the loosened state policy, a male heir was a requirement for a household to 
continue.  A household would become extinct if the family failed to secure a male heir 
before the death of the head’s widow.  Once the widow died and there was no heir, the 
household would lose all their property, including jichan and nazu land. 
Family size in Shuangcheng, therefore, not only contributed to a household’s upward 
mobility in wealth accumulation, but also accounted for most of the dramatic downward 
mobility.  While the causal relationship between family size and wealth could run in either 
direction, the decline of family wealth usually started with the aging of the household head, 
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the disability of male members, or, most crucially, the absence of a surviving heir.  For 
example, as discussed in chapter six, the major reasons that Shuangcheng households gave 
up land were aging and disability.  Since families could not completely control their 
demographic outcome, even the wealthiest families could not escape the fate of decline.  
In our stories, Wenkai’s and Jiertukan’s families both lacked a surviving heir.  Although 
they managed to become the wealthiest families in Shuangcheng, they eventually faced 
extinction because they had either only daughters, or the only grandson died.  While 
Wenkai’s family successfully solved this crisis through adopting Wenkai’s cousin’s son, 
Jiertukan’s household gradually gave up their landownership and became extinct in 1896.  
 
Political achievement 
If demographic outcomes reflect the unpredictable nature of life, political 
achievement signals individual merit and agency.  In China, political power is highly 
associated with wealth.  The autocratic nature of the Chinese political system legitimated 
the intervention by political power into economic rights.  This tradition not only enabled 
the state to constantly redistribute wealth, but also endowed political elites with privileges 
that allowed them to use power to accumulate landed wealth.  Chinese historians have 
agreed that, in historical China, official’s land acquisition through political power was a 
major cause of land concentration (Han 1984; He 1956; Yang 1990).  Therefore, land 
distribution in China was the outcome of the interaction between two forms of political 
power: the state power and individual power derived from a connection to the state.   
At the same time, the major path to achieve political power is to become an official 
through a merit-based examination system.  As the Song dynasty emperor Zhenzong 
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(997-1022) wrote:  
“To be wealthy you need not purchase fertile fields, 
     thousands of tons of corn are to be found in the books. 
     To build a house you need not set up high beams,  
     golden mansions are to be found in the books.  
     To find a wife you need not worry about not having good matchmakers, 
     maidens as beautiful as jade are to be found in the books. 
     To travel you need not worry about not having servants and attendants, 
     large entourages of horses and carriages are to be found in the books. 
     When a man wishes to fulfill the ambition of his life,  
     he only needs to diligently study the six classics by the window.” 
(Miyazaki 1976) 
The above poem suggests that an average man could achieve wealth and social status 
through an official career earned by the civil service exam.  The examination was highly 
competitive; in Qing China, only about 0.1 percent of literate adult males, or 0.01 percent 
of all adult males at a given time could achieve the title of jinshi that would make them 
eligible for appointment to official posts.29  Achieving an official career, therefore, 
required tremendous aspiration and talent.    
Although the banner system provided bannermen greater opportunity for political 
achievement than the civil service examination system did for civilians, it still required 
individual ability and talent.  Not only did bannermen enjoy special quotas in the standard 
civil service exam, but they could also become officials through the special translation 
examination or even bypass the exam system through the banner hierarchy (Elliott 2001).  
Any of the above paths, however, required successful performance as an indicator of the 
                                                        
29 In the Qing, there were three levels of exams: the district and prefectural exam, by passing which the 
candidates earned the title of Shengyuan; the triennial provincial exam, by passing which Shengyuan earned 
the title of juren; the triennial metropolitan exam, by passing which juren earned the title of jinshi.  While 
in the beginning, the Shengyuan title holders were able to get some low-rank official positions, due to the 
increase in the number of candidates by mid-Qing only jinshi degree holders were eligible to official posts.  
At any given time in the Qing, there were about 500,000 Shengyuan, 40,000 juren, and 2,000 jinshi degree 
holders.  If we project the adult male population in 1750 to be 50 millions, then, the percentage of 
Shengyuan was 1; that of the juren was 0.1 percent; and that of the jinshi was 0.01(Ho 1964; Lee and Wang 
1999).  
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candidate’s talent.30  In Shuangcheng, for example, a bannerman could start his career in 
government either by holding a shengyuan title or as a soldier (pijia).31  Both paths could 
lead to the same career.  Usually, a shengyuan title holder would start as a clerk, and then 
be promoted to tax preceptor and such higher level officials as banner captain, assistant 
commandant, and area commander-in-chief.  A soldier could also be promoted to a clerk 
position if he was capable of handling paperwork or be promoted to tax preceptor, 
lieutenant, banner captain, and so on.  When assigning official positions, the local 
government had to send the candidate’s resume to the provincial government for review.  
Previous experience and performance were the major criteria for obtaining a position. 
While all the three families/descent groups in our stories of land accumulation had 
members with official or soldier titles, Mingshan’s case most clearly demonstrates the role 
of political power and individual ability in wealth accumulation.  Mingshan was the most 
successful individual in his family to establish an official career.  As the second son in the 
family, he was able to overcome the disadvantage of birth order and acquire occupational 
mobility outside of his family.  In order to become a clerk, Mingshan’s reading and 
writing skills were probably better than others including his elder brother.  The job 
provided him two resources: a stable salary and power.  Mingshan earned an annual salary 
of 24 taels of silver as a clerk and 36 taels of silver when he later became a granary official.  
This stable income served as indispensable financial support for his land acquisition.  
Moreover, although Mingshan’s clerk position did not make him a high official, he directly 
controlled access to land endowments because of the nature of his work.  This position 
                                                        
30 The yin privilege also existed within the banner system.  Yin privilege benefited the candidate by giving 
him an easy start of official career.  Yet the official positions acquired through yin privilege were usually 
some low rank position or honorific title without specific duties.  The candidate’s future career still 
depended on his ability and performance.  For example, in Shuangcheng, sons of bannermen who died in 
battles would be given a title of yunqiwei.   
31 Sometimes, a bannermen can be both shengyuan and soldier.   
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provided him not only a stable income but also an advantage in land accumulation.  In this 
process, Mingshan acquired land for both his and his brother’s family.  Although 
Mingshan’s elder brother did not have extravagant nazu land, the brother’s eldest son was 
able to acquire a jichan plot in 1869 at the age of 6 sui.  In 1878, when Mingshan was in 
charge of the allocation of 302 jichan plots, he managed to reserve one plot for his 
brother’s second son, who was so young that he had not yet been registered.   
The larger picture in Shuangcheng also reveals that political achievement commonly 
facilitated the attainment of higher wealth status by bannermen.  Throughout the entire 
period under analysis, official families were concentrated at the top strata of nazu land 
possession.  The proportion of official families in the top 1 percent of households was 
especially high.  As table 8.8 shows, in 1870, of the top 1 percent of households, 25.6 
percent were official families, which is 5 times the proportion of official families (4.8 
percent) in the entire population in the same year.  Moreover, this concentration of official 
families in the top 1 percent of households was prominent in both the metropolitan and 
rural bannermen; 22.2 percent of the metropolitan and 26.7 percent of the rural households 
were official families.  In 1889, the concentration of official families in the top 1 percent 
of households remained at the same level; 35.7 percent of these households were official 
families, which was 4 times the proportion of official families (8.3 percent) in the entire 
population.  At the same time, households in the higher strata universally had a higher 
proportion of official families. 
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Table 8. 8 Percentages of households with officials in each strata of nazu land ownership, 
1870-1889. 
  1870   1889 
 Percent Jingqi Tunding Total Jingqi Tunding Total
Top 1 22.2 26.7 25.6 28.6 37.1 35.7 
Next 4 11.1 8.8 9.1 12.5 19.2 18.6 
Next 5 16.7 7.5 8.9 16.0 14.2 14.4 
Next 10 5.3 5.2 5.2 11.8 11.2 11.3 
Next 20 4.3 3.7 3.8 5.4 9.3 8.8 
Bottom 60 3.8 4.1 4.1 6.2 5.9 6.0 
Sources: The linked population and land database. 
 
If we consider the households who successfully sustained their top position in the land 
holding strata, the concentration of official families is much greater.  In both the 
metropolitan and rural bannermen, 75 percent of the households (3 of the 4 metropolitan 
households, and 7 of the 9 rural households) who sustained their position at the top 1 
percent in nazu land possession were related to official families.  Of the three 
metropolitan banner households, two had members serving as tax preceptor and clerk and 
one’s household head was an assistant zong tunda.  Of the seven rural banner households, 
three had official titles of platoon commander (fangyu), vanguard, and tax preceptor; two 
had members working as clerks; and two had members serving as soldiers.   
At the same time, although the use of political achievement to accumulate wealth was 
a common practice, not all families with power were able to translate it into material gain.  
Despite the opportunity provided by political achievement in land accumulation, there was 
still tremendous stratification in landed wealth among official families.  As table 8.8 
reveals, some official families were still located at a lower stratum in nazu land possession.  
In 1870, official families accounted for 4.1 percent of the bottom 60 percent of households, 
and in 1889, the percentage of official families in the bottom 60 percent was 6.  In addition, 
in 1870, 3.8 percent and, in 1889, 8.8 percent of the households in the third to fourth deciles 
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were official families.  This phenomenon indicates that some official families either were 
not interested in accumulating land or else were not very good at it.  Moreover, there was 
no positive association between official ranks and their wealth status.  For example, the 
majority of the households who sustained their top 1 percent status in nazu possession were 
not high-ranking official families but rather middle and lower level official and soldier 
families.  Mingshan’s case also reveals that despite his low rank as a clerk, his duty regard 
to land allocation rendered greater power in wealth accumulation.  Therefore, in private 
land accumulation, what mattered was not official rank per se, but whether the individual 
in the household was associated with political power and wanted to use that power for 
material gain.  
 
Conclusion: state power and individual agency 
The overall picture of land distribution in late nineteenth-century Shuangcheng 
reveals both continuity and change: the state policy succeeded in maintaining 
between-category inequality and within-category equality among the majority of the 
banner population, while continuous land accumulation by bannermen also created an 
upper class and a have-not population that transcended state-designed population 
categories.  More than fifty years after the establishment of the state farm, metropolitan 
and rural bannermen still possessed the majority of registered farmland.  Every household 
had a share of land, and eventually, land was equally distributed among metropolitan and 
rural bannermen respectively.  The landless proportion of the metropolitan and rural 
banner population was still small, and can be accounted for by disability and the absence of 
capable laborers.  The inequality between metropolitan and rural bannermen continued in 
the majority of the population; in the distribution of landed wealth, rural bannermen, 
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overall, occupied a lower stratum than did metropolitan bannermen.   
At the same time, however, the rise of an upper class in land ownership illuminates 
individual agency.  In the 1870s, an upper class did exist in Shuangcheng; the top decile of 
households occupied 30.9 percent of the farmland registered by metropolitan and rural 
bannermen (figure 8.2).  Most members of the upper class sustained their wealth status for 
two or more generations.  This upper class is mainly a product of the constant interaction 
between individual behaviors of land acquisition and state policy.  Beginning in the 1840s, 
official permission to open nazu land allowed a rapid growth of this upper class.  In 
particular, highly capable rural bannermen benefited from owning nazu land and were able 
to rise to the top stratum in land possession.   
The development of the upper class also transcended state-designed categorical 
inequality.  While the state had attempted to establish metropolitan bannermen as the 
upper class, by the 1870s, the state land grant was only able to situate them at the middle 
strata in land distribution; 55.2 percent of metropolitan households with only one plot of 
jichan land were located in the fourth to fifth deciles.  While the state had designed the 
rural bannermen as the disadvantaged segment of the banner population, 9 percent of rural 
households were able to rise to the top decile and thus enter the upper class.  Therefore, 
despite state policy that effectively determined the economic status of the majority, some 
exceptional families were able to transcend their assigned role through the cultivation of 
nazu land and land acquisition by various other means. 
Moreover, capable rural banner households were increasingly able to bridge official 
between-category inequality through the acquisition of nazu land in the closing decades of 
the nineteenth century.  The data reveal that the proportion of rural banner households in 
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the top decile of households in nazu land ownership increased from 1870 to 1889 (figure 
8.5), demonstrating that more rural banner households surpassed metropolitan banner 
households and moved into the upper class in the later period.  In this process, political 
achievement especially facilitated upward mobility in wealth status for rural bannermen, 
demonstrated by the finding that the proportion of official rural banner families in the top 
decile of households in nazu land ownership in 1889 was significantly higher than that in 
1870 (table 8.8).  
Yet, despite the existence of individual mobility beyond state control, the capacity for 
individual agency was still largely derived from state power.  Political achievement in the 
form of official and soldier titles, as well as family size, constituted important capitals for 
families’ land accumulation.  Official families accounted for a considerable proportion of 
the upper class and were able to sustain their wealth status.  Political achievement served 
as a capital not only in the form of official salaries, which provided families stable income 
and greater purchase power, but also in the form that families used their political power to 
acquire land.  This finding is in accordance with the observation that, in China, political 
power constitutes a major source of inequality.  
While the land distribution reveals the overall success of stat policy, in the following 
chapter, I reveal that the existence of the different social strata and the concomitant labor 
relations between the four population categories –metropolitan, rural, floating bannermen, 
and civilian commoners—quickly assumed social meanings. The land allocation assigned 
different social meanings to these population categories.  Through the one-hundred-year 
history of Shuangcheng state farm, the tension between these social groups had been 
entangling with local politics and transcended individual and even polities.  
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Chapter IX    
Social Formation and Conflict  
 
In December 1912, one year after the fall of the Qing, a rent resistance movement 
swept the 120 Shuangcheng villages, dividing the villagers into two groups: rural 
bannermen in the 80 villages of the right and left tun, and metropolitan and rural 
bannermen in the 40 villages of the central tun.  Rural bannermen in the right and left tun, 
who farmed part of the land allocated to the bannermen in the central tun, refused to pay 
rent for these plots.  Having failed to collect rents, the central-tun residents struggled with 
the residents of the right and left tun, both at the level of the local village and at the 
provincial government level.  In the villages, the central-tun residents rode their wagons to 
the right and left tun, one after another, and pressed their tenants for rent; when refused, 
they sometimes initiated fights.  Simultaneously, at the seat of the provincial government, 
the representatives of the central-tun residents sued the representatives of the right and left 
tun for organizing this collective action. 
To fight against the charges by the central-tun residents, the bannermen of the right 
and left tun filed a lawsuit of their own, suing the central-tun residents for bringing a false 
charge against them.  In their petition, these rural bannermen targeted the metropolitan 
bannermen and expressed their chronic grievances: 
“The residents in the new tun [the right and left tun] were restricted by the 
residents of the old tun [the central tun] for no reason.  Metropolitan 
bannermen enjoyed the profits of the sula [refers to rural bannermen in the 
context of Shuangcheng].  We were not willing to have this special suffering.  
Yet in the Qing [the state] gave special treatment to metropolitan bannermen.  
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Although we sula in the new tun suffered from [this inequality] like ulcers 
deeply rooted in our bones, nobody had sympathy for us.  We thus had to let 
them manipulate us.”1 
    “[In the Qing,] not only was the Shuangcheng government the government 
for metropolitan bannermen, but everything under heaven (tianxia) was also for 
metropolitan bannermen.  How can [we] little people fight against the 
powerful?  We were overshadowed by the power of the metropolitan 
bannermen, controlled and rode roughshod over by them like masters and 
servants.  We had hidden our grievances for more than ninety years.”2 
 
This conflict revealed two pairs of competitive social groups: metropolitan bannermen 
versus rural bannermen, and bannermen residing in the central tun versus those residing in 
the right and left tun.  Both pairs were products of the Qing land allocation policy.  The 
state intentionally created the first pair, whereas the subordination of bannermen in the 
right and left tun to the central-tun bannermen was not a deliberate consequence of state 
policy, but rather a consequence of the spatial patterns of settlement and land allocation.  
The residents in the right and left tun became tenant farmers for those in the central tun 
because part of the land the state allocated to the residents of the central tun was located in 
the right and left tun and was originally cleared by their residents.  This arrangement 
therefore resulted in a hierarchical landlord-tenant relationship between the residents of the 
central and those of the right and left tun.  Moreover, the coincidental fact that all 
metropolitan bannermen had settled in the central tun blurred the distinction between the 
metropolitan-rural rivalry and the rivalry between central-tun residents and right- and 
left-tun residents.  After the collapse of the Qing, the authority that had maintained the 
land allocation policy and produced the social distinctions in question, 
previously-suppressed tensions between these groups found vehement expression in the 
                                                        
1 See the report of the representative of the right and left tun to the county government on 1912.12.29. 
(MGSCXGSDA, item no. 270).  
2 See the petition to the Shuangcheng county government by the representatives of the right and left tun on 
1913.3.9.  (MGSCXGSDA, item no. 270). 
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rent resistance movement. 
In this chapter, I revisit the state allocation of jichan land in the 1820s to examine the 
social meanings of land distribution.  I especially focus on how tensions formed within the 
landlord-tenant relationship between metropolitan and rural bannermen, and between 
residents of the central tun and those of the right and left tun.  In the first part of this 
chapter, I analyze the basic unequal relationships among the four population categories 
created by the initial allocation of land in the early 1820s.  In the second part, I explore the 
1829 adjustment of the land allocation policy that created an unequal landlord-tenant 
relationship between residents of the central and those of the right and left tun.  The 
unequal relationships formed in the early period of land allocation persisted throughout the 
entire history of the Shuangcheng state farm and even influenced local politics.  Moreover, 
by analyzing the discrepancies between bannermen’s land holding status and their income, 
I demonstrate that, in Shuangcheng, it was not income but land ownership that defined 
social groups.  Therefore, the cold numbers in the official land registers were in fact 
closely tied both to local politics and to the happiness and sorrow of Shuangcheng 
residents. 
 
Categorical inequality and tension 
In Shuangcheng, the categorical inequalities enforced by state land allocation policy 
constituted the basic tensions between residents.  The most prominent inequality in 
Shuangcheng was that between the haves—metropolitan and rural bannermen—and the 
have-nots –floating bannermen and civilian commoners.  Floating bannermen and civilian 
commoners had no access to jichan land until 1906, when the state officially allowed it to 
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be freely transacted.  In addition to controlling jichan land, metropolitan and rural 
bannermen also occupied the majority of nazu land.  Nonetheless, the haves themselves 
were riven by tension and inequality, as metropolitan bannermen had more land than did 
rural bannermen.  
However, the same state institution that produced unequal population categories also 
successfully maintained the local social order, precluding the eruption of the above 
tensions.  By creating population categories, the state clearly differentiated the rights and 
obligations of Shuangcheng residents and thus circumscribed their expectations of 
entitlement.  Resistance to the inequalities created by state categories was thus considered 
a violation of state regulation.  Knowing their limits, members of different population 
categories usually chose to remain within the boundaries of these categories.   
Therefore, in Shuangcheng, the most visible conflicts originated not from the most 
prominent inequalities but from the places where the boundaries were most porous.  For 
example, although the inequality between bannermen and civilian commoners was 
prominent, civilian commoners seldom confronted metropolitan and rural bannermen as a 
group.  Conflict between civilian commoners and bannermen was averted mainly because 
state policies totally excluded civilian commoners from stipends and land grants.  In 
contrast, conflicts between the various banner categories were more evident, as all 
belonged to the national elite and boundaries between these categories were more fluid.  
Thus, in this part, I mainly analyze the tensions emerging from the unequal landlord-tenant 
relationship between different categories of bannermen.      
 
Floating bannermen versus metropolitan and rural bannermen 
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In Shuangcheng, because floating bannermen occupied an awkward status as both 
national elite and local non-elite, the conflict between the haves and have-nots mainly 
occurred between metropolitan and rural bannermen on one side and floating bannermen 
on the other.  On the one hand, floating bannermen were excluded from the allocation of 
state land and could farm only as the tenants of metropolitan and rural bannermen.  The 
wealth status of floating bannermen was even lower than that of the civilian commoners, as 
they were not even allowed to officially register nazu land.  On the other hand, the state 
still considered floating bannermen members of the banner population.  As I document in 
chapter five, the state not only paid attention to their registration, but also tried to explore 
employment opportunities for them, granting them local government posts and 
government student titles and directing them to newly-developed settlements.  Banner 
membership therefore offered floating bannermen opportunities to improve their 
underprivileged wealth status and compete with metropolitan and rural bannermen.  
The porous boundary between floating bannermen and rural bannermen provided 
floating bannermen a chance to change their status.  Since many floating bannermen were 
from the same descent group as rural bannermen, they could officially become rural 
bannermen through adoption.  For example, the case of Née Wu’s adoption of her 
husband’s nephew, Dong Hai, in 1882, which I document in chapter seven, illustrates how 
the wife of a deceased rural bannerman adopted a relative, himself a floating bannerman, to 
avoid the extinction of her household.  By joining Née Wu’s family, Dong Hai 
successfully changed his category from floating bannerman to rural bannerman.  These 
opportunities not only allowed floating bannermen some chance of upward mobility but 
also motivated them to strive for it.   
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In the process of acquiring landed property, the interests of floating bannermen 
inevitably conflicted with those of metropolitan and rural bannermen.  Metropolitan and 
rural bannermen often used the official regulation prohibiting floating bannermen from 
registering land (fuding buzhun lingdi) to defend their privileges.  For example, in the 
dispute between Qingxi and Zhao Shiyu over the land left by the deceased Jing’ebu, which 
I document in chapter seven, Zhao Shiyu, as the village head (tunda), used this regulation 
to prevent Qingxi’s cousin, the floating bannerman Chenghe, from inheriting his uncle’s 
land, even though Chenghe had been managing the land.3  Interestingly, as more and more 
land disputes erupted between floating bannermen and metropolitan and rural bannermen, 
it was not the government but the metropolitan and rural bannermen who most frequently 
cited the official regulation to prevent floating bannermen from owning land.   
The case of Wulintai in 1879 illustrates an official conflict between metropolitan and 
rural bannermen as haves and floating bannermen as have-nots.4  In that year, Wulintai, 
whose family had already achieved a decent occupational status in the banner government, 
petitioned for state permission to open and register two unused plots located outside the 
banner villages and to pay rent for them.  Although Wulintai only requested nazu land, his 
action marked the historical momentum of efforts by floating bannermen to officially 
obtain land in the state farm.  When handling this case, the banner government did not 
simply reject Wulintai’s request by pointing out that, as a floating bannerman, he could not 
own land.  Instead, the state sent personnel to investigate the two plots on-site, checking to 
determine whether they were indeed arable and unclaimed.  For a time, Wulintai seemed 
to have a good chance of promoting both his own wealth status and that of floating 
                                                        
3 SCPZGYMDA, reel 200, vol. 829, pp. 69-74. 
4 SCPZGYMDA, reel 203, vol. 841, p. 294; reel 204, vol. 846, pp. 246-254. 
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bannermen in general. 
However, both metropolitan and rural bannermen opposed Wulintai’s request.  After 
the on-site investigation, the banner officials found that both plots had been used by 
metropolitan and rural bannermen in adjacent villages as public land.  While one plot, 
more than 50 shang (92 hectares) in size, was located in the north border of the central tun, 
the other plot, 120 shang (220.8 hectares) in size, was located in the east border of the left 
tun.  Bannermen in adjacent villages had used both plots as grazing land and burying 
grounds.  Therefore, Wulintai’s request for these plots conflicted with the interests of the 
haves.  The metropolitan and rural bannermen of the three villages closest to these two 
plots, one in the central tun and two in the left tun, thus filed a joint petition to defend their 
public land, stating that opening the two plots would interfere with their livelihoods.  
After reviewing all the reports, the government finally denied Wulintai’s request. 
 
Metropolitan bannermen versus rural bannermen 
Among the haves, tensions existed between metropolitan and rural bannermen.  
Although both population categories enjoyed more privileges than did either floating 
bannermen or civilian commoners, tremendous inequality existed between the two.  As 
early as the settlement stage, the state intended that the rural bannermen would serve the 
metropolitan bannermen as laborers.  In this section, I analyze the distribution of jichan 
land among metropolitan and rural bannermen to illustrate the unequal relationship 
between the two population categories.  Due to the lack of land data in the early years, I 
use the land data from 1876.  By looking only at the distribution of jichan land, I reveal 
the great disparity in wealth status between metropolitan and rural bannermen.  As I will 
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show, in 1876, a half century after the establishment of the state farm, even though some 
rural bannermen managed to accumulate more land, they were still significantly 
disadvantaged in jichan land holding.  Therefore, disparities in status persisted between 
metropolitan and rural bannermen in the state farm. 
The government’s land allocation policies created inequality between metropolitan 
and rural bannermen in the forms of both material wealth and social status.  In terms of 
material wealth, the metropolitan households held twice the land of their rural counterparts.  
As table 9.1 shows, in 1876, 56 years after the initial land allocation, 63.5 percent of the 
2,100 rural households (from 80 villages) whose registers were preserved still held 18.33 
shang (33.7 hectares) of jichan land, the standard size of plots allocated to the rural 
bannermen.5  Of the 697 metropolitan banner households living in the forty villages of the 
central tun, 68.7 percent still held 35 shang (64.4 hectares) of land, the standard size of 
jichan plots allocated to metropolitan bannermen.  These numbers show that the 
government’s land allocation process generated a fundamental and persistent distinction 
between metropolitan and rural households in terms of landed wealth.  Even after a half 
century of land accumulation by some rural bannermen, only the top 25 percent of rural 
banner households had as much jichan land as an average landed metropolitan household.  
This distinction in jichan land holding determined the categorical inequality between the 
majority of the metropolitan and rural banner populations. 
 
                                                        
5 In 1829, the government increased the size of the jichan plots allocated to banner immigrants, granting 
18.33 shang to rural banner households and 35 shang to metropolitan banner households. 
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Table 9. 1 Distribution of jichan land among metropolitan and rural banner households, 
1876. 
Land size   Rural banner households   
Metropolitan banner 
households 
In shang In hectares   N. Percent 
Mean 
size   N. Percent 
Mean 
size 
0 0  256 12.2 7  144 20.7 3 
18.33 33.7  1333 63.5 9  0 0.0  
35 64.4  0 0.0   479 68.7 4 
36.66 67.5  332 15.8 10  0 0.0  
55-90 93.8-165.6  160 7.6 11  47 6.7 5 
90.1-120 165.7-220.9  14 0.7 9  23 3.3 5 
120.1-185 221-340  5 0.2 14  4 0.6 6 
          
Total     2100 100.0     697 100.0    
Sources: the linked population and land database. 
 
 
Taking household size into consideration, the inequality in per capita land holding 
between metropolitan and rural banner households was even greater.  As table 9.2 shows, 
although an average landed rural household had only half the land of an average 
metropolitan household, it had twice as many members.  A comparison of per capita land 
holding between the two population categories further reveals this unequal land 
distribution.  In 1876, the minimum amount of land held by a landed rural bannerman was 
0.3 shang (0.55 hectares), while the minimum held by a landed metropolitan bannerman 
was 2.3 shang (4.23 hectares), seven times the minimum among rural bannermen.  Table 
9.2 demonstrates that the median per capita land holding among rural bannermen fell 
between one and two shang, which was less than the minimum holding among landed 
metropolitan bannermen.  Furthermore, while the median per capita holding among 
metropolitan bannermen fell between 5.1 and 8 shang, only 9.67 percent of rural 
bannermen held that much land or more.  In other words, only the top 10 percent of rural 
bannermen had as much land as an average metropolitan bannerman. 
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Table 9. 2 Household per capita jichan land holdings of metropolitan and rural 
bannermen, 1876. 
Rural bannermen Metropolitan bannermen
Size in hectare 
Size in 
shang N. of persons Percent
N. of 
persons Percent
0.2-1.8 0.1-1 3,073 17.99  0 0.00 
1.9-3.7 1.1-2 5,625 32.93  0 0.00 
3.8-5.5 2.1-3 3,304 19.34  79 3.44 
5.6-7.4 3.1-4 2,002 11.72  136 5.92 
7.5-9.2 4.1-5 1,234 7.22  393 17.10 
9.3-13.2 5.1-8 1,150 6.73  656 28.55 
13.3-18.4 8.1-10 305 1.79  332 14.45 
18.5-27.6 10.1-15 227 1.33  310 13.49 
27.7-36.8 15.1-20 128 0.75  213 9.27 
36.9-55.2 20.1-30 16 0.09  83 3.61 
55.3-92.0 30.1-50 13 0.08  86 3.74 
92.0+ 50.1+ 4 0.02  10 0.44 
   
Total 17,081 100.00 2,298 100.00 
Sources: the linked population and land database. 
The land allocated to metropolitan bannermen allowed them living standards far 
superior to those experienced by rural bannermen.  Although the land allocated to rural 
bannermen yielded enough produce to feed their families in the 1820s, metropolitan 
households could enjoy a greater surplus with more land.  According to the official reports, 
in the 1820s, the grain yield of one shang of land was 8 to 9 market shi (2,566 to 2,887 
kilograms) in good years, 6 market shi (1,925 kilograms) in middle years, and 4 to 5 market 
shi (1,283 to 1,604 kilograms) in bad years.6  In average years, a rural household with 10 
shang of cultivated land would therefore produce 60 market shi (19,250 kilograms) of 
grain, equal to 150 imperial shi.  With 150 imperial shi of grain, a rural bannerman could 
                                                        
6 See HCZDLZ, book 3, p.14b, the report of Wang Lütai to the assistant commandant of Shuangcheng on 
1821.8.4 (SCPTTJL, p.165), and the memorial of Jing’ebu on 1844.5.7 (HCDXTGZY, juan. 31, book 14, 
6b).  All these reports on the yields of land agreed with each other.  Here the yield of one shang of land 
referred to grains with husk on.     
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still enjoy a large surplus after feeding his family.  Since rural households in the 1820s had 
an average of six members, including adults and children,7 an average rural household 
could live well with the output from this ten-shang jichan plot.  Metropolitan bannermen, 
with twice as much land and half the number of dependents, could thus have lived much 
better. 
This unbalanced land-labor ratio between metropolitan and rural bannermen gave rise 
to labor-hiring and sharecropping among banner immigrants.  Some members of the rural 
banner population worked not only as hired laborers but also as sharecroppers.  As soon as 
metropolitan bannermen arrived in Shuangcheng, the government urged them to use their 
travel stipends to hire rural bannermen as laborers.  Many metropolitan bannermen also 
personally rented their land to rural bannermen, depending on that rent for their livelihoods.  
This land rental benefitted both metropolitan and rural bannermen; not only did 
metropolitan bannermen acquire a stable rent income, but rural bannermen with large 
families also found ways to generate income and thus to prosper.  According to Jing’ebu, 
in the early years, rural bannermen would pay 0.5 shi (160.4 kilograms) of grain in rent for 
each shang of land.8  Metropolitan bannermen who rented out their full twenty shang of 
jichan land could thus collect 10 market shi (3,208 kilograms) of grain.  This stable rent 
income ensured a decent living for metropolitan bannermen inexperienced in farming; as 
Jing’ebu pointed out, in the 1840s, metropolitan bannermen who rented all their land out 
lived better lives than those who did not.  At the same time, the rural tenants enjoyed a 
                                                        
7 Because the lack of population data in the 1820s, I have to use data from the 1870s to project household 
size back to the 1820s.  From the information provided in table 5.2, the mean rural banner household size 
in 1876 was nine.  In the 42 years from 1870 to 1912, the rural banner population increased 62.7 percent.  
If the rural population experienced a constant growth rate from the 1820s on, given the fact that the number 
of households did not change thoughout the history of the state farm, then the average rural banner 
household size was approximately six, including adults and children. 
8 See Jing’ebu’s memorial on 1844.5.7 HCDXTGZY, juan. 31, book 14, 6b. 
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decent gain from the produce of the land they rented.  In an average year, if the yield of 
one shang of land reached 6 shi (1,925 kilograms) of grain, a rural tenant could keep 5.5 shi 
(1,764 kilograms).  Even after taking into consideration of the cost of farming, this 
income was high.    
However, although some rural bannermen enjoyed economic gains by farming as 
tenants, the landlord-tenant relationship between metropolitan and rural banner households 
reinforced the inequality of the two population categories.  Being landlords gave 
metropolitan bannermen both symbolic and real power over their rural tenants.  As 
Jing’ebu described in 1844,  
    “Some metropolitan bannermen treated their tenants like slaves, 
commanding them and shouting loudly to them.  Moreover these metropolitan 
bannermen also asked for loans from their tenants.  Having been refused, they 
would then deprive their tenants of land and look for somebody else to rent the 
land.”9 
 
The above quotation reveals that, even though some rural bannermen were economically 
more prosperous than their metropolitan landlords, metropolitan bannermen held the 
superior position in the social hierarchy, having acquired greater power through the state 
allocation of jichan land and the institution of population categories. 
Metropolitan bannermen were also privileged in their exemption from service to the 
government.  Although the state did not levy regular labor service from metropolitan and 
rural bannermen, when labor was needed for construction, the government turned to 
Shuangcheng bannermen.  In 1866, the government extracted money and labor from 
residents to rebuild the city wall at the Shuangcheng seat.  While the government targeted 
all of Shuangcheng for money, it ordered only rural bannermen and civilian commoners in 
                                                        
9 Ibid, 7a. 
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Shuangcheng to work as laborers.10  Rural banner adult males building the city wall not 
only had to work as laborers but also had to prepare their own food and tools.  Households 
without adult males had to hire laborers to provide their service.  In return, the 
government gave these laborers limited stipends.  As the government annually found parts 
of the city wall damaged, it extracted labor from rural banner households on a regular basis.  
This labor service lasted for several years, but metropolitan bannermen were spared.   
This special government treatment generated discontent among rural bannermen, 
especially those who lived alongside metropolitan bannermen in the villages of the central 
tun.  In 1871, Guan Shengde, head of one of these 40 villages, filed a petition to the 
general of Jilin, asking for exemption from labor service on the city wall.11  In this petition, 
Guan had allied himself with several other rural bannermen to collectively represent all 
rural bannermen in the 120 villages.  They expressed grievance for having suffered this 
labor service and for the differentiated treatment:  
“While [we] had already finished building the city wall, it was not 
expected that [parts of the city wall] collapse every year and have to be repaired 
annually.  Except the adult males in the Plain Yellow and the Bordered Yellow 
banners [refer to metropolitan bannermen] who had never been asked for 
service, we, the adult males in the other six banners [refer to rural bannermen], 
had to repair the city wall at our own costs.  [Moreover], it was set up as the 
rule forever.”12 
 
Therefore, the state’s unequal treatment of metropolitan and rural bannermen penetrated 
every aspect of state farm life, constantly reminding members of the two categories of their 
distinctive social status.  Through these everyday interactions, social boundaries 
gradually formed between these state-created categories. 
 
                                                        





In 1829, the state reduced the quota of designated metropolitan banner households 
from 3,000 to 1,000 and allocated the jichan land prepared for the additional 2,000 
metropolitan households to the existing metropolitan and rural bannermen in Shuangcheng, 
adding 15 shang (27.6 hectares) to each metropolitan household and 8.33 shang (15.33 
hectares) to each rural households.13  While the first phase of land allocation created 
inequality between the two state-defined categories of metropolitan and rural bannermen, 
the policy adjustment in 1829 resulted in the differentiation of these two populations by 
residential space: the residents of the central tun versus those of the right and left tun.  
Although the state did not design this spatial inequality, it was nonetheless produced by the 
government’s land allocation policy.  Reinforced by the existing inequality between 
metropolitan and rural bannermen, the categorical spatial inequality generated a major 
conflict among state farm residents.  This conflict intensified over the ninety years 
following the policy adjustment, exploding in the 1912 rent resistance movement and 
subsequent political struggles. 
 
Policy adjustment in 1829 
In 1829, when allocating the additional land to metropolitan and rural bannermen of 
the central tun, the officials soon confronted a spatial constraint.  In the original land 
allocation, the government had planned that each of the three tun would have an equal 
amount of jichan land: –30,000 shang (55,200 hectares)—to accommodate 1,000 rural 
households and 1,000 metropolitan households.  Since the government finally decided to 
                                                        
13 For details of this policy adjustment, see chapter four. 
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settle all metropolitan bannermen in the central tun, the adjustment of the relocation quota 
would result in only 1,000 rural banner households in each of the right and left tun, with 
1,000 rural banner households and 1,000 metropolitan banner households in the central tun.  
This plan, however, left no extra jichan land in the central tun for the additional allocation 
to its residents.  In contrast, the right and left tun would each have 11,670 shang (21,472.8 
hectares) of extra land. 
To solve this spatial constraint, the government allocated the extra land farmed by 
rural bannermen of the right and left tun to the residents of the central tun.  The 
government decreed that each household in the right and left tun could take 18.33 shang of 
the 30-shang plot it farmed as its own property.  It would then have to give the remaining 
11.67 shang (21.5 hectares) to one metropolitan and one rural household in the central tun, 
7.5 shang (13.8 hectares) to the metropolitan household and 4.17 shang (7.7 hectares) to 
the rural household.  In this way, the 11.67 shang of land relinquished by two households 
in the right and left tun comprised the additional jichan land allocated to one metropolitan 
(15 shang) and one rural household (8.33 shang) in the central tun.14  The 1876 land 
register of the Bordered White banner, which administered twenty villages in the left tun, 
illustrated the composition of the jichan land farmed by bannermen of the right and left tun.  
As table 9.3 illustrates, in 1876, rural bannermen of twenty of the forty villages of the left 
tun farmed 499 plots of land, of which 228 were partially taken by residents of the central 
tun and 271 were not yet allocated to central-tun residents.  The 30 shang of each of the 
228 divided plots of land were split into three parts: 18.33 shang belonged to the rural 
banner farmers themselves, 7.5 shang belonged to metropolitan bannermen, and 4.17 
                                                        
14 See the investigation and report of the Shuangcheng government in 1912.  The report recounted the 
history of the adjustment of the land allocation policy (MGSCXGSDA, item no. 270). 
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shang belonged to rural bannermen of the Plain White banner, which administered twenty 
villages of the central tun.  The 30 shang of each of the 271 not-yet divided plots were 
split into two parts: an 18.33 shang plot as the rural banner farmer’s individual property 
and a 11.67 shang plot that rural banner farmers rented from the state, waiting for its future 
allocation to central-tun residents. 
 
Table 9. 3 Composition of jichan land farmed by rural bannermen under the Bordered 
White banner (20 villages in the left tun), 1876. 
Amount not owned as jichan 
Types N. of plot 
Size of 
jichan 
(shang) Owned by 
metropolitan 
bannermen 
Owned by rural 
bannermen in 









taken by the 
central-tun 
residents 228 18.33 7.5 4.17 -- 30 
Plots not yet 
taken 271 18.33 -- -- 11.67 30 
Total 499         30 
Source: the 1876 land register of the Bordered White banner, SCPGBTDHKDM, reel 1834731, vol. 659. 
 
 
This policy adjustment turned rural bannermen of the right and the left tun into the 
sharecroppers of central-tun metropolitan and rural bannermen.  The distance between the 
central tun and the right and left tun made it impossible for the residents of the central tun 
to manage their “enclaves.”  The state therefore stipulated that the original farmers of 
these plots should continue to farm the land and pay rent in kind to the central-tun residents.  
The rent was originally set to 0.5 shi (160.4 kilograms) of a mix of millet, sorghum, and 
beans for each shang.  In 1853, when the residents of the central tun complained that the 
income from the allocated land was not sufficient to support their families, the government 
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increased the rent to 0.8 shi (256.6 kilograms) of grain for each shang.  In addition, the 
residents of the right and left tun were also responsible for transporting the rent to their 
landlords’ homes in the central tun.  If they chose not to transport the rent themselves, they 
would pay an additional 0.2 shi of grain for each shang to subsidize the cost of 
transportation.15  The rural bannermen of the right and left tun were therefore 
institutionally subordinate to the metropolitan and rural bannermen of the central tun. 
Despite the unequal landlord-tenant relationship between the residents of the central 
tun and those of the right and left tun, by farming part of the land allocated to the residents 
of the central tun, or even by renting this land out, rural bannermen in the right and the left 
tun in fact could have earned more income than their landlords.  In 1912, when 
investigating the rent resistance movement, the local officials estimated the income of 
these bannermen according to the informants’ reports.  If a rural bannerman of the right or 
left tun rented the full 11.67 shang of land allocated to central-tun residents out to private 
tenants, he could collect a rent of 2.2 or 2.3 shi (705.7 or 737.8 kilograms) of grain for each 
shang.16  He would then only need to hand 0.8 shi of grain for each shang of land to his 
landlords in the central tun, and could keep 64 percent of the rent income for himself.  As 
table 9.4 illustrates, in this scenario, a metropolitan household would control 20 shang of 
jichan land in the central tun plus 12 shi (3,849 kilograms) of grain collected as rent on its 
15 shang of “enclave” in the right or left tun.  The income of rural bannermen of the right 
and left tun could even compete with that of the metropolitan bannermen; each household 
in the right and left tun not only controlled 18.33 shang of jichan land, but also had a 
potential rent income of 16.34 shi (5,241.1 kilograms) of grain.  The rural bannermen of 
                                                        
15 SCPZGYMDA, reel 209, vol. 870, pp.289-298; reel 209, vol. 873, pp. 113-121. 
16 MGSCXGSDA, item no. 270. 
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the central tun, however, were the most disadvantaged; their households controlled only 10 
shang of jichan land plus 6.66 shi (2,136.2 kilograms) of grain collected from their 
8.33-shang “enclaves.”  
 
Table 9. 4 Comparison of household landed property and estimated incomes from jichan 
land after the policy adjustment. 
Central-tun residents 
  
Right and  
left-tun 
residents 





bannermen   
Rural 
bannermen 
Size of jichan land under control 
(shang) 20 10   18.33 
Size (shang) 15 8.33  11.67 
Rent per shang 
(shi/kilogram) 0.8 (256.6) 0.8 (256.6)  1.4 (449.1) Sharecropped 
jichan land  
Total rent income 
(shi/kilogram) 
12       
(3,849.6) 
6.66 
(2,136.5)   
16.34 
(5,241.9) 
Sources: MGSCXGSDA, item no. 270. 
 
 
Tensions between the central tun and the right and left tun 
The tradeoff between social status and material wealth created chronic tensions 
between residents of the central tun and those of the right and left tun.  As the 
Shuangcheng population grew, the control of these “enclaves” became the site of power 
struggles between the two groups.  On the one hand, residents of the central tun were 
always trying to control their land for more material wealth.  In 1853, the central-tun 
residents petitioned the government to withdraw their “enclaves” from the right- and 
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left-tun residents and allow central-tun residents to manage these plots themselves, so as to 
accommodate their increasing population.17  On the other hand, the rural bannermen of the 
right and left tun were also disaffected by the central-tun residents’ exploitation of their 
labor.  As the rural bannermen in the right and left tun expressed in their 1912 accusation:  
“If the land in the new tun [the right and left tun] was indeed opened by 
metropolitan bannermen, we could still negotiate [the ownership transfer].  Yet 
[the land] was exclusively opened by [the residents of] the new tun.  [We] 
worked painstakingly with our labor, but they just seized our product without 
any effort and took it for years.”18 
 
These rural bannermen, who had originally cleared and farmed these plots, felt exploited 
by having to pay rent to the residents of the central tun.  Sharing this mentality, the rural 
bannermen of the right and left tun often used rent resistance to fight against the central-tun 
residents and exhibit their power.  In 1881, the residents of the central tun reported that the 
residents of the “new tun (the right and left tun)” refused to transport the rent to the central 
tun.  Moreover, even when the central-tun residents went to collect their rent, the right and 
left tun residents gave them only chaff and blighted grain.19 
While conflicts between individual landlords and sharecroppers arose from time to 
time,20 these conflicts became more and more organized beginning in the late nineteenth 
century.  In 1881 the residents of the central tun and those of the right and left tun 
confronted each other as distinct groups.  In that year, Zhao Fuxing, a rural bannerman in 
the Plain White banner (which administered twenty village of the central tun), filed a 
lawsuit at the local banner government, suing the rural bannermen of the right and left tun 
                                                        
17 SCPZGYMDA, reel 207, vol. 864, pp. 95-99. 
18 MGSCXGSDA, item no. 270 
19 SCPZGYMDA, reel 209, vol.870, pp.209-215. 
20 In the local government archives, some legal cases concerning rent disputes represent this type of 
conflict.  For example, the rent dispute between the metropolitan bannerman Shouchang and the rural 
bannerman Han Zhaoqing in 1882 (SCPZGYMDA, reel 209, vol.873, pp.113-121.) 
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for not paying sufficient rent to their landlords. 21  Zhao intended to withdraw his land 
from the residents of the “new” tun and manage it himself.  The local banner government 
investigated the chief village heads (zong tunda) from the 80 villages of the right and the 
left tun.  These chief village heads defended their villagers’ interests and denied Zhao’s 
charge.  They also pointed out that since only Zhao alone requested to withdraw land, they 
would not give up their plots.  The government therefore denied Zhao’s request.  
Dissatisfied with the adjudication of the local government, Zhao submitted his petition to 
the provincial government in 1882.  This time Zhao clearly stated that he was representing 
all metropolitan and rural bannermen of the central tun.  In addition to himself, Zhao had 
also found five co-signers – three metropolitan bannermen and two rural bannermen – from 
the forty villages of the central tun.  The right- and left- tun representatives consisted of 
four chief village heads.  All these representatives attended the hearing at the provincial 
government. 
The banner government, however, preferred to maintain the status quo.  In 1853, 
when the residents of the central tun first requested to withdraw their land, the government 
mitigated the conflict by increasing the rent by 60 percent from 0.5 shi to 0.8 shi.  
Although the solution of the 1882 case is not preserved in the archives, the continuous 
development of this spatial tension shows that the state did not change its policy; the 
central-tun residents remained landlords, and the right- and left- tun residents remained 
sharecroppers.  When rent disputes arose between the two parties, the government always 
tried to treat them as individual cases.  The government’s mentality can be illustrated by 
the adjudication of a 1902 lawsuit, in which a group of rural bannermen of the right and left 
tun tried to have the government deny the central-tun residents’ ownership of their 
                                                        
21 SCPZGYMDA, reel 209, vol. 870, pp. 209-215 and pp.289-298. 
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enclaves.  The government refused this petition, stating, “(you) are the extreme examples 
of those who were not benevolent and righteous.  Those who pay rent are tenants, and 
those who live on rent are landlords.”22  
While the central-tun residents struggled to control their allocated plots, the right- and 
left-tun residents tried to abolish the central-tun residents’ power over these plots.  At the 
turn of the twentieth century, the right- and left-tun residents seized on an opportunity to 
overturn their landlords.  In 1902, in order to increase revenue, the state decided to collect 
rent on all banner land in Northeast China, including the allocated jichan land.23  In order 
to collect this rent, the state first issued a deed to every land owner, noting the size of the 
plot and its boundaries.  The rural bannermen of the new tun therefore petitioned at the 
provincial government to eliminate their rent to the central-tun residents and have the 
deeds to those plots issued to the actual rural banner farmers of the right and left tun.  
Moreover, in 1909, Guangzhi,24 a clerk (bitieshi) who resided in the Bordered Blue banner, 
(which administered twenty villages of the right tun), even offered 200,000 strings of 
copper coins in donation if the state agreed to this request.25   
Having been refused by the provincial government, Zhao Rongchun,26 a banner 
                                                        
22 See the accusation of the central-tun representatives (MGSCXGSDA, item no. 207). 
23 SCPZGYMDA, reel 268, vol. 1195, pp.1-18. 
24 About Guangzhi’s background information, see the accusation of the central-tun residents in 1912 and 
the population registers (MGSCXGSDA, item no. 207).  In their accusation, the residents said in 1909 that 
Guangzhi was a candidate for the post of Assistant Secretary (fujingli).  While there were four people 
named Guangzhi in the population registers, only one had banner post.  The population register indicates 
that Guangzhi was a student of the government school and later worked as a clerk in the banner 
government.   
25 See MGSCXGSDA, item no. 207.  In  recounting the case of Guangzhi, the document did not explain 
the source of the 200,000 strings of copper coins.  Yet another account of this case said that Guangzhi 
offered to contribute all the rent belonging to the central-tun residents to the government.  Therefore, the 
200,000 strings of copper coins are probably the monetary form of the rent the right- and the left-tun 
residents owed to the central-tun residents.  
26 The population register indicates that Zhao Rongchun was a local person of the Bordered White banner.  
He was registered under the fourth village of the second jiala and was a nephew of the household head.  
He also held a government student title. 
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lieutenant of the Bordered White banner (which administered twenty villages of the left 
tun), colluded with the officials in the other three banners in the new tun to not record in the 
land registers the boundaries of the “enclaves” of the central-tun residents.  As a local of 
the Bordered White banner, Zhao used his political power to defend the economic interests 
of his own social group.  This resistance significantly hindered the issuing of land deeds to 
the central-tun residents; by 1912, the central-tun residents still had not received the deeds 
to their plots in the right and left tun.27 
 
The culmination of conflicts 
In 1911, the political transition after the fall of the Qing provided an opportunity for 
the right- and left-tun residents to alter the unequal relationship between themselves and 
the central-tun residents.  As the Qing dynasty fell under a series of rebellions and 
revolutions, a republican government was established.  On the one hand, the republican 
government preserved the local order under the Qing; the banner government, with the new 
title Office of Banner Affairs (qiwu chengban chu), continued to administer the banner 
villages.  On the other hand, the new government also pushed through political reforms 
initiated at the end of Qing, encouraging local self-governance and establishing local 
councils.  This change provided bannermen with not only an alternative power structure 
but also new concepts of citizenship and equal rights.   
In 1912, catalyzed by these political changes, the repressed grievances of the two 
groups finally led to the collective rent resistance movement described at the beginning of 
this chapter.  The local elites of the right and left tun soon rose to organize rural 
                                                        
27 See the accusation of the central-tun representatives (MGSCXGSDA, item no. 207). 
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bannermen to request ownership of the land they farmed.  In the autumn, as the time for 
rent collection approached, Zhao Rongchun and Wu Chengzhu, a tax preceptor (lingcui) of 
the Bordered White banner, circulated a leaflet door to door among the residents of the 
eighty villages of the right and left tun, asking them not to pay rent to the central-tun 
residents.  Zhao Rongchun assured these bannermen that he would serve as their 
representative to the provincial government and successfully negotiate their land 
ownership.  These organizers not only staffed the banner government, but were also active 
in the local self-governance movement under the new republican regime.  For example, in 
1912, Wu Chengzhu was also in charge of the Office of Election Affairs of Dong’an, the 
seat of the left tun,28 and had been elected a member of the council in Dong’an Township.  
This background assured the rural bannermen from the right and left tun of the organizers’ 
ability to negotiate, and convinced the right- and left-tun residents to refuse rent to the 
bannermen from the central tun.   
This event soon resulted in a factional struggle in the banner government between 
officials from the central tun and those from the right and left tun.  The central-tun faction 
accused Zhao Rongchun and Wu Chengzhu of cheating the rural bannermen of the right 
and left tun  in order to pursue their own personal material and political interests.29  
Through this struggle, the central-tun faction succeeded in expelling all personnel from the 
right and left tun from the banner government.  The banner government not only removed 
all active officials who originated in the right or left tun from their posts, but also 
permanently denied their right to serve the banner government.  At the same time, at the 
                                                        
28 See MGSCXGSDA, item no. 207. 
29 According to the charges of the central-tun faction, Zhao and Wu asked for monetary donations from the 
rural bannermen of the right and the left tun for representing them to negotiate the land ownership (See 
MGSCXGSDA, item no. 207). 
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provincial government level, eleven central-tun representatives accused the right- and 
left-tun residents of rent resistance.   
Having failed in the banner government, the right- and left-tun representatives tried to 
find a way to succeed under the republican government.  Four rural bannermen 
represented the right and left tun residents to defend their rent resistance action.  These 
representatives submitted a solution to the provincial council, stating that they were willing 
to buy the plots in question from the central-tun residents at the price of 135 strings of 
copper coins for each shang of land.  They embraced the new language of “citizen,” “the 
people,” and “equality” to justify their ownership of the plots: 
“Since now [the polity] has changed to the republic, [all people], regardless 
Manchu and Han, are citizens.  Thus we should have equal rights.” 
“Now it is the republican era, and we all are common bannermen of the 
same kind.  If we still maintain the old social order to give special treatment to 
metropolitan bannermen, having the sula in the new tun pay rent [to them], isn’t 
it a departure from the agreement of equality among the people?  Has not our 
polity changed to republic government?  Yet why they [the central-tun 
residents] still used the old system to defend their benefits, emphasizing their 
status as metropolitan bannermen?”30 
 
By using the new concepts and language, the representatives of the right and left tun 
referred to the new political system to justify their quest for equality. 
Moreover, in their petitions, instead of targeting all residents of the central tun, the 
rural bannermen of the right and left tun attacked only the metropolitan bannermen.  The 
spatial division that had classified the bannermen of the right and left tun as tenants to 
landowners in the central tun was both structured and reinforced by the categorical 
inequality between rural and metropolitan bannermen, as all metropolitan bannermen 
resided in the central tun.  For these representatives, therefore, the categorical inequality 
between metropolitan and rural bannermen was the fundamental inequality created by the 
                                                        
30 See MGSCXGSDA, item no. 207. 
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old system.  The rural bannermen in the right and the left tun tactically highlighted this 
categorical inequality, which was incongruous with the ideals of the new republican 
government, to protest their disadvantaged status and bolster their request for equality. 
Despite the new institutional support, the republican government still failed to find a 
quick solution to this chronic conflict.  At first, in March 1913, the provincial council had 
voted in favor of the proposal of the right- and the left-tun residents, making it mandatory 
that all residents in the central tun surrender their plots in the right and the left tun for the 
price of 135 strings of copper coins per shang.31  This decision, however, received 
vehement opposition from the central-tun residents, whose representatives protested at the 
provincial government.  Since neither of the two representative groups – thirteen 
central-tun residents and eleven right- and left-tun residents – were willing to give up their 
interests, the provincial governor pressed the council to develop a better solution and 
ordered an on-site investigation of the case.  By November 1913, as the time of rent 
collection approached, the conflict remained unsolved.  The provincial government thus 
decided to maintain the status quo, stipulating that, for the year of 1913, the right- and 
left-tun residents should still send rent to the central-tun residents.32  Only in February 
1914 did the provincial government order the central-tun residents to sell their plots to the 
right- and the left-tun residents at half of the value of the land.33 
However, even after the republican government ordered the central-tun residents to 
sell their “enclaves” to residents of the right and left tun, the landlord-tenant relationship 
between the two parties persisted.  In 1938, the local government under the Manchukuo 
regime issued another order, stating that, upon the agreement between the two parties, the 





landlords in the central tun should sell their rights of rent collection to their tenants in the 
right and left tun.34  This later edict indicates that the settlement in 1914 by the republican 
government in fact was not effective, and suggests that the residents of the right and left tun 
probably continued to pay rent to their landlords in the central tun. 
 
Conclusion: land ownership and its social meaning 
While the results of land distribution described in chapter eight reveal the state’s 
success in maintaining categorical equality and inequality, the stories in this chapter 
demonstrate the state’s success in using these categorical distinctions to create social 
groups.  The state was successful not only in that differential entitlements to jichan land 
directed conflicts in the state farm, but also because the state thus successfully confined the 
scale and patterns of conflict; no matter how fierce the struggles or how complicated the 
population groupings, the conflicts never went beyond the frame defined by land allocation.  
The system of differentiated entitlement first defined the hierarchy among the four 
population categories, dividing them into two large groups: floating bannermen and 
civilian commoners, as the have-nots, were marginalized in struggles over land; 
metropolitan and rural bannermen, as the haves, were empowered and were the major 
actors in struggles over land.  This division meant that metropolitan and rural bannermen 
allied to defend their elite status against floating bannermen’s quest for land, but it also 
precipitated struggles between metropolitan and rural bannermen, which comprised a 
major issue in local political and social life.  Therefore, the Shuangcheng society was 
deeply embedded in the state institution of population categories.  
In the process of social formation in Shuangcheng, land ownership per se outweighed 
                                                        
34 See SCXZ (1990) p.145. 
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the income from land in determining social status.  All the conflicts I document in this 
chapter are about the ownership of jichan land, which was independent of income and 
usufruct.  As I illustrate in table 9.4, by farming the land for the central-tun residents, rural 
bannermen of the right and left tun in fact earned more income than their counterparts in 
the central tun, enjoying a standard of living on par with metropolitan bannermen.  
Similarly, rural bannermen who worked as tenants for metropolitan bannermen also had a 
decent income from the land.  Despite this economic picture, unequal entitlement to land 
still created chronic tensions between these population categories and finally turned them 
into distinct social groups.   
This separation of ownership from income illustrates the dual functions of land in 
Chinese history: land as wealth and land as a source of income.  The two functions were 
interrelated but at the same time independent; while the ownership of landed wealth 
marked social status, the rent and produce from the land provided income.  This dual 
function was prominent in many areas in China Proper in the late imperial period and was 
especially well documented in the Jiangnan area.  In Jiangnan, the development of a land 
market in the sixteenth century generated a two-tiered form of landownership that has 
persisted ever since (Huang 1990; Pomeranz 2008).  Land was considered to consist of 
both topsoil and subsoil.  Topsoil rights referred to usufruct, and its ownership was 
relatively stable.  After being separated from topsoil rights, the subsoil rights became an 
artifact of family wealth status and, by the twentieth century, could be traded like stocks 
and bonds (Huang 1990).  The land market in Shuangcheng also separated ownership 
from usufruct.  Land rentals and conditional sales that secured tenants’ usufruct persisted.  
This land market played an important role in providing a decent living for bannermen with 
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large households but less land and for floating bannermen and civilian commoners who 
had no entitlement to jichan land.  The local government allowed this market to develop in 
order to balance the labor-land ratio among Shuangcheng families. 
However, as recent studies of wealth distribution in developed countries reveal, 
wealth is more important than income in determining social inequality (Keister 2000; 
Schneider 2004).  As recent studies on wealth distribution in western countries reveal, a 
substantial portion of concentrated wealth is acquired through inheritance, not through 
income (Schneider 2004).  In 2004, while the top two deciles of households controlled 
84.6 percent of total net wealth, the top two deciles of income earners controlled only 58.7 
percent of total income.  Moreover, income and wealth are not necessarily strongly 
correlated.  For example, in the United States, even after including asset income in total 
income, the correlation between wealth and total income in 1983 was only 0.49 (Keister 
2000), suggesting that wealth status could vary greatly within income categories.  
Inequality in wealth distribution was therefore much greater than inequality in income. 
Compared to that in the above mentioned societies, the registered landed wealth in 
Shuangcheng could be even more important in determining social status.  While in every 
society, wealth rendered power, under the institution of population categories in 
Shuangcheng, wealth status was even more strongly associated with power, since the 
entitlement to landed wealth was defined by the state.  In contrast to areas where free land 
transactions were allowed and people could convert their income into wealth by 
purchasing assets, in Shuangcheng, state-defined entitlements confined opportunities to 
increase wealth.  Inequalities in power therefore directed the formation of social groups 
and their collective conflicts over land. 
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The banner immigrants’ demographic behaviors also demonstrate that in 
Shuangcheng population categories and levels of land ownership associated with them 
indicated immigrants’ social status rather than their living standards.  Previous analysis of 
the mortality of metropolitan bannermen from twenty villages of the central tun and rural 
bannermen from twenty villages of the right tun revealed that metropolitan bannermen 
suffered greater mortality risks than did rural bannermen, despite higher levels of 
entitlement to state land (Chen, Campbell, and Lee 2006).  The mortality disadvantage 
experienced by metropolitan bannermen persisted from 1870 to 1890 in all age groups 
except the elderly.  Moreover, even after decades of adaptation, in the period 1891-1912, 
metropolitan banner children and youth still had higher risks of dying than did their rural 
counterparts.  Since mortality is mainly a function of living standards and lifestyle, the 
comparison of mortality rates for metropolitan and rural bannermen indicates that rural 
bannermen’s reduced entitlement to state land did not result in a living standard poor 
enough to affect their mortality.  Instead, it was the metropolitan bannermen’s adherence 
to an urban life style that led to their mortality disadvantages.   
At the same time, the immigrants’ marriage behavior was consistent with the 
hierarchy of population categories (Chen, Campbell, and Lee 2008).  In Shuangcheng, 
daughters of rural bannermen married earlier than did those of metropolitan bannermen.  
Moreover, whereas nearly all women in the rural banner population married, three to five 
percent of the women in the metropolitan banner population appear to have remained 
unmarried into late middle age.  As for males, the metropolitan bannermen had better 
chances to marry than did their rural counterparts; whereas 94 percent of metropolitan 
males were married by age 35, only 88 percent of rural males were married by the same age.  
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The male and female marriage patterns in Shuangcheng were consistent with traditional 
marriage practices in China, where higher social status tended to delay marriage for 
females and improve the chances of marriage for males.35  The fact that population 
categories predict differential marriage patterns in Shuangcheng indicates their correlation 
with social status. 
Above all, state land allocation in Shuangcheng created durable inequalities that 
persisted for more than a century and even transcended polities.  Although landed wealth 
inherently marks the owners’ social status, in Shuangcheng, the state control of these 
resources enlarged this aspect of landed wealth and presented it in an extreme form.  
While landownership in general was associated with both state policy and the market 
economy, the ownership of jichan land was independent of market forces; the 
Shuangcheng immigrants acquired jichan land exclusively through the political processes 
of population categorization and land allocation.  On these politically differentiated 
entitlements, immigrants formed into groups to expand and defend their rights.  Once they 
came into being, these social groups and the subsequent power struggles between them 
persisted across dynastic transitions and changes of political institution.  The 
landlord/tenant relationship between the central-tun and the right- and left-tun residents 
                                                        
35 In China, females have always married universally and early, while males have married later or not at all.  
According to previous studies of Chinese marriage, in the nineteenth century most Chinese females were 
already married by age 20-24.  By age 30-34, virtually no Chinese females remained single.  Contrary to 
the early and universal marriage of women, the scarcity of females and the cost of marrying had prevented 
many men from ever marrying.  Previous studies show that in nineteenth-century China, more than twenty 
percent of males still remained single by age 30.  Even by age 40-45, some 15 percent of males were still 
bachelors (Lee and Wang 1999).  This contrast between male and female marriage patterns is a 
consequence of the scarcity of females in the marriage market caused by sex-selective infanticide and 
restrictions on female remarriage.  It is also related to the traditional practices of bride price and dowry.  
Bride price was pivotal in securing the marriage, whereas dowry was not necessary and was usually only 
provided by rich families.  Therefore, hypergamy is a typical pattern for female marriage; lower status 
women married early because the marriage brought their family bride price, whereas higher status women 
married late because their families had to pay dowry and, at the same time, the pool of prospective grooms 
was circumscribed by the women’s high social status (Lee and Wang 1999). 
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was sustained through the different regimes, from Qing to republic and then to Manchukuo.  
Although the republican government tried to solve this chronic tension, its social roots 
were just too strong to shake.  Even in the Manchukuo period, despite the appearance of 
another government order on the settlement of this conflict, whether it was effectively 
carried out remained unclear.  The Qing state policy in land allocation therefore generated 




 Chapter X   Epilogue: Wealth, Power, and Category 
 
Throughout the world, the distribution of wealth is highly unequal.  In 2000, 85.1 
percent of the global wealth was concentrated in the hands of 10 percent of the world’s 
households, and about 60 percent of households had nearly nothing (Davies et al. 2006).  
Even in the most egalitarian Western nations, the top 10 percent of households possess 
more than half of total national wealth.  In the United States in 2001, for example, the top 
10 percent of households accounted for 69.8 percent of total wealth, while the top 10 
percent of households in the United Kingdom in 2000 and in Sweden in 2002 accounted for 
56 and 58.6 percent of all wealth respectively.  In contrast, the share of households with 
zero wealth was 40 percent in the United States and the United Kingdom and 60 percent in 
Sweden (Davies et al. 2006).  
In many Western countries in the past, the distribution of wealth, especially landed 
wealth, was even more skewed.  For example, in England and Wales in the late eighteenth 
century, the top 1 percent of households possessed 43.6 percent of marketable net worth, 
and the top 5 percent of individuals possessed 84.6 percent (Schneider 2004).  As late as 
the 1920s, the top 10 percent households in Sweden possessed 91 percent of total wealth.  
Inequality, in other words, is present almost everywhere, is persistent across time, and at 
the individual level is largely inherited (Schneider 2004).   
The relatively equal wealth distribution found in China today and in Shuangcheng 
historically is therefore a major exception to global trends.  In present day rural China, the 
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top 10 percent of individuals possessed 26.2 percent of total wealth in 1995 and 30.5 
percent in 2002 while the proportions of have-not individuals accounted for less than 10 
percent of total population (Li and Zhao 2007).  Similarly in 1876 Shuangcheng, the top 
10 percent of metropolitan and rural banner households occupied 30.9 percent of the 
banner land, and only 9.7 percent of households had no land. Land distribution was still 
relatively egalitarian, even when we take into consideration floating bannermen and 
civilian commoners who were systematically discriminated against.   
Shuangcheng, as I documented in Chapters 1 and 2, was typical of many communities 
in late imperial Chinese history or for that matter imperial and even pre-imperial Chinese 
history as a whole.  It is typical because the use of population categories to maintain 
between-category inequality and within-category equality was a characteristic practice of 
the Chinese state.  And it is typical because the distribution of wealth within categories 
was consistently egalitarian.  Thus, the Chinese state has a long tradition of intervening in 
the livelihoods of its subject population through the allocation of resources.  Although the 
state’s ability to control resources waxed and waned along with its power, whenever and 
wherever the state was powerful enough, an equal distribution of wealth was the norm.  
Therefore, Shuangcheng exemplifies the tradition of Chinese state seeking to maintain an 
egalitarian distribution of wealth.   
The relatively equal distribution of land in Shuangcheng illustrates the state’s success 
at allocating wealth and power equitably through a command economy.  Under this 
command economy, the state was the only source of power.  Through land allocation, the 
state empowered the haves and, at the same time, prevented the concentration of wealth 
and power.  State land allocation divided the Shuangcheng populations into two different 
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levels according to their power; the rural and especially the metropolitan bannermen were 
at the top; the floating bannermen and civilian commoners only had very limited rights to 
land and thereby were at the bottom.  At the same time, by enforcing the equal distribution 
of land within each population category, the state prevented the concentration of wealth 
and thus power.  Indeed, by ignoring most previous lineage and kinship organizations in 
recruiting emigrants from Beijing, Liaoning, and Jilin, the state prevented the formation of 
any possible competing power structures in Shuangcheng immigrant society.  This unique 
institutional arrangement in Shuangcheng guaranteed the state remained the only source of 
organizational authority and political legitimacy. 
At the same time, the rise of the have-a-lots and have-nots in the metropolitan and 
rural bannermen marked the interplay of state power and individual agency.  Although the 
state farm system represented an extreme example of command economy, like elsewhere 
in China proper, the state institutions still left space for local practices.  In Shuangcheng, 
ironically, the absence of strong local social organizations (e.g. lineage) left individual 
households greater space to practice their agency.  In this context, despite the state 
prohibition of land transaction, the land market still played a partial role in wealth 
stratification.  On one hand, some capable or lucky households that were large or had an 
affiliation with the government managed to empower themselves by land accumulation.  
Through individual behaviors of land acquisition and transaction, metropolitan and, from 
the mid-nineteenth century on, rural bannermen were able to overcome the power structure 
established by the state policy and became have-a-lots.  On the other hand, some 
incapable or unlucky households became have-nots either because demographic adversity 
led to the extinction of their household, or they were unable to manage land.  This 
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interaction between state power and individual agency therefore constituted the major 
force in a stratified but not concentrated pattern of land distribution. 
Moreover, even when the drastic political changes in the early twentieth century 
eliminated the institutional constraints of banner system, many key characteristics of late 
imperial economic stratification continued.  In 1905, in order to cope with the fiscal crisis 
incurred by the indemnity for the Boxer Rebellion, the Qing started to collect rent on jichan 
land in Shuangcheng.1  To facilitate the rent collection, the state acknowledged the prior 
private transactions both within the bannermen and between the bannermen and civilian 
commoners, issuing ownership certificates to the de facto landowners.2  In 1906, the state 
finally allowed unrestricted land transactions between bannermen and civilian 
commoners.3  This move marked the eventual transformation of landownership from the 
                                                        
1 The state made the decision in 1902 to open all land in Shuangcheng to private owners.  See the 
twenty-eight rules made by the General Bureau of Tax Counting and Land Opening (qingfu fanghuang 
zongju) on 1902.7.15 (SCPZGYMDA, reel 268, vol. 1195, pp. 1-18).  To do so the state not only 
encouraged the claim of unopened land but also started to collect rent on the allocated banner land.  After 
three year’s preparation and transition, the government finally collected rent on jichan land in 1905.  See 
SCPZGYMDA, reel 275, vol. 1237, pp.35-39. 
2  See the twenty-eight rules made by the General Bureau of Tax Counting and Land Opening on 
1902.7.15 (SCPZGYMDA, reel 268, vol. 1195, pp. 1-18). “This time, all banner land is subject to rent 
collection.  Thus, all the land which has been sold to civilian commoners should be identified and granted 
a certificate.”(12). In this movement, the state worked hard to decide the de facto land owner.  The 
government not only issued certificates to those whose land transaction was complete, but also tried to 
identify the owners of conditional sale.  The government finally decided that once a conditional sale had 
been established for thirty years and the sale price had been paid off, a conditional sale should be 
considered as a sale. 
3 In 1906, the provincial government issued an order, stipulating that from then on all individuals who 
transacted land, regardless of bannermen and civilian commoners, could obtain a land certificate. See the 
order from the Jilin Provincial Government on 1906.3.27 (SCPZGYMDA, reel 276, vol. 1238, pp. 
225-226).  The contents of this order had three points: first, from then on, the land under each banner 
administration was fixed in size and location. The administering banner had the right and obligations to 
collect rent according to the size of land.  Second, all individuals, bannermen or civilian commoners, were 
able to trade land.  Third, to document the land transaction and manage land, the government only need 
change the individual owner’s information and issue certificate.  There was no need to move the plot from 
the previous owner’s banner administration, if it was the case, to the new owner’s.   This policy change 
intended to reform the previous way of banner land allocation and management, whereby land plots were 
associated with banner households; a Captain’s Office can only collect rent from households under its 
administration.  Therefore, once land transaction occurred across banner administrations, the traded plot 
was moved not only from the previous owner’s name to the new owner’s but also from the banner 
administration of the previous owner’s to that of the new owner’s.  This reform, by allowing the rights of 
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state to private owners; after the elimination of restrictions on transactions, the different 
levels of entitlement to land that were previously attached to state categories eventually 
disappeared.  Five years later, the Qing dynasty fell and a republican government replaced 
the Qing government as the authority.  In 1932, after the Japanese invasion of Northeast 
China, a puppet government of Manchukuo was established in northeast China.  In 1945, 
after the defeat of Japanese invasion, the communist party established a local government 
in Shuangcheng.  
Inequality did increase.  By 1906, when the state first permitted unrestricted land 
transactions, the proportion of landless households among the metropolitan bannermen had 
already increased compared to that in 1876.  As figure 10.1 shows, in the metropolitan 
banner households in 25 villages, the proportion of households without jichan land 
increased from 16 percent in 1876 to 25 percent in 1906.  The demographic composition 
of these landless households, moreover, also suggests that a larger proportion of the 1906 
landless households lost their land due to reasons other than family size.  As table 10.1 
shows, in 1876, 57 percent of the landless households had no adult male, while in 1906 
only 31 percent households had no adult male.  This 9 percent-point increase in landless 
households suggests that since 1876 on, even before its official permission, land 
transactions probably had led to increased inequality in land distribution.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
land to both bannermen and civilian commoners, cleared the boundaries of state population categories and 
facilitated land transaction. 
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Figure 10. 1 Distribution of jichan land in the metropolitan banner households, 1876 and 
1906. 
Sources: The linked population and land database. 
 
 
Table 10. 1 Number of adult males in metropolitan banner households without jichan 
land, 1876 and 1906. 
  1876 1906 
N. of adult male N. of household Percent N. of household Percent
      
0 39 57.35  48 30.97
1 23 33.82  82 52.9
2 4 5.88  21 13.55
3 2 2.94  3 1.94
4    1 0.65
      
Total 68 100 155 100
Sources: The linked population and land database. 
 
 
Inequality continued to increase until the eve of the land reform in 1947.  In that year, 
the top 10 percent of Shuangcheng households occupied 56 percent of the total registered 
farmland, and the top 1 percent households (the large landlords) occupied 18.7 percent of 
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land.4  The proportion of land occupied by the top 1 percent of households increased by 
1.6 times than that in 1876, and that occupied by the top 10 percent of households increased 
by 81 percent.  At the same time more than 65 percent of the households were landless and 
could only work as hired labor.5   
Equality and banner land ownership in general however also persisted.  As figure 
10.1 shows, in 1906, 75 percent of metropolitan banner households still retained jichan 
plots.  The distribution of jichan land within these metropolitan bannermen also became 
even more equal.  In 1926, 20 years after the transformation of land ownership, 
bannermen still occupied most of the registered farmland.  Of the 467,882 shang of 
registered land of the county, 389,181.57 shang belonged to the bannermen, which 
accounted for 83 percent of the total registered farm land.6  The civilian commoners only 
had 66,788.42 shang, which accounted for 14 percent of the total land.  Compared to 1876, 
the percentages of land owned by the bannermen and civilian commoners remained almost 
the same.  Moreover, in 1947, while the proportion of hired laborers county-wide was as 
large as 65 percent, it remained small in previous banner villages.  Based on the land 
reform records for six banner villages, the proportion of hired labor ranged between 5 
percent and 51 percent, and the average proportion of hired laborers for these villages was 
only 19.7 percent.7  Therefore, the majority of the landless households in 1947 were 
relatively recent arrivals, not the descendants of the migrants who came in the first half of 
                                                        
4 See SCXZ (1990), p.155. 
5 See SCXZ (1990), p. 155. 
6 See SCXZ (1990), p.147. 
7 See the registration book of land acreage and population classification of Shuangcheng (tudi mianji 
renkou dengji dengji bu) compiled in 1947.  This registration book was compiled for the purpose of 
recording the results of land reallocation in the land reform.  The registration book is organized by village.  
It registered for each household the name of household head, the class of the household-landlord, rich 
peasant, middle peasant, poor peasant, and hired labor-the household size, and the grade and acreage of 
land allocated.  In my trip to Shuangcheng in 2007, I collected the records of six previous banner villages. 
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the nineteenth century. 
The persistence of the historical pattern in the land distribution in Shuangcheng 
demonstrates the salient legacy of the command economy even after the development of 
market.  The Shuangcheng example, therefore, is an extreme example of a worldwide 
phenomenon; for most of human history, a command economy coexisted with the market 
and played an important role in economic life (Polanyi 1957b; Dalton 1961).  As Karl 
Polanyi pointed out, the market economy, in which a self-regulating market system was the 
controlling force, did not exist before the nineteenth century (1957b, 43).  In all 
pre-industrial countries, a command system, organized either on the principles of 
“reciprocity or redistribution or an integration of the two,” took precedence (Polanyi 1957b, 
1957a).  It was not until the nineteenth century that the wide spread of factory 
industrialism and market organizations in England changed economic relationships 
between people and eventually lead to the rise of a self-regulating market.  Moreover, 
even after the "great transformation" from command to market economy, the tension 
between the growing self-regulated market and the efforts to regulate it persisted.  This 
tension eventually impaired this self-regulating market system and lead to its collapse in 
the 1910s.  Starting in the 1920s, many states reasserted a role in the market and began to 
intervene once more. 
The long history of the command economy suggests that in the past, political power 
was the crucial pre-condition for the accumulation of wealth.  This is true both in China 
and in the rest of the world.  In China, although the land market emerged as early as the 
fifth century B.C., the state continued to intervene in land distribution through either direct 
redistribution or imposition of heavier taxes on large landholders.  Moreover, in most 
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cases in Chinese history, it was not transactions in the market but political privileges that 
led to land concentration. Eventually, the large landlords were people with political power 
and special privileges.  For example, in the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), the land grant 
from the emperors to the imperial lineage and officials with close ties to the emperors 
constituted a major source of land concentration.8  
Similarly, in Western Europe, the application of political power by kings and feudal 
lords resulted in a much higher level of wealth concentration than present day.  For 
example, in the mid-seventeenth-century Scania, Southern Sweden, land was so 
concentrated at the hands of the privileged that 92 percent of the population were tenants 
on crown and noble land (Olsson 2006).  Moreover, the nobilities preserved their 
privileges in land ownership over the course of the transition from feudal to peasant 
economy.  Because of the stratification generated by political privileges, wealth 
distributions were more concentrated in the past than the present.  In Sweden in 1920, the 
top 10 percent of households owned 91 percent of the total wealth, while in 1975, the 
percentage of the total wealth owned by the top 10 percent of households was only 54 
percent (Schneider 2004).  In Great Britain, the percentage of the total wealth owned by 
the top 10 percent of households was 89.1 in 1923 and 71.7 in 1972 (Schneider 2004, 23). 
The historical pattern of wealth distribution in Shuangcheng also persisted because the 
social structure formed under the Qing was preserved by the Republican and Manchukuo 
regimes.  After the fall of the Qing, the Republican regime preserved the banner 
administration in Shuangcheng.  Under the Republican government, the Office of Banner 
                                                        
8 In the Ming dynasty, the imperial lineage occupied a large amount of land.  In 1514, in the Beijing area 
alone, the farm belonged to the imperial lineage summed up to 37,595.46 hectares.  In the latter half of the 
Ming dynasty, the expansion of the imperial lineage farms constituted a major form of land concentration.  
In 1393, the Ming state had 8,507,623 hectares of registered taxable farmland.  In 1502, the amount of 
registered taxable farmland reduced to 4,228, 518 hectares.  The 4,279,105 hectares of missing land were 
occupied by imperial lineage members and powerful officials (Lai 1957). 
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Affairs (qiwu bangongshi) was established specifically to administer the banner population.  
Previous land owners in Shuangcheng continued to own their land.  This stable social 
structure enabled smooth intergenerational wealth transmission.    The landed class 
formed under the Qing therefore enjoyed a stable political environment to pass down their 
wealth. 
In addition, the banner ownership in Shuangcheng endured the influx of free 
immigrants because the relatively equal land distribution under the Qing created class 
stability.  Since the late nineteenth century, Shuangcheng witnessed a constant 
immigration of Han-Chinese to the Northeast China.  The volume of immigration 
significantly increased in the early twentieth century and changed the ethnic and social 
compositions of the population.  In many regions of China proper, this social change led 
to bannermen’s loss of landownership.9  The bannermen in Shuangcheng, however, 
resisted this competitive social force brought by the new immigrants because of their large 
population size.  In the first 90 years in Shuangcheng history, the state power successfully 
maintained a relatively equal distribution of land.  This relatively equal land ownership in 
turn created a large size of landed class and stabilized them as a group.  At the beginning 
of the twentieth century, the landed bannermen accounted for about 60 percent of the 
Shuangcheng population.  The substantive size of the landed class therefore constituted a 
social force that was strong enough to resist social change. 
Therefore, as the Shuangcheng story illustrated, state categories interacted with 
wealth and power to form the social structure.  In this process, wealth acted as an 
                                                        
9 The bannermen’s loss of banner land to civilian commoners has been a chronic problem ever since the 
eighteenth century.  Even the Qing officials had surmised that prior to the state’s acceptance of free land 
transaction, the civilian commoners had occupied substantive banner land in Northeast China 
(SCPZGYMDA, reel 268, vol. 1195, pp. 1-18).   
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especially important channel for the tranmission of power and thereby explained the 
durable inequality between the have and have-not categories.  The fact that many 
state-created population categories disappeared when the political regimes they depended 
on fell demonstrates that political power alone can not maintain durable inequality.  By 
contrast, inequality supported by unequal distribution of wealth is more durable.  The 
historical pattern of wealth distribution persisted in Shuangcheng because the metropolitan 
and rural bannermen, by transforming their privileges under the Qing into landed wealth, 
achieved a durable power.  Through intergenerational transmission of wealth, the power 
relationship formed under the Qing persisted.  This durable power of the haves withstood 
the republican revolution and the enormous society change incurred by migration into 
Northeast China.  Only until the 1947 Land Reform, when the communist state initiated a 
truly social revolution and used coercion to equally redistribute wealth, did the privileges 
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1815 Jichan 90,000.0 165,600.0  
1820 Hengchan 6,220.3 11,445.4  
1820 Suique 6,500.0 11,960.0  
1822 Gongzu 5,729.0 10,541.4  
1845 Baqianshang 8,753.1 16,105.7  
1853 Ziken 42,502.3 78,204.3  
1856 Maohuang 7,817.9 14,384.9  
1862 Sanwanshang 24,766.0 45,569.4  
1862 
Hengchan 
jiajie 8,394.5 15,445.9  
1867 
Hengchan 
fuduo 2,255.8 4,150.7  
1871 
Hengchan 
fuduo 610.8 1,123.9  
1880 
Hengchan 
fuduo 899.2 1,654.6  
1881 Fuduo di 19,528.8 35,933.0  
1883 Fuduo di 1,495.2 2,751.2  
   
Total   225,473.0 414,870.2  
Sources: The 1876 land registers of banner and civilian divisions.  SCPGBTDHKDM, reel 1834696, vol. 
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